

GHAZALI SHAFIE'S
MEMOIR
on the Formation
of
Malaysia



Ghazali Shafie

S i r i M e m o i r
U n i v e r s i t i K e b a n g s a a n M a l a y s i a

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ISTANA NEGARA
KUALA LUMPUR

PREFACE

BY HIS MAJESTY THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG AND THE
CHANCELLOR OF UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA

While serving as the Deputy High Commissioner for Malaya in London, I was concerned with the negotiations with the British Government and had followed closely the developments with interest. We commend this narration of a subject of national interest based on first-hand involvement which should serve well as a primary source of reference for historical studies. Tan Sri Ghazali is to be congratulated for his painstaking personal observations and insight of the circumstances and background of the formation of Malaysia.

TUANKU JA'AFAR IBNI ALMARHUM TUANKU ABDUL RAHMAN
DK(NS), DKMN, DMN, DKMB(BRUNEI), DK(KELANTAN),
DK(KEDAH), DK(SELANGOR), DK(PERLIS), DK(JOHOR),
DK(PAHANG), DK(TRENGGANU), DK(PERAK),

YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG X

Written at Istana Negara
Kuala Lumpur on 15th November 1996

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Many books and articles have been written on the subject of the formation of Malaysia. Some have their own meanings and interpretations of events which took place. What I have written is not a scholarly treatise but a narrative of events in which I was either present or directly involved.

I decided to put down in writing after I had thought that well after thirty years these matters should be narrated as I saw them; I felt I owe it to future generations. I had not kept a journal or diary but I had jotted down a few notes of some occasions which helped me to refresh my memory of what took place and what I thought of them then. Therefore, my opinions of those events should be read with the backdrop of that time. For instance, the story as to why Brunei did not join Malaysia has been given several versions, and in this narrative I have given mine.

This book, I hope, will provide those students of history and diplomacy something of interest or value. To the events and occasions mentioned, I have given no references but they could easily be checked either through official records in the archives of Malaysia or the United Kingdom or from the back copies of newspapers. What I thought I have done in this narration is to highlight the role of the Tunku (Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, the First Prime Minister) who was the main authority of the various policies keeping his cabinet colleagues continuously well-informed particularly his deputy (Tun Abdul Razak) whose advice he never missed to seek. The Tunku was humane, thoughtful, kind and always human. Those attributes of the man were often clearly reflected in the private discussions he had with a number of people in my presence which might not be found in any official documents. This narrative therefore is very much the story of the Tunku and his role in the formation of a country which we Malaysians love dearly. To the Tunku we have reasons to be grateful.

With regard to Tun Abdul Razak all honour and praise must be given to his particular role in steering the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) in fact the body which eventually gave the substance for the independence of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia. He was most tactful and understanding and able to accommodate those thorny questions which bristled during the IGC negotiations. His personal relationship with Lord Landsdowne, the Chairman and representative of the British Government, was superb. However, Tun Abdul Razak never failed to consult the Tunku and his colleagues whenever he was faced with difficult issues. He also had the knack of keeping in confidence the officials working with him well-informed as to the disposition of the Malayan Cabinet in this project. Malaysia, in particular Sarawak and Sabah owe to this illustrious son of the soil a huge debt of gratitude for his

monumental contribution. With regard to Brunei, the failure of the late Sultan of Brunei, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin to be convinced that the constitutional position of His Highness had to be consistent with the position of the other rulers. I know the late Tun Abdul Razak, despite the many words of comfort and encouragement, considered that it was a shortcoming in the whole exercise.

As for me, I rest with the happy thought that I had been extremely lucky to have been tasked by the late Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra and the Malayan Government to actualise what I once regarded as an unreachable dream, liberating millions from vestigial colonialism. Once in a while, history would offer a person the rare opportunity for him to participate directly in charting its course. And the course of history has forcefully brought home to me that "*Bersatu Bertambah Mutu*" (humans united their value enhanced) and political power shared endures.

I am grateful particularly to Dr Wan Hashim Wan Teh of Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu and the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia for encouraging me to put in writing my memoir regarding the formation of Malaysia. I would like to express my gratitude to Mohamed Musa for the proof reading of the text. My thanks are also due to Ms Marjorie Ann Madrigal and Wan Suriani bt. Wan Mahmood for their painstaking work in the typing of the manuscript which I had written in my almost illegible handwriting. I wish to thank my wife Tijah and my two sons Bakhtiar and Sheriffudin M for their support in this project. Above all, my sincer gratitude goes to His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong - Tuanku Jaafar Ibni Al-Marhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman who was once my college mate and colleague in the Malayan Foreign Service for the gracious words in the Foreword of this memoir.

And I dedicate this to all citizens of Malaya and Singapore and to congratulate Sarawak and Sabah and their citizens for having joined in 1963 the Long House that is now called Malaysia.

PART ONE

Genesis



It was while as a student of law at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth that I began to think of a greater union comprising the States of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. I thought the British had succeeded in implementing part of the idea when they proposed the shortlived Malayan Union in 1946 and later agreed to the formation of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. Before that, except for a short period of the Japanese occupations there was no country strictly called Malaya but a territory of nine sultanates as British Protectorates and three Straits Settlements as Crown Colonies.

On February 1, 1948, I was appointed by the State Government of Pahang to read the Federation Proclamation at the *Council Negri* at Pekan marking the end of the Malayan Union, in the presence of the late Sultan Abu Bakar, his future *Menteri Besar* (Chief Minister), the late Dato Mahmud bin Mat and all the members of the State Council, chiefs, dignitaries and community leaders from all corners of the State. I was filled with emotion, realising that I was partaking in a historic and momentous occasion as a young patriot. The Malayan Union found itself in the annals of history and the *Persatuan Melayu Pahang Barat*, of which I was a committee member, had played an active role in the organisation and activities of the Malay political movement that came to be known as UMNO which brought about the birth of the *Persekutuan Tanah Melayu* (Federation of Malaya).

I had become acutely sensitive at that time to the fact that at last I had a country called *Tanah Melayu* or Malaya whereas before I was only a citizen of the state of Pahang. With the formation of the Federation of Malaya, I had become a citizen of Malaya, a much bigger unit than Pahang. During that morning's pompous ceremony, I asked myself if Sultan Abu Bakar was really aware that he had surrendered a great deal of his sovereignty to the central authority which would be held by the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur. I wondered if he realised that in the performance of his duties, except in respect of those matters pertaining to Malay customs and Islam, he had to mandatorily follow the "advice" of a British Advisor. I drew some comfort from the fact that he would have a very able man as *Menteri Besar* in Dato Mahmud bin Mat whom I knew well as a forthright and a disciplined administrator in what was known as the Malayan Civil Service (MCS).

After the Federation Proclamation, I sat in the *Dewan* sweating hot and cold, listening to the speeches. My mind was in turmoil as I began to realise

that this show was not the one I really wanted. But my ultimate desire then seemed an impossible dream. It was the vision of a dream without the British Advisor.

After the group photograph and refreshments, I went back to the Pekan Rest House to change from the formal court dress of Pahang to a comfortable outfit and got into the jeep of the Justice of the Peace of Lipis, the late Ong Siong Teck, who offered to give me a lift back to Kuala Lipis. On the way we did a bit of snipe shooting.

As we drove on the bumpy road to Jerantut, I asked Siong Teck if he thought the Chinese would support the Malays in an endeavour to dislodge all the British advisors from all the states in Malaya. He laughed almost patronisingly which annoyed me somewhat but said, "We Chinese have always been independent. Of course, but we must be given a place." I did not know what he meant nor cared to ask what he meant by "We Chinese" since my mind then would not address itself to such a question as a place for the Chinese who the British would have made them willy-nilly Malaysians under the Malayan Union, a contradiction of their interwar colonial policy. After all they had China which the British had encouraged them to remember as their home during the interwar years.

We did not speak much until we reached Lipis, stopping for a while at the Old Jerantut Rest House where the Hailam cook Ah Heng, who knew my father well, made fine roasts of the snipes.

UMNO was evolving its slogan from "*Hidup Melayu*" (Long live the Malays) to "*Merdeka*" (Freedom) and I could see the British was trying to guide its course using Malcolm MacDonald and Tan Cheng Lock through Dato Onn bin Jaafar, the President of UMNO. I was then serving in Lipis as the Deputy Assistant District Officer, a minor official of the Land Office.

The District Officer was a Mr. Blacker and his assistant, my immediate superior, was Abdul Rahman bin Mat. Through their assistance and my war service record, I managed to get a Federal Government Scholarship to study Law at Aberystwyth, Wales, a far away place with a strange sounding name, a place I never knew existed before.

* * *

On arrival in London, in August 1948, I was met by the Tunku (Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra) and Abdul Razak Dato Hussain (later Tun), who were then finishing their studies for the Bar. A fraternity was established among us to work for the independence of Malaya, now that we had a country known as the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu since February 1948, with powers shared between the British Crown and the Sultanates.

As I mentioned earlier, while reading for an LL.B. degree, my mind had started to address the subject of independence, not just of Malaya. I could not erase the thought that a greater federation involving the 11 States of the Federation with Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo would be

desirable and viable for the benefit of the people. Already, the communists in Asia under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was creating security problems. The best way to face the threat was to eradicate colonialism from the area providing a better leverage in mobilising popular sentiment and support against the China-inspired and China-led communism.

The concept of this "togetherness" became almost an obsession. I could not suggest a name for it but wrote in the paper (*The Straits Times*) of the desirability of a Commonwealth of Southeast Asia and an article regarding the potential supportive role of a combined navy which could play in the waters of Southeast Asia.

After graduation, I returned to Kuala Lumpur as an Assistant State Secretary and Clerk of Council for the State of Selangor. This appointment as Clerk of Council caused some anxiety with my mother who thought I had wasted time and energy to go for a higher education only to end up a clerk! While holding that position, I had helped the Tunku to organise the formation of the Alliance for the first Municipal elections of Kuala Lumpur.

Later, I was sent to Seremban where, for a short while, I acted as the State Secretary. The first thing I did was to put right what I thought was inappropriate. It was the role of the British Advisor in the Executive Council of the State Government. The British Advisor was advisor to the Ruler and in the Exco he was an ordinary member. As I understood it, he was not an advisor to the Ruler in Council. Fortunately for me, the British Advisor then was Mervyn Sheppard (the late Tan Sri Mubin) and he was most understanding and sympathetic; and from him I received a great deal of assistance and guidance in the field of administration and management. The role of the British Advisor was clarified but the effect had been that the Ruler now claimed he was a true sovereign when sitting in Council. However, this was not so with the Ruler of Negri Sembilan who was qualified in Law and experienced in administration. I was privileged to serve him once again when he became the first *Yang di-Pertuan Agong* (Paramount Ruler). He was indeed a great man.

* * *

Since then, I had become too senior in the colonial administrative service, by-passing expatriates, and too political for the likes of the colonial government. I was sent to Oxford University to attend a Devonshire Course which I did not enjoy at all since the approach was partisan. After a short stint, I obtained special permission from the Chief Secretary's Office, Kuala Lumpur, to take a post graduate Certificate in International Studies at the London School of Economics. This was agreed to by the Tunku whom I consulted and we both agreed that someone one day had to organise and run a Foreign Service of an independent Malaya which at that time was still very much a vision.

Although the post graduate studies required a two year endeavour, with the consent of the University authorities, I managed to sit for the final

examination and obtained the Certificate in one year and spent the following year at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the office of the Commissioner for Malaya at Trafalgar Square. At the same time, I managed to attend my dinners at Lincoln's Inn. I was also given some limited access to the various departments at the British Commonwealth and Foreign Offices.

On my return to Kuala Lumpur I found there was no job waiting for me since it would be unthinkable to place a young native in a very senior position. After consulting with the Tunku and Razak, I agreed with the idea that I should live in India for a while.

* * *

In India, I was well taken care of by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Radakrishnan and Krishna Menon besides senior Indian officials like Desai of the Foreign Ministry and some educational leaders. For a few months, my dear old friend Malcolm MacDonald whom I had come to know and admire when he was serving as the British Commissioner in Southeast Asia with an office in Singapore, although he lived in Johore, took me as his house guest. Malcolm had become the British High Commissioner in India. He reinforced my belief in the desirability for a greater federation.

It was from Malcolm that I learnt that the British Colonial office had for a long time, even before the Pacific War, wanted to rationalise its position in Malaya since it was extremely cumbersome to run a territory with so many semi-independent states and configurations in the form of the Federated Malay States, the Unfederated Malay States, the Straits Settlements and the somewhat vague entities, the Borneo territories. Since the Rulers and the British Crown had treaty relations and not a relationship based on one of conqueror-vanquished as upheld by the British judiciary, the sovereignty of each Sultan had never diminished. This had been proven in the cases of *Mighell v. The Sultan of Johore* (1894), *Duff Development Corporation v. Kelantan* and *Pahang Consolidated Coy. Ltd. v. State of Pahang* (1935). There was nothing the British could do without the consent of the Rulers.

To create a single political entity by making a constitutional adjustment in the form of the Malayan Union, the MacMichael initiative was manoeuvred during the Pacific War and at a time when the Malay Peninsula was still run by the British Military Administration (BMA) during which the Sultans could be intimidated for alleged collaboration with the Japanese. The exercise was undertaken by MacMichael to press for "voluntary" cessation to the British in order to bring the whole nine states into a single jurisdiction confirming the Rulers' sovereignty a myth.

With the Malayan Union backwashed by history, it soon became apparent to me that the British had succeeded, through the Federation of Malaya Agreement to actualise the desire of the Colonial Office to integrate the Sultanates with the two Straits Settlements into a single political entity - the Federation of Malaya, in a government headed by a British High Commis-

sioner and a Chief Secretary in whom the true power rested. But that also augmented my own convictions that it would be possible to bring in the areas under the Colonial Office, namely, Singapore, Sarawak, British North Borneo and Brunei in an association as a new federation with the member states of the Federation of Malaya.

Through various conversations with Malcolm, I gathered that the British could be persuaded to integrate Singapore and the Borneo territories but the format, as Malcolm saw it, was a federation of the existing Federation of Malaya together with Singapore, and the Federation of British Borneo comprising Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak. The new Federation would be composed of the three units.

It was here that there was a difference of opinion between Malcolm and me because I thought that there should be one Federation comprising all the states. It would be difficult if the Federation of Malaya was on equal footing with the Federation of the Borneo States or Singapore in a larger Federation. It did not occur to me then that Malcolm was reflecting the thinking of the Colonial Office which he personally favoured. All these came out later when the Cobbold Commission, of which I was a member, was drafting its report.

Despite the views expressed by Malcolm, I was convinced that the British, after having given up the Indian subcontinent, were anxious to divest their colonial responsibilities - but were unable to find the right formula that would best protect British interests and also be acceptable to the British public. It was that conviction which encouraged and inspired me to think that it would be possible to offer a formula of a Federation of States as an independent entity. I was also certain that in the context of a time-frame, it would be possible to seek the agreement of the British to surrender jurisdiction to a Federation as a package to include the Borneo territories and Singapore.

Kuala Lumpur bid me to return after about seven months in New Delhi where I spent a lot of time at the British High Commission observing diplomacy at work between Great Britain and part of her former Empire, India. I was also given the opportunity to observe from the Indian side whose diplomatic officers at that time gave me the impression of being among the best in world. I also took note of their experiences in the management of affairs with a former raj. At the same time, I endeavoured to study the various development problems and societal engineering that was taking place in the context of Nehru's socialistic pattern of society. I toured the whole of India by car from New Delhi to Calcutta, then to Madras, cutting across to Bombay via Bangalore and then back to New Delhi after visiting the Elora and Ajanta caves and Agra and Fatehpursikri, testimonies of the cultural greatness of the sub-continent.

* * *

Back home in Kuala Lumpur, the fever for Merdeka was warming up. The Tunku had been in the forefront fighting for Merdeka as well as against the

Communist insurrection. There was precious little I could do in Kuala Lumpur because, as part of the plan, I was to remain in the civil service while the Tunku and Razak openly led the political movement. All of us involved in the nationalist movement were fully aware that the politicians would need the wholehearted, integrated and synchronised support of the civil service. In my particular case, I was to concentrate my attention on the Foreign Service and Foreign Affairs in addition to Defence and Internal Security.

The Tunku, his deputy, Abdul Razak and I thought that it would be best to have a few officials taken from the civil service trained as diplomats and then set up offices in selected countries with the approval of the British Government. Legally speaking, these establishments would be under the jurisdiction of the British diplomatic establishments. I was to go back to New Delhi and head a Commission there while a Commission was established in Karachi and another in Canberra. Later, an office was also established in Jakarta. All those host governments were most supportive of the "Merdeka" movement. There was already a Commissioner in London.

While I was in New Delhi, the Tunku sent a message that as he was on his way to Karachi by ship which would call at Bombay, he wished to see me. In fact, he was on his way to London bringing with him the Alliance delegation. Also with him was the Rulers delegation representing the Malay rulers for the final negotiations with the British Government for the Malayan Merdeka.

I met the delegations in Bombay and arranged with the Governor, then Mr. Desai, that they would meet with him. Desai was most helpful and encouraging. As Bombay was a dry state, I was able to obtain a certificate for the members of the delegations to be exempted from the dry law and who wished to have a swig!

The Tunku told me that the ship ride was his idea to encourage the Rulers delegation to meet with the political delegation. On board, between Singapore and Bombay, both sides had ironed out their differences and decided on strategies as to how they would face the British together.

It must be remembered that the Malay Sultanates were independent entities subject to their respective protectorate agreements. The legal and constitutional situation was that the British could only return the powers given by the protectorate agreements to the Sultans. It was now the task of an elected Alliance group to obtain the agreement of the Rulers as to what powers the people should have. Of course, the Alliance wanted all powers to be divested on the people through a properly constituted Parliament but would agree to retain the Rulers as Constitutional heads, offering the sovereign status with its privileges and immunities. This was the offer that made the Sultans' representatives agree to the independence agreement. If not for this stroke of genius, I cannot imagine the Rulers agreeing to hand over all their powers to the people. These would, like in some countries, have to be wrested from them, which in the Malay context, would then produce a very awkward situation.

I asked the Tunku if he thought of the greater federation. He asked me to be patient because all these things had to have their moment and process. The first important thing was to get independence for the Peninsula and to make sure that the position of the Malays would in no way be disadvantaged in an independent Malaya. He and his political colleagues did not have time to think of other matters.

The Tunku had invited the Rulers delegation, represented by Dato Seth of Johore, Dato Abdul Wahab (Dato' Panglima Bukit Gantang of Perak) and Dato Nik Kamil of Kelantan to take the journey together by boat with the political delegation. I realized that secretariat was served by two nationalist activists, Aziz later Governor of Malacca and Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin who later became the Chief Secretary to the Government, which was of immense satisfaction to me.

The main stickler was the question of the sovereignty of the Rulers. The draft Constitution did not provide for each state the institution of the Ruler-in-Council. Without that the Rulers would no longer have any semblance of sovereignty and therefore would not agree to Merdeka. The Tunku had devised the concept of sovereignty of the Rulers in the Constitution with the institutionalised paraphernalia to the satisfaction of the representatives of the Rulers.

It was Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin who told me how diplomatic the Tunku was in being able to persuade the Rulers' representatives to agree to his viewpoint in all those tricky matters which Rulers thought were important though they appeared trivial to others. Perhaps the Tunku, being a senior prince, made the consensus easier to achieve. Conversely, Merdeka was most important, above all other considerations. Nonetheless, the journey by sea was most advantageous and as the Tunku shook hands with me while bidding farewell on his journey to Karachi, with a twinkle in his eyes he said we might get our Merdeka that year (1957) and then we could think of the other subject of the bigger federation later. From Karachi, the two delegations would fly to London.

After the ship had disappeared into the horizon, I left for New Delhi, where I began to feel a sense of uncertainty about the bigger federation. I wondered if the British would agree to an arrangement according to my formula. Also, how would the people of those territories respond to the issue particularly if the plan should come a decade or two later which would make newcomers feel as if they were mere appendages. Furthermore, I had noticed the designs of Communist China as seen from India and the planned hegemony over the mainland, including Singapore, leaving President Sukarno of Indonesia all the islands that would include the Borneo States.

In my view, it had become extremely urgent to address the question of the bigger federation. Communist China had drawn a line of influence which included some Indian border territories and to the south of Singapore and then to the South China Sea close to Borneo. The only way to thwart the grand

design was for the Malay Peninsula and the Borneo States to be a single political entity. Should that become a reality, Sukarno would be most uncomfortable if the Peninsula fell into China's hegemony since part of his Borneo island would also be included in that hegemony. Sukarno would then not let the Peninsula fall into that scheme of things.

However, I respected the wisdom of the Tunku who was able to persuade the British to grant independence to Malaya if possible by August 31, 1957. The Federation Constitution drawn up with the help of eminent jurists from the United Kingdom, Australia, India and Pakistan provided for new territories to join the Federation. Three days before Merdeka, I was asked by the Tunku to return to Kuala Lumpur and to create the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I accepted the challenge not just because I had the necessary academic training but also for my experiences in London, India and as an attaché to the British delegation at the United Nations. Most of all I accepted because I was given the best opportunity to further develop the idea of the greater federation.

* * *

A few months after Merdeka, Malaya entered into a Treaty of Friendship and Cultural Agreement with Indonesia. An Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was proposed but only supported by Thailand and the Philippines. President Sukarno of Indonesia would not touch ASA with a barge pole since reading between the lines, in the context of the Cold War, he foresaw an Anglo-US plot to subvert the newly independent states of Southeast Asia. After all, both Thailand and the Philippines had very close military alliance with the United States and Malaya was part of the Anglo-Malaya Defence Agreement.

While I was personally disappointed with Sukarno's objection, I understood the logic at that time. It confirmed my suspicion of the grand hegemonic design between Communist China and Sukarno. Communist China had shown impatience and took military action to recover claimed territories in those places in the northern border of India. The Malayan Government under the leadership of the Tunku was the first to condemn Communist China for her intransigencies against India and started a fund. This also convinced the Tunku that the Sino-Sukarno's grand design should be frustrated.

Sukarno was flirting a great deal with his own *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI - the Communist Party of Indonesia) and the Tunku never lost a single opportunity to remind Sukarno and the Indonesian people that the real danger was communism.

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Singapore had General Elections in June 1959. Malayan leaders had sent messages of felicitations to the People's Action Party (PAP) leaders for having

won the elections although they would have favoured Lim Yew Hock's Labour Party to Lee Kuan Yew's PAP. Lim Yew Hock during the heat of the elections campaign accused, rather unjustly I thought, that Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and others were pro-communists or fellow travellers, if not communists. The kindest words at that time was that Lee Kuan Yew was riding a tiger and many remarked that he might not be able to jump off from the tiger's back. Now that the PAP was going to take over the self-government of Singapore, Lim Chin Siong would have to be released soon. This gentleman had been detained by the British but was an important member of the PAP and well-known as "Crimson."

A few days after the elections, before the formation of the new government, the PAP sent to Kuala Lumpur one of their senior members, Kenny Byrne on June 3, 1959. He came to thank the Malayan leaders for the messages of congratulations but basically to assure Malaya that the allegations of Lim Yew Hock were completely untrue. None of those leaders whom the Malayan leaders knew, for example Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye, Goh Kim Swee were communists or fellow travellers.

Kenny Byrne spoke in confidence that Lim Chin Siong and the other PAP detainees would be released the day after the victory rally to avoid any impression that it was not the victory of the PAP but that of the communists. I knew Kenny Byrne well since we were students in the United Kingdom. He was most reassuring that Lee Kuan Yew and his friends would be able to manage the situation since the non-communist leaders knew well the communist tactics and ways. The release of Lim Chin Siong would be necessary for the PAP to show that the Party got into power with clean hands. Byrne told me, no doubt for the ears of the Malayan leaders, that should Lim Chin Siong indulge in subversive activities, the PAP Government would have no hesitation in having him detained. The communist group in Singapore, which was under the control of Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), knew that they were then very weak and would lie low for the time being which would provide the opportunity for the PAP to reorganise itself. The PAP Government would be most anxious to get started with a programme that, in Bryne's words, would gear the people and reorientate their feelings toward a more positive consciousness of a Malayan nation. It was made clear to me during the course of the conversation that the primary aim of the PAP was a merger with the Federation of Malaya. On the question of merger, I was careful to keep my own counsel.

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The subject of merger kept coming up whenever a Singapore Minister met Malayan leaders. I had no doubt that the PAP leaders would have also been nagging the British government on the subject at the same time. On January 13, 1961, Duncan Sandys who was then the British Secretary of State came to

Kuala Lumpur for a visit. Razak and I met him at the airport. As soon as Sandys completed his handshakes, he turned to Razak and said that he wished to discuss the future of Singapore. Razak knew at once what Sandys meant and he jocularly replied that the question of merger could be decided by a game of golf. Whoever lost would keep Singapore!

The Tunku had arranged for Sandys to go with him to Ipoh by air to attend the races there. After that they would travel by car to Cameron Highlands. Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee were also invited to the hill resort for golf. There were a few others including ambassadors and high commissioners.

I travelled by car from Kuala Lumpur to Cameron Highlands with Goh Keng Swee who was fully appreciative of the apprehension that Malayan leaders had over the Singapore merger with Malaya. I told him that Tunku was going to announce an idea on what I thought should be the plan not only for the Singapore merger but also the format for the British Borneo within the context of a new federation. I told Goh Keng Swee that it would be the only way that would be acceptable to the people of Malaya.

Cameron Highlands was bustling with so many important visitors who included golf playing Commonwealth members of the diplomatic corp. On the first evening, a hunting party went into the forest to get venison for *satay* but I was told they came back empty-handed. Nevertheless, there was venison *satay* served the following evening party but the meat must have come from elsewhere although there were a lot of deer tracks on the golf course.

It was like a festive occasion. Indeed it was, since old adversaries who did not speak to each other on other occasions were together hitting the little white balls in the cool air of the highland resort. This was clearly evident between the Indian High Commissioner and the Pakistani High Commissioner although they kept their respective scores a secret.

I did not partake in any discussions but I believe the Tunku, Duncan Sandys, and Lee Kuan Yew had separate meetings in between golf and meals. When the party left the hill resort everyone looked tanned and definitely ebullient. The Tunku was a wonderful host and had made the occasion very enjoyable, friendly and absolutely agreeable.

I had no idea as to what was discussed between the Tunku and Duncan Sandys during the car ride from Ipoh to Cameron Highlands, but I had no doubt the question of merger must have cropped up and the Tunku would also have asked Duncan Sandys as to the future of British Borneo. The Tunku must have explained to the British Secretary of State his misgiving in thinking only about Singapore without the Borneo territories.

Sandys came ostensibly to visit the British troops which were then camped in Malacca under the Anglo-Malaya defence arrangement. I accompanied him to Malacca on January 14. We visited the British military camp which was on an extremely agreeable site overlooking the Straits of Malacca. I told Sandys to look for another name for the camp since it did not seem appropriate to be called Fort George! It had since become Camp Terendak.

At the end of Sandy's visit, no mention was made in the communiqué regarding the merger. The emphasis was the security of Southeast Asia.

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On January 27, 1961, Goh Keng Swee was in Kuala Lumpur and had tea at my house. He expressed confidence of success in the effort of the PAP Government to instil a Malayan consciousness among the Chinese in Singapore. This inevitably led us to discuss the subject of merger in particular the question of representation in a federal parliament. It was truly an academic exercise since a merger of Singapore without the Malaysia Plan would be a non-starter. However, we both agreed that the following subjects should be under the jurisdiction of the central authority - External Affairs, Defence, Internal Security and National Development. We also thought that education would be a difficult subject since Singapore had its peculiar problem but at some later date the matter could be the subject of a special policy of the central government.

By the end of April, 1961 the situation in Laos had changed drastically. The Pathet Lao had come quite close to Luang Prabang. Communist China was demanding that US aid and personnel assisting the Laotian army under the US-Laos Agreement should be completely withdrawn. It was quite clear that the US would not comply with the demand since the Soviet and Viet Minh were actively supporting the Pathet Lao.

The US had been approaching Britain, India and other powers to get Soviet Union and Communist China to be more restrained in their involvement. The US was then contemplating taking the matter up to the Security Council of the United Nations, even with the strong prospect of a veto by the USSR. The Malayan Government was extremely uneasy with the new development and it became clear that Laos, under the control of Pathet Lao, with the help of the Soviet Union and Communist China, would render the Geneva Agreement useless.

It was therefore all the more reason that the idea of a closer arrangement with the Borneo territories, Singapore and the States of the Federation of Malaya should be expedited. This gave me the opportunity to get the Tunku to hasten what later became known as the Malaysia Plan and not simply be obsessed by the fear of Malaya-Singapore merger which had become the hot topic since the PAP came to power.

One of the measures to allay the fears of the Malay leaders in the Peninsula was to get Singapore leaders to be committed to make Malay the national language of Singapore. In the meantime, I continued to suggest to the Tunku that the UMNO in Singapore should form an alliance with the PAP. I sincerely thought then and I expressed it to the Tunku that the PAP in alliance with UMNO could effectively look after the interest of the Malays in Singapore. The Tunku thought the idea was preposterous and indeed impossible since the PAP had declared itself non-communist instead of anti-communist. He thought

it would be extremely unwise to be associated with a non-communist group while UMNO had declared its anti-communist stand. He had a very clear impression at the Baling Talks (December 1955), where he led the Malaya-Singapore delegation meeting with Communist Party of Malaya leaders, that the communists would only take advantage of a group that would allow itself to be subverted by being non-communist. Communist elements could penetrate the non-communist party by not declaring openly their adherence to communism. The Tunku admitted that he was not clever enough to play such a dangerous game as riding a tiger. He would prefer to be transparently anti-communist.

I had started to plant the idea among Singapore PAP leaders that they had to show a biasness towards the Malay language if they wanted the Malay leaders in the Peninsula to accept Singapore for close constitutional relations. To pacify the Singapore Chinese, I had even advocated that all schools in Malaya and Singapore should be nationalised and all primary schools whose medium of instruction would be the Malay language should compulsorily teach English and Mandarin languages and constitutional provision should be made for the opportunity to study any of the languages as a subject at the secondary and tertiary levels. I thought a Malayan with two or three languages would be of great advantage internationally.

At that time the national language campaign with its slogan "*Bahasa Jiwa Bangsa*" (Language is the Soul of the Nation) was intense and so, neither the Tunku nor Razak could accept the merit of my suggestion, despite my argument that the policy, if adopted by the Alliance (UMNO-MCA-MIC), would remove the allegation that English and Mandarin were going to be destroyed in Malaya.

On May 27, 1961 the Tunku in a speech to the Foreign Correspondents Association in Singapore signalled the birth of the concept of Malaysia:

.. sooner or later Malaya should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be brought about, but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic cooperation ...

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The Tunku appointed me as the project officer for the formation of Malaysia. I was to work out the concept and to achieve success the concept had to be acceptable to all parties namely, the Malayan Government and its people, the Conference of Rulers, the British Government and the people of Singapore and the Borneo territories.

I had already done a little homework regarding the various communities in the Borneo territories. There was a great deal of cultural affinities with

those in the Federation and Singapore. As for Singapore, the dialogues I had with the new dynamic leader of the island convinced me that Lee Kuan Yew would wish for a Singapore merger with Malaya first. If that was not possible he was *ad idem* with my idea of the greater federation. At least I knew he would give his support as to the format of the federation if the Borneo people would accept the concept.

Already some contacts had taken place between Kuala Lumpur and the proposed members of the new federation. Kuala Lumpur was represented on the Security Council of Singapore. There was already an exchange of officials. A number of Malayan senior officials had been seconded to Brunei. All these territories had similar systems of civil service and administration; there was a common tradition in the system of law and justice. Even in economic terms there was synergy and cohesion; there was a common currency board and figures then would show economic interdependence.

There was another factor which found favour among the Malayan political leadership to go into the Malaysia venture although this point had not been greatly articulated. Among the Malayan politicians, there were many, particularly Malays, who felt that the natives of the Borneo territories would not get a fair deal in development under a colonial administration. The Malayan Constitution if applied to them would provide a special position for the natives as the Malays in the Federation of Malaya. There was therefore a common cause.

In the case of North Borneo there were already signs that Manila was going to make a cartographic claim based on some vague historical ground. The only way for the people of that territory to achieve their independence was through the Malaysia concept. Whitehall would never do anything very positive for the people and that colonial territory could not be defended by armed means in the post World War II period of anti-colonialism. Such a step would be anachronistic and would invite condemnatory world opinion.

The Communist Clandestine Organisation (CCO) in Sarawak with assistance from abroad had begun to show their fangs and claws. As revealed by Malcolm MacDonald to me in India, the British were thinking of a federation of the Borneo territories. However, the idea had been a non-starter to Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, the Sultan of Brunei, when after a meeting between the Sultan and the two governors of British Borneo in 1953 in Kuching, His Highness openly declared his disapprobation of such an idea. It was not clear then why the Sultan objected to the idea. The speculation then was that he would find it more comfortable in the company of his nine brother rulers of Malaya. It was also surmised that he was aware of the British desire to control oil.

The other point which was considered the more serious was that any federation with Brunei as a member would force Brunei into the process towards democratisation. The British had begun to get the people interested in forming democratic local authorities.

Turnbull, the Governor of North Borneo, in March 1958 after Merdeka in Malaya, took the initiative by getting a resolution passed in the North Borneo Legislative Council that the British Borneo territories should discuss the question of the desirability of a close constitutional link, a form of words to refer to a federation. Again Sultan Sir Omar poured cold water over it. In fact, by that time, Brunei was already planning its own future outside the British design. In 1959, the Sultan promulgated a Constitution which provided for a British High Commissioner to be resident in Brunei. Until then, the British Governor of Sarawak was also the British High Commissioner for Brunei.

These were some of the reasons which made me uneasy if there was a delay in the formation of a greater federation. Immediately after Merdeka, Malaya cultivated Brunei by closer cooperation including seconding senior officers to replace some of the British expatriates. Brunei people were given every encouragement to feel the proximity of relationship with Malaya in particular the Sultan with his brother rulers. In that way the British design of forming a Borneo federation would not be realised.

However, some British officials in the Borneo territories would not allow Malaya to have a free hand in Brunei. The people of Brunei were encouraged to hate the Malayan expatriates there. They helped to arouse the narrow feeling of nationalism and it would not be beyond anyone's imagination to surmise that some maverick British officials and business communities encouraged the Azahari group to eventually create public disorder. When Malayan intelligence shared the information with the British that the Azahari group was receiving military training in Putussibau in the Indonesian Borneo, the British scoffed at it as an extended stretch of Malayan imagination. The British High Commissioner jocularly remarked to me that it was a "boyscout" camp. Hence the Azahari uprising was a complete surprise and later Jakarta when he discovered that what could have been a simple coup indeed became a mission impossible.

While there were many arguments in favour of the greater federation in the format I had in mind, there were many issues which needed close attention if they were not to serve as obstacles.

The Borneo territories had an area of almost 180,000 square miles but the area was discontinuous because of its topography and extremely uneven in its economic and political developments. There was a complexity of ethnic and cultural communities ranging from the very primitive tribes to Malay gentries and Chinese tycoons. In the face of any external threat, there was little capability for defence as the people were never mobilised for training as a defence force to be relied upon.

Following this was the question of demography. Even with the three Borneo territories, the merger of Singapore would make the Malays of the Peninsula out-numbered. This therefore made it imperative that Malaysia had to have the Borneo territories; a single merger with Singapore was a non-starter.

As the project officer for the formation of Malaysia, my first task was to form a Task Force. Zainal Abidin Sulong, a top official in the Ministry of External Affairs, was the head of the force and entrusted to plan and organise actions. Firstly, a format had to be worked out and the support of the people of the Borneo territories and Singapore needed to be included.

Secondly, the British in Whitehall and the British officials in those territories had to eventually share the views as to the format of Malaya. It was anticipated that while Whitehall might have the idea of a closer constitutional arrangement it was not quite clear as to the form it should take. Local colonial expatriate officers too had their vested interests not necessarily selfish but well meaning and idealistic. They had a special feeling for the primitive peoples and the Chinese they had been subjugating.

Thirdly, and no less important than the other two were the sentiments of the people of Malaya, particularly the Malays. After all independence came to them only in 1957 and they continued to harbour a sense of deprivation in economic terms although they might have been satisfied with their political power. The Government other than endeavouring to correct the income differentials had done very little to restructure the society. The Malays felt that the Government was following what the former colonial masters had done for them, like Windstedt, who suggested that the best way to assist the Malays was to make them better farmers and fishermen than their fathers. The Malaysia Plan had to revolutionise all that and had to include the natives of the Borneo territories in one process of restructuring and development. There should be a level playing field for all alike.

The minister responsible for the formation of Malaysia was the Deputy Prime Minister, Dato Abdul Razak bin Hussein. Razak and I had been long standing personal friends since childhood days in Pahang. We had continued our friendship at Raffles College, Singapore, and later in Britain. He and I spent many long hours discussing and seeking consensus as to what should be done. Eventually, it became his responsibility to persuade the Malaysians politically to accept the concept of Malaysia. This he had to share with other leaders in the Alliance, in particular the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), which might misconstrue this plan as a device to deprive the local Chinese particularly those from the MCA from their position of economic dominance by the intrusion of Singapore Chinese. This particular point was inadvertently overlooked and indeed after the formation of Malaysia, Singapore was regarded as unacceptable to the MCA, both politically and economically.

Zainal Abidin Sulong was provided with a task force to organise the "softening" of attitude of the people of the Borneo territories. No particular programme was devised for Brunei since it was known already that the man who held the power – the Sultan was in favour. In Brunei the Sultan's wish was never disputed and there was no sign of any disloyalty then. It was left to the Tunku and Razak to work out an agreeable arrangement with the Sultan. Of course local leaders were not to be neglected and matters had to be clearly

explained as to the intention and the plan in order to help the Sultan to make up his mind.

The neighbours, particularly Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines had to be informed. In the case of the people of Singapore, I had already understood from Lee Kuan Yew that the PAP would fight for the merger. Lee Kuan Yew found himself sandwiched between the British who incorrectly thought of him as potentially dangerous because of his game of brinkmanship with the communists, whereas communist leaders knew him, quite correctly, as a potential enemy. The well-known story of the PAP struggle for merger is extremely relevant as it proved above anything else that the American domino theory was wrong. Singapore, together with Malaya, could defeat communism with the support of the people.

As soon as the Tunku made the historic speech in Singapore, the initial reactions from Singapore and Brunei were positive and there was a mixed reaction from Sarawak and North Borneo. Zainal Abidin Sulong and the task force were in fact at an early stage of their operations. The Indonesian and Philippine reactions were not negative.

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The PAP Government had invited me to attend a national parade in Singapore on June 3, 1961. It was a grand political display of the PAP government whose ministers with their white shirts and white trousers together with the Yang Dipertua Negara (The President), stood resplendently in the blistering hot sun of Singapore demonstrative of their success in finding a place in the sun! The most extraordinary and important aspect of the parade was the participation of Singapore UMNO. It seemed for some reason, the Tunku had passed the message to the Singapore UMNO leaders that he saw no objection to their cooperation with the PAP in such a national celebration. Silently and secretly I was personally pleased.

That night as part of the celebration, a reception was held which I attended. Lee Kuan Yew spent a great deal of time with me and we were the last to leave the reception. As if I was to convey his viewpoint to the Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew told me that Malay should be the national language of both Malaya and Singapore. He, however, regretted that in the Federation the manner of implementing the policy was not good. In Singapore he said he had made it a policy to explain that everybody had to study Malay because without Malay they would not be able to get a job and the study had to be motivated purely through economic necessity. No one was forced to study the Malay language. Eventually, he mentioned Singapore merging with Malaya and indicated that the Tunku was showing positive response and that his statement of May 27 vouched for this.

On my return to Kuala Lumpur, I repeated to the Tunku what I saw and heard. It was on June the fifth. We discussed a great deal the follow-up to his May 27 speech. I shared with him my view that considering the present

sentiments the best approach would be to address the British Government to think seriously of the subject.

None of the Borneo territories then were viable economically with the exception of Brunei which would not join the other two to form a separate federation to achieve independence. If history was allowed to overtake us, the result might be that Brunei would run away to join the Federation of Malaya and the two territories and Singapore would be left to their own devices in which case they would be exposed to Sukarno's and the communist intrigues.

I reminded the Tunku that Singapore must never be allowed to believe that she was being abandoned before she was able to control the communist elements. That would weaken the resolve of the non-communist PAP leaders to oust the communists and pro-communists from the party. Such a situation would only facilitate the communist elements to take over control in Singapore. After the British withdrawal as a result of the impending constitutional review in 1963, Singapore would be a Chinese-based communist country; it would be to Malaya what Cuba was in its relations to the United States. In that situation the only recourse open to Malaya was to clamp the causeway.

By 1963 the PAP leaders and the British Government would have to review the Constitution of Singapore and I could not see any outcome other than an agreement for the independence of Singapore. It would seem to me then that the only way to forestall an independent Singapore under communist control was to assist the PAP non-communist leaders like Lee Kuan Yew into achieving independence within a federation that would include the three Borneo states.

Lee Kuan Yew and his non-communist friends were rather perturbed by the development in Singapore in respect of the formation of the Alliance Party comprising Singapore People's Alliance (SPA), Malayan Chinese Association (Singapore) and UMNO (Singapore) since SPA had been advocating independence for Singapore rather than be part of a federation which in all aspects would be contrary to what the Tunku was promoting. The Tunku told me that the SPA policy was formulated before the Alliance and he would see to it that the Alliance would not espouse the SPA policy, at least not publicly. The Tunku emphasised that Singapore should be part of the Malaysia Plan but must be given special treatment while the Borneo states would enjoy certain safeguards to placate any opposition to the Plan. But all the four states together with the existing states of the Federation should constitute the Federation of Malaysia.

Soon after the formation of the Singapore Alliance, Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee came to Kuala Lumpur and the Tunku entertained them to a Chinese dinner at Istana Tetamu. I was present at the dinner and sure enough Lee Kuan Yew brought up the subject of the new Singapore Alliance and the SPA stand. The Tunku gave him the same assurance as he mentioned to me

previously. I was not sure at that time if Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee were satisfied with the Tunku's assurance.

On the question of the future constitutional association between Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo states which henceforth shall be referred to as the "Malaysia Concept", although at that time the nomenclature had not yet been thought out, it would seem that there was a meeting of minds between the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew on general principles.

The following day, Lee Kuan Yew partnering Goh Keng Swee, played golf at the Selangor Golf Club against me with James O'Sullivan, the deputy head of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, a personal friend of mine and a very accomplished golfer. It was a very friendly and diplomatic game ending in a draw. Lee Kuan Yew took advantage of O'Sullivan's presence by asking him many questions about Indonesia and Sukarno since his last post was Jakarta. It may be mentioned here that Lee Kuan Yew at that time had a very poor opinion of Indonesia and Sukarno.

When I had an opportunity to talk to Lee Kuan Yew alone, I asked him about his view of the "Malaysia Concept" since in drafting the Memorandum to the British Government, it would be helpful if I could get some preliminary thoughts from him. He was most generous by candidly telling me what his concept was. It appeared to him that he had several stages in mind with regard to the process. He thought that the first stage would be to bring in the three territories and Singapore in a kind of a confederation. After that the three territories could be integrated as one of the states of a federation and then ultimately, Singapore. It would be too soon then to bring in the Borneo states as one of the states of a federation with the other states of Malaya. For some reason that was not explained, Lee Kuan Yew appeared to be extremely preoccupied with the view that Sukarno would annex the three Borneo states, particularly if the West Irian problem was resolved. He was extremely alive to the possibility of the communists taking over control of Singapore if she was then abandoned by Malaya.

I told Lee Kuan Yew in the best manner I knew that he should not push too hard his idea of merger or whatever he had in mind regarding the Malaysia concept but should wait for the Tunku to work out the concept. In all candour, I told Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee that there should be more contacts between Singapore and Malayan ministers but that whatever political stance Singapore might wish to adopt they should not overflow across the causeway. Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee should consult the Tunku if they had any uncertainty with regard to the Peninsula and nothing would be gained by an insular or arrogant attitude. Both Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee warmly thanked me for the candid and friendly advice.

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A few days later, while I was working on the draft Memorandum which was to be sent to the British Government, the Tunku told me that he had a chat with

the Sultan of Brunei. I had missed that meeting and did not know that it had taken place at all. It crossed my mind at once that Limbang was discussed and perhaps this was the carrot that made the Sultan want to bring Brunei in. The Tunku requested that I draft a letter to the British Government urging Brunei to join the federation and the Sarawak colonial government to cede that part of Sarawak to Brunei.

I must admit I was most uncomfortable with the suggestion. As part of a grand concept, it was untimely and could be very upsetting to the British as well as the people of Sarawak whose wishes we had no knowledge yet. I informed the Tunku of this and said that we might mention the Sarawak territory in the Memorandum to the British but avoid the suggestion that Brunei join the present federation. If Brunei really wanted to be a part of the present federation then it should be at the initiative of the Sultan to address the British Government. The Tunku thought of this suggestion and agreed that I should not address Brunei but the question of Northern Sarawak being part of Brunei should Brunei be included as part of the "Malaysia Concept". This would be reflected in the Memorandum to be sent to the British Government.

As soon as the draft Memorandum was completed I sent it up to the Tunku. He then addressed a letter to Duncan Sandys dated June 15, 1961.

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In that letter the Tunku said that if the British was favourably disposed to the idea, then a meeting could be convened between the representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom, Sarawak, British North Borneo and Brunei on the one hand and representatives of the Government of Malaya on the other. The Tunku also stipulated that the representatives of the Borneo territories must be persons who could be regarded as capable of speaking on behalf of their territories.

Roughly, the Tunku's letter spelt out the preliminary thoughts regarding the plan to bring in Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo as integral parts of a federation. Singapore would be a special state within that federation with absolute right to determine its own affairs except in matters of defence, external affairs and internal security.

The Tunku urged the British Government to expedite a decision on the matter because it would be best for all concerned as the communists, encouraged by their success in Laos, would be very active in this part of the world. The Tunku also indicated that Lee Kuan Yew had shown interest and had been receptive to the idea while the Sultan of Brunei was enthusiastic and had informed the Tunku that he would not support the formation of an independent Borneo federation composed of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. The Tunku promised the British Government that he would send an outline of the Malaysia Plan in the form of a Memorandum which might serve

as an official communication and the basis for discussion between Her Majesty's Government (HMG) and the Malayan Government.

The Memorandum on the Malaysia idea was submitted to the British Government with the intention of explaining the preliminary concept primarily to convince Her Majesty's Government of the urgent need for the constitutional arrangement.

Perhaps, details of the content of the Memorandum on Malaysia, which I assisted in the drafting by the Malaysia Task Force be mentioned here. The Memorandum pointed out that Britain and Malaya followed identical policy in respect of all dependent territories, which was, that they should attain independence. Malaya regarded the pockets of colonial territories in South-east Asia as vulnerable to external anti-colonial pressures. The immediate concern to Malaya was of course Singapore and the British Borneo territories.

The point was also made to the British that their domination in the region had in fact paved the way for an administrative system supported by a currency arrangement, the interchangeability of civil police, technical and educational services. In the case of Brunei, a number of Malayan civil service officers were being seconded to that government. The Tunku made his personal input to the Memorandum by mentioning that Brunei in Malaysia would have a Sultan and added that Brunei in Malaysia would be given sovereignty over the northern part of Sarawak, which according to the Tunku, had a population mainly of Malays and Dayaks. I had some difficulty over this last point since I thought it was premature to have it included in the Memorandum. In any case, I argued with the Tunku that the matter should be decided by the people in the area concerned. The Tunku was adamant and had his way.

Furthermore, according to the Memorandum, Malaya was represented in the Internal Security Council of Singapore and that the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement had committed Malaya to the defence of the Borneo territories, Singapore and Hong Kong in the event of external aggression.

It was therefore logical for the states of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and the British North Borneo to form close ties based on the following:

- (a) Brunei, Sarawak and British North Borneo be brought into the Federation of Malaya. These territories would enjoy the same rights and privileges as the states that form the Federation of Malaya. Brunei would have the Sultan as its head while Sarawak and North Borneo would be headed by Governors;
- (b) since the Singapore Constitution had to be reviewed in 1963, it would be appropriate to hold preliminary discussions before that date. It was envisaged that Singapore within Malaysia would retain the rights over its internal affairs but defence, internal security, finance, immigration, education and external affairs would fall under the jurisdiction of the Federation Government. Regarding the British bases, with Singapore in

Malaysia they would no longer be at the disposal of SEATO although these bases could be utilised for the defence of the Commonwealth in accordance with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement;

- (c) the existing administrative systems in Singapore and Brunei should be maintained in the future so that officers in the services of these territories would be interchangeable or transferable since for all intent and purpose they belonged to the same service. Singapore would maintain its civil service but would have the right to claim for secondment of officers from or to the Federation Government.

The Memorandum admitted that the main difficulty would be on how to persuade the people of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei to accept the Malaysia Concept. The Memorandum suggested that the delegation representing Her Majesty's Government would include representatives from each of these territories at a meeting between Her Majesty's Government and the Malayan Government.

Singapore did not pose any problem since the people of Singapore could express their will through their elected representatives.

The Memorandum suggested that the meeting of the parties concerned should decide on the appointment of an independent commission to work out the details of such a federation. The Tunku suggested the commission should consist of these members of the commission which drafted the Federation of Malaya Constitution.

Emphasising that the proposed federation would be powerful and viable and would be able to give "greater contribution" in the support of the Commonwealth association, the Memorandum concluded that the Government of the Federation of Malaya considered the merger of these territories should not be a matter for future long term objective. It was emphasised that any delay would lead to many undesirable consequences.

What had moved the Tunku, the UMNO, the Alliance Party and the Malayan Government to make his May '61 statement in Singapore proposing a plan for Singapore, British Borneo territories and states of the Federation of Malaya was their anxiety that the People's Action Party (PAP), the party which was heavily loaded with communist elements, had won the 1959 general elections. There was, in the view of the Malayan leadership, the real possibility for the communists taking control of the PAP and therefore Singapore. The idea of a merger had always been there but the Tunku had chosen to hasten it slowly. With the dangerous situation in Singapore in the face of a constitutional review and the development in Laos, the Malaysia Plan became relevant although British and Singapore leaders thought that a merger of Singapore with the Federation of Malaya would resolve that problem. However, Malayan leadership at that time would not accept just a merger of Singapore with Malaya but a Malaysia Plan would have the support of the people in Malaya with certain conditions. The solution of security for

Malaysia was not hinged mainly on Singapore but in the wider context of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Singapore then was a key factor.

* * *

A few days later the British Government and the Singapore Government had received the Memorandum from the Tunku outlining his thoughts. I went to Singapore on June 27, 1961 having been invited by Lord Selkirk, who was then the British Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia, to meet with him and the Governors of North Borneo (Sir William Goode) and Sarawak (Sir Alexander Waddel) and also the British High Commissioner in Brunei (D.C. White). The office of the Commissioner, first held by Malcolm MacDonald, was to coordinate policies and administration of the British territories in Borneo and Singapore. It was also to prepare the Borneo territories for independence. Naturally, such a question as the "Malaysia Concept" would fall under the purview of the Commissioner-General. Malcolm MacDonald as he told me in India, had been planting the seed of the federation of the Borneo territories. But for the objection raised by the Sultan of Brunei that federation might have been realised perhaps with Singapore as a member of a confederation. Among the many British interests was the role of Singapore in the security arrangement with the United States in respect of Southeast Asia.

Philip Moore, a high ranking British officer stationed in Singapore, was also there. I found Moore extremely amiable and we became friends since then. Meeting started after lunch and lasted until 4.30 p.m. Selkirk opened the discussion by thanking the Tunku for the very clear and frank Memorandum outlining the "Malaysia Concept". He said the three governors and he and indeed the British Government agreed that generally it was a good idea in principle and should be the objective of future endeavours. I knew at once what was coming next. Selkirk said he would like to be candid and that in a matter of such importance the British Government would be willing to carry out any proposal if it was acceptable to all concerned.

Selkirk said that he had the impression that the Malayan Government was not well informed regarding the real situation in British Borneo. He did not know if the Tunku and other ministers or leading Malayan officials had acquainted themselves with the conditions in those territories particularly in the interior. Only twenty years before then, the people there still practised "head hunting" and it would not be difficult for them to revert to such violence if they felt insecure or annoyed. I had to grit my teeth when I heard it.

Up to that moment, the British Government had worked hard to provide law and order and to instil confidence in those people. In those areas there was already an efficient administration providing for the security of the indigenous peoples in the ulu. If the present administrators were to be replaced it would give the impression of a Malay domination. The indigineous people of the Borneo territories were not in the least ready to take over the administration. However, Selkirk felt that while the proposal was commend-

able the process of achieving it must necessarily take time. He wondered if the best solution would be that the British and the Malayan Government would reach some understanding, which could be made public, that the Borneo territories might, in five or ten years when they had become ready to administer themselves, subject to the wishes of the people, join the Federation.

I then interjected by saying that I did not think the Malayan Government would consider such a proposal as feasible or acceptable. Lord Selkirk with a glint in his eye said that the Tunku was always suspicious of British intensions. I was quite sure then Selkirk was referring to me and not the Tunku. Selkirk emphatically said that the British Government would be most reluctant to pursue a policy which eventually would produce undesirable consequences bringing no credit to both the British Government and the Malayan Government in whose well-being the British Government was equally interested. I thought when he said that, he was thinking of Nyasaland.

Selkirk continued by saying that it was not clear as to what the Memorandum envisaged when it said that the Borneo territories should join as states of the Federation like the other existing states. The present development in those territories, as he had pointed out earlier, would not be in a position to produce governors and chief ministers. He reminded me that the present British governors were at once heads of state and chief executives. He then made the point that if there was going to be a change in the authority of these territories, it was important that the expatriate colonial officials who opted to stay in Malaysia should be given assurance of their future so that efficiency and morale would not suffer.

At that juncture, I began to hear echoes of what Malcolm MacDonald told me when I was in India. The British might be willing to transfer authority but the colonial character of the administration should remain. I had dismissed that thought as mere fantasy but the ghost, however, reappeared during the preparation of the Cobbold Commission report.

Lord Selkirk further said that the British Government had commitments for defence in SEATO and of Australia and New Zealand. The position, as he understood it from the Memorandum, in so far as Britain was concerned would be most difficult in her relation with SEATO. It would amount to Britain having to leave SEATO thus undermining the position of SEATO in this region, which up to then was the only thing that kept the communist aggression spreading from the North.

Then, once again, Selkirk spoke rather dreamily as if he was thinking aloud that the position would have to be reviewed if the defence of this area should be left entirely to Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand under a new arrangement. Suddenly, waking up, he said that the United Kingdom of course would always be ready to come to the assistance of the Commonwealth.

At that stage, Sir Alexander Waddel, the Governor of Sarawak, said that the people of Sarawak had a very real and sincere regard for Malaya and the Tunku's leadership. Since the Tunku made the statement in Singapore, the

people of Sarawak did not express any hostile attitude toward it. However, the people there would wish to be assured that the proposal was not in effect a veil to capture the administration by Malays and to swamp the territory by Chinese. Waddel reminded me that the old politics of secessionist and anti-secessionist were still in evidence and this factor should be taken into consideration.

Then H.C. White, the British High Commissioner in Brunei, joined in a similar vein by saying that there was genuine regard and affection for Malaya among the people. At that time there were many officials seconded to Brunei in various departments including the State Secretary at the request of the Sultan. However, the exercise was not popular with some of the people of Brunei who thought that they were deprived of their positions. White was at pains to explain that the attitude was not general and in any case it was not anti-Malaya. It was merely an expression of dissatisfaction with regard to the calibre of the officers sent from Malaya, who the Bruneians thought, were no better than their own people. It flashed through my mind that in the early days of struggle for Merdeka, many Malays could not believe that they would be capable of running the country. This was a complex which made it possible for a young British cadet officer, completely raw in experience, to overlord over a senior Malay Administrative Officer. It was a manifestation of colonialism and the same was found in Brunei. The Malay officials sent were British university educated with long experience but because they were Malays, the Malays of Brunei thought less of them. However, with regard to the proposal, the people of Brunei were apprehensive of being colonised by Malaya although they would welcome cooperation from Malaya, White repeated a great deal of what Selkirk had said regarding the backwardness of the indigenous people. He also said that the Sultan was not in touch with local conditions. If there should be integration it should be done slowly.

So far the comments had been well rehearsed and points made were very clear and very patronising. However, I held my thoughts to myself since no advantage would be gained then by arguments.

Sir William Goode, Governor of North Borneo was the last to speak. I had known Bill Goode since I was a schoolboy in Raub, Pahang, before the Pacific War, where he was the District Officer. He taught a few of us to play rugger. Goode made the point that he regretted very much that all these were not thought out earlier in particular the position of Singapore. If there had been no Singapore problem, whatever he might have meant, it would have been quite simple to work out a programme for the integration which he sincerely felt was the only solution for those territories. However, under the conditions, obtaining the concept should be worked out with great caution. In particular, Goode confirmed Selkirk's views about confidence which the present administration had created among the indigenous people.

I sought clarification whether there would be any effect on the morale and confidence both of the administration and the local people if the present

machinery was left intact after the transfer of sovereignty. I chose my words carefully and did not use Selkirk's "transfer of authority". It was Goode who answered that it would certainly help to maintain the sense of security and confidence amongst both the administrators and the indigenous people. Goode continued by asking if Malaya felt confident that it would be able to resolve her racial problem in order to create a proper Malayan nation so that there would be an assurance that Malaya would not be dominated by the Chinese which in turn would produce the effect of North Borneo being Chinese dominated. I assured Goode that under the present leadership and system, with an enlightened programme of nation building, there was no danger of such a development as he feared in the foreseeable future.

Philip Moore did not say a word. He was new in the region and perhaps a bit overwhelmed if not intimidated by Selkirk and the others. He and I came to know each other well after that. I thought I had gathered enough trend of thought of the local officials whom I knew would influence the thinking in London.

I told Selkirk that I was authorised by the Tunku to say that the integration of the Borneo territories could not be taken in isolation from the question of merger of Singapore with Malaya. Neither would the Malayan Government agree to a slow process nor treat the subject as a long term objective. With regard to Singapore, I told the meeting it was very much like a ripe "durian" waiting to fall from the tree. Come 1963, the question of the future of Singapore would have to be faced. Hence the urgency of the whole issue.

Admittedly, I said, the question of administrative efficiency and morale could not be disregarded and indeed they were matters of great importance; the major issue would be to arrive at an agreement on the transfer of sovereignty of those British territories in the Memorandum.

I reminded Lord Selkirk that it had been indicated in the Memorandum that a delay in bringing about the integration would only result in their drifting even further apart. Selkirk interjected by suggesting a condominium as a solution. I at once responded by saying that although I had no authority to comment on the suggestion, my personal guess was that it would be a non-starter to the Malayan Government. I returned to the point of the need for expeditious consideration in view of the fate and future of Singapore which had to be decided in 1963 with serious implications on the question of the security of Southeast Asia.

Selkirk in concluding the meeting said he now understood better the Malayan position regarding the need for the early transfer of sovereignty of the Borneo territories and its implications with Singapore. He, however, requested that the Malayan Government should find it possible to adopt a flexible stand particularly in those matters pertaining to the administration of the three Borneo territories and also on the question of defence. Selkirk gave

me the impression that he thought the Memorandum was somewhat rigid in tone.

I left the meeting convinced that the British colonial administrative and technical officials, not the governors, would wish to hang on to their jobs and this, as we had experienced in Malaya, was not a difficult issue. The more difficult issues were the time frame for the Borneo territories in relation to Singapore and the preservation of the colonial administration which was contrary to the idea of independence of the Borneo territories in the federation.

* * *

I had promised Lee Kuan Yew to have tea with him that afternoon. He was waiting for me at Sri Temasek, not particularly a beautiful house in the compound of the Istana.

Lee Kuan Yew looked somewhat agitated and gave me no opportunity to tell him what I gathered from Selkirk except to say in very general terms that Selkirk was genuinely worried over the question of the administration of the Borneo territories in the federation and also that the local people should not be upset with the proposed arrangements.

It was the situation in Singapore which was foremost in Lee Kuan Yew's mind. He said the communists were dead against the merger and had been using the line that the merger was directed against the Chinese. While he was not at all amused that Lim Kean Siew was against the merger he was glad that Ahmad Boestamam had a view which the PAP could support. Both these political leaders of Malaya who were left-wing inclined were against the Malaysia Plan.

With regard to the British he seemed to have had discussions with them before the meeting with me. Lee Kuan Yew said he well understood the British fears about early integration of the Borneo territories. Lee Kuan Yew thought that one of the things which could happen would be for Brunei to join with the Federation first thereby striking at the heart for any future plan to create an independent country composed of North Borneo and Sarawak. In the meantime Lee Kuan Yew suggested that a transitional programme be worked out expeditiously for the integration of Singapore into the Federation with a condominium over the two Borneo territories. I simply told him that those ideas would be non-starters. On the question of Brunei, I agreed with Lee Kuan Yew's suggestion that Kuala Lumpur should invite leaders of the *Parti Rakyat* (Peoples Party) to visit Malaya so that they could be made familiar with the political and social development in the peninsula.

Lee Kuan Yew then expressed the hope that the Tunku might find it possible to say publicly, even if it were said *en passant*, to the effect that the Malayan Government would be prepared to have Singapore with the PAP Government within the Malaysia Concept. It appeared he wanted this from the

Tunku to counteract the claim of his political opponents that the Alliance Government in Kuala Lumpur would accept the merger of Singapore only if the government was made up of the new Singapore Alliance.

In the meantime, Zainal Abidin Sulong and his men had been organising study visits of people to Malaya from the Borneo territories and also visits of people from Malaya to the Borneo territories. The first of such visits was for the Tunku to Sibuan and Kuching in order to meet the people there. This was done during the first week of July 1961.

* * *

Before leaving for London to meet Harold MacMillan, the British premier, the Tunku decided to visit Brunei. He had wanted to share his thoughts with the Sultan and his ministers. It was also arranged that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong would make a state visit and the Tunku, Razak and I would be in the retinue thus camouflaging our real intention. We had informed the Sultan and the British High Commissioner there that we would be talking to them on the prospects for Malaysia.

The Royal visit was a short one. The Royal House and the people of Brunei received the Royal Malaysians most warmly with bunting and decorations everywhere.

Because the Sultan wanted assistance to man his administration, he had requested for a number of Malayan officers. He did that to replace the British officers as a stop gap arrangement before the Brunei people themselves would occupy the senior posts. A number of senior posts were held by officers from the Malayan civil service, education service and even forestry service. For some reasons perhaps fanned by those who did not like Malaya or the Sultan's preference for Malayan officers, resentment against these officers grew. In fact, a Malayan forest officer, Yakin, was assaulted and Malaysians had found themselves in an untenable situation where they would be insulted in public as colonialists, and the word "CONGO" shouted at them.

I could not trace the origin of this term CONGO except it must have been coined when our troops went to the Congo in the service of the United Nations. When the car that carried the Tunku and I passed a group of young men they would shout "CONGO!" at us. Since we did not know its meaning we thought it was all a joke. I was reminded of the story of a man who was addressed by his neighbour as Mr. Hippo for a long time without taking offence until he took his son to the zoo and saw how the creature looked like. The Tunku in his good humour shouted "CONGO!" when he passed the car of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong who must have been quite startled by the Tunku's demeanour since he too did not understand what CONGO was all about. In any case the whole matter was quite infantile.

I found that there was an air of unease when I spoke to the local officials. Perhaps they were embarrassed and felt awkward after Yakin's case. The Tunku wanted to meet their high officials but none was available. The Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) was down with high blood pressure and was hospitalised. Some said the illness was a diplomatic excuse.

The Tunku met with Malayan officials who held high positions in Brunei but it was not the same. After the Tunku had retired for the day, I had further discussion with Wan Ahmad, the State Secretary and Ali Hassan the judge who were both seconded from the Malayan Government service. The perception at that time was that the Malayan officers were taking away high ranking jobs that should be reserved for the Brunei people. I asked these two gentlemen if they were convinced that there were qualified Brunei officers who could take over should we pull out our men. By doing so, we would have demonstrated that our intentions were bona fide and, as far as I was concerned, it would demonstrate to the other British Borneo territories that the Peninsula had no desire to usurp the top jobs in these territories. It was unfortunate that in Brunei the government machinery did not explain to the local people that the Malaysians were there upon request made by the Sultan. The two senior Malayan officials agreed with me that they would provide a list of local people who might be qualified to take over the jobs held by Malaysians for the Tunku or Razak to present to the Sultan.

The Tunku was getting agitated on the second day of the visit as he had been unable to meet anyone in a position of responsibility to advise him on the secondment of Malayan officers. I told him that I felt there was a conspiracy to avoid the subject because no one knew what was in the mind of the Sultan, who made decisions on his own. The autarchy was such that no one would want to entertain an embarrassing conversation which would have no conclusion. The best thing to do would be to speak to the Sultan direct and I arranged a meeting that night on board a navy ship which was on a goodwill visit. After the Tunku had agreed, I was able to make the arrangement for dinner but the Tunku insisted on first talking to the British High Commissioner, a man thought to have great influence on the Sultan.

We managed to get White, the High Commissioner who was an amiable man. White confirmed my surmise that there was no one other than the Sultan to talk regarding the problems of the Malayan seconded officers. The Tunku told White that under the circumstances, he would withdraw all Malayan seconded officers since they were extremely unhappy and nervous for their own safety and that of their families. The feeling in the streets was very strong against these Malaysians. Their wives could not go to the market without being jeered at and insulted and their cars when parked would be scratched. The Tunku said that Malaya had no political ties with Brunei except a feeling of brotherhood and Malay kinship when Malaya agreed to the ruler's request for the services of these seconded officers. The real tie was between Brunei and Britain.

The Tunku said that many of the posts could be filled by Brunei officers. Other posts like the Attorney-General or Chief Surveyor could be filled by British officers. White remarked that the Malaysians had rendered sterling service to Brunei and he particularly mentioned the Education Officer, Idris Babjee. He, however, drew the attention of the Tunku to Dr. Abdul Wahab who according to White had caused the resignation of a number of government doctors and staff members. Dr. Wahab was well-known as a strict disciplinarian and I was not at all surprised with the information. In Brunei, perhaps, Wahab would be out of place. White agreed that already a few of the posts could be given to Brunei officers. Mentioning the case of Yakin, the High Commissioner said that there were previous incidents when British officers were attacked or assaulted by the Brunei mob.

At this point, the Tunku really became agitated. He interjected that the circumstances were different. British officers were sent to Brunei because it was the responsibility of the British Government to administer the state. In the case of Malaya, she came to help at the invitation of the Sultan. To be attacked and treated as colonialists was something that Malaya had not bargained for and it hurt when no one in Brunei would explain to the people the reason for their presence and to assure the Malaysian officials that they were welcomed and not to be treated so badly. If, the Tunku said, we were really a colonial power we would know what to do. In his anger, he said that in a couple of weeks he would beat the hell out of those hooligans.

White talked of Azahari who might be the provocator. According to White he was extremely influential. The Tunku said he would not deal with Azahari. White said that Malaysian officers had no one to handle their personal safety and agreed that the posts should be Bruneianised. Perhaps it was not just Azahari and the Brunei Party Raayat (Brunei People's Party) that wanted the Malaysians out because they wanted their own people to man the Brunei administration when they came to power. The British also felt pushed out by the Malaysians as if it was a conspiracy between the Malaysians and the Sultan against the British and his own Brunei Malays. The people just vented their wrath on the poor Malaysians and their families.

White asked the Tunku what made him think of the greater cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Malaysia Plan. The Tunku replied that as sure as he could see White sitting before him, he saw the dangers of communism spreading after their success in Laos. This part of the world should consolidate itself. None of these Borneo territories were viable and time was of the essence. The British knew well that Malaya was the only true friend in the Commonwealth among the non-white members. The Tunku told White that he was most touched by the remark made by MacMillan in one of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences that Malaya was a shining example of a true member of the Commonwealth. White said he liked the Malaysia Plan.

After the meeting with White we attended the boat regatta. The Tunku had his dose of the CONGO treatment when the car passed a crowd; and it was on this occasion that he shouted "CONGO!" when the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's car passed ours.

There was a boat race between the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's team and the Sultan's. I was included as a member of the crew of the Malayan team, composed of the Tunku, Razak who was the Minister-in Attendance on the royal visit, the Keeper of the Ruler's Seal, Brigadier-General Abas the Military aide-de-camp and Mohamed Nor the Police ADC to His Majesty. Our team lost the race much to the delight of the Brunei people who had come out in the thousands to watch or partake in the water festival. It was altogether a grand affair.

A private dinner was arranged for the Tunku and His Highness the Sultan. It was on board the Mutiara which was left by the British when we became independent. It was an old junk and the engine was quite noisy. It should have been sold to the junkyard for scrap. But we were grateful that we had a boat even if it was an ancient one.

That night after the very private dinner of the Tunku and the Sultan, I asked the Tunku what he thought of it all. I knew that the Tunku was most anxious to exchange thoughts on the Malaysia Plan and the position of the seconded Malayan officials in Brunei. The Tunku told me that the navy boat was so noisy because of its age he could not hear much of what the Sultan was saying. His Highness always spoke very softly, almost in whispers. Anyway, he made his point on both subjects. The Tunku, now more than ever, was determined to recall all the Malayan officers and would not send any replacement. He thought the Sultan would ask the Mentri Besar to speak with the Tunku the next day.

I had a very private audience with His Highness at the Istana the next day when I had planned to leave Brunei. There was no one else in attendance. It took place first thing in the morning. I had had a terrible attack of diarrhoea that morning but common courtesy dictated that I should call at least to give thanks and seek permission to leave and more importantly I had to know what he thought of his conversation with the Tunku the previous night.

He rambled about his unhappiness with British officers who had served in Brunei because they did not respect the local custom and niceties hence his request for Malayan officials. With regard to White, the Sultan, to my surprise, shared his thoughts with me. In short, he did not have much confidence and trust in the High Commissioner. His Highness asked me if I could come out with a name of a British officer who had served in Malaya and knew the Malay customs well to replace White. I could not respond in any way but simply said that I would convey to the Tunku his personal feelings. He asked me to do just that. Then I asked him what he thought of the Tunku's Malaysia Plan in his conversation the previous night. His Highness the Sultan replied that when the Tunku spoke he used the Kedah dialect and

pronunciation. His Highness could not understand the Tunku at all. The dinner was a disaster, I concluded.

I joked about it when I told the Tunku that since one side did not hear and the other did not understand, there had been no communication and Brunei would not find her way in Malaysia. The Tunku laughed heartily and thought it was extremely funny. I have often used the story to demonstrate a lack of communication.

Years later, after the end of the confrontation during a visit of Indonesian pressmen to interview the Tunku, one of them asked the reason why Brunei did not join Malaysia. The Tunku laughed to the bewilderment of the Indonesian pressmen. He then turned to me and said that I should tell them. I knew it was that jocular story that the Tunku was reminded of and I related the incident where there was absolute lack of communication although both were Malays. The Tunku laughed again and so the Indonesian journalists most heartily joined him. But that was not the end of it although I had told them that the story was a private joke and not for publication. One of them reneged and published it in Jakarta. The Sultan had already abdicated and he was known as Sri Begawan. He made a public statement chiding me and saying that I knew the actual reason. Very quickly I tendered my humble apology with a short explanation that the story was not intended to be the reason behind nor to be published, and there the matter ended.

From my audience with His Highness, I went straight to see the Tunku at his guest house. The Mentri Besar of Brunei, having been commanded by the Sultan, had just arrived to call on the Tunku. He looked really sick and devastated and I felt that I had sinned when at first I thought his inability to see the Tunku was a diplomatic illness. He was really ill and his loyalty to the ruler brought him to meet with the Tunku.

The Mentri Besar said that the Malayan officers should not be withdrawn. He must have heard it either from White or the Sultan that the Tunku was contemplating the withdrawal of Malaysian officials. Even if they were leaving for good, each one should do so while taking earned leave at the end of the contract. There should not be any appearance of a huff. The Tunku said since there was no guarantee that they would not continue to be subjected to humiliation including such remarks that the Malaysians came to Brunei to "scrounge" for food, it would be in the best interest of all concerned that they all should return home since they were unwanted in Brunei. Having received from Wan Ahmad a list of Brunei officials the Tunku provided the Mentri Besar with a number of names which could fill some of the posts vacated by Malaysians. The technical jobs could be filled with recruits from Britain. The Mentri Besar said that the Sultan had to agree to the list.

The Mentri Besar looked pathetic. He knew it was an embarrassing problem and he was simply taking orders. He admitted that he had spoken to local leaders and penghulus to advise the people not to behave surly against Malaysians and he was saddened by the bad impression created by the local

people. He guaranteed that the police would be taking more precautionary measures by increasing their beats. The Tunku simply smiled and said that the problem could not be solved by increasing police beats. The Tunku, seeing the hopelessness of the situation which could only be resolved by public campaign and explanations, decided simply to tell the Mentri Besar that he would write to His Highness the Sultan.

After that, we left Brunei for Sibul but not after the Tunku had made a radio broadcast telling the people of Brunei that the presence of Malayan officers was at the request of His Highness and it was never the intention of Malaya to colonise Brunei or any other country. He expressed regret that no one had explained to the people as to why the Malayan officers were in Brunei. He also said that the idea of Brunei being a member of the Federation would mean that Brunei would enjoy equal status with the other states in Malaysia and that His Highness would one day be the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

* * *

We had arranged for the Royal Malayan Navy ship, Mutiara under the command of Lt. Ismail, to provide transport, board and lodging for the Tunku. On arrival in Sibul, the arrangement was for the Tunku to meet on board the Mutiara, dignitaries of the Sarawak Third Division. The list of guests were led by Temenggong Jugah who the Tunku lightheartedly referred to as the originator of the Beatle hairdo! Jugah, the Resident and the District Officer including others like Aini Dobi, whose brother Rosly Dobi, was hanged for the assassination of Governor Stewart, Tuanku Bujang, Abang Louis Barieng and Ahmad Zaidi and some timber tycoons were on the list. The Task Force had already identified local leaders who could be cultivated to support the Malaysia Concept and later to be involved in the political life of the territories concerned.

The reception given by the Tunku on board the Mutiara was an extremely successful and happy gathering with a relaxed air of informality even if the weather was quite warm and humid. I thought the Tunku, by his personal charm and charisma, had won over the confidence of the people, particularly the Iban community. Jugah was in great form. He loved his drinks and I had the impression that he had a very keen sense of humour. He was extremely intelligent and quick-witted. I gathered to my horror that he could only write to sign his name. Even that he had his signature tatoed on his left arm from which he could copy by using his left arm pressed on the paper to be signed! Otherwise he was absolutely illiterate. We struck a cordial friendship very quickly and he addressed me and Tijah my wife, as "anak". He joked a great deal.

At one point Jugah rapped the Assistant District Officer (ADO) who was a Malay for speaking in English with the Tunku. He teased the ADO since everyone there spoke Malay and he did not know English, which perhaps was

his real reason for chiding the embarrassed ADO. The Tunku was very impressed with Jugah.

I also noticed Jugah cornering Lt. Ismail, the captain of the boat, and asked the poor fellow point blank as to why the Malayan navy boat should come up the Rejang river to Sibü. Jugah told Ismail that the Third Division was peaceful and that everybody, Iban, Malay and Chinese were living together happily in peace and harmony and were also working hard to develop the place and raise the standard of living. Little did he realise that his area was one of the black areas or active centres of the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO). Ismail simply replied, almost disarmingly that he was there to provide transport and lodging for the Tunku on that visit and he was happy that Sarawak was doing well. I did not think Jugah believed Ismail. Jugah must have thought that Ismail had some sinister motive chugging up the river. Jugah must have also thought that Ismail was simply avoiding a direct reply. Jugah kept asking Ismail about the Malaysia concept which of course Ismail was not equipped to answer. I saw Jugah throwing up his hands in despair upon questioning Ismail and the whole thing appeared quite humorous.

An Iban in the Administrative Service posted in Sibü by the name of Bennet Umpam told me that he had heard what the Tunku said in Singapore and liked the idea of a closer association. He wanted me to explain to him the concept. I told him in general what it was all about and the intentions of uplifting the indigenous people using the same special position of the Malays in the Federation Constitution. He agreed with me that the federation would be beneficial to Sarawak particularly the indigenous people. Sarawak could achieve independence through the Malaysia Concept but his main misgiving was that it would open the way for the Singapore Chinese to come in droves to Sarawak. I told him that the people of Sarawak could ask for special powers to control immigration. He brightened up and simply said with his hand touching mine, "Please help us." I was deeply moved.

Bennet Umpam was an educated man; he said that if Jugah could be persuaded then there would be no problem from the Ibans in Sarawak.

The following day in Sibü, the Tunku was met by the Resident, Mr. Griffith and members of the Urban District Council and community leaders. The first feature of Sibü which struck the Tunku was that the Resident did not have a chauffeur but drove the Tunku himself. I was taken by the District Officer who also drove himself. This gentleman used to be the District Officer in Balik Pulau, Penang. His quarters was a modest little house which in Kuala Lumpur then would be regarded as Class IV quarters. There was no fan in the bedroom and Sibü was then a hothouse, steaming with humidity.

This was the first visit of the Tunku to Sibü and he was taken to meet the Urban and Rural District Council (UDC) members. Sibü was a Chinese town, with 95 per cent Chinese. The Chairman of the UDC in his welcome address welcomed the Tunku's plan for closer cooperation and expressed the hope that

whom we met in Sibuh the previous evening. The house was quite close to the school and the Tunku received the traditional welcome. First he had to walk along the bridge leading to the door of the longhouse. The railings of the bridge were hung with "*kain pesaka*" as decorations. There was an arch at the end of the footbridge with WELCOME written on a piece of cloth and distended at the top semicircle of the arch.

The Tunku was spared the ceremony of sticking a spear into a pig but a man came out with a cockerel as the Tunku was climbing the steps after going through the arch. The man held the cockerel high over the head of the Tunku and waved it round and round chanting shrilly some words whose meaning I never found out. Then the Tunku shook hands with the oldest man standing waiting for him on the right. After that six maidens came forward each offering a drink by handing a glass to the Tunku and then sipping it after the Tunku had done so. As I wondered what the drink was, it was my turn to sip from each of the six glasses. It was the usual sweetish kind of rice wine which I had tasted before though I could not say with relish.

I did not count the number of *bilik* (room) but the longhouse must have housed about forty families. I was told it was a medium sized dwelling place but a self-contained village. The verandah or *ruai* was rather wide. Hung here and there were baskets of skulls and Umpam quite proudly showed me some of them.

There were lots of children running around with a few ladies in their finest dresses. Except for a very few of the women, none of the ladies were bare-breasted. Nearly all the women when they smiled, showed gleaming gold teeth some soiled by their chewing of betelnuts.

There was music as we entered the house. The orchestra was played by women and the instruments were composed of gongs arranged downwards. The ceremony of feeding the spirits started when the Tunku was requested to sit down cross-legged on the floor like he would do in a Malay house if there were no chairs. The maidens brought *pulut* (glutinous rice) on a plate followed by eggs, *bertih*, betel leaves and *ketupat*. The idea was to put, in a ceremonious way, in the plate eight bits of each of the food and these were to be offered to the spirits. The Tunku told me later he had the fright of his life when he thought he had to eat the food. He chided me for not warning him of the ceremony and to tell him what was expected of him. I told him that if he was prewarned he could not qualify to merit the offering! But the Tunku had to drink a glass of *tuak* as each maiden sang a *pantun* of welcome. I thought this time there were seven and the Tunku had his fill for the day. After the drinking and singing session the man with the cockerel once again waved the frightened bird over the Tunku's head and later slaughtered it. The food for offering to the spirits was then placed at a conspicuous place near one of the main pillars of the house.

The *Penghulu* (Headman) gave a speech in Iban welcoming the Prime Minister saying how fortunate the longhouse was to have the opportunity of receiving someone whose name and fame had spread far and wide. He was

sorry that the Tunku's wife could not come and I told myself Puan Sharifah Rodziah would be sorrier if she did because she would not have been able to walk in the wet and muddy condition. He then presented the Tunku with a *kain pesaka* a traditionally woven cloth which the Tunku received with gratitude.

In his reply, the Tunku after thanking the Penghulu and the inhabitants of the longhouse and Bennet Umpam, said that he was much impressed by the similarity between the Iban and the Malay in look and language even if the pronunciation of certain words were different. Much to the pleasure of the whole house, the Tunku invited the Penghulu and other elders to visit Kuala Lumpur and that all would be organised for them by the Malayan Government.

Puan Sharifah Rodziah and my wife Tijah, in the meantime, were shown another longhouse accompanied by the District Officer. Nevertheless, during lunch in a bot named *Jolly Bachelor*, they were green with envy when we described the reception accorded to the Tunku but I knew they could never have made the journey.

We went back to Sibu accompanied by Pengarah Banyang who became one of the greatest influences among the Ibans in support of the Malaysia Concept. In Sibu, the press ambushed the Tunku and asked for the Tunku's comments on Jugah's very recent rather negative comment on the Malaysia Plan. The Tunku simply replied that neither Jugah nor anyone would know whether the Plan was good or bad since the Plan had not as yet been disclosed. Then a pressman asked whether Malaysia would be a better plan if it was a confederation. I suspected it was a plant because I was certain the chap would not be able to explain his question. However, the Tunku treated the question in a matter-of-fact way. He said if it was a confederation, very little help would come to Sarawak which was sorely in need of development assistance. In a federation, Sarawak would become a member state. There would be no colonisation since the central government would also belong to Sarawak if the political configuration was right as the case of the Sarawak parties joining the Alliance and winning the elections in Sarawak. If it was a confederation, the Borneo states could never hope to face the competition from the Federation of eleven states. In any case, the Tunku said rather humbly, he knew only the Federation type of arrangement and it had worked successfully so far. He also said that the central government was spending 5,200 million Malayan Ringgit from the present five year development plan. He asked them to imagine what it would be for Malaysia. I thought the press went away quite happy.

As the Mutiara sailed down the Rejang river to the sea at the conclusion of the Tunku's visit to Sibu, my mind went back to the various conversations I had and what I had seen. It was quite clear that Jugah and the Iban leadership must be won as a matter of priority; the other matter was to get a certain degree of cohesion among the Malays of Sarawak who were clearly divided between the pro-colony and the anti-cessionist. In any case the Iban and the

Malay leaders also had to have a common understanding particularly at the personal level between Temenggong Jugah and Datu Bandar Abang Mustapha, the leader of Party Negara.

As the Mutiara passed longhouses and solitary Chinese houses in all their calmness and serenity, I wondered if they knew that they were the target of the Communist Clandestine Organisation (CCO) and that the best solution to their problem would be the Malaysia concept. Sarawak, as a colony, would never be left in peace by communist China and the CCO. Ships from China were visiting Sarawak ports even in Binatang, blaring their songs of revolution through loudspeakers to the towns. When we reached Binatang, the people had come out to the jetty shouting for the Tunku to stop. The Tunku requested Ismail to anchor and we went ashore and met hundreds of people. We visited the District Office, the Town Hall and the dispensary. It was a trading town with a few brick houses and dirt roads. At the mosque, there were more people waiting for the Tunku. They gave the Tunku a very warm welcome and the Tunku spoke a few words of encouragement.

I met two interesting young people, one an Iban who was a police inspector and another a Malay customs officer. Both were very critical of the colonial administration which never brought any development to the people. I asked the young Iban police inspector if he was one of those trained in Malaya. He replied he was one of the two who were not trained in Malaya because of insubordination. He had thrown a book at the British Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) when the latter first threw the book at him. They were marvellous boys and I had occasion to meet them again later. By then they had resigned from their respective jobs and spent full time promoting Malaysia. It was with great reluctance that the people of Binatang let the Tunku sail downstream. The journey was uneventful and it was even less after we had reached the sea. We saw fishing villages and they were far apart from one another.

As for me I enjoyed the sunset which I had not seen for a long time. The colours were beautiful and the reflection on the calm sea with the cool breeze was really exhilarating. That night we had to stop at the mouth of the Sarawak river since we had no pilot to sail upstream to Kuching. I must confess that the noise of the Mutiara did not make sleep easy. It was the same dint which helped drown the words of the Sultan of Brunei at a meeting between the Tunku and the Sultan.

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The Mutiara moored at the Kuching landing place for government vessels at about eight in the morning. Governor Waddell and his wife were on the jetty waiting for the Tunku. The reception was extremely appropriate with an extremely smart turnout of the guard of honour which the Tunku inspected with dignity.

We then crossed the river in a *perahu* (boat) paddled by four Malays in white uniform which was the traditional means of transport for the Brooke Rajahs. The colonial administration inherited from the Brookes not only the *perahu* but also the *Istana* (Palace) and its garden among other things. At the entrance of the *Istana*, the Brookes had inscribed a motto in Malay, "*Berharap Selagi Bernafas*".* (While there's life, there's hope)

After a short rest and some refreshments, the Governor invited the Tunku to his study. The Tunku asked the Governor if I could accompany him and he acquiesced.

The Governor opened the discussions on the same line he did with me in Singapore, which the Tunku was already aware of. Waddel pointed out the various pitfalls in the Malaysia Concept as expressed in the Memorandum and reminded the Tunku that it was only very recently that the Dayaks gave up headhunting. Furthermore, the local people had expressed rather spontaneously through Party Negara and Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) that they preferred individual development. Waddel suggested that perhaps a merger with the other Borneo territories as a federation should be tried before joining the Federation in the Malaysia Concept. Waddel admitted that the colonial administration was doing all it could to encourage the formation of a Borneo federation before joining Malaysia which, Waddel thought, was a highly commendable idea.

The Tunku rather calmly said that he regretted very much that the colonial administration had chosen to distinguish the various communities of Sarawak into Iban, Bidayuh, Malays and so on. Yet the communities were not that different if one should take the Iban and the Malay. Their languages were the same except perhaps the dialect, nuances and pronunciations. Indeed the Iban language was archaic Malay but Malay nevertheless. The Tunku mentioned that the development in an independent Malaya was phenomenal as compared with a colonial Sarawak and there was something that Malaya could do for the people of Sarawak if there was integration.

The conversation which lasted about forty-five minutes was cordial and in a spirit of goodwill although I could see little hope of a meeting of the mind. However, it was helpful to get further confirmation as to the attitude of the colonial administration. This was not necessarily the attitude of Whitehall.

Being a Friday, Datu Bandar Haji Mustapha accompanied the Tunku to the mosque. The Datu was leader of Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) and he was a great supporter of the British colonial administration and therefore hated by those Malays who were anti-cessionist. He became very much the trusted mouthpiece of the colonial administration. As expected, he echoed the Governor's views and therefore not entirely supportive of the Malaysia Concept. However, what I saw at the mosque confirmed in my mind that if the people were given the details of the concept they would certainly welcome the Tunku's leadership for Sarawak. I made up my mind that Datu Bandar Mustapha had to be won over.

As I was waiting for the Tunku and watching the congregation crowding around the Tunku, some embracing him and some with tears were kissing his hand, I asked a man who I saw had kissed the Tunku's hand and then his shoulder from the back as to why he regarded the Tunku with such high esteem. He said in Malay that he felt it his duty to kiss the Tunku's hand and shoulder which would lift the people of Sarawak from their misery. I was greatly moved by the man who appeared extremely happy that he had the opportunity to touch and kiss a person he hoped would be his future leader. The Tunku also was greatly touched by the way the people had received him.

* * *

Datu Bandar agreed to meet with me after lunch. We met at an agreed place where no one would see us. After the usual pleasantries, I directly asked him why he had not been supportive of the Malaysia Concept and requested him to be absolutely candid. His reply, very much like Waddel's, was that the people of Sarawak were not ready particularly the Ibans who still would not discard their *cawat** (a piece of cloth or a bark of tree to cover the private part) meaning their primitive way of life. I then asked him the strength of his Party Negara. His reply was forty thousand and I expressed skepticism. Eventually, he admitted that he had forty thousand in the register but he had seven thousand paid up members. I said that was good enough but he must now make sure that if his voice was to be heard he should strengthen his membership.

Since we both agreed that we would be candid with each other I told him that as far as I knew he was not popular with lots of Malays in Sarawak who regarded him as someone who had sold Sarawak to the British colonial government. I then told him that he should take the opportunity to explain in a positive way why he had taken that stand. Malaysia Concept meant independence for Sarawak within a federation. It would not be possible to get rid of Brooke as a Rajah if there was no colonial administration for which true *Merdeka* could be achieved. The Brooke dynasty would never relinquish its position and Sarawak would forever be ruled by a white Rajah and no white Rajah would be comfortable to sit as a member of the Conference of Rulers. In any case Brooke would never agree to be a constitutional Head of State.

Datu Bandar at once brightened up and said that I had given him an opportunity to resolve his problem. We then discussed a great deal with regard to the concept. At the end of the meeting he grabbed me by the shoulders and embraced me warmly saying how grateful he was for the meeting with me because he could then see that the future of Sarawak was extremely bright. He expressed regret that he had opposed the Malaysia concept before. I invited him to visit Kuala Lumpur and to bring along some of his friends.

Datu Bandar said it was difficult for him to publicly change his stand overnight just like that. I told him not to worry too much over such a question and he would have an opportunity that evening to say something when the Tunku would address the press.

It was agreed before hand that the Tunku would give an indication that the Malaysia Concept meant that Sarawak would be independent within Malaysia, equal in status as Penang and Malacca. This the Tunku did most effectively and answered all questions clearly.

The Tunku also went to Radio Sarawak to make a recording for listeners in Sarawak. There I met an Iban broadcasting officer who was very much influenced by the British colonial official and therefore very much against the Malaysia Concept. I made a note of his name and passed it to Zainal Abidin Sulong who later managed to change his understanding of the Malaysia Concept and became very helpful.

As days went by, it became clearer to me that Donald Stephens of Jesselton, North Borneo was extremely important in this exercise. Also I must try to get the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) to support the Malaysia Concept and some leaders I thought could be persuaded although it might not be so easy to get the whole party which had been infiltrated by the CCO. Both Donald Stephens in North Borneo and the Chinese leaders of SUPP of Sarawak had expressed their opposition to the Malaysia Concept.

In Sarawak, Datu Bandar Haji Mustapha the leader of the Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) and a trusted friend of the administration had made a statement a few days after the Tunku left Sarawak that Malaysia Concept was a great thing for Sarawak. The sommersault stunned the colonial administration which now had to depend on the Ibans led by Jugah and Pengarah Montegrai. These two leaders were at first agreeable to visit Kuala Lumpur with Datu Bandar but declined after a British official warned them not to associate themselves with Datu Bandar.

Datu Bandar had made the reverse statement without discussion with the executive committee of his Party. He promised me that his committee would support the Malaysia Concept otherwise there would be a cleavage which could be exploited by colonial officers and the SUPP.

In order to find out personally how the SUPP regarded the Malaysia Concept, I was fortunate to have been able to meet with Yeo Cheng Hoe of the SUPP. He appeared to be attracted to the idea of a greater political association but the SUPP non-communist leaders were very much toeing the line of the colonial administration. At that stage, Yeo Cheng Hoe thought that the Borneo federation must first be created. I did not spend much time explaining the concept but advised him to follow development and that he should be able to make up his own mind.

PART TWO **Consultations**



Zainal Abidin Sulong and I had worked out a piece of document based on the Constitution of Malaya to be the basis of the new Malaysia relationship. The opportunity was given to us when we heard that the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) of Asia was going to meet in Singapore in July 1961. By being in Singapore I could also meet with Lee Kuan Yew and others, and Lord Selkirk. Zainal Abidin and I went to Singapore. It would be an excellent opportunity on that occasion if a consultative committee of the CPA could be formed to examine the Malaysia Concept which by itself would help to propagate the idea in Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. The proposed committee should also include those who opposed the Concept. When I spoke to Lee Kuan Yew about it he was at once agreeable even if the committee had Singapore opposition members.

Lee Kuan Yew and I had also worked out a programme for the CPA Conference in Singapore which would centre around the question of economic and technical cooperation. Members who were friendly could steer the debate towards the question of cooperation in the context of the Malaysia Concept. Consequently, discussions on the Malaysia Concept became inevitable. The leader of the Malayan delegation was Abdul Hamid Khan, and Zainal Abidin Sulong had armed him with suitable points for his speech and interventions.

I was able to obtain permission to sit in one of the sessions. I became convinced that the move to form a consultative committee had to be made by someone from the British Borneo and none better than Donald Stephens. A few of my friends thought it was rather risky since Donald Stephens could not be manipulated. It was precisely for that reason I chose Donald Stephens whose credibility was beyond question. If he could be made to examine thoroughly the implications of the Concept and if he was convinced of its desirability then it would thereafter be quite smooth sailing.

I sought the assistance of Lee Kuan Yew to arrange for lunch for Donald Stephens and me in the privacy of one of the salons in the Istana. Donald Stephens came straight to the Istana from his CPA Conference. I gave him two copies of the draft constitution on the proposed new federation prepared by Zainal Abidin Sulong to be the basis for discussions. We carefully went through it line by line and, to my joy and gratitude, Donald Stephens agreed to take up the matter at the CPA Conference before it ended. I think what impressed him was the various provisions including those related to protection of fundamental rights, of religious freedom and above all he had

been convinced that the effect the Concept would have on the speed for independence for North Borneo and Sarawak.

I was particularly pleased when I learnt later that at the conference resolution to establish a Malaysia Consultative Committee, the initiative was taken by members from North Borneo and Sarawak led by Donald Stephens of North Borneo and Yeo Cheng Hoe of Sarawak. These two gentlemen, once opponents of the Malaysia Concept, would become members of the Malaysia Consultative Solidarity Committee. The whole move would certainly hasten the pace of the formation of the new federation. Donald Stephens also had agreed to accept Zainal Abidin Sulong's invitation to visit Kuala Lumpur.

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I had come to Singapore to meet Singapore leaders and to meet with Lord Selkirk while observing the CPA Conference. I stayed for two days, and spent not less than 16 hours altogether with Singapore leaders trying to understand some of their more serious problems. Among those I met were Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and Rajaratnam. Having pieced together all the conversations, the following emerged as a line of thought dating back to the pre-Hong Lim by-elections amongst the Singapore Government and the PAP leadership.

For some months Lee Kuan Yew and his friends had observed that Lord Selkirk and the staff of the British mission were making special efforts at cultivating the friendship of Lim Chin Siong, Woodhull and other elements of the leftist group. At first Lee Kuan Yew had taken those activities mainly as part of a diplomatic activity, perhaps for the purpose of eliciting information. But since the Hong Lim by-elections (April 1961) this relationship between Lim and his men and Selkirk and his men had become closer. So much so, it came to the point of embarrassment to Lim Chin Siong, when, during a reception at Istana Negara, Lord Selkirk was seen chasing after Lim Chin Siong who had been trying to avoid him.

Not long before the Anson Elections (1961), certain opinion had begun to develop which culminated in the denouncement of the merger by Lim Chin Siong and his friends. The PAP leadership began to be challenged openly and there were mounting attacks as weeks passed by approaching the elections. About this time, some PAP Assemblymen had begun to take the Lim Chin Siong line and on investigation it was found that those defectors including Dr. Lee Siew Choh, had been given the impression by Lim Chin Siong that the communists would be in a position to assume leadership in the Government of Singapore. Dr. Lee Siew Choh had several interviews with Dr. Goh Keng Swee and other PAP Ministers before he defected and he told them that Lim Chin Siong was extremely confident and indeed he had no illusion about the British stand if the pro-communist group would assume power in Singapore. None in Singapore thought that Dr. Lee Siew Choh was a communist but in view of the communist strength in Singapore and the fact that the communists were now prepared to assume leadership he considered it futile to do otherwise than to

go along with the trend. He had indeed become the spokesman for the Lim Chin Siong group.

This particular point was extremely important to the PAP leadership because all along while they acknowledged that Lim Chin Siong was a communist and there were other communists who were working in the name of the PAP, the PAP leadership was able to suppress the communist activities by threats and intimidation to the effect that if they indulged in communist activities, the PAP leadership would not lift a finger to help them should the British Government take strong repressive measures. The idea was drummed into the heads of these communists that the British would not tolerate a pro-communist government. The PAP being a non-communist government was the limit that would be tolerated by the British. If there were any signs of pro-communist elements going to seize power there was every reason to believe, according to the PAP, that the British would suspend the Constitution and put the communists and fellow travellers in the jug.

According to Lee Kuan Yew, this method of creating fear in the minds of the communists was effective because they would rather be at large and work through the Trade Unions than be locked up in detention. There was a sort of mutual need for each other between the PAP and the communists but for different reasons. The PAP needed the communists to consolidate the Chinese-educated masses to orientate them into a Malayan outlook so long as the communists would continue to keep their efforts within non-communist lines. Goh Keng Swee personally told me years later that he thought it was an extremely risky business bordering on folly to adopt such an attitude; however, at that time, the PAP had no other alternative but to take a calculated risk and make use of the communist machinery in order to gain time to educate the masses. But Dr. Lee Siew Choh quite definitely, before defecting, told the PAP Ministers that Lim Chin Siong was not afraid of the British and that he was confident that the British would not do anything even if a pro-communist element were to take power. This was the point when the PAP leadership began to see a dangerous pattern taking shape.

As a result of further enquiries and investigations, the PAP leadership formed the conclusion that it was Selkirk's policy to see that the PAP Government should continue to govern Singapore but without too much power. Therefore, by flattery and persuasion, the British had created a feeling of confidence amongst the communists to challenge the leadership. The British had been giving the impression, wittingly or otherwise, that Britain would not mind any form of government in Singapore, even a pro-communist government, so long as they would allow their base to remain there for defence purposes including its use by SEATO. Lim Chin Siong, having got this impression and overcome by his fears of the British instilled by the PAP, no doubt had also given the impression to the British that if they took power they had not the slightest intention of asking for full independence or the removal of the British base. To the communist, it was a good rallying point for the

British to keep Singapore as a colony and a base in order to attract more people in Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories towards the anti-colonial platform. This whole idea was mutually attractive to the British as well as to the communists.

Things came to a head with the Tunku's statement regarding the integration of Singapore and Borneo territories into the Federation; the merger was then around the corner.

Intensive anti-merger campaign was sporadic and the communists, who until recently had paid lip service to the idea of merger, saw their future as extremely bleak if the anti-communist Federation should assume power in internal security. During the Anson by-elections, every method was used to challenge the PAP leadership on the basis that there was a sell out to the Federation and the Malays by the merger policy of the PAP Government. The final onslaught occurred with the defection of several PAP Assemblymen, led by Lim Chin Siong.

Lee Kuan Yew at that time thought that he would be able to keep about 26 PAP Assemblymen altogether and this would give him a very slender majority.

Since the Anson by-elections, Lee Kuan Yew had taken the initiative to retaliate against the communist leadership which had taken the question of merger as an issue. The merger was regarded as extremely important in Singapore and Lim Chin Siong now found himself in a defensive position, hence he reverted by saying that he was not against the merger. Consequently, there was confusion in the rank and file of the Trade Unions and Malay members in Party Rakyat. Lee Kuan Yew thought that other Pro-Malayan Trade Unionists would come out to oppose the anti-merger group. Trade Unions would now assert their position and would take steps to discredit Lim Chin Siong. This had already begun, as reported in the papers, that six leaders of the Trade Union Congress had publicly opposed Lim Chin Siong.

Lee Kuan Yew held that British authority in Singapore had encouraged the communists in the PAP to revolt against the PAP non-communist leadership in the hope that the PAP non-communist leadership would retaliate and demand that the British should imprison the communist elements. However, Lee Kuan Yew quite definitely had no intentions of fighting the communists by having them in detention and be branded a British stooge, since the British were still in power in Singapore. He did not want to make the same mistake as Lim Yew Hock who alienated the feeling of the masses by lending himself to do the dirty job for the British and be condemned as a British lackey. It would have been different if Singapore was rid of the British or was part of the Federation of Malaya. He would then be in a position to defend his actions in the national interest to have detained the communist elements.

While Lee Kuan Yew believed that stern measures should be taken against the communists, the right step, as far as the PAP was concerned, was to deal with them politically. Lee Kuan Yew felt that this particular line of thinking and action had never been appreciated by Lord Selkirk who had the

impression that the PAP leadership was lacking in character if it did not itself take measures to lock the communists up.

Lee Kuan Yew was angry with the British for playing a double game on a matter that was extremely vital to the peace and security not only of Singapore but of the Federation and indeed the rest of Southeast Asia. In his opinion, the British authority in Singapore was rather blase and did not appreciate the wily ways of the local communists who were not at all like European communists of the Galagher type. Lee Kuan Yew said that Lord Selkirk had often remarked that Lim Chin Siong was a likeable fellow and reasonable.

The PAP leadership, was not desperate, but extremely worried that if the British continued at this double game a position might be reached where the communists, by using proxies and popular front men, would be in a position to seize power. Should that happen, the communists would then consolidate themselves by brainwashing the local population, intimidating of opposition leaders and completely subverting the police and other law enforcement authorities. At that stage, there would be a decline in the economic position of Singapore; a situation that would be manipulated by the communists to create unrest and, when sufficient distress and unrest has been created, assistance would then pour in from communist countries. In the circumstances, it would be difficult for the British to resist the arrival of aid particularly from China in view of the Chinese-based population of Singapore.

According to Lee Kuan Yew, the PAP had an extremely good chance to win in this struggle for the hearts and minds of the people of Singapore if he was given every assistance on the question of merger with the Federation. He did not think that the British would want to seriously help him. The British would pay lip service that they would like to see Singapore merge with the Federation knowing well that such a merger would not take place. The Tunku had said that the question could not be taken in isolation from the integration of the Borneo territories which the British then had no intention of giving up.

Lee Kuan Yew was planning a series of assaults by exposing the true character of Lim Chin Siong and his comrades as communists. These assaults would begin with the debate in the Assembly on a Confidence Motion. The series of exposures would last about two or three weeks in which he would clearly explain the communist frustration and the various steps taken by the communists using the PAP. Lee Kuan Yew said that he would not hold back any punches and in particular he would make reference to the part which the British was playing in this whole affair.

I had the impression that Lee Kuan Yew very much wanted the Tunku's indulgence and patience in his efforts to neutralise the communist elements in his own way. Lee Kuan Yew said that he was considering very seriously to come up to see the Tunku in the next few days to seek his advice once he had crystallized his thought on the steps that he should take.

Merger was now a central issue in this struggle against the communists. Lee Kuan Yew felt that the Malayan Government should be prepared for an intensive effort on the part of the communists at creating a climate of opinion against the merger. There would be mounting attacks on the economic and industrial concerns in Singapore in order to create apprehension and despondency.

Dr. Goh Keng Swee shared with me his views that if immediately there was a general elections, the PAP would not get in since the party machinery was not as strong as the communist machinery. However, the PAP had then begun reorganising. There might be a reshuffle in the Cabinet which would relieve Ong Pang Boon from ministerial duties in order to free him to concentrate more on party work. Perhaps Ahmad Ibrahim would become Minister of Home Affairs while Byrne would succeed Ahmad in the Ministry of Health and another chap would have to be found to take the Ministry of Labour.

The PAP was confident that they would win if a referendum should take place on the question of merger.

There was a genuine desire in Singapore that a merger should take place with the Federation and this desire should not be allowed to lapse as a result of undermining by the communists. On the other hand, Lee Kuan Yew feared that the British would be too slow in surrendering the Borneo territories and, under the circumstances, it was perhaps better to have Brunei integrated first. Lee Kuan Yew definitely thought that if the reality of merger was seen to be imminent, the communists would then be really apprehensive. There might even be riots in Singapore, but he did not worry about that since he felt that stern measures could be taken against the communists.

Already the Ministers in Singapore were being intimidated by left-wing and communist elements. Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee were reported to have received death letters. The PAP leadership, however, would not change its position and would proceed with the idea of exposing Lim Chin Siong and his cadres of their communist activities. This exercise would indicate that the PAP had changed from a declared policy of being non-communist to one of anti-communism, although no such statement would be made.

The preceding events appeared to me to be the state of mind of the PAP leadership. This had relevance to the Malaysia Concept which I could ill-afford ignore.

During my two day visit to Singapore, I met with Lord Selkirk who informed me that a letter would be coming from Her Majesty's Government about the question of integration of the Borneo territories and Singapore with the Federation and Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur would perhaps know much more than he did on the matter, since Tory returned from London to Kuala Lumpur later than he did and had been kept fully in the picture. There was a possibility that the Prime Ministers of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore would be invited to go to London later that year but perhaps only to discuss the question of the merger of Singapore.

He thought the people in London were not yet ready to proceed with the question of the Borneo territories in view of the antipathy expressed by the local people in those areas.

When confronted with the fact that Party Negara had already changed its stand in Sarawak, Lord Selkirk contradicted his previous contention. Contrary to his previous claim, he now said that Party Negara was a small and inexperienced party which was in an embryonic stage. Therefore its decision was of no consequence. He looked uncomfortable, as I gave him a knowing smile, when he repeated that the Tunku, including me, had always been suspicious of the British.

Lord Selkirk said that there was a genuine desire amongst the local people that at least Sarawak and North Borneo should first federate before integrating with the Federation. At this point, I asked if it was genuinely the desire of the Borneo territories or was it not the long and cherished desire of the British colonial office. He gave a hearty laugh and said that it was true that the British had conceived the idea some eighteen months previously and he now wished that the Tunku had made his proposal earlier so that the policy of integrating the Borneo territories would not have been started. He appeared oblivious to the old colonial office policy, the seeds of which Malcolm MacDonald had started to sow in the fifties.

Discussions then turned on the subject of the Anson by-elections. I enquired as to what made the communists come openly to challenge the non-communist PAP leadership. He replied that it might be the result of the Hong Lim by-elections and of course there was the question of merger which the communists did not like. He then asked me my opinion. I told him that I had no authority to represent the views of the Malayan Government, but based on personal observation, I would agree that the Tunku's statement on the integration of the territories certainly helped to speed up the attack against the non-communist PAP leadership. This was evident from the statements made and the intensive activities of the communists in holding discussions and distributing anti-merger leaflets to labour union members.

However, I told him that there was a point of view at least prevailing in Singapore that the communists had the impression that Her Majesty's Government (HMG) would not do anything if the pro-communist elements took power so long as the British bases were left intact. This was the kind of impression which the communists needed. As if anticipating that I might bring forth further inferences, Lord Selkirk quickly replied that it was not true.

In the course of further conversation I attempted to extricate what the reaction of the British might be if the pro-communists or the communists were actually the Government of Singapore. Lord Selkirk waffled that the British Government had to be careful since the Constitution had safeguards for all democratic institutions and processes and it would be difficult for HMG to do anything so long as no violence or undemocratic method was resorted to. When I said that the communists might feel encouraged to seize power, Lord

Selkirk gave the impression that if the communists themselves were openly to seize power through elections and to govern the country without resorting to violence the British Government would tolerate it and would not lift the Constitution. I voiced my opinion that if the pro-communists were to be in power, then the field was open for subverting the whole of Southeast Asia. He replied, to my horror, that the Federation of Malaya should take over the island and prevent any deterioration. But he could not, at this stage, say definitely that HMG would lock the communists up. On the other hand, he would expect Lee Kuan Yew to come up openly to demand the detention of the communist elements instead of hiding behind the Internal Security Council. At that moment, I had the impression that Selkirk had in mind the idea of the present detainees being released and to have them placed under house arrest. He said HMG should not do anything which might appear repressive in view of the British Parliament and any arrests in Singapore should openly be done by Lee Kuan Yew.

Lord Selkirk thought that the PAP would be able to hold power but of course not with the same majority. There was every chance that by Lee Kuan Yew's open fight against the communists he might regain the respect of those he had alienated at the beginning of the PAP administration.

Following my discussions in Singapore for two days, I had the impression that although Lee Kuan Yew was not in a state of panic, he was extremely worried over the situation in Singapore. At the same time he thought he was on a good wicket since the communists had made merger the main issue, placing the communists in rather a bad light except to some of the chauvinistic Chinese elements.

There seemed to be some justification in the deduction of the PAP leadership regarding the double game played by the British as seen in the conversation I had with Selkirk. The communists would certainly not move forward if they knew that the British would not have them as the legal government. There was also something in the belief that the British would encourage the communists to quarrel with PAP so that the PAP, instead of the British or the Internal Security Council, would take the measures of detaining the communists. If these were true then there was a miscalculation on the part of the British authority.

Whitehall, at that moment, was too pre-occupied with the Berlin crisis, Disarmament, Common Market and Laos, such that the matter of the integration of the Borneo territories could not receive the full consideration it deserved. Lee Kuan Yew, by telling me in advance of his intentions, probably had hoped that the Malayan Government would not be taken by surprise when he would make his assault against the communists and perhaps with equal vehemence against the British for their part. In that process he would even suggest that the Selkirk double game had endangered the prospect of the merger of the Borneo territories by leading everybody up the garden path. An open quarrel with the British colonial administration was therefore

expected and he would need this to rally mass support on the popular anti-colonial platform to be used against the communists. Lee Kuan Yew might even go further as to claim that the communists and the British were in cohort.

The PAP, I thought, was seriously thinking of taking some very decisive steps in the very near future and Lee Kuan Yew was very careful to say that before he did anything he would come up to the Tunku to seek advice. I noticed that this was said in extreme humility and respect for the wise leadership of the Tunku. What form the plan would take was yet unclear.

Lee Kuan Yew might embark on pushing the idea of merger even without the Borneo territories since he was convinced that the most effective way to smash the communists would be to make them fight on their weak wicket. I thought then it was possible that Lee Kuan Yew might adopt one of the following strategies:

- (a) he would put a referendum to the people of Singapore as whether to accept merger or not and once that referendum was decided, which he correctly thought would be on the side of merger, then he could manoeuvre the merger to take place first by an introduction of transitional provision until the details had been worked out. I thought this plan he would launch only if Malaya would agree to a merger with Singapore without the Borneo territories;
- (b) the second possibility was that he might just ask Malaya to publicly agree in principle on the question of merger without any commitment that the merger would immediately be made effective after the referendum. Once the assurance was given he would proceed with the referendum which he would win. Subsequently, he would promise his supporters that the PAP would strive to get the Federation to agree to the integration at some future date thus defeating the communists on the most vital subject;
- (c) if the Malayan Government could not agree to commit itself either to (a) or to (b) then Lee Kuan Yew might, as an option, seek a general elections on the question of merger, but it was doubtful if he would succeed in the general elections since merger would not then be the only issue. If he did not succeed, the best that could happen would be that no party would gain sufficient majority to form a government. There was a danger that the pro-communist elements or communist proxies might succeed whereby the situation would be extremely grave;
- (d) PAP might just sit tight until the next general elections.

I was certain that Lee Kuan Yew would resort to the idea of referendum only with the agreement of the Tunku and also within the next few months before the end of the year. If later than that, the PAP might find it difficult to

win because the communist anti-merger propaganda might have by then seeped through widely. Moreover the implementation of the Malayan education policy in January 1962 would be used adversely by the Chinese chauvinists in Singapore.

I had therefore recommended to the Tunku and Razak that the Federation of Malaya begin to think in terms of the possibility of the pro-communists or communist proxies if not the communists themselves taking over power in Singapore, perhaps in coalition with some small political parties if only to wear a badge of respectability. In order not to be taken unawares it might be advisable for the Government Committee on Defence and the Committee on Commerce and Industry to make studies of the implications of such a situation and to prepare a worst case scenario exercise of isolating Singapore.

There was a general gloom in Singapore at that moment and business people were extremely worried over the future of Singapore. For the first time people including taxi drivers and ordinary workers were beginning to talk that the only alternative group in Singapore to the PAP would be the communists.

I reported all these developments with my comments and recommendations to the Tunku and Razak. It was not clear to me what the Tunku did with the information but he did suggest that I should keep a close watch on Singapore. The Special Branch of the Malayan Police which had a special liaison with its counterpart in Singapore was to be guided with regard to special targets.

Matters in Singapore were becoming intensely serious. It was confirmed by intelligence agencies that Selkirk did receive Lim Chin Siong half an hour after I had left him, the last time I met with him in Eden Hall, confirming Lee Kuan Yew's story that Selkirk was in close touch with Lim Chin Siong.

With regard to the British stance as told by Selkirk, the Tunku was adamant that there should be a firm decision in respect of the Malaysia Plan regarding both Singapore and the Borneo territories. He thought that Whitehall might be persuaded to overrule the Borneo officials and also alter their policy on Singapore. The Tunku also thought that the invitation to him and Lee Kuan Yew should indeed come from the British Government.

However, I told the Tunku to be wary because a meeting in London under the present circumstances would be pointless since the divergence of views was too great. It would be helpful as a preliminary step to get some popular opinion from the Borneo territories to form the basis of an attitude which might influence the British thinking.

I informed the Tunku that the special political operations in Sarawak and North Borneo were in place and with the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee working, the Tunku would thus have a better leverage to bring about a change in the British policy. If it was only to listen to the British policy as stated by Selkirk, the London meeting would be futile and even dangerous. I suggested to the Tunku that we should work closely with

Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur. The Tunku said he would give his serious consideration to the matter and would speak with me when he had crystallised his thoughts. Razak, after being briefed, did not offer any opinion but left the matter entirely to the Tunku to decide. He, however, concluded that a proposal for Singapore Merger without the Borneo territories should be rejected outright.

* * *

In the meantime, I had arranged for a meeting between the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew which I thought would be important to maintain the momentum. The Singapore situation required urgent attention and Lee Kuan Yew had thought of going to London to talk about Singapore before the New Year. I felt the need for a very frank discussion between the two leaders in particular on the question of how to deal with the British Government which was a vital factor.

Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee had been spending a few days in Cameron Highlands attending the Singapore Internal Security Council of which Malaya was a member, during the latter part of August. They had come down from the hills on August 23, 1961 and stayed at Istana Tetamu. I called on them and they had agreed to a meeting with the Tunku, Razak and me. The venue was the Residency at 8 p.m.

I requested Lee and Goh to be absolutely candid with the Tunku and assured them that the Tunku was of good heart and they should not in any way feel awkward or uncomfortable in raising whatever matter that needed discussion.

Lee Kuan Yew thought that he would ask the Tunku to cooperate in a kind of political ploy by agreeing that Malaya would openly say that she preferred to accept Singapore as a State on the same status as Penang or Malacca; Lee Kuan Yew would then react by insisting on keeping Education and Labour. This would enable him to demonstrate to the people of Singapore that the arrangement was no mere dictation from Kuala Lumpur. I shared my thought with Lee Kuan Yew that it was not such a good idea but that he should place his cards on the table. I did not think that the Tunku would find it easy to play a game of that kind since it was not his style; the Tunku had all along been saying that he would be prepared to give Singapore a special treatment.

I had no time to inform the Tunku of that discussion directly, but I managed to pass the message to Razak. The meeting started at about 8 p.m. at the Residency. After the usual pleasantries, the talk opened with the Tunku saying that he learned from me that Lee Kuan Yew would prefer to go the United Kingdom before the New Year. Lee Kuan Yew then explained that the situation had become extremely serious and urgent. In that case, the Tunku said that he would agree with Lee Kuan Yew and that he should go to London in October or November.

The Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew then discussed the question of the proposed Referendum and they were of one mind that the Referendum should be done as quickly as possible. After that, Lee Kuan Yew toyed with the idea he had mentioned earlier to me that the Tunku should offer Singapore the status of a State, similar to Penang, with local autonomy in Education and Labour. By so doing, according to Lee Kuan Yew, the Referendum would be to choose between a 100 percent merger or merger less Education and Labour. As I expected, the Tunku quite simply said that the best procedure was to go straight to the point by simply asking the people on what Lee Kuan Yew could offer.

The discussion then turned on the letter which the Tunku would send to MacMillan. They both agreed that the letter should give the picture of the situation that the communists were using Chinese chauvinism in Singapore to avoid a merger. The discussion included a suggestion and a consideration that the Malayan Government had viewed the situation so seriously that they were contemplating to have reserve powers to suspend the Constitution of Singapore after the merger had taken place.

Lee Kuan Yew implored on the Tunku that Lim Yew Hock should not be informed about the Referendum or anything regarding this conversation. It was agreed that the Referendum should be announced by Lee Kuan Yew. The Tunku assured him that Lim Yew Hock or anybody else would know only from the announcement.

The Tunku also assured Lee Kuan Yew not to be apprehensive regarding Lim Yew Hock or Hamid Jumat, a Malay leader from Singapore. He would not reveal anything to them. The Tunku also said that he had no doubt in his mind that the PAP Government was then the right government for Singapore, but that did not mean that the people of Malaya would agree on everything with the PAP. The main concern, according to the Tunku, was whether the PAP could find sufficient support on the issue of Malaysia.

The Tunku then advised Lee Kuan Yew not to pay too much attention to the PAP rebels by taking punitive measures against them because our Asian mind was always sympathetic with the underdog. Any punitive action would only appear vindictive. I noticed both Goh Keng Swee and Lee Kuan Yew nodding their heads.

Then the conversation came back to the question of going to the United Kingdom to see Harold MacMillan, the British premier. The Tunku said that together they should go there with one mind; not even a comma should be the subject of argument. He reminded them of his momentous trip to the United Kingdom for independence. The Rulers' representatives were at first opposed to independence then because of certain issues but in the end everything was amicably resolved. This was achieved by travelling together, by ship, the representatives of the Rulers and that of the Alliance Party and they were able to meet and talk with each other every day until they reached Bombay and Karachi. He also suggested that this time the Malaya-Singapore delegations

should go by ship so that they would have ample time to discuss things on the way without any external interference or influence. Should there be no agreement, it was better to stop halfway. If Singapore and Malaya were of one mind, the British side would then be resigned to the position of having to place the Singapore base under the Defence Agreement.

After a while, the Tunku became very emotional and sentimental. He began talking with that distant look, which I had often witnessed when he was in deep emotional thought, by saying that he was now getting on and would not have too much time to complete his work. Being a Prime Minister he said, the job was very demanding which should be done by younger men. As he pointed his finger at Razak, he said he did not want Razak to inherit problems. The Tunku said he could of course postpone facing difficulties, but by so doing he would only leave behind unresolved problems as his legacies. That was why he initiated the steps to deprive the citizenship of Lim Lian Geok. All these things had to be faced squarely with courage and conviction.

Lee Kuan Yew agreed and said that in dealing with the Chinese it would be better to separate Chinese chauvinism from communism which were then interwoven.

The Tunku said, as a servant of the people, he was entrusted with the job of keeping the country happy. He was determined not to allow the country to go to the dogs or postpone the evil day.

The conversation then went back to the topic of going to the United Kingdom and it was suggested that Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman and Tan Siew Sin be invited to join. When Ong Yoke Lin was also suggested to join the party, Razak said that he could not afford to have the whole Cabinet away from the country and jocularly said that might tempt the civil servants to stage a coup d'etat! I assured the Tunku and Razak that there would not be any coup d'etat by civil servants since the only officer who was capable of staging such a coup d'etat was going with them. "Who was that?" Razak asked. I said, "I!" amidst laughter and shaking of heads, perhaps in disbelief!

I then asked both the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew the question of the formation of a Working Party which would be studying the implications of the merger; they agreed to the suggestion. I had scribbled on a piece of paper the draft of the press communiqué and this was approved by the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew and I passed it to Frank Sullivan, the Prime Minister's Press Secretary who was outside waiting for it. Frank Sullivan then typed it out with some improvement and I brought it back to the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew for them to make any changes if necessary. The statement was released for publication the next day.

It contained a list of participants from Malaya and Singapore and also that Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee had come to Kuala Lumpur to attend a weekend meeting of the Singapore Internal Security Council which has been held in Cameron Highlands. I was mentioned as having been present at that meeting held on August 23.

The Statement said the Federation and Singapore leaders had a full and frank exchange of views on the situation in Singapore in particular on the question of merger and the various implications arising from this subject.

Included in the Statement was that among many matters examined was the question relating to the Federation's responsibility for Defence, External Affairs and Security. The Singapore Prime Minister had laid particular stress on the necessity of Singapore is retaining local autonomy especially on matters of Education and Labour.

It further mentioned that both Prime Ministers had agreed in principle on these proposals. They had also agreed that a Working Party should be set up to go into the overall financial and other implications, arising out of arrangements whereby local autonomy would be retained by Singapore on agreed matters, and to consider the financial contribution Singapore would be required to make to the national government.

The serious business was then over and we went to dinner. At half past ten I left to catch the *Straits Times* plane to go down to Singapore. Since I was going to Jesselton the following morning at 6.30 a.m., I had a miserable time as the plane did not leave until a quarter to one which left me with only a couple of hours' sleep.

* * *

At 6.30 a.m. on August 24, 1961 I left Singapore for Jesselton by Dakota. On arrival at Kuching airport for refuelling, I saw a big crowd among whom were some familiar faces. One of them came to me and asked where Datu Bandar was. It appeared that the crowd of people were Party Negara members who were waiting to receive Datu Bandar that morning. Datu Bandar had not informed them that he had changed his plans and was not returning then. I was informed that there was to be a big reception for the return of Datu Bandar from Kuala Lumpur.

I arrived at Jesselton airport at about 2.45 p.m. local time and I was surprised that no message was waiting for me as to the place where the Commonwealth Committee Meeting was to take place. Just when I was going through the airport formalities, Sir William Goode, the Governor, arrived at the airport. On seeing me, he approached me and in an extremely surprised manner asked why he was not informed of my arrival. I told him not to worry about it. In fact, a message had been sent to the Chief Secretary about my visit but that it might have strayed somewhere. I thanked the Governor for his concern. I asked him about the Consultative Committee Meeting that was going to take place in Jesselton. He said he was completely out of the picture since the participants at the meeting did not wish the British colonial officials to be at the meeting. He then said something about Donald Stephens whom he thought was out of tune from the feelings of his own people and that whatever comments he made would be his own.

Goode suggested that I should use his car for which I thanked him. After he had gone into the plane for Sandakan I got into his car. As I was entering the car I noticed that the driver had not removed the state pennant. I then asked the driver to fold the pennant in order that I could travel correctly in the car. The driver in an extremely confident manner turned round and spoke in Malay to the effect that today because of "Malaysia" I was to drive with the state pennant flying. I was flabbergasted and despite my insistence he just got into the car and drove off with policemen slapping their foreheads in salute until I reached the Secretariat. Such was the mood then.

As soon as I arrived at the Secretariat, I called on the Chief Secretary and then proceeded to the Conference Room where the Commonwealth Committee Meeting was held.

I was then officially introduced by Donald Stephens, the Chairman of the Conference, to everyone else. I listened to the various discussions. There was a great deal of questions asked by delegates from Sarawak and North Borneo. Since the Malayan delegation was well briefed on the various points they did not find it difficult to dispose of the matter. However, two or three technical subjects came up, like the difference between 'federation' and 'confederation' and also certain aspects of the Constitution. I was invited to clarify these points. I was also invited to give my views on the general concept of Malaysia which I thought were well received. After that the Conference discussed the question of future meetings and then decided on the following press statement:

Delegations from Commonwealth Parliamentary Associations, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo, met here yesterday to discuss the Malaysia plan proposed by the Federation of Malaya Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Mr Donald Stephens of the North Borneo delegation was elected Chairman of the meeting.

The meeting was held in two sessions. In the morning the leaders of each delegation delivered their opening speeches. Malaya was called upon to make the opening speech. In his speech, the Honourable Encik Ismail bin Yusof, Assistant Minister of Interior, Federation of Malaya stated clearly the policy of the Federation of Malaysia in relation to the future relationship between his country, his people and the three Borneo territories and Singapore. The Honourable Mr. S. Rajaratnam, Minister of Culture, as leader of the Singapore delegation, expressed his full support and backing on the concept of the Malaysia plan. Both the Honourable Datu Mustapha, leader of North Borneo delegation and the Honourable Mr. Yeo Cheng Hoe, leader of the Sarawak delegation, also expressed agreement with this grand plan.

In the business session the Committee discussed fully and frankly a number of matters relating to the status and rights of the individual territories within the Malaysian framework.

A number of delegates expressed fears that Malaysia would mean the domination of weaker and smaller territories by the stronger.

It was pointed out that Malaysia would not come about by a process of large units like the Federation of Malaya taking in smaller units.

The Malayan delegation explained that Malaysia would be a new political unit, forged by the coming together of all the potential members of Malaysia as individual, equal partners. In other words, Malaysia will be constituted by the coming together of 15 territories as individual units. There will, therefore, be no question of bigger units absorbing smaller units.

It was also pointed out that there would be considerable local autonomy for the States, thus ensuring that State interests were safeguarded.

The delegates also discussed such subjects as language, rights, freedom of religion, education policy, land rights, immigration problems and economic relations.

The Conference agreed to publish a booklet dealing with the questions raised at the conference. This would help clear misunderstanding and doubts that some people had expressed about the nature and aims of Malaysia.

The Conference also agreed to publish a journal to be called "Malaysia". This would provide a forum for free discussion of problems connected with Malaysia.

It was also agreed that at the next meeting there would be papers on the following topics:-

- (a) Economic basis of Malaysia;
- (b) Constitutional and political problems relating to Malaysia.

The meeting considered the drawing up of a constitution defining membership and functions of the Committee for consideration at the next meeting.

It was agreed that the aims and objects of the Committee should be:-

1. (1) to collect and collate views and opinions concerning the creation of Malaysia, comprising Brunei, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya;
 - (2) to disseminate information on the question of Malaysia;
 - (3) to initiate and encourage discussions on Malaysia; and,
 - (4) to foster activities that would promote and expedite the realisation of Malaysia.
2. Programme for future meetings:-

The next meeting is tentatively fixed for the first week of November 1961 and the venue of the meeting is Kuching, Sarawak. The meeting also agreed that at the next meeting the Committee would decide how often it should meet.

The meeting also agreed that all members present at this meeting would be treated as pro-tem members of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee.

Mr. Richard Lind, Secretary, C.P.A., North Borneo, will act as pro tem Secretary of this Committee.

After the Conference I met Donald Stephens and Rajaratnam and they both expressed their thanks for my role at that Conference which they regarded as extremely helpful.

That night Donald Stephens entertained all of us to a dinner where the Kadazan people performed their beautiful folk dances. During dinner, I had the opportunity of speaking to a few Chinese leaders and their friends with whom I had made arrangements to meet at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce the following day. After dinner, when all the other guests had left, I stayed behind in order to have a frank exchange of views with the Kadazan leaders who had come from the rural areas. This, Donald Stephens wanted in order to assist him in the meeting which he was going to call on the following Saturday.

Donald Stephens also told me that as soon as he got back from Singapore and Kuala Lumpur recently he was called up by the Governor and queried on

his statement on Malaysia, in particular his target date of 1963. The Governor said that Stephens was not in step with his own people. The one remark which made Stephens very upset was when the Governor said that he should be cut down to size. Stephens told the Governor that he would like to tender his resignation from the State Council as well as the Executive Council in view of that remark. Goode became conciliatory and said that he did have full confidence in Donald Stephens but that he did not want Donald Stephens to lose his supporters.

I spent the whole morning of Friday (August 25) from 10.30 until lunch with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other Chinese leaders. They were extremely interested in the question of Malaysia in particular concerning education, national language, autonomy of the State, immigration of Singapore Chinese, business and industrialisation policies and oddly enough someone asked about defence arrangements. I had the feeling that when they left the meeting after lunch they went away with some of the questions answered and much of their doubts removed. But they were still having a nagging feeling as to whether or not they would be treated as second class citizens, a point much used by anti-Malaysia elements.

That afternoon the Malayan, Singapore and Sarawak delegations left Jesselton. That night I was invited to a very private dinner by Donald Stephens with a couple of his friends. There I was able to gauge further the personality of this man. He told me that his father was the one who raised the abortive and untimely rebellion of the Jesselton people against the Japanese occupation. As a result, the Japanese killed his father and Donald Stephens himself was tortured. He went at length to explain the gruesome methods of the Japanese torture and the hell he went through during those frightening days. He did not give in to the Japanese to the last. He told me that his stubbornness to the Japanese had cost him two broken ribs and forty-eight hours of hanging by his hands.

On the morning of Saturday August 26, at about 7 a.m., Sundang, the Kadazan leader from Keningau, came to see me. He wanted a few points for use in a radio broadcast arising out of his discussions with Donald Stephens.

At 8.30 Donald Stephens came to the hotel to take me to a Kadazan village a few miles outside town to meet some of the elders there. The village, Penampang, was Donald Stephens' own stronghold and there I had the opportunity of having a chat with the village elders in particular relating to the rural development and education programmes which were taking shape in Malaya. They gave me the impression of being extremely impressed and were not hesitant to condemn the colonial government. They all agreed that Malaysia was the solution for the natives of North Borneo.

Donald Stephens, on the previous day, had a four and a half hours' meeting with the Executive Committee of the United Kadazan National Organisation (UKNO) which endorsed his stand. He later gave me a list of names of leaders of his Party to be invited to Malaya for a familiarisation tour.

At 11 o'clock, I had a meeting with the Chief Secretary and also the Secretary for Local Government. Both these colonial officers painted a gloomy picture of the situation by saying that the people were not ready; there was no organised political opinion and that the best scheme was to get the Borneo federation first, which was the same colonial official tune. They did not appear to understand the implications of the Malaysia plan and the autonomy of the States nor did they understand the concept of the Federation and the timing in view of the situation in Singapore.

I tried to explain the salient features of the Federation Constitution and these served to overcome some of their objections particularly those relating to religion and official language. In the course of the conversation, both the Chief Secretary and Secretary for Local Government said that there was an opinion current in North Borneo that the reason for Malaya's proposal of Malaysia was because the Tunku wanted it for his next elections platform, in order to retain his position. This was preposterous since the Tunku and the Alliance were riding high. The point made sounded like an opinion of a political science undergraduate. I then quite plainly and in a very straightforward language or parlance asked them the source of the information. They evaded the question and I said that at least they should assist by stating the class or the kind of people who held that opinion: whether they were Kadazan, Chinese or what. Both would not answer and I said it must have been an opinion of certain individuals and certainly not current since, on their own admission previously, there was no such thing as public opinion in North Borneo. I had never again heard of that line as a reason for opposing Malaysia.

In order to save them from further embarrassment, I veered the discussion to some other subjects. We discussed the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), in particular its proposal to disseminate information on the question of Malaysia. In the end, it was agreed that both governments, Malayan and North Borneo, should assist to make information available relating to the subject. I also made the request for cooperation in arranging for some community leaders and members of the various local councils to visit Malaya. The Chief Secretary gave me the impression that the British officials in North Borneo were still working with the idea of creating the Federation of North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak and I had no doubt then that they would continue to gear their energy in that direction.

* * *

I left Jesselton for Sandakan that afternoon and I was met at the airport by Khoo Siak Chiew who was one of those who visited Malaya with Donald Stephens after the Singapore CPA Conference and also Pengiran Galpam and the District Officer. That night I attended a private dinner party at a restaurant where local Chinese leaders and some natives were present. They asked a lot of questions about Malaysia. During the early part of the

conversation, one of them questioned the justification for providing special privileges to Malays. This question was asked by a young lawyer by the name of Peter Lo. I explained to him the Constitution and the policy of the Government of the Federation of Malaya and the reasons for having affirmative actions as corrective measures in order to level the economic playing field without shifting the goal posts. I had a feeling that there was some doubt in his mind about the validity of such an arrangement but he did not say much further.

After the dinner, we adjourned to a private house where only the Chinese leaders and Pengiran Galpam were present. More discussions took place until past midnight. The questions were about the same as previously, in particular the question on education, language, autonomy of the State and the civil service.

A doctor by the name of Francis, said that one of the problems regarding the formation of political parties in North Borneo was that the Chinese community were well-off and better educated. For this reason, the natives would find it difficult to throw in their lot with the Chinese for fear that they might be overwhelmed. I told the good doctor the need to demonstrate to the natives not only by words but also by deeds in good faith of the commitment of the Chinese to regard North Borneo as their only home and object of loyalty. One of the means by which the Chinese could allay the fears of the natives was to commit themselves to the idea that when Malaysia came into being the Chinese community would support the concept of the special position of the natives in the Constitution of Malaysia and that the local indigenous people should be treated as the Malays in the Peninsula. At once the doctor's face brightened up and said that indeed was the answer and I noticed that Peter endorsed the view. One leading Chinese, whose name I cannot now recall but whose family had been there for several generations, wanted me to express to the Tunku his gratitude which I did on the subject of Malaysia for two reasons:

- (a) Malaysia had awakened the people of North Borneo, particularly the Chinese, and had made them politically conscious instead of living in the belief that making money was all that mattered; and,
- (b) Malaysia was first mooted by the Tunku and not by Soekarno. He said that if as the enemies of Malaysia said that this was a device by Malaya to colonise North Borneo it was better that it was colonised by Malaya than by any other people!

The next day Sunday, August 27, 1961, Pengiran Galpam, who was a native chief from Guamantung on the Kinabatangan river, took me to the house of the leading native in a village called Kampung Berhala Darat. The Orang Kaya-Kaya was a grand fellow and he called his lesser chiefs from near and

afar. We had an interesting discussion the whole morning until lunch. I did not have any great difficulty in convincing them that in Malaysia they stood to gain. They were most keen to know the various details of the Federation Constitution and also the rural development programme and the education policy of the Federation of Malaya.

I requested them to go deep into the *ulu* or the upper reaches of the river and also to the outer islands in order to sell the idea if they truly liked the Malaysia Concept. They gave me the impression of being extremely enthusiastic; no doubt I felt they were the best type of people to spread the concept of Malaysia for their areas. They also promised me that every Friday they would organise a special prayer for the success of the Malaysia Concept in every mosque in the *kampungs* all over the area and they hoped that this would spread to other parts of North Borneo. I advised them to get themselves organised into political societies particularly that which was then being organised by Datu Mustapha. I also advised them that they should not be extremists in their struggle for their rights. When they dispersed I felt extremely elated at the thought that these simple folks clearly saw in the Tunku their salvation and only hope for the future of their children.

That afternoon I went out intending to do a bit of fishing with two Chinese millionaires of Sandakan in a luxury boat belonging to one of them. These two were from old families and knew no other homes. They were most keen to identify themselves with the political struggle in the country. They asked me for my advice and how they could assist the natives and also in setting up political parties. I repeated what I said the previous night on the question of political parties. I undertook to request the Malayan Alliance Party to assist in training a few of their young men.

They told me in confidence that they were keen to assist Datu Mustapha by giving him financial backing but they were not certain as to how they should approach the subject. They said they were disappointed with OKK Sundang because it was originally agreed that he should form a national party instead of a communal party but now Sundang had started his communal party. I told them there was no harm for communal societies to emerge, if they had non-chauvinistic aims and objectives. At the early stage communities might find security in polarised groupings. In Malaya there were similar political organisations but they came together and formed the Alliance as a party which definitely was an amalgamation of communities. We went back after two hours of circumnavigating the island of Berhala Laut without catching a single fish since nobody was really interested in fishing.

That night, I was invited by the British District Officer to drinks; there were British and European businessmen, planters and some of the Chinese and native leaders whom I had met previously. The European community as a group approached me and questioned me about Malaysia. My suspicions were that the exercise was done purely to intimidate me into admitting that Malaysia should not be brought into being before the North Borneo

Federation had taken place. Invariably indeed, they came to that point. Even after I had explained the constitutional setup of Malaysia as envisaged, one of them asked me what advantage the Federation of Malaya would get out of Malaysia. He must have been obdurate for refusing to understand after several explanations that once Malaysia came into being, the entity known as the Federation of Malaya would cease to exist and therefore the question of advantage to Malaya simply did not arise. One of them pointed his finger and poked me on the chest and asked why Malaya was so much in a hurry in pushing the idea since the people were not ready for Malaysia. He insisted that they must first work for the Federation of North Borneo Territories. The man was extremely rude but I kept my cool. I told him that the Prime Minister of Malaya simply made a statement at the Press Club luncheon in Singapore and one or two statements in Parliament and other places. I then pointed my finger at him and said that if he felt that he was being pressured, it was not because Malaya had pushed him but that because he had been caught in the new current of political whirlpool within the Borneo territories about which he understood little. I told him that the question was indeed boiling and if he did not adjust himself to the new trends he might find himself caught with his pants down.

After the cocktail, one of the guests came to me and said that I had weathered the storm well and all had left with a better knowledge of the concept of Malaysia.

* * *

I left Sandakan for Kuching the next day (August 28). As soon as I arrived at the airport at Kuching, I was at once embarrassed and pleasantly surprised when I saw Datu Bandar and his opponent Ong Kee Hui, the leader of the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) waiting for me. I gave equal attention to both of them without showing any preference but at the same time I was able to whisper to each of them the time I would be able to see them individually.

Ong Kee Hui came to my room at the hotel as soon as I got back and we had a long chat about his position in SUPP. In the course of the conversation I found out his main trouble in the Party was that he was not influential enough to be assertive on many of the members of the Party. When I asked him a point blank question why he had to make bed-fellows of the communists, he did not deny it but said that at the time when he was forming a political party he had to take in everybody, like lifting a fishing net in which he said it was inevitable that there would be in the catch some good fish and some *sembilang* (catfish). I asked him how he was going to get rid of the *sembilang*. To this he replied that he had to rely a great deal on the natives, which meant the Ibans, and that was why he had to go slow on the idea of Malaysia because the idea had not yet penetrated into their mind in view of the influence of the British officials against the Malaysia Concept. He admitted that basically he and his Chinese friends were not against Malaysia but against communists and those

with communist leanings. That was why he had to win over the support of the Dayaks in his party before he could make an open statement.

I then persuaded Ong Kee Hui not to allow himself to be in the position of being used by the subversive elements but that he should organise himself and the Party to get rid of them. He agreed that the day of reckoning would have to come sooner or later, and I suggested the sooner the better and the better way to get rid of his communist henchmen was to get his moderate Chinese and natives to be familiar with the idea of Malaysia. I could organise an invitation to those people he would recommend so that they could visit Malaya. In the process they might be able to make the issue of Malaysia the parting of the ways between them and the communist elements. He seemed attracted to the idea and said he would think about it but right then he said his people would not wish to visit Malaya without him going along. Since he was going to the United Kingdom for the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting, the visit would have to be postponed until after his return.

The following morning (August 29) he again came to my room and had breakfast with me and said that he had given a great deal of thought on the previous evening's conversation and now agreed to send five of his Committee Members including the Secretary-General and the Vice-Chairman to visit Malaya. I noted their names and he said that he had carefully excluded the communist elements.

Ong Kee Hui appeared extremely happy that morning and asked whether some members of the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) which was at that time opposed to the Malaysia Concept could be invited. I heartily agreed that would be a marvellous idea. He stayed in my room talking about methods the communists in his party were using to gain power, which included the proposal to form a Farmers' Union. Luckily for him, he said, the colonial government did not approve the formation of that union.

Ong Kee Hui did most of the talking and I listened with a great deal of interest, in particular his views and beliefs. At that stage, his political position was extremely precarious and he was simply walking on a tight rope if not actually riding a tiger. He suggested to me that he would try to get the British Colonial Government to assist him in getting rid of the communist elements in his Party. Candidly, I said, it would be counter-productive because if he were discovered doing so he would at once be condemned as a colonial stooge and would lose the support of the non-communist as well as the Chinese chauvinistic elements.

Somehow, I had a feeling that my conversation with him had helped him in some measure; he was extremely friendly and in a happy frame of mind. However, I could not help feeling that he thought there was plenty of time and that if Malaysia could not be formed as targeted he would be happy to pursue the line as espoused by the colonial officials by first forming a Borneo Federation. I had therefore a feeling that while in the United Kingdom attending the coming meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Associa-

tion, he would try to obtain a firm line from the British Government on this and if he was assured by mischievous or misinformed officials of the British Government attitude that they preferred a Borneo Federation I think he would not hesitate to continue to fight against the Malaysia Concept and to support a Borneo Federation.

While he was in my room Datu Bandar Abang Mustapha rang up from downstairs saying that he was coming up and this caused Ong Kee Hui to beat a hasty retreat by a different exit.

The purpose of Datu Bandar's visit was to consult on the radio broadcast which he was going to make on the fourth of September. I gave him the points he wanted which were quite simple. I planned to monitor the broadcast in Kuala Lumpur. During my discussions with Ong Kee Hui, I had the impression that Ong Kee Hui wanted to make friends with Datu Bandar. Therefore, when I met Datu Bandar this time I gave him a hint that whatever political differences there might be in the internal politics of Sarawak, the Datu and Ong Kee Hui should be united on the question of Malaysia. I suggested that he should cultivate the friendship of Ong Kee Hui in that regard. Datu Bandar was quick in the uptake and said that it was Ong Kee Hui who did not wish to be friends with him. I then said that somebody had to make a start and why not he. He said he would try, and left.

Soon after, the Deputy Chief Secretary, a British colonial official, came up to my room rather unannounced and we exchanged greetings and after some polite conversations he suggested that the invitation to Temenggong Jugah should be renewed. Jugah had refused once before because of his wife's illness. This at once gave the indication that the British were already worried that Temenggong Jugah might miss the bus if he persisted in opposing the Malaysia plan. As I gathered later, Jugah had refused to come to Malaya previously with Datu Bandar on the advice of a senior British official.

I received information that on August 25, the day Datu Bandar arrived from Kuala Lumpur, more than three thousand people had received him and shouted "*Merdeka*" (Independence) several times. They had a big political gathering that night followed by some feasting and dancing. This was confirmed by Hussein Noordin, Secretary-General of UMNO. While in Kuching, I was also able to meet some of our contact men and managed to get suggestions about other groups of people who might be invited to Kuala Lumpur for the purpose of propagating the idea of Malaysia. According to my estimation, Sarawak needed a great deal of work among the Ibans, since the propaganda of the colonial officials had penetrated somewhat deeply after the Datu Bandar volte-face. This I felt would be better facilitated after we had been able to get a few more chiefs of all grades (*penghulus* and *tuai rumah*) to Kuala Lumpur.

I met Peter Ratcliffe a British official of Radio Sarawak. Ratcliffe told me that SUPP was very much influenced by the communists. This, I knew already. He, however, unlike other British officials, had supported the idea of Malaysia

as the best answer for Sarawak. He appeared in earnest but it was difficult to ascertain his real intention then. While I thought I could trust him there were some in my team who thought that his uncolonial officer's behaviour was simply to gain my confidence. He was in full support of the Tunku's contention that the Dayak language was definitely Malay but of a different dialect and he promised to send me an Iban dictionary. He did this later.

* * *

I left Kuching by plane on the afternoon of August 29, to Singapore and travelled together with Hamid Jumat, a Malay leader from Singapore. In the plane, Hamid and I talked generally on matters relating to the Malaysia Plan and suddenly he became very emotional and said that he was going to tell the Tunku how much I personally had done to promote the Malaysia Concept. He was in tears when he said this which I did not understand. He said that if I had not appeared at the meeting in Jesselton the whole Conference would have been a disaster. He was extremely sorry that the Malayan Government had sent as the leader of the delegation a person who, not only knew nothing about what he was talking, but was also obdurate. He said that he would report to the Tunku about the meeting. I was also amazed that in the course of the conversation with Hussein Noordin UMNO's Secretary-General, he also had the same view regarding the leader of the Malayan delegation. Something must therefore have gone wrong, a point which I never did come to understand.

* * *

When I arrived in Singapore I found that Lee Kuan Yew had sent his secretary to meet me at the airport and had invited me to have dinner with him. He had arranged that I should travel back to Kuala Lumpur by the *Straits Times* plane. At dinner we had Stanley Stewart, Ahmad Ibrahim and Hon. The purpose of the dinner was to tell me that the Malayan Government should set up a Working Committee as quickly as possible and those three gentlemen would form the Singapore side. He was most anxious that I should lead the delegation for Malaya since I knew the subject. I told him that was a matter for the Tunku, but I personally felt that I would find it difficult to fulfil that function if I had to run around dealing with the question of Malaysia as a whole. I would rather leave such a job to an expert. However, I suggested to him that the best thing would be for someone to go up to Kuala Lumpur to have a chat with Razak or the Tunku.

Lee Kuan Yew gave me the impression of being extremely happy with the development so far, but he also made me feel that he was like a man always in a hurry. I told him not to worry a great deal but to take things in their stride and above all to continue to be calm and well composed. He appreciated what I said and took in the spirit in which it was given. I was supposed to have left by

9.30 but the plane did not leave until about 10.30 and I was stranded in the waiting room at the Singapore airport for an hour.

But I amused myself by talking with David Marshall who was on his way to Sydney to continue with his honeymoon which was rudely interrupted by the Anson by-elections. He introduced me to his friends as the person who said that he, meaning Marshall, did not know the law. He was referring to an incident when I pulled him up in the City Hall during the Singapore national day celebration and told him he was wrong in his definition of 'confederation'. I said if the Singapore aim of the merger was to enable the centre to control internal security a confederation would not achieve that.

That night Marshall also told me that he was keen to introduce a law whereby the *Straits Times* should not have the monopoly of the press. He said if all the English language newspapers in the country belonged to one group where was freedom of speech and of the press? It was always a delight to talk to David, one of the sharpest minds I ever knew, even if I did not always agree with him. But if I always did then it would not have been interesting any more and he was the kind of fellow that I would prefer to be on my side.

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Things were then happening very fast. Reports from both the Borneo territories were that the natives were beginning to accept the Malaysia Concept; they were only anxious to know the details. The problem was Singapore because Lee Kuan Yew and the British were pushing very hard for the merger yet the Tunku had not heard anything definite from London. Tan Siew Sin, the Minister of Finance, was more concerned with costs and had asked Abdul Jamil Rais, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance, to study the financial implications of the Borneo states in Malaysia.

Jamil who was never in the picture could not fathom as to how the problems should be viewed and he thought the whole thing was rather ill-planned. His minister, Tan Siew Sin had spoken with Goh Keng Swee who was in Kuala Lumpur on May 31, 1961. They were distant cousins. I began to be fearful, perhaps wrongly, that Goh Keng Swee might have convinced Tan Siew Sin that the priority was the Singapore merger. This was the way Singapore and the British had viewed the subject.

More and more people particularly the natives of the Borneo territories were arriving in Kuala Lumpur. Questions poured in for clarification. Some even asked if there would be a new Malaysian currency!

While I had to keep my attention on the Borneo territories, the development in Singapore had to be carefully watched. I had been going up and down Singapore having tea and meals with Singapore leaders, travelling often by the *Straits Times* plane late in the evening.

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The Tunku had asked me to see Lee Kuan Yew on September 6, 1961 and to show him the draft letter which the Tunku intended to send to MacMillan. In that letter the Tunku gave the gist of the conversation he had with Lee Kuan Yew on the twenty-third of August. The Tunku suggested that a meeting should be held in London soon. Lee Kuan Yew, after studying it closely, said that he agreed with the Tunku's message.

Then Lee Kuan Yew raised with me the question of the future plan and work with regard to the Singapore-Malaya Joint Committee of officials. I suggested to him that he should first get a firm stand from the Tunku regarding Malaya's attitude towards the Singapore merger since no one had yet come out to say exactly as to the form of the merger. I told him that there might be a confusion of thought even in Kuala Lumpur. I knew for certain that the Tunku and I were working on the merger on the basis of Ulster but I had indication from Razak that he might be more inclined towards a confederation.

I suggested to Lee Kuan Yew that he should go to Kuala Lumpur to meet with the Tunku who should be asked to work on the basis of the talk of the twenty-third of August. I expressed my thought that he should show to the Tunku the list of subjects which Singapore would wish to retain. It was also important that the question of the elections and representatives in the Federal Parliament should be fully discussed in order that a clear understanding would be reached. Lee Kuan Yew and his Singapore colleagues should be very clear as to what they wanted in particular, the question of citizenship and nationality. Lee Kuan Yew then said he would be able to see the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur in a few days' time.

S. Rajaratnam, the Singapore Minister of Culture, was always kind to me and he appreciated the fact that I was very close with his immediate relatives in Seremban like Mr. Nadchitram, the late father of an illustrious Kuala Lumpur lawyer, Ms. Saraswathy, when I was there serving in the State Secretariat in 1952. Rajaratnam would never miss inviting me for a chat and the man was so knowledgeable on almost anything that I used to look forward to meeting with him. This time, when he heard that I had met with Lee Kuan Yew he asked me to lunch. At the lunch there were three Singapore officials of the proposed Singapore-Malaya Working Committee. These officials asked me on what I thought they should give priority to. After some hesitation, I ventured to suggest to them that changes should be brought about with the least amount of upsets and therefore the less change in the state list would be the better for it. I emphasised that for the government machinery in a federation to function well the chain of command must be clear and unambiguous.

That afternoon I played golf with Lee Kuan Yew and returned to Kuala Lumpur by the *Straits Times* night plane. Besides the noisy Dakota plane rides what I remember most was the role of golf in the Singapore-Malaya diplomacy for merger. We played golf at every opportunity and anywhere from Singapore

to Penang and Cameron Highlands. The Tunku would test his views at the golf course and it became a routine for me to play with the Tunku every morning followed by a breakfast of papaya and cheese, a rather strange combination. I had become rather proficient in the game. Until today, I still keep and use the Macgregor putter which Lee Kuan Yew presented to me in 1961. It is now certainly a collectors' item and an object of envy even if my golf had greatly deteriorated. Among the diplomatic corps, the Tunku had made the golf bugs run wild. The Tunku in a conversation with the President of an Islamic country referred to the President's envoy in Kuala Lumpur as a very good Muslim for "playing" golf five times a day! Even the Soviet Ambassador had taken up the game of the bourgeoisie!

As soon as I got back to Kuala Lumpur, I arranged for the British High Commissioner, Geoffrey Tory, to meet with me at my office where I requested him to pass the Tunku's letter to MacMillan. In the conversation with Tory I expressed my misgivings regarding the attitude of the British officials in the Borneo territories. They were causing a great deal of confusion particularly among the natives who had looked up to the British officials for advice and guidance. Tory assured me that he had been doing a great deal of hard work to persuade the British Government in London to provide a guideline. It was, however, evident that there was no coherence in the thinking in Whitehall. The Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry had not as yet put their heads together.

As Razak was also keen to sit in when Lee Kuan Yew would be meeting with the Tunku, a date was fixed for Lee Kuan Yew to come to Kuala Lumpur when both the Tunku and Razak would be in town. Razak had often talked to me of a confederation which made me feel that he would prefer to deal with Singapore in the context of a confederation instead of a federation and all its implications. Razak seemed to be harbouring a thought that it would be easier to eject Singapore in a confederation than if Singapore was part of the Malaysian Federation.

* * *

A very important leader of Sarawak was then in Kuala Lumpur when I arrived back from Singapore. He was Ahmad Zaidi of Sibu, the leader of the *Barisan Pemuda* of Sarawak. I found him extremely interesting as he revealed the stand taken by the *Barisan Pemuda* with regard to the colonial issues. He wanted to know if I could arrange for some of his youth leaders to train in Malaya.

On the day Zaidi was with me in Kuala Lumpur, another Sarawak leader by the name of Dawi was reported to be forming another political party to oppose the Malaysia Concept because now, Datu Bandar Haji Mustapha the leader of Party Negara, had changed his tune. Zaidi did not believe the story but would do everything possible to persuade Dawi and his friends not to proceed with the idea if it was true. Zaidi that morning had a very long chat

with the Tunku who wanted him to play a major role in the actualisation of Malaysia. This indeed he did.

* * *

The much awaited meeting between Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku took place at the Residency on Thursday September 14. Rajaratnam, Razak and I were present. The discussion opened with the Tunku's enquiry if Lee Kuan Yew had seen the copy of a letter he had sent to MacMillan dated the fourth of September in which several pertinent questions were asked regarding the British attitude towards the integration of the North Borneo territories and Singapore with the Federation, and the question of the Singapore base. Lee Kuan Yew said that he had seen it and that Lord Selkirk had also informed him that the letter had already been sent to London by telegram. However, Selkirk said that it would not be possible for anyone to be given the full authority to discuss on these matters. Lee Kuan Yew then asked the Tunku the date of the visit to London. The Tunku replied that since Lee Kuan Yew was also going to London the visit should be after the Singapore people had decided regarding the merger. There was a need to have a complete understanding on all issues and Singapore and Malayan leaders must speak in one voice at the meeting with MacMillan. For that reason, the Tunku once again suggested that the best way would be to go by sea or at least half the journey where he and Lee Kuan Yew would be able to discuss matters at leisure before reaching London.

Both the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew agreed that the communist threat in Singapore was increasing and could be extremely dangerous. If drastic measures were not taken in Singapore the position in Malaya would worsen within five or six years.

The Tunku asked whether the best way of dealing with the problem was for the PAP Government to go back to the country on the issue of merger. In order to assist Lee Kuan Yew, Kuala Lumpur would issue a statement to the effect that the Federation Government would only accept merger on the terms as stipulated by the PAP. If, as a result, the PAP was defeated it was then obvious that Singapore did not want the merger, but according to his analysis of the situation, the PAP would certainly carry the people of Singapore on that issue.

Razak emphasised that the elections were necessary because it was important to the Federation that not only that the question of merger should be satisfactorily resolved but also the Government which was going to run Singapore would be the one acceptable to the Malayan leadership. If as a result of a referendum, the people had decided for merger, the PAP Government would still have to go through an elections at a later date when the platform would be somewhat weakened since the biggest issue had already been resolved and the result might not turn out to be as desired. After all, he said, people's memories were short and the merger might be followed by the establishment of a government in Singapore which might be undesirable in so

far as Kuala Lumpur was concerned. In short, Razak was interested in the PAP coming in.

Lee Kuan Yew said that he needed more time to think about the Tunku's question regarding elections, since he had not been working along that line. As a preliminary thought, a general elections at this stage would mean that the Singapore Government would fall into the very trap which would be set by the communist elements and the idea of merger would be torpedoed. A general elections would only produce confusion for various reasons. There would be a larger number of candidates with all sorts of platforms and the anti-merger group could easily cloud the issue by emphasising on other matters such as Education or Internal Security which would put the question of merger in the background. Furthermore, the swarm of candidates with all sorts of platforms would in the end split the votes and the island then would have produced a dozen Chedi Jagans.

There was again the question of Lim Yew Hock. It would produce a great deal of setbacks to PAP if SPA and PAP were seem to be working together; in any case the votes would be split. Lee Kuan Yew also expressed the hope that Lim Yew Hock should not be the first to mention about the referendum in Singapore. According to Lee Kuan Yew, Lim Yew Hock was a discredited politician in Singapore but the people respected UMNO a great deal. Lee Kuan Yew himself had suggested to Lim Yew Hock that he should give up politics and be appointed an Ambassador of Singapore, but Lim Yew Hock preferred to be involved in Singapore politics.

On that point, the Tunku thought that he could not let Lim Yew Hock down but he would request Lim Yew Hock not to discuss anything on this matter. The Tunku said that he would discuss with Razak and me regarding the manner by which the matter should be tackled with regard to Lim Yew Hock. If Lim Yew Hock would not listen to him it would be just as well for UMNO Singapore to break away from the Singapore Alliance. After all many UMNO elements in Singapore and in the Federation considered that the Singapore Alliance was a mistake and a dead loss.

Lee Kuan Yew felt that the best approach to the subject was first to work towards the referendum, but this must be done in such a way that the communist elements in Singapore should be taken by surprise. He was, therefore, thinking of introducing the Referendum Bill in the next session of the Assembly which should be on the thirtieth of October. The referendum would then take place immediately after that.

According to Lee Kuan Yew, it was anticipated that there would be a riot in the night of the counting of the referendum since the communists would be extremely agitated and nervous about the whole matter. They would also know that their cause had been lost and they would try their best to make the Government of Singapore and for that matter the Malayan Government pay the highest price.

However, the whole purpose of the referendum was to get the people's decision on the question of merger; on that issue Lee Kuan Yew was 100 percent confident that the people of Singapore would decide in favour of merger. Lee Kuan Yew had been working on the arithmetic that 15% of the population of Singapore were Malays, 10% Indians and 10% English educated Chinese. Thus he was certain of their support for merger and it would not be too difficult for him to get the other 17% from the educated Chinese, who would belong to the class of shopkeepers, Chinese clerical assistants and the like.

Lee Kuan Yew thought that it was important that this referendum should first take place because once the people of Singapore had decided on the merger it would be easier for stern measures to be taken against those subversive elements because such a step could be justified on the ground of national security, whereas any steps taken now to clobber them would be associated with the presence of the British in Singapore and the whole issue would be regarded as colonial measures. After the cleansing operation had taken place the merger would then take place with those subversive elements safely tucked away.

If elections were to take place now before the cleansing or if no cleansing operation should take place after the merger decision, according to Lee Kuan Yew, confirmed communists who had no popular support would use front organisations to gain support for them. However, if these front organisations were smashed after the merger decision when elections took place, fellow travellers and sympathisers would find they had no legs to stand on.

The aim of an early merger decision even before elections was the signal for the removal of the British flag in Singapore. Should stern measures be taken before the merger decision, it would be easier for the communists to stir up international sympathy since the whole matter could be twisted as a human rights issue in a British colony. The matter might be referred to the United Nations and other world forums and there might even be an international conference or a commission to deal with Singapore. On the other hand, once the British sovereignty was transferred any action taken would be regarded as internal affairs and international implications could no longer arise.

Lee Kuan Yew said that it was his aim in life to serve the country and to protect it from those elements who might wish to ruin Malaya and Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew thought that the PAP was in an advantageous position at that moment since the communists had come up with the proposal of either a confederation or a complete merger. The referendum which Lee Kuan Yew had in mind would be a simple issue of choosing a merger according to the PAP's terms which had the advantage of autonomy in several matters including education and labour or a complete merger. The Chinese in Singapore would certainly not bargain for a complete merger and the communists knew this but they used it because the communists knew that the Tunku did not want a complete merger.

Razak expressed scepticism on the feasibility of such an arrangement. Nevertheless, Lee Kuan Yew thought that his idea would succeed. I was more inclined to the "referendum" proposal made by Lee Kuan Yew.

The question now, therefore, was to decide on what the merger plan was. That of course should be exploratory in nature. After reference to the Constitution of Ulster it was agreed that Singapore should be treated on the same line as Ulster except for a few variations in particular the power relating to the police which in Ulster was in the hands of the Ulster Government.

The question of the State list for Singapore was raised and the Tunku said that it would be open to Lee Kuan Yew to suggest what the State list might be and for the Working Committee to work on. Lee Kuan Yew suggested that based on population, it would be better to have separate citizenships for Singapore from that of the rest of the Federation. This would make it easier to determine the franchise and thereby contain the politics of Singapore.

The Tunku referred to a press statement made by David Marshall in Sydney on the August 13 which Marshall had regarded the way the PAP Government was handling the merger question by making Singapore citizens as second-class citizens. The Tunku said that this matter would be extremely important and therefore a great deal of attention must be paid to the question of citizenship. It was agreed that the proposal to have separate citizenships for Singapore and for the rest of the Federation equal in status with a single nationality and with rights confined to each territory merited serious consideration.

The Tunku suggested that the merger should be effected in such a way that the interests of the Malays should be well protected. Lee Kuan Yew agreed with this view since he thought that it would be most important not to upset the strong native base in the Federation.

In view of the large number of subjects contained in the Singapore list it was agreed by both Prime Ministers that the Singapore representation in the Federal Parliament should not be on the same basis as the other States of the Federation. Having taken the various population figures Lee Kuan Yew suggested 15 seats for the Federal Parliament but Razak thought that 10 would be adequate. The Tunku, however, said that approximately 14 would be the right answer.

Lee Kuan Yew said that out of the number of seats in Singapore he was certain that three would go to Singapore UMNO.

Both Lee Kuan Yew and Rajaratnam expressed the same opinion that in the end, maybe in five years' time, the Federation Government should take over education and labour and treat Singapore as one of the other States. They feared that if education were perpetually kept separate for Singapore it would serve as a nursery for the breeding of undesirable elements which would disrupt the programme for the building of a united nation and a single national consciousness. The Tunku agreed with this view but at the same time he said that one should not lose sight of the Malays whose interest should be

protected and this question of the merger of Singapore must be tied up with the question of Malaysia.

After further discussion it was finally agreed that the trip to London which was at first contemplated to be taken by the Tunku together with Lee Kuan Yew should be postponed until after the referendum. However, it was decided that the Tunku should go alone to the United Kingdom to obtain from MacMillan a firm line on the question of Malaysia, and this should be done before the referendum. The British Government should be persuaded to give an unequivocal commitment of the question of the North Borneo territories.

It was also agreed by both the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew that the impression must always be left in the minds of the people that the merger and Malaysia were inevitable. However, in working out the merger plan both sides should emphasise that all legitimate local and special interests of the people in the various territories concerned could be safeguarded within the framework of merger and Malaysia plan.

Lee Kuan Yew regarded it a heaven-sent element when the drought took place in Singapore because, according to him and Rajaratnam, it was one of the strongest points which made the Singapore people realise that they could not exist by themselves without the supply of water from Johore and the idea of merger could not be avoided.

However, merger according to the two Prime Ministers, would be favoured by the people in Singapore as well as in Malaya for different reasons. An opinion among certain Chinese on both sides of the causeway was that the number of Chinese would be enlarged as a consequence of such a merger and, therefore, the Chinese influence would be proportionately enlarged in the country as a whole.

Lee Kuan Yew maintained that a referendum and not a general elections on the question of merger would appear to be the better way of handling the situation.

The Tunku, in conclusion, then said that it would be entirely left to Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore PAP leaders to decide whether to have a general elections or a referendum first, and he was quite willing to make a statement at the right time to the effect that he would only agree to merger on the basis of the PAP proposals.

That afternoon a game of golf was arranged for Lee Kuan Yew. After that I took him and Rajaratnam to Kajang for satay. We were completely incognito although I was careful to let the security people ensure that it was safe for Lee Kuan Yew and Rajaratnam.

The following day after golf, another meeting between the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew took place but this time it was more or less to confirm what was discussed the previous day. Once again I witnessed the Tunku in an emotional mood. I did not understand how he got into that state of mind. The Tunku lamented the fact that Malaya was very short of effective Chinese leaders. Tan Siew Sin was a very sincere and clever man but he could not speak any

Chinese dialect to be really influential among the Chinese masses. I could not help noticing that the Tunku had a special liking for Lee Kuan Yew and perhaps would consider it a good fortune if he could get a person like Lee Kuan Yew to assist him in the management of politics among the Chinese community in the new Malaysia. The Tunku wanted Lee Kuan Yew as a leader of the Chinese in Malaysia. It was then that I understood why the Tunku became emotional during the meeting of the August 23 when he talked of not wanting Razak to inherit problems.

The Tunku had invited Lee Kuan Yew alone for drinks at the Residency with him that evening.

Lee Kuan Yew did not leave for Singapore until the evening of Saturday, the September 16. There was golf everyday. At the lunch on Saturday, Lee Kuan Yew suggested that education should not be left with Singapore for too long after the merger. The Federation, he said, should take it over; otherwise there might be trouble. He did not elaborate nor did the others ask him to do so.

* * *

I met Datu Mustapha in Singapore on September 18, 1961. He handed me a list of people of North Borneo who should be invited to visit the Peninsula. In the course of the conversation he said the British Government had played out Donald Stephens by sending him to the United Kingdom to attend the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting. The colonial officials were now working to split the Kadazan by saying that Donald Stephens was not a real Kadazan. As a result the United National Kadazan Organisation had been split into three factions, one following Stephens, another Gani Gilong and yet another following Sundang. Mustapha also revealed that he was offered two million ringgit by a wealthy Chinese to organise a political party which would espouse the idea of Malaysia to go slow but he had refused it. The Chinese leadership would prefer to hang on to the colonial administration but if pressured they would change. This reminded me of my meetings in Sandakan.

Datu Mustapha said he had been busy organising public opinion and there would be resolutions from *kampung* meetings regarding their support for the Malaysia Concept and that it should be realised as quickly as possible. He was now organising a political party but needed funds. He had about 100,000 Malayan Ringgit, but that would not be enough. He also wanted to have some of his party workers trained. He wanted UMNO to send a legal man to assist his party. Mustapha expressed the hope that he could unite all the Muslim associations and native associations to be affiliated to his political party by the end of October 1961.

I advised Mustapha that he should cultivate a firm relationship with Donald Stephens and join forces to bring together the natives of North Borneo; the strength and base of any political party in North Borneo must be

with the native people there. The Chinese would certainly join them if they noticed that the natives were united and strong. Mustapha agreed with me that he should be on the friendliest terms with Donald Stephens. He, however, asked if he could get an adviser since he admitted he was completely in the raw with regard to the new political development. I said I would assist him to get what he wanted. On the question of financial support for his political activities which I thought was the main purpose of the exercise, I promised that I would speak to the Tunku who might have to bring the matter up with the UMNO Executive Council.

Lee Kuan Yew had invited Datu Mustapha and me to dinner at Temasik. Dr. Goh Keng Swee and Toh Chin Chye were also present. Mustapha was very candid with his opinion about the Chinese and Lee Kuan Yew handled the situation marvellously. I overheard Mustapha suggesting to Lee Kuan Yew that Singapore should join the Federation only after the Borneo territories and the Peninsula had formed Malaysia. It would then be easier for Lee Kuan Yew to lay down conditions for the Singapore Chinese entry into North Borneo.

* * *

In the meantime the whole nation had to be fully made aware of the Malaysia Concept. Quite soon, the concept would have to be debated in Parliament. The ground work had to be prepared.

A meeting of the Ministry of Information officials was held. Led by Zainal Abidin Sulong, the officials decided that a full record of the Malaysia Consultative Committee meetings should be made into a documentary film for exhibition all over the country. Ways and means were also to be found to get the films distributed and shown in Singapore and the Borneo territories. Dol Ramli, the Head of Broadcasting would work out the possibility of beaming Radio Malaya broadcast towards North Borneo, Singapore and Indonesia. These officers were extremely upbeat and professionally came out with many brilliant ideas.

It was quite amusing in the beginning when many of the information officials had regarded the whole exercise to be a psychological warfare as if the whole scheme was colonial. Soon the matter was corrected and it was reported to me later they were quite relieved that we were not on a colonial rampage. Zainal Abidin Sulong did not miss this point and together with Ambassador Mohammed Sophe, the information chief in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a very careful guideline was worked out.

This was extremely important also when foreign governments and correspondents had to be briefed. Not all foreign government representatives in Kuala Lumpur understood what the Malaysia Concept was all about.

I was quite pleased in the course of a private conversation with a senior staff of the Australian High Commission that his government, having understood fully the Malaysia plan, was anxious that Malaysia should be

realised as soon as possible. He said in confidence that his government had been urging the British Government to respond positively to the Malaysia Concept.

At the academic institutions, one of the senior staff of the Foreign Ministry, Zainal Abidin Wahid was tasked to deal with them and it must be acknowledged that he did brilliantly in seminars and other intellectual centres. He eventually left the Ministry and became an illustrious professor of history in one of our leading universities.

The delegations from the Borneo territories, including Brunei, had been streaming into Kuala Lumpur visiting Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) schemes, being briefed in the development operations room by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and being entertained by Ministers. The highlight of each visit was the meeting with the Tunku who never missed to see them and openly discussed with them their fate and future. Delegations included Government officials both local and expatriates and members of non-governmental organisations.

One of those who impressed me a great deal was an Iban by the name of Bennet Jarrow. He came from one of the remotest parts of Sarawak and was most resplendent with his long hair and bright intelligent face. It was Bennet Jarrow who suggested to me and later to the Tunku that Temenggong Jugah was ready to meet with the Tunku but it would be most effective if the Tunku would invite Jugah as his personal guest. This idea was accepted by the Tunku without reservations.

* * *

Amidst all these, I should mention the interest of the foreign newspapers which had been watching the development and also venturing to write articles and editorials. That particular aspect was dealt with by Zainal Abidin Sulong and Mohammed Sopiee who through briefs to our representatives abroad and foreign correspondents based in Kuala Lumpur had been feeding and enlightening their editors with facts. At no stage were foreign editors and senior staff writers simply given handouts without an opportunity to discuss their contents.

We had many visits of newspaper senior representatives from interested countries like the United States, Britain, India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. This in part was due to the colonial connection and trade relations. The defence arrangement also attracted a great deal of attention in the United States. In particular, Singapore was very much in the limelight and to the US the question of the British base in Singapore was most vital.

However, from Australia I found one political correspondent revealing a concern and the remedial measure Australians might have had. The line he proposed was that if Malaya would support the idea of an independent West New Guinea to serve as a buffer between Indonesia and Australia, the

Australian public would be supportive of the Malaysia Concept. I found the idea somewhat bizarre and in view of what I had heard from the Australian official which assured Malaya his Government's support for the Malaysia Concept I did not care to address my mind seriously on such poppycock which if responded to would make a headline out of a non-issue.

* * *

Quite often, I was asked why I had used the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur as the channel of communication with the UK Government rather than the Malayan High Commissioner in London. This sort of question came from Malayan Government ministers and senior officials. I had to admit that it would not have been usual if the subject was an ordinary diplomatic matter. However, I had to choose this channel because I wanted very much the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur to be thoroughly knowledgeably involved and to feel that they were part of the exercise. It was quite a simple matter for me or Zainal Abidin Sulong to call the High Commissioner or one of his senior staff to brief them who in turn would have easy access to us. In London the procedure would have been different since the Malaysia Concept was treated as one of those many subjects, and the Malayan High Commissioner would not get a priority treatment. It had been tried a couple of times but the call by the Malayan High Commission had been given rather low priority. By dealing with the UK High Commission in Kuala Lumpur or Selkirk's office in Singapore it could be certain that any matter raised would receive the highest attention and consideration in London. Of course we keep our London High Commission informed of every move in case a British official wanted some clarification from our London High Commissioner.

* * *

The letter from the Tunku to Harold MacMillan which I delivered to the British High Commissioner on September 21, 1961 contained a suggestion by the Tunku that a meeting between them should be held soon in order to obtain a firm commitment on the future of the British Borneo territories in the context of the Malaysia Concept. In the conversation I had with the High Commissioner, I emphasised the importance of the firm commitment by the British before a statement from Lee Kuan Yew which might be made on the thirtieth of October. I told the High Commissioner that as Lee Kuan Yew would be talking of the Singapore-Malaya merger he should be in a position to say that Malaysia was on track with a clear indication that the merger was part and parcel of the Malaysia plan. I admitted to him that as far as Malaya was concerned that was the furthest the Government could agree to an idea of the Singapore-Malaya merger.

I took the opportunity again to tell Sir Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner, that the Malayan Government would very much wish to see a

coordinated approach on the part of Whitehall on the subject. It seemed to me then that there were three levels of activity. One was on the ground with the Governors and their British officials who worked towards the formation of a Federation of the British North Borneo territories which had been the old colonial policy and that they would procrastinate on the Malaysia Concept. Secondly, the Selkirk level was thinking a great deal in terms of SEATO in which the British should not be in a position to lose its place as an effective member in relation to the United States. The loss of the use of the Singapore base for SEATO after the Singapore merger would bring about the loss of British influence in SEATO. And thirdly, the Whitehall level which again had three factions namely the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Ministry of Defence. It appeared to me that in a while HMG would simply say that it was up to the people "there" to decide. I urged the High Commissioner to take it up with Whitehall to sort this out to avoid uncertainties and confusion. The High Commissioner once again pleaded for understanding that he was very much in sympathy with my concern but he had been working under a very serious handicap due to the office of the Commissioner for Southeast Asia. After all, the British had to depend on Selkirk and the Governors' reports regarding the Borneo territories.

* * *

In reply to the Tunku's letter, Harold MacMillan had asked the British High Commissioner to see the Tunku with the oral message that what the British Government could say then was no more than to leave to the people in the Borneo territories to decide. It would be most difficult at that stage for MacMillan to sign on the dotted line giving away the Borneo territories without the support of the people of Borneo. The High Commissioner said that MacMillan would be voted out of office if he did that.

I was present at that meeting and the Tunku's reply was simply that there would be no purpose in going to London for a meeting if the British Government could not give a firm commitment on the Malaysia Concept. He certainly did not expect more than that. The Tunku reminded the High Commissioner that it would be a mistake if the British thought of dealing with the question of Singapore merger alone. Singapore was never to be taken in isolation but that it was part and parcel of the Malaysia Concept.

The High Commissioner was trembling; he was most shaken by the response. I said to Geoffrey Tory in a very conciliatory manner that I had already told him the Tunku's line of thought at the time when I delivered to him the message to MacMillan from the Tunku. Probably the point was not passed to London; perhaps in Tory's view it was simply my personal opinion.

The Tunku once again said that it was most unproductive for him to go to London simply to hear what the British attitude would be and to return with nothing. The Tunku assured the High Commissioner that he was willing to go but only if the British side was prepared to say that they would transfer

sovereignty of the Borneo territories of course contingent upon the wishes of the people which also was a *sine quo non* to the Malayan Government. The Tunku informed the High Commissioner that the British colonial officials on the ground in the Borneo territories were working in different directions. To the Tunku, the idea of Malaysia was not as important as the security, peace and wellbeing of the people of Malaya. In fact, he told the High Commissioner rather candidly, in the most charming manner defying any negative misinterpretation to the effect that it was not really a good bargain to take in the three Borneo territories at the price of Singapore; there was little that could be gained from the exercise. However, he would write to MacMillan once again to suggest that MacMillan should visit those territories and he would invite MacMillan to stop over in Malaya. He then instructed me to draft a letter to MacMillan to reiterate his stand on the Malaysia concept and Singapore and the issue of the transfer of sovereignty of the Borneo territories.

Sir Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner, called at 11.00 a.m. on September 27, 1961. It was cabinet day and I had already sent a report of the exchanges between the Tunku and MacMillan regarding Singapore and Malaysia to cabinet for information. Tory told me that he had sent a telegram to London on the conversation with the Tunku the day before.

Tory also told me he felt that what the Tunku said did make a great deal of sense and agreed that the Tunku would not find it possible to go to London without a firm commitment. Further, he said, he had great faith in the Tunku who would be able to pull something out. He then told me that the reports of the Borneo Governors were disheartening. He said the people of North Borneo and Sarawak were still thinking according to the Governors, in terms of a North Borneo Federation. When I pressed for further explanation Tory admitted that the Governors were talking in terms of what the Chinese businessmen said. He also mentioned to me that Datu Mustapha of North Borneo had told William Goode that independence for North Borneo would mean that the Chinese of North Borneo would overwhelm the native people and Malaysia would mean that the Chinese from Sarawak and Singapore would add on to the Chinese problem of North Borneo.

I told him that the colonial officials were definitely interpreting the situation to bring about a procrastination of the formation of Malaysia. I was quite certain that the Chinese in those territories were also on a go slow for two reasons: firstly, because they feared that with Malaysia, their monopoly in business would meet with serious competition from Chinese capital from the other parts of Malaysia particularly Singapore; secondly, because they knew that the colonial official line of action was also "go slow" on the Malaysia Concept. However, if the British colonial officials on the ground were to insist that Malaysia was a good thing and was to be done quickly the British would find that the Chinese would change their attitude.

With regard to Datu Mustapha, I said that his salvation was in Malaysia, not in the Federation of North Borneo because through Malaysia the native

interests would be protected. This I knew the Datu had understood and appreciated since the Malaysia Concept envisaged that the position of the Malays would be extended to all the indigenous peoples of Malaysia. Perhaps that part of Datu Mustapha's view was not reported to London. From my observation, Datu Mustapha was a native leader with the instinct of the oppressed. He could be running with the hare and chasing with the hounds. He had told Lee Kuan Yew something and he could tell me something else. But he had a very high sense of responsibility although he could easily commit errors of judgement.

Tory said he appreciated that and throwing up his hands said that there was precious little that he could do in Kuala Lumpur since London would only listen to the governors who were sent by them to report on the local situation. Anything the High Commissioner might say would carry no weight. He sounded rather pathetic and helpless. I told the High Commissioner that the Tunku would be writing a letter to MacMillan and the draft had already gone up to the Tunku. I thought he felt somewhat comforted when I said that I fully appreciated his difficulties in spite of which he had been extremely helpful.

At 12.00 noon I went to see the Tunku and told him about the conversation I had with the High Commissioner. I had made a draft of the response to the message of MacMillan. We went through it together. The Tunku was determined that the British should give him an answer.

That afternoon, P.P. Narayanan the most senior labour leader in the country, came to see me. He said that on his way back through Singapore he was met by Woodhull, Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan and another person. They appeared to be anxious to know what the attitude of the Malayan Trade Unions was towards the Malaysia Concept. Narayanan told them that merger, according to *Barisan Sosialis* (Socialist Front), would find no support in Malaya because the non-Malays were resisting since the citizens of Singapore would be in a better position than the citizens of Malaya in view of the qualifications for citizenship. Strange enough, according to Narayanan, these people condemned the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) when talking to him knowing well that he was its Regional Chairman. He asked me for my opinion if he should allow himself to be interviewed by these people from time to time. I encouraged him to do so as the Regional Chairman of the ICFTU could not avoid meeting trade union leaders of any colour or creed anywhere.

* * *

I invited Sir Geoffrey Tory at 11.00 o'clock on the twenty-eight of September to meet with me at my office and delivered him a letter to Harold MacMillan signed by the Tunku in which the Tunku wanted a firm commitment from the British Government on the Malaysian issue. That letter also suggested that if MacMillan wanted to know the opinion of the local people then he should visit

the North Borneo territories and Malaya. If this was not possible he should invite the North Borneo territory leaders and Lee Kuan Yew to London for a discussion.

I once again stressed to the High Commissioner the importance of getting a firm commitment on this matter and I found that Tory was a bit more forthcoming. He said that the British had accepted the principles of the Malaysia Plan and that HMG would agree to cooperate with the Malayan Government in commending Malaysia to the Borneo territories with a view to bringing it into effect, if possible by 1963, subject to the British obtaining an assurance that the people of the Borneo territories would support the Malaysia Concept. The British Government, he said, also would undertake to transfer sovereignty over these territories to the Federation simultaneously with, if not before, that of Singapore. I sent a minute to the Prime Minister to that effect.

The Prime Minister had told me the previous day that Lee Kuan Yew would be coming on September 29 with Goh Keng Swee and no doubt they would be discussing the latest developments in Singapore. I had hoped my minute to the Prime Minister would be useful regarding what we should do.

* * *

I went to the airport to meet Lee Kuan Yew at 10.30 a.m. on September 29 and Razak was also there. Razak together with Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and I went straight to the Prime Minister's house. The Tunku told Lee Kuan Yew that he would not be going to London until the British had made up their mind about Malaysia. However, he told Lee Kuan Yew that there had been a change within the last 24 hours. He told Lee Kuan Yew about the minute which I wrote to him regarding the British stand. The important thing, of course, was that the United Kingdom would now be ready to cooperate in commending Malaysia to the Borneo territories.

Lee Kuan Yew said that he had met Lord Selkirk before he came; Selkirk was on his way to Sarawak to attend the intra-regional meeting at Kuching. Selkirk had told Lee Kuan Yew that the Tunku should not think that he (the Tunku) had been used by the British. Neither Tunku nor I understood what Selkirk meant. Lord Selkirk had MacMillan's assurance that MacMillan was personally interested in the issue. That was why he was prepared to see the Tunku at that stage even when he was busy with Berlin, the Common Market and other serious matters. Lord Selkirk said that the people of Borneo should not be rushed into Malaysia but if the Borneo territories agreed then the United Kingdom would certainly accept. Selkirk must have received the same instruction as Tory had which was in part conveyed to me.

The main question then was how to get the signal from the Borneo people that they would agree. After further deliberations, it was decided that Lee Kuan Yew should go to London to tell the British of the urgency of the problem. Lee Kuan Yew also agreed to send a message to Selkirk in Kuching




PLATE 1 The Prime Minister reading the Malaysia Proclamation in the Merdeka Stadium, Kuala Lumpur.




PLATE 2 British Premier, Mr. Harold MacMillan, and Tunku Abdul Rahman during their first meeting on the formation of Malaysia in London, 20th November, 1961. On MacMillan's left is Tun Razak. Mr. Duncan Sandys, is on Tunku's right.



PLATE 3 Tun Abdul Razak



PLATE 4 Tunku Abdul Rahman




PLATE 5 Tun Tan Siew Sin



PLATE 6 Lord Cobbold




PLATE 7 S. Rajaratnam




PLATE 8 Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister and Goh Keng Swee, the Minister of Finance, Singapore.




PLATE 9 Sir Anthony Abell (right) and Sir David Watherston (left)




PLATE 10 Guest at the Celebration in Kuching, Sarawak. From left to right Mr Teo Kui Seng, Minister of Natural Resources, Mrs. Taib and Mr. Abdul Taib Mahmud, Minister of Communication and Works, Temenggong Jugah, Dr. and Mrs. Sockalingam and Hj. Yusoff, the Tuan Imam.




PLATE 11 Lord Cobbold, Chairman of the Malaysian Commission of Enquiry accompanied by Lady Cobbold and two British members of the commission. Sir Anthony Abell and Sir David Watherston, made a brief stop at Kuala Lumpur on Feb 18 1963, on their way to Borneo. Picture shows the Federation's Deputy Minister Interior, Mr. Mohd Ismail Mohd Yusof (right) greeting Lord Cobbold at the tarmac. Sir Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner is in the middle and Lady Cobbold can be seen to the left.




PLATE 12 United Nation's Commission (Sarawak Group) on their first session in Simanggang on 26 August 1963. Sitting at the centre table are observers from Great Britain and Malaysia. Observers from Indonesia and Philippine were absent.



PLATE 13 Lord Cobbold (left) with Zaiton Ibrahim bin Ahmad (right)



PLATE 14 Mr and Mrs. Ong Kee Hui



PLATE 15 His Excellency the Governor is sworn in



PLATE 16 Tan Sri Zainal Abidin Sulong, Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.




PLATE 17 Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee, 8 January 1962, Kuala Lumpur.




PLATE 18 Cobbold Commission, from left. Ghazali Shafie; Wong Pow Nee; Lord Cobbold, Sir David Watherston and Sir Anthony Abell.



PLATE 19 Ong Yoke Lin



PLATE 20 Malcolm Macdonald



PLATE 21 Sukarno



PLATE 22 Dato Setia Pengiran M. Yusof



PLATE 23 Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie



PLATE 24 Tun Tan Cheng Lock



PLATE 25 Lim Yew Hock



PLATE 26 David Marshall




PLATE 27 Azahari



PLATE 28 Yusof Ishak



PLATE 29 Donald Stephens



PLATE 30 Returned after London talks on Malaysia. Right to left: Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Tan Siew Sin, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew.




PLATE 31 Picture of United Nations's Commission (Sabah Group) taken in the Ranau Court on Monday 26 August 1963. In the middle is Mr. George Jenecek, Head of the group. On his right are Mr. Irshad Bagai, and Mr. George Howard. On Jenecek's left are Mr. Yokushi Akashi and Mrs. Richardson, the group secretary.

to say that he had met the Tunku and heard the report regarding the Tunku-MacMillan exchanges. He would then tell Selkirk that he was most perturbed about developments. The British should make up their mind quickly, otherwise all would be lost. He himself would pack up and go.

I had lunch with Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee. I gathered that Lee Kuan Yew had met Tory just before lunch and had informed Tory to tell Selkirk about what he discussed in the morning with the Tunku. I asked him what he felt about the threat of the communists organising strikes in Singapore. He said he was not at all perturbed by it because what he did then was to go through the workers and say, "Let us have a meeting and tell us your grouses, not through the Trade Union leaders." That was the reason why the strikes at Robinsons and Shaws had fizzled out.

After lunch, I returned to my office and was horrified to read a message from Donald Stephens that Datu Mustapha had told the Colonial Under-Secretary that Malaysia should only come in another five or ten years. Stephens had gathered this from an authentic source. This worried me because it was somewhat similar with what Tory told me regarding the report by Goode. I prayed that the Datu was not playing a double game and I was quite prepared to continue to believe him until it had been proven to the contrary. I would certainly put him to task when I meet him next. Nevertheless, I must admit I had my nagging doubt about the good Datu who was quite capable of saying all things to all men.

Donald Stephens said that he himself wanted Malaysia as soon as possible, but from what he gathered from the people of North Borneo, the country must first attain self-government. He believed that if the British wanted to see Malaysia established they could do it. All these were tied to the British Governor and officers on the ground. He would therefore urge that the Tunku should see MacMillan. A referendum with Borneo territories, he said, would be a bad thing because the British officials would do all sorts of tricks. Donald Stephens said he was the only chap left to defend the idea of early Malaysia. If he and Datu Mustapha could pass a resolution in the State Legislative Assembly, things would be different. I decided to speak with Datu Mustapha.

That night, in view of the fact the Tunku, Razak and Dr. Ismail were all engaged, I took Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee to dinner.

I had prepared a draft communiqué for the two Prime Ministers. At 12 o'clock on Saturday the thirtieth of September the two Prime Ministers met once again. Razak was not there. Lee Kuan Yew reported to the Tunku that he had met Tory and had informed him about the importance of knowing the British attitude towards the question of Malaysia in order to have a clear cut line regarding a Singapore merger. He told the Tunku that he formed the impression that Tory was very positive towards the Malaysia Concept and that he was most helpful. Lee Kuan Yew also asked the Tunku that if for some reason or another the British Government was going to play some delaying tactics he would try to put some pressure. Lee Kuan Yew said he could make

some form of press statement warning the British in that direction. The Tunku simply replied that Lee Kuan Yew could say anything he wished.

The draft communiqué was then given to the two Prime Ministers who accepted it with a minor amendment. I presented it to Frank Sullivan, the PM's Press Secretary for publication.

I thought Lee Kuan Yew did not appear to be very composed that day. He was talking at an unusually fast speed all the time; perhaps he was agitated believing that the British Government had already crystallised its opinion. I should have mentioned that we received that morning a message from London saying that Harold MacMillan had agreed that there must be early progress and he was consulting his cabinet. We shared this bit of news with Lee Kuan Yew and probably upset Lee Kuan Yew because the communication did not say anything at all regarding the Malaysia Concept and the Singapore merger. This appeared to confirm the suspicion that the British Government had never applied its mind to the question of Malaysia or the merger and their implications.

At lunch Lee Kuan Yew and Razak who had come to join the two Prime Ministers exchanged opinion regarding Selkirk. Nothing very complimentary was said about his lordship. Lee Kuan Yew was still fuming. He wanted to publicise the story of my lunch with Selkirk in Singapore. I had then related to Lee Kuan Yew that at my last meeting with Selkirk, his lordship was seen to be restless at lunch and said he was going to play golf, which gave me the hint that I should leave early. In actual fact he was not going golfing at all; he was preparing to meet Lim Chin Siong. Goh Keng Swee advised Lee Kuan Yew not to have the story published. I sighed with relief as Lee Kuan Yew agreed since I did not want the incident to be public knowledge then.

At the airport press interview at 3 p.m. Lee Kuan Yew lashed at the British by saying that he would put the heat on the British if they tried to delay the merger. He told the press that the Tunku was cheesed off because of the British procrastination over the merger and the formation of Malaysia.

* * *

That night I went to dinner as a guest of an assistant minister, Haji Khalid who was entertaining *Barisan Pemuda* (Youth Front) and the *Wanita Sarawak* (Sarawak Women). I found that the Sarawak group was most enthusiastic regarding Malaysia. However, my dinner was somewhat spoiled by Khalid's stupidity in asking Zainal Abidin Sulong as to the financial aspect of the dinner in the presence of our guests. I had to abruptly change the subject.

This group of people were five in number: a Melanau couple Abang Louis Barieng and his wife Pauline. Abang Louis was a man of great character and a born leader. He was then a government clerk. His wife was an ardent social worker in Sibü. The Sibü Malay man was a very strong member of *Barisan Pemuda* and the Malay woman was a social worker. There was a Chinese who was a lorry driver but an official of the Government Drivers Union. He was a

keen supporter of *Barisan Pemuda*. They were extremely attracted to the Malaysia Concept which would bring independence to Sarawak; and they were most eager to learn. I found them highly intelligent and I thought they would be very helpful in actualising the Malaysia Concept and indeed might play some important roles in their future country - Malaysia.

* * *

It was Sunday morning the first of October. I had gone to the airport to bid farewell to Razak who was going to Japan. The Prime Minister was also there. After Razak had left the Tunku asked me to see him at his house and it was already a quarter to eleven. At the Residency we discussed Lee Kuan Yew's statement to the press and the Tunku said it was rather a harsh statement. I suggested that I should tell Lee Kuan Yew what he thought. I also told the Tunku that Lee Kuan Yew had telephoned me before I came to the airport to say that he was going to see Lord Selkirk the next day and would tell almost the same thing officially to Selkirk.

The Tunku remarked that Lee Kuan Yew had appeared to be agitated this time when they met. Nevertheless, his statement to the press perhaps would serve some purpose. He thought that if queried by the British the best line would be to say we did not know anything of what Lee Kuan Yew wanted to say and the statement was entirely his own. It was then that I changed my mind about informing Lee Kuan Yew regarding what the Tunku thought of his statement.

When I arrived home after the meeting with the Tunku, I found a group of people from Sarawak were in my house having morning coffee with Tijah, my wife. They left me in no doubt that they were all for Malaysia and would do anything to achieve it. I joined the group for lunch with Ismail, the Assistant Minister and his wife.

* * *

My mind was all agog to think that Lee Kuan Yew was going to have a confrontation with Selkirk. I was extremely apprehensive that in the heat of the moment unnecessary words would be exchanged which might not be helpful. However, I had sufficient confidence that Lee Kuan Yew would handle it well which of course did not reduce my curiosity to know what actually would transpire between the two.

Lee Kuan Yew rang up from Singapore on the October 4. He said that he had spoken with Lord Selkirk on Monday and told him everything what he felt about the part the British had played. According to Lee Kuan Yew, Selkirk looked worried and white and Lee Kuan Yew made no bones about the fact that if any hitch should arise and if things appeared unsatisfactory, the British alone would be to blame. As far as the Singapore Government was concerned they were going ahead with the present plan. Lee Kuan Yew said Selkirk

appeared to have understood the position perfectly now and something would soon be forthcoming from London.

* * *

At about 4.00 p.m. on the same day Lee Kuan Yew spoke to me, Tory had rung up saying that a message from MacMillan for the Tunku had arrived. The message was delivered to the office and I read it with a mixed feeling. I took it up to the Tunku immediately and explained to him what I felt. In that message MacMillan said that he was disturbed that the Tunku did not wish to come to London to meet with him until there was firm commitment. Nevertheless, he wanted the Tunku to come to London. He said he welcomed the concept of Malaysia, but in another part of the letter he said the visit would be necessary to clarify the constitutional position of the Borneo territories. That I thought was odd because we had already explained in a memorandum what the constitutional position would be. There had been no request for clarification which suggested that nobody had ever applied his mind to the subject until then. MacMillan's message also attached a draft joint communiqué in which some very clever wordings were put in. However, there was a great deal of progress made and the Tunku acknowledged that.

The Tunku said that since he had already agreed to go to Vietnam on the twentieth he would find it difficult to go to London on the twenty-third and therefore suggested that he would make the trip some time during the first week of November. I was then to draft a reply to MacMillan saying that the Tunku would be prepared to go. Emphasis should be made that time was of the utmost importance. The Tunku then asked me to golf with him and it was already 5 o'clock and we did not start our game until about 5.45 p.m. and completed only six holes when darkness prevented us from continuing.

That night the Tunku entertained the nine members of Party Negara of Sarawak delegation who was on a visit here and also the five from Sibiu who belonged to *Barisan Pemuda*. The Tunku was in good form and I thought the Sarawakians were extremely impressed.

* * *

The one character in North Borneo I was very much attracted to among others was Datu Mustapha. He was a natural leader with a charisma which I thought was a rare commodity. He was also a political person and extremely shrewd. In the early days of my knowing him he had no idea as to how to deal with colonial officials. I had observed him once or twice talking in a kind of double entendre with the colonial officials and even with Stephens. Consequently, he was regarded with suspicion. For instance, he once told the Chief Secretary that what North Borneo needed was economic development and in the course of the conversation he mentioned that he did not want a federation of Borneo States. Stephens having heard from the Chief Secretary that he made no

mention of Malaysia surmised that Mustapha did not support the Malaysia Concept. Hence Stephens told me that Mustapha was a strange fellow. Of course Stephens also regarded him as a political rival.

My early opinion of the man was that he lacked self-confidence and would prefer to play safe. However, as I got to know him better, I began to appreciate his quality of leadership and native instinct. He had a complex when it came to formal modern education since he had none; he would talk on the matter in a kind of inverted arrogance.

He was schooled in the real world of the pirate-infested Sulu Seas where his ancestors had ruled. He had fought the Japanese occupation and had the highest respect and regard for British rule and laws. He was at once modest and proud in the true tradition of a Malay. In the beginning of our acquaintanceship he spoke rather indirectly with innuendos and imagery as a Malay would with a stranger.

The first few times I met him I was impressed by his kindness and generosity. He was always with a number of men when he moved about in North Borneo. These men were his ardent sidekicks and loyal followers. Like the old Malay gentry, he had his share of leeches and lice. Mustapha had that rare quality of being able to inspire blind loyalty among those Borneo coastal dwellers and islanders. He was literate in the sense he could read and write in Jawi and romanised Malay and the Koran but had little knowledge of written English. He spoke a number of dialects of the Sulu Sea. He had worked once in a lowly post for the Chartered Company which administered North Borneo and that made him the one-eyed king in the country of the blind!

I had the vision that Mustapha would one day lead the whole of North Borneo. However, he had to be polished and tutored. He was sensitive and had to be treated with tremendous care. He was not unintelligent but needed to have his complexes removed in particular his special regard for the colonial administrators who flattered and bullied him without him knowing their wiles and exploitations. This attitude of his made him appear subservient to the colonial masters.

My first close encounter which began a history of the closest relationship with Mustapha was on the afternoon of October 7, 1961. That morning I had a very busy time because the Singapore-Malaya working party was in town. I also had to prepare for the Tunku a message for MacMillan to be handed through the acting High Commissioner of Britain in Kuala Lumpur.

I was already in a bothered mood when I returned home. Mustapha was there being served tea and well taken care of by my wife Tijah. I was not much inclined to polite conversations but it was Mustapha in a very charming way complemented Tijah for her *bubur kacang* (pea porridge). He did most of the talking and generally it was on the subject of political parties. He was in fact zooming on to his idea that for North Borneo he felt it would not be a good idea to start a political party but rather to form a number of associations in all places and at the right time these associations would get together to form a

political party. If a political party was started without such a preparation the colonial government would crush it and it would be difficult to start again. He showed extreme caution perhaps out of respect or fright with regard to the Jesselton Government. Also he seemed to have taken a leaf out of the history and the emergence of UMNO. UMNO did not begin as a political party in the strict sense of the word. It was a popular political movement which was constituted by friendly, literary and political associations from all over Malaya.

I told him point-blank that such a style of doing things in North Borneo circumstances would serve no useful purpose but indeed would be fraught with dangers from within his groupings. It would need only one or two of his would-be affiliates to throw the spanner and the wheel of political progress would come to a grinding halt.

When I observed that he was intently listening to me, I concluded that he was only kite flying to provoke me into suggesting something positive for him. I remembered then what Stephens and the British officials had told me about the man and his ambivalent ways. I could not hold back my comment reminding him of the different stories and versions he told the British, and to Stephens about his stand on the Malaysia Concept. I revealed to him that I knew what he said to the British colonial officials when he counselled them to be cautious and as Governor Goode said to make haste slowly. That, I told him, led the British to use the argument against the Malaysia Concept on the ground that North Borneo was not yet ready for independence within Malaysia.

I saw that his face had changed to a shade darker than he was. Perhaps now looking back, I must have said it rather harshly when I told him that he had to develop a spirit which was then absent that would drive him towards achieving independence for his people. I said that he had hitherto made my position very difficult and even awkward when I had to deal with the British who used his argument for a Malaysia to be formed at leisure.

He could no longer contain his feeling and burst out in anger. He said he would *hentam* (bash) those people who had distorted the whole thing to the British. He said there was absolutely no truth that he wanted the process towards Malaysia to be slow. In fact he was the only one who opposed the slow process in the Executive Council meeting in Jesselton. He named two new members, a Mr. Khoo, a Mr. Pang and the one member substituting for Stephens who was away, a Mr. Lai who advocated the slow process. Mustapha emphatically said he opposed them. What the British had told me was a lie.

He then cooled down and said he was grateful to me for being so candid. I knew what he said on that particular occasion in the Executive Council was true but I also knew that on other private occasions he had said to colonial officials that the process had to be slow and cautious. Nevertheless, I indicated clearly to Mustapha that I believed him and that he should no longer try to continue with the two-version game.

Tijah had been listening to the conversation. She was quite sensitive to my demeanour and knew well that I had a bad day and that I could easily be provoked into saying something quite unnecessary. Tijah looking straight into Mustapha's eyes joined the conversation addressing Mustapha affectionately as *Abang* (elder brother). Almost in a voice that was accusing, Tijah asked why was he so scared of the British since they could do nothing to him. According to Tijah, Mustapha was the most powerful man in North Borneo saying so not at all flatteringly but in all sincerity which pleased Mustapha. It was the British who should be afraid of Mustapha; even if he did not have the modern kind of high education, he was blessed with fine qualities, wisdom and leadership that had been accepted by the people which should place him in a position of very great strength. Tijah urged him to carry the torch and lead the people and never to dilly-dally which would only confuse his followers. Tijah told him in no uncertain manner that his future was with his people and not the British and therefore he should get on with it.

Mustapha was stunned and appeared most uncomfortable. He turned to me and said that it was the greatest blow he had ever received from a woman. He said Tijah's remark was like a razor blade cutting through his heart. He then said no wonder the people in Kuala Lumpur had always treated him with some reservation as if there had been a barrier.

Mustapha assured me most sincerely that he was grateful for my candour and those points as expressed by Tijah. Perhaps, he said, his methods, ways and language might not have been properly understood. I too assured him of my affection and regard for him and was very grateful that he had accepted what Tijah and I had said in the manner it was given. However, I requested him to be more transparent in his ways and statements so as not to be confusing. With that we rambled on other more pleasant subjects including *bubur kacang* which he said had been his favourite since his childhood.

It was also important, I thought, that Mustapha and the leader of the other native group, Donald Stephens, should hold hands together in the struggle for Merdeka for North Borneo in Malaysia for their people. Stephens was a very strong anglophile and relied a great deal on the flattery of the colonial officials which were given in the coating of advice. But Donald Stephens was not a stupid man and he was always fired by his ardent desire for a rightful constituency in order to serve his people. He found one among the Kadazans and Dusuns.

The Kadazans and the Dusuns were naturally biased towards the colonial officials and those white rulers who served the North Borneo Company before them. The Kadazans and Dusuns had found safety under the protection of the white man's laws from pirates and coastal marauders who had plundered their homes and treated them with no respect. Since Mustapha came from among the coastal Suluks, he was treated by the Kadazans and Dusuns with fear and distrust though not without awe and respect.

For the liberation of British North Borneo, these two major indigenous people should be on the same side. For so long as they were at daggers, it would be extremely easy for a *divide et impera* policy to be applied in that territory. In fact, since the Chartered Company days, that was how North Borneo was run.

These age-long suspicions, hate and contempt had to go. It could only be accomplished if the two native leaders would find in their hearts something over and above their sentiments of the tribal days. I thought the one uniting force would be the ardent desire to be free. That would be easy to find among freedom loving people of the coast since their life had always been unfettered even lawless buttressed by Islam which jealously provided them with a strong sense of independence from heathen domination and social injustice. The main problem was how to convince the cowed Kadazans into believing that their bullies could be trusted in partnership. If the sense of unity among the indigenous peoples proved to be only temporary they would once again expose the territory and its problems to the wiles of divisive forces which had always been and would continue to be in great abundance.

Stephens had a great capacity for devoting his convictions towards convincing others. Those around him, I noticed, had not followed him blindly; to convince them he would not hesitate to garner support from any quarter that would bring obvious advantage to his viewpoint. It was for this reason he often appeared obsequious to those he regarded his saviour in order to get their support or patronage. It was this facet of the man's character I thought had to be different and that at all times he must be seen to be standing on his own feet. The two men Mustapha and Stephens if they could be in unity, they would be the most powerful and formidable team in North Borneo.

The opportunity offered itself on the October 9, 1961 when Mustapha and Stephens were in Kuala Lumpur together with about thirty people from all parts of British North Borneo belonging to all communities. They were leaders of their groups. I managed to get the two leaders to lunch privately while the rest of the groups first met the Tunku and later were entertained to lunch elsewhere by the Assistant Minister of Education. The Tunku in the meeting with the North Borneo groups had impressed on them that they should be forthright in their struggle for independence and had suggested that they should organise themselves in political societies and always nurture the spirit of unity.

During the lunch at a restaurant called "Nanto", Mustapha was quite talkative but Stephens was quietly attentive perhaps overawed in the presence of Mustapha, a man he feared but did not have much respect for. Stephens, I thought, was sizing Mustapha who had been theorising that the British colonial officials would kill any political movement in North Borneo. According to Mustapha, as he had once explained before, it would be best to organise friendly societies in all districts as many as possible and when the time came, they would declare their political stance. He was still trying to sell the same idea.

I noticed Stephens was quite agitated but did not interrupt Mustapha although if it was anyone else I thought he might have done so. Perhaps, he felt that Mustapha was chiding him for forming his Kadazan political party. Stephens held his peace until Mustapha had exhausted his arguments. Then as if appealing for my support while looking in my direction Stephens told Mustapha that the British colonial officials were not so idiotic as not to see the ploy. The best method was to either persuade the officials to support the Malaysia Concept or prove to them that anti-Malaysia was contrary to the wishes of the people. He went at length to support his views based on his personal contacts and relationship with British colonial officials. This must have impressed Mustapha because he did not have the same proximity and intimacy in relationship with British officials as Stephens had. The British officials had always treated Mustapha with suspicion fearing his deceit and native craftiness.

I had already known their respective attitudes since I had had meetings with them separately. This time I had them face to face with me. Indeed, I was in a difficult position; at no stage must I show any preference since that would be the kiss of death. Both leaders were from the same place and in some cases the same constituency and it would be best that they would make up their own mind for their own future. I was somewhat in agreement with Stephens viewpoint although there was merit in Mustapha who had taken a leaf out of the genesis of UMNO which was a popular Malay movement, an amalgamation of Malay associations to face the MacMichael's Malayan Union. This time I did not contradict Mustapha. I thought the best person to talk to them would be the Tunku with whom they would meet that evening for dinner. They were not present when the Tunku met their groups. Before we dispersed Mustapha and Stephens had embraced each other and made me a witness that they had resolved to work together for the realisation of Malaysia.

I was happy to have had for the first time provided for these two leaders an occasion to meet and discuss with each other face to face. This was a matter of great satisfaction for me. I had been able to confirm in my mind the importance of their joint role in bringing about independence and freedom for their people on the basis of trust and confidence in their joint leadership.

That evening the Tunku had invited the two North Borneo leaders to dinner. Tijah and I were also invited. The Tunku during dinner said that he welcomed the pleasant news that Mustapha and Stephens had resolved to cooperate for the future of North Borneo. He told them that they should fear nothing, least of all the British colonial officials. On the other hand, those officials should be cultivated and be given the assurance that they would be welcomed to serve in the new Malaysia including those in the security forces and the judiciary and civil service. The Tunku related that after Merdeka many British officers remained to serve in an independent Malaya. The important thing according to the Tunku was for the two local leaders to set their hearts on the liberation of their people in North Borneo. In fact if the

British hated them for that they should feel that they were touching the colonial nerves and success would not be far.

The Tunku also had a word for Mustapha and Stephens about the Chinese community in North Borneo. He had heard that the rich Chinese very much supported the colonial official stand, which was particularly so among the tycoons of Sandakan and Jesselton. The others, farmers and petty merchants, would follow the crowd. Even the elitist Chinese when they saw that things were strongly moving in a certain direction, they would make adjustments and if they felt hopeless, they would decide to leave the country with their money. The Tunku advised the two Borneo leaders not to be hostile towards those Chinese but to persuade them to support the Malaysia Concept which would guarantee their well-being. They should be invited to Kuala Lumpur to see how the Chinese businessmen were faring.

The Tunku touched on financing the political movement which was one of the worries of the Borneo leaders particularly Mustapha. He told them that funds would come when they had demonstrated their leadership and had espoused a sacred cause. UMNO when it began had no money but that did not deter the struggle. More than money was the spirit which could bring success. Money might soil and spoil the struggle unless it was properly managed.

The Tunku was in high spirit and I was the butt end of his many jocular stories. It was during these jokes and stories that Mustapha must have gathered his courage to tell the Tunku that during tea at my house a couple of days before, he was for the first time attacked by a female who made him change his mind and resolve to work with Stephens on the political plane. The Tunku made a very high compliment to Tijah whom the Tunku regarded as coming from a family of patriots mentioning Tijah's sister Halimahtun who was the first woman MP and a staunch UMNO member.

After dinner Mustapha and Stephens invited me and Tijah to go to their hotel to meet the rest of the North Borneo delegation. When we got there they were all waiting for us in the lobby of the ninth floor. It was past midnight and through the glass windows, I could see the twinkling of stars in a clear sky.

I thought the air conditioning was particularly cold but the atmosphere was one of warmth and cordiality. Drinks were freely served and the conversations were lively even noisy. There was no one to complain since the delegation had taken the whole floor.

The voices suddenly stopped when Mustapha spoke. There was dead silence except for the muffled sound of the air-conditioning machines and that of the not too distant traffic outside. The hotel was in Bukit Bintang, a place notorious for its nocturnal activities hence vehicles never seemed to stop moving at whatever hour. Foodstalls were forever open for the midnight crawlers.

Mustapha welcomed Tijah and me as the two people who had greatly influenced his life lately. After the compliments and pleasantries Mustapha made the historic announcement that he and Stephens had decided to form a

political movement which would devote itself towards the independence of North Borneo through the Malaysia Concept. That was a revolutionary announcement coming from Mustapha on the early morning of the tenth of October, a double ten in a hotel whose name was Federal.

He then made a public confession that he had until then regarded Stephens not at all as a friend but a rival for the leadership of the natives. He had always thought that Stephens had regarded him with suspicion but now he knew better and would not think of that any longer and asked Stephens to work closely with him for the independence of North Borneo through the Malaysia Concept. Mustapha, filled with emotion, asked those present whom he regarded as the leaders of North Borneo for their support and be the core of the movement. As for himself, Mustapha said, he was prepared to sacrifice everything including his last pair of shoes! (Until today I could not understand the reference to "shoes" as the most precious article but I had noticed that Mustapha had always worn nice branded ones).

When Stephens spoke, he was even more emotional. Tears were rolling down his cheeks. It was a night of confessions. He admitted he had not trusted Mustapha before and now he asked for forgiveness. There was a thunderous applause.

Mustapha and Stephens embraced each other and announced to those present they were now blood brothers pledged to work for the well-being of the people through the Malaysia Concept.

After that there emerged a kind of emotional responses. One after another, almost in hysteria, they said that they were prepared to lay down their lives for the Malaysia Concept whose realisation must be speeded up. What I thought was the most impressive person amidst this pool of emotions was a *Panglima* (Warrior) from Sempurna whose name sadly I cannot now recall. He had the deportment of a soldier and every bit the picture of a warrior or was it a pirate. He came out with a clear voice that he was going to make a short speech because there was no time. He was in a hurry to get Malaysia!

A North Borneo Chinese by the name of Chan also spoke in support of Malaysia and thought that the Chinese should form a political party. He, Stephens and Mustapha then held hands and together with everyone else in chorus shouted *Merdeka Malaysia* ten times in keeping with the *feng shui* of the double ten. The single political movement for North Borneo was born. They all then turned towards Tijah and me and asked us to say a few words. I felt at once most humble and elated. Tijah made a short concise statement urging everyone to be united, to proceed quickly without hesitation looking neither left nor right nor behind but to fix their minds on the future.

I, too, like the people of North Borneo was filled with emotion. My throat was choked and I could not say much except to emphasise on unity. I told the story of Hilary and Tensing, two very different people who were able to conquer the biggest rock on earth, Mt. Everest. They surmounted all difficulties until they reached the top, tied to each other. Reminding them of

the story in *Kisah'ul-Anbiya* (Tales of the Prophets) and the Old Testament, two brothers Abel and Cain, turned a small stone into a big problem which eventually caused disaster when it was in the hand of one maliciously aimed at the head of another. The problem was not the stone or its size but the wrong relationship between men.

Mustapha in bringing to an end the momentous occasion said he understood my story and owed Tijah and me a tremendous debt for helping the people of North Borneo in charting their future. The whole meeting clapped their hands while Mustapha and Stephens warmly hugged me.

It was almost dawn as we drove home. It was also the dawn of the new North Borneo who that morning had spoken. How appropriate that North Borneo should be called Sabah – the Dawn.

That morning both Mustapha and Stephens issued a press statement which to the colonial officials and the Chinese in North Borneo must have come like a bolt from the blue when they both declared their support for the Malaysia Concept.

I had not slept a wink because I had intended to send off Mustapha and Stephens. I went to their hotel at about 7.00 a.m. I had already recovered from the highly charged emotion of the few hours earlier. I shared with them my thoughts that the colonial officials would, after that day, find it difficult to say that the people of North Borneo did not as yet want Malaysia. Stephens wondered if self-government should come first before Malaysia. I told him that such a proposal would lead to misunderstanding and would provide a new opportunity for divisive elements. Stephens said that what he had in mind was the introduction of a member system. I said if he wanted to speak about self-government publicly he should specify his meaning in the way he explained to me.

When their plane took off, I felt there was now no turning back for the people of North Borneo. I began to ache in a new anxiety as to whether Kuala Lumpur and London could come to an early understanding. Otherwise the situation in the Borneo territories might destabilise because of frustrations and hopelessness.

It was with this feeling that I went straight to a meeting with journalists and newsmen from the Borneo territories. I explained to them the implications of Mustapha-Stephens solidarity action and that if the media was to serve the people well it should not compete to publish sensational stories particularly misinformation from quarters that would wish to frustrate the Malaysia Concept.

* * *

The Tunku had told me that he had been advised by the Alliance Party that a statement on the Malaysia Concept should be made in Parliament. With the various study groups and delegations from Borneo and press statements after their return, the people in Malaya had become very aware as to the

development and would wish to have the situation reported to the nation. The Tunku said he would like to do it on October 16, 1961 and I was to prepare the statement. At once I felt the extra pressure. The British had not come out yet with their statement after hearing from the Tunku. And since Singapore was part of the concept, the question of the British base in Singapore as part of SEATO would have to be rationalised.

I had occasion to speak to the US Ambassador and I explained to him the difficulty about the British naval base when Singapore would be merged in Malaysia. The Malayan Government stand was unequivocal that it would not agree to the base being used for SEATO and that I had been cracking my head to work out a formula which would be satisfactory to all concerned including the USA. The Ambassador said he understood the situation.

The British side was working on the draft statement which would be made if the Tunku and MacMillan found some common ground. I had been given a copy to comment and amend. The important part was whether Kuala Lumpur would agree to the consultation with the Borneo territories without which the British could not give a firm commitment for which the Tunku had asked. Without even consulting the Tunku as I knew what his answer would be, I responded that the Tunku would agree to the consultation with the Borneo territories so long as the British side would give a firm commitment to the Malaysia Concept.

In the meantime, I had organised a meeting between trade union leaders of Singapore and Malaya in order that the Malayan counterpart would understand better the thinking of the Singapore unionists. From Singapore, Kandasamy came and spoke about the dangers of subversion by communists in trade unions. However, a visit in Kuala Lumpur like that of Kandasamy could be a political problem since he could be accused of meddling. The Tunku and the rest of the cabinet had to be briefed and the Tunku in fact was extremely positive and indeed encouraged people like Kandasamy to contact Malayan ministers and union leaders. Lee Kuan Yew was told about the attitude of the Tunku and the Malayan cabinet which made him now feel free to send his comrades with message to Kuala Lumpur. Lee Kuan Yew at that time was anxious that Kuala Lumpur should know how the communists in Singapore operated and the methods which Lim Chin Siong had been using.

The Tunku's speech for Parliament had to be prepared. I suggested to the Tunku that we should do the draft speech in Penang since we were going there. He agreed but not without inviting almost a plane load of people including Lee Kuan Yew from Singapore. For the most part no work was done because we and our wives were on the golf course. From the thirteenth to the fourteenth October we just had golf and sumptuous meals given by the Governor Tun Uda, the Soon family and other hospitable people of that Pearl of the Orient. It was not a particularly good golfing season since the rain never ceased which made the ground soggy and soaked the hair of the ladies who made regular disappearances into the ladies hair salons. To compensate for

the weather the Tunku in his merry mood announced that the King was going to give a cup and Lee Kuan Yew without his knowledge and agreement had to donate a cup for a mixed foursome. All went well except that I could not rid of the problem of the Tunku's speech in Parliament. Everytime I reminded him he pushed me aside by saying that there was no problem and that I was a born worrier!

Eventually, on the morning of the October 15, the Tunku called me to his room at Istana Kedah and we started working on the speech and also the answers to some possible questions. The Tunku was very relaxed and I felt guilty that I had become such a bore and a pain in the neck to him. He was enjoying himself and there I was reminding him constantly of the speech. Anyway, it was done and I rushed to the airport for Kuala Lumpur while Tijah had already left by car with her friends Dr. Chuah Sin Kah and his wife Gladys. Lee Kuan Yew was going to Cameron Highlands and took the same aircraft as far as Ipoh.

As soon as I arrived in Kuala Lumpur I rushed to Dewan Tunku Abdul Rahman to meet Parliament members of the Alliance Party who asked to be briefed on the Malaysia Concept and the Tunku's speech. The explanations were given and some questions came up and they dispersed quite certain now they could debate the issue with the opposition.

I went to dinner with a group of Brunei State Council members and several leaders from North Borneo. They were organised by Zainal Abidin Sulong to be in Kuala Lumpur to witness how Parliament worked but my main aim was to let them hear in person what the Prime Minister had to say in Parliament about their fate and future.

The momentous occasion arrived in the morning of October 16, 1961. I had been with the Tunku at the Residency from the early morning brushing up his speech and making final changes. He was delighted to hear that the Alliance MPs had been briefed and expected them to speak in support of the motion. He took me in his car to Parliament and after question time, the Tunku rose to speak. There was a silence filled with expectations and everybody's eyes were on him. The House was full and so was the public gallery since the Malaysia Concept was of interest to all members and the public including those who were opposed to the concept. In the Distinguished Gallery, I saw the people from the Borneo territories with whom I had dinner the previous night. They, as expected, appeared eager. As the Tunku spoke in measured and clear language, I was imagining the feelings and emotions of those Borneo visitors. They were watching the history of their land and people being discussed and debated and indeed being created.

It took more than an hour for the Tunku to complete his speech. He delivered it well with sincerity and an air of confidence and full of conviction. It is perhaps useful for those who wish to know the thinking of the Prime Minister of Malaya at that time to glance through his speech and despite the few technical errors, for example when he regarded the three Borneo

territories as colonies, yet he found the occasion later to describe Brunei in the strictest constitutional form. It was my view that many of those which could be regarded as technical errors were not made in a fit of absentmindedness but rather that was the view of the Tunku at that moment in time. No one could say that he was insincere. On the other hand, I had heard comments from various people, from ordinary citizens to diplomats and businessmen that the Prime Minister had spoken with clarity and sincerity which no one could fault. In checking with the Borneo delegations at a subsequent dinner, I found them extremely impressed by the Tunku's speech so much so that they threw a party to celebrate the occasion. What had clouded their minds before were now clear.

I would not be doing justice if I simply summarised what the Tunku said. The whole speech recorded in the Hansard deserves to be quoted in full as follows:

I move that this House agreeing in principle with the concept of Malaysia comprising the eleven States of the Federation, the States of Singapore and Brunei and the territories of North Borneo and Sarawak, endorses the Government's initiative in taking action for its realisation, the progress of which will be reported to the House by the Honorable Prime Minister from time to time.

When considering the concept of Malaysia it is necessary to keep in mind that the independent Federation of Malaya has to take note of three separate elements and the special interests of each. These three elements are the State of Singapore, which is almost completely self-governing, the three Borneo territories which are still colonies (sic), and the United Kingdom which has particular obligations or duties in relation to the peoples of these areas. I will consider Malaysia in relation to each of these elements in turn. I would like to say at this point that the word merger has generally come to be accepted as a way of expressing the future integration of constitutional relations between the Federation and Singapore, but let us not forget that the broader concept of Malaysia is, of course, a merger too, but on a larger scale. Therefore when I refer to merger it will be directly in relation to Singapore and also to Malaysia, because merger with Singapore is an essential part of the Malaysia idea.

I will deal first with Singapore because it is the closest to us, its problem is the most complicated in many ways, and its future is certain to be of profound importance not only to itself but also to the Borneo territories and the Federation of Malaya.

The idea of Malaysia did not come to me by chance. As a matter of fact the plan had been forming in my mind for a considerable time. Originally it arose as a result of discussions I had with a number of responsible citizens of the Federation and Singapore who asked me from time to time whether there was a possibility of integrating the two territories of the Federation and Singapore. The same question was also brought up in Parliament on a number of occasions. It came whenever I had occasion to address our Malayan students abroad. It came, too, when I visited foreign countries. Pressmen of every shade of opinion posed the same question. I always ignored the question or gave a negative answer.

I was not in favour of the idea as I was of the opinion that integration of the two territories would spell danger for the security of this country. The differences in outlook of the people of the Federation and Singapore were so pronounced that for me a merger was out of the question. In the first place the majority of the people here have accepted the idea of kingship and sultanate, of Malay as the national language, and of Islam as the official religion of the nation. I realised that it would be difficult to persuade the people of Singapore to accept these ideas because 70% of the people on the island are Chinese, and it would be better to allow Singapore to take the line best suited to her own people and to have a Constitution more agreeable and compatible with the requirements, disposition and desires of her own people. The idea of kingship, the Malay language and Islam as the official religion would not be readily acceptable to people, the majority of whom profess religions other than Islam and to whom Malay is not a lingua franca, and who moreover have never had a King of their own. In the event of a merger of these two territories the different views of the people of the Federation and Singapore might clash and thus create problems which would be difficult to resolve.

However times change, and so must our outlook, hence what was not agreed to yesterday might be agreed to today when we give it a second thought; and so the idea of Malaysia took shape. Singapore, after the election of 1959 tried to set up what we might call an extreme socialist Government under the PAP. When they assumed office they tried to put to trial socialist ideas and at the same time attempted to secure an understanding with the Federation Government. We tried our best to accomodate them, but the businessmen of Singapore had their own misgivings and fears about the extreme socialist policy – they were pouring money and transferring their interests into the Federation. This was serious for

Singapore, bearing in mind that the economy of the island rests solely on business, trade and commerce. We kept the gateway to the Federation open to help the Government as well as to allay the fears and suspicions of the businessmen. We made it possible for both our Governments to work and cooperate to the best interests of the two territories, and we kept the door of cooperation open always. However Singapore was aware that something more was necessary if Singapore was to hold the confidence of the people for they realised as they pursued their leftist policies, they must sooner or later suffer economically, or even clash with us. In such an eventuality the people of Singapore would suffer great hardship. They found it difficult to run the island without the cooperation of men in commerce and industry, and also without being in the best of terms with the Federation Government. The responsible leaders then realised that they owed a duty to the people to serve their interests rather than themselves, so the seeds of difference between the non-communist and pro-communist elements in the PAP were sown which today have broken into a complete break.

Therefore the Prime Minister of Singapore felt rather concerned and approached me with some of his problems and difficulties. We made a careful study of the situation and came to the conclusion that the only salvation for Singapore would be in some form of closer economic and constitutional association with the Federation. The division of the two territories might be alright at a moment when Singapore was still under the control of Great Britain, as the security of the island was in the hands of the UK Government, in other words in safe hands, but a time would come when Singapore would ask for and be given independence, and that time is not far off for new talks on the Constitution are to be held in 1963. Would Singapore then be strong enough to look after its internal security, external affairs, defence, finance, etc., and would it still be possible for the Federation to keep its gateway open to allow the free flow of people and goods between the two territories? It would probably be impossible to do that, even with the best of understanding between the two independent countries – we do it now because we are represented in the Internal Security Council, but we will not be in an independent Singapore. While Singapore is under the British there is no threat of open action by the communists which might endanger the peace and security of the Federation, but with an independent Singapore anything could happen. One thing is certain, and that is a newly-independent Singapore would not submit to an arrangement whereby her sovereignty would be compromised by having the Federation in the Security Council.

I can assure you that the leaders in Singapore and my colleagues here consider that independence is not practicable, and so we have been working hard to find a solution whereby we can co-exist in the closest association. Having gone into it thoroughly we are convinced that we can find a way satisfactory to both. We must prevent a situation in which an independent Singapore would go one way and the Federation another. The way Singapore would go then would be towards another camp which is hostile to the Federation, and this would be quite unacceptable to us. Neither of us wants this; both of us want to work together. National security demands it, our mutual economy demands it, and so do the people of both territories. Neither of us want the gateway to the Federation to be closed to businessmen as well as traffic, nor do we want the people of Singapore to suffer as a result. Neither of us want grave economic unrest, nor do we want to be subjected to external interference which would follow. We have seen this happen already elsewhere, and we do not want to see it happen here. If such an eventuality should come to pass, Malaysians would be fighting among themselves, goaded on and helped by forces from without. There would be bloodshed and destruction, and the country would be torn by strife and suffering, from which it would be very difficult to return to normal, if we ever got a chance to return. The same situation would develop as we have seen in the past in divided Korea and divided Vietnam. Hence responsible leaders in our territories have to discuss and plan now as to how best to prevent such things from happening.

As I said, the Prime Minister of Singapore has been very concerned about the future, just as I have been, and he has come to Kuala Lumpur to hold talks with me and discuss the problems which would arise, some of which are rather frightening. Apart from that, he has also taken a great deal of risk upon himself by disclosing publicly for the first time what has been happening behind the scenes in Singapore and making known to the people those who are trying to manipulate events. Many people are involved, including a number in the Federation. While some are conscious of their acts, others are allowing themselves to be used. It is not the intention of the Governments of the Federation or Singapore to prevent people from following their political ideology provided it does not lead to strife and the dividing of the nation. What responsible leaders of both territories fear and wish to avoid is outbreak of violence and the complete disruption of the peace and happiness we now have, and the destruction of our way of life. We appreciate that the ordinary man or woman in both territories only desire to be left alone to

pursue his or her way of life in peace and without interruption. We realise, therefore, that if there is to be a closer association between these two territories (as part of the Malaysia Concept) we must decide now what form it should take.

We must take into account the fact that in the last few years the people of the Federation and those of Singapore have moved along separate ways. We in the Federation have a King, Malay as the national language, and Islam the official religion. We pursue a policy of free enterprise; we have freedom of movement and speech, of association and belief; we protect the rights of the indigenous people, the Malays. The emphasis in the Federation is on the freedom of the individual whereas in Singapore there has been a greater degree of state organisation, for example, in matters of labour. In addition, as a sovereign country we have also been following an independent foreign policy which, though free from foreign influence, is bound up with the free world. We are anti-communist, and we make no secret about it. All these differences have sprung from separate policies, because we in the Federation are independent and Singapore is not. Now the need is to come together in a practical manner without harming one another and without interrupting the lines we have been following. This will not be an easy task, and will take time. Absolute merger, for instance, would cause some degree of uneasiness in the minds of the people of both territories. There are various sections or interests which have to be taken into account. In Singapore where the great majority of people are Chinese they naturally want Chinese participation in government service without any reservation. Those who were not born in Singapore would also be unhappy at the different qualification for citizenship which are applicable to the Federation. They would also not like any control of their education policy, of their system and methods of education in Singapore. They want a free hand in dealing with their labour problem, and greater reserve of powers in order to keep the sectional interests of the island satisfied. In other words they would want to retain their control over their domestic affairs.

At the same time it would be true to say that the people of the Federation view with some nervousness the prospect of a merger with Singapore. For one thing the predominantly Chinese population in Singapore have shown strong ties with China and are inclined towards Chinese chauvinism. This is evidenced to some extent by the fact that they even have a Chinese university. The Prime Minister of Singapore himself has disclosed the presence of a

large number of people in Singapore who are inclined towards communism and their activities, and this is substantiated by our own intelligence sources. However there is a group of people who are real Singaporeans and in that sense they are real Malaysians, and they present no problems, but compared with the other elements they are less active and articulate. The activities of the people who are inclined towards communism in Singapore present a constant threat to the well-being of the Federation and are the cause of some anxiety to the people of the Federation, who naturally do not want to see these people gain control of the political and social structure of our life here. There is this anxiety among the rural population, businessmen and everybody else.

Therefore, the form of association between these two territories must be such as to provide protection for the interests of the people in the Federation. At the same time it should provide Singapore with economic security, which is the desire of the people of Singapore, and prevent outside interference and intervention in the affairs of Singapore. The form of association is therefore a difficult matter.

We must also, at the same time, take stock of the opinions expressed by political associations, of the public, of political leaders as well as views put forward in the press. This will necessitate a thorough study before a final decision is reached.

When I addressed the Foreign Correspondents' Association in Singapore on the 27th of May, I posed the question of a merger for the first time, with the result that everybody started to take an interest, and the subject was widely discussed everywhere. The opinions of politicians and leaders of Singapore were expressed openly. And some were in favour of a full merger which would bring Singapore into the fold of the Federation as a unit of the Federation like Penang or Malacca, some expressed the view that a complete merger with the Federation would not be in keeping with the situation and political progress and thinking of Singapore, and some others felt that there should be a form of loose federation with the Federation, and so on.

But one thing is certain, and that is that we cannot take Singapore with us in complete merger without a great deal of unhappiness and trouble, and so we must find a middle course. However we have in the meantime given much thought to the many questions and other

issues and other aspects of merger and finally we have agreed that we should each appoint a Working Party to study the question from every angle. I will be pleased to welcome any constructive proposals from all political parties in Parliament and other interested organisations. These constructive proposals can be considered by the Working Party.

I should like to inform the House that by the terms of reference of the Working Party, the Committee would be an exploratory Working Party appointed by the Cabinet to look into all aspects of the merger with Singapore, which would include defence, administration and constitutional implications (including finance and economic), considerations arising out of wider reserve powers for Singapore without prejudice to the principle that there should be a strong central Government.

The terms of reference also include the examination of the question of separate citizenship for the Federation of Malaya and Singapore with a single nationality with a view to ensuring that such an arrangement does not render one citizenship inferior to the other. They also include the examination of any other matters connected with merger.

The opinion which prevails in Singapore today on the question of merger is that such a merger is absolutely necessary for reasons of security and economic stability of the island. On the other hand, it is feared that the communists do not want it, because the Federation does not recognise communism in any shape or form. Merger would prevent those who are communist-minded from being able to align independent Singapore with the communist bloc. It follows therefore that they are opposed to merger, or else they will demand merger on terms unacceptable to the Federation. Whichever course they propose their object is still the same, to make a communist state of the Malay Peninsula (and also the Borneo territories). They cannot say that they do not want merger. But they will try to make it difficult to effect a merger. They talk about the proposals already made as a "phoney merger", and so on, and this will continue to be their line with regard to it.

I recall very vividly my meeting with Chin Peng at Baling way back in December 1955. I had then proposed to him that when the country had achieved Independence there would be no further need for him and his men to fight. Therefore, they should lay down their arms, come back into Malayan society, and carry on with their political

activities in a normal and democratic way. He convinced me from what we discussed, that he was a communist and that his aim was to bring about a communist Malaya. It is completely true – once a communist, always a communist. I left Baling convinced that communists and true Malaysians could never co-exist. In all my experience, I have never found any reason to doubt the validity of this conviction.

Take another instance. In Sarawak recently statements were made by a member of the United Peoples' Party that the party did not want merger with Malaysia, because this would make Sarawak a colony of Malaya, and it was better to get independence separately first. This is the line of the pro-communist elements in the Federation, Singapore and in Borneo, and it is obvious that the pro-communist faction got someone unwittingly to put over the communist line. In actual fact everyone must know that under the concept of Malaysia there can be no colonies, that in fact there will be no Federation of Malaya, because in its place there will only be independent Malaysia, in which all the States will have equal status and such reserved State powers as will be agreed by all the States concerned. Malaysia will be the ultimate object of our loyalty. The opinion given by this member of the Sarawak United Peoples' Party is certainly not the opinion of Mr. Ong Kee Hui who is the President of the party, and who had declared himself in favour of Malaysia. Opposition by such people to the concept of Malaysia arises not from any fear or suspicion which they openly express, but from fear that the communists would have no more grounds for inciting discontent or creating trouble as they have tried it here unsuccessfully. You see therefore that the pattern is the same; the communists will work in every way they can to oppose a merger and the concept of Malaysia.

I mentioned that all the States in Malaysia would enjoy equal rights and equal status. But because of the special position of Singapore as a city State, to my mind it would be best if Singapore came in on a partnership basis, with local autonomy with powers to determine nearly all matters except defence, external affairs and security. These must be under the control of the Central Government as they are in all countries with Federal Constitutions. What I have in mind is to call such an association or federation of States the Federation of Malaysia, i.e. all the Federation of Malaya States, the Borneo territories and Singapore, in which the States of the Borneo territories and the States of the Federation of Malaya join in together as a Federation of Malaysia, and Singapore is joined in

partnership on a footing something like that which exists between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. An association of such a nature would recognise the Federation of Malaysia with Singapore as partners in one identity.

What you may ask is the relationship between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland? At this moment our Attorney-General is making a study of the Northern Ireland Constitution which defines the relationship and sets out the respective position of the two States. The information I have available at this moment is roughly this:-

Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. She enjoys a certain measure of local self-government and has a legislature of her own with powers to deal with purely local affairs.

The essential feature of the Constitution of Northern Ireland is that her territory forms an integral part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. She elects members direct to the UK Parliament in Westminster and a large range of legislative and administrative functions is delegated to her Government. The Head of the Government and the Representative of the Sovereign within the limits of the Northern Ireland Constitution is the Governor. He summons, prorogues and dissolves the Parliament of Northern Ireland, gives final assent to its legislation and fulfils other functions normally exercised by the Sovereign.

I will now turn to the problem of the Borneo territories in relation to the concept of Malaysia. These territories do not present the same complexity in the implementation of the concept as Singapore does. In a broad sense it could be stated that the question is much simpler there, in fact so much simpler that they present a special difficulty of their own. The three Borneo territories have two political factors in common. First, Sarawak and Sabah are still colonies and Brunei a protectorate under the British Crown, and because of this they are the vestiges of British colonialism in the area of Southeast Asia. The second factor they have in common springs from the first, and that is that their constitutional development has been very slow indeed. It is quite remarkable, when you come to think of it, to consider that the Federation of Malaya became independent twelve years after the end of the War, that Singapore had its first elected Ministers ten years after the War and far greater autonomy stemming from 1959, but the Borneo

territories are still colonial in government with nominated members; it follows that there have been no general elections. This slowness of constitutional developments is in marked contrast to developments in other British Colonies or Protectorates in Africa or Asia.

Malaya's attitude towards colonialism is well-known and constantly reiterated both at home and abroad. We consider that it is our duty to help bring about an end to any form of colonialism. The very concept of the Malaysia Plan is an effort to end colonialism in this region of the world, in a peaceful and constructive manner. We in Malaya won our independence by peaceful means, and we are sure that the peoples of the Borneo territories would like to end their colonial status and obtain independence in the same way.

From the Federation's point of view we are linked to the Borneo territories not only by proximity and close association but also because the Borneo territories have the same types of culture and racial origin as Malaysians. We have similar customs, similar problems - economically or otherwise - and we even share the same currency. We work along similar administrative lines, our civil services have grown up in the same tradition and on the service principles. The territories, like the Federation, have a diversity of races. There are Chinese there just as there are here. There are Malays there, and many of the other races there are of the same ethnic stock as the Malays. There are other similarities, too. Brunei, for instance, is ruled by a Malay sovereign, and the royal history of the State is intimately bound up with the past history of Malaya. Until a few years ago Sarawak also was a Royal State under the rule of a Rajah. So these two States have a tradition of Government similar to Malaya's many States, and above all the common language understood by all is Malay. The story of Sabah is different. Sabah today is a Crown Colony and called British North Borneo, but until very recently it was run by the Borneo Chartered Company, in much the same way as Penang and Malacca were for many years by the East India Company.

For all these reasons, therefore, there is a natural affinity between the territories and the Federation, an affinity which I should say has no exact parallel elsewhere.

If any proof is needed of the intimate and close importance of this affinity, it can be seen in the remarkable reaction and response which the peoples of the three Borneo territories have shown in the

concept of Malaysia. I have made it clear from the beginning, and I have repeated frequently that the Federation of Malaya has no ambitions for mastery and will not do anything which is contrary to the basic desires of the peoples of the territories. We have not set out to start a great propaganda band-wagon rolling to win over the peoples of the Borneo territories to the concept of Malaysia. The peoples of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah have sparked off and demonstrated their won deep interest in the ideal. For example, when we asked them to come over to the Federation, look around for themselves and form their own judgments they came without hesitation and in large numbers from all sections of the community and from towns and villages. While they are here they show much enthusiasm about what they see in the new Malaya, and they ask innumerable questions about many things.

From what I have seen I am surprised that they have not been given a greater part in the management of the affairs of their country, because they have displayed great knowledge of the affairs of government and keenness, far-sightedness and political acumen. I can guarantee that within a year of the birth of Malaysia they will show a great change in themselves and will be no different from any of us here. They can contribute a tremendous amount to the well-being and prosperity of Malaysia. Within the past few months no less than twelve delegations from the three territories numbering 103 persons, have come to Malaysia. Even as I speak there are three delegations from the Borneo territories, including one from Brunei, touring the Federation, and in fact some of them are present in the Public Gallery to listen to this debate in our Parliament. Some more are on their way here.

While these representatives of the peoples of the Borneo territories are learning about us, about our progress, about our affairs, we too in Malaya are learning a great deal from them. It is my hope that as soon as opportunity arises it will be possible for more delegations from Malaya to visit the Borneo territories in the same exploratory way. In fact, a delegation from the Socialist Front will be visiting those territories soon on our study tour vote.

One extremely important factor in furthering the concept of Malaysia has been initiated by a meeting of members of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association recently called in Jesselton, which has resulted in the formation of the Malaysia Consultative Solidarity Committee. This was initiated and achieved by the leaders of the Borneo territories themselves. What better

proof could there be of the inherent accord which the concept of Malaysia produces in the Federation, Singapore and the Borneo territories? This historic Committee is shortly setting about the task of determining the future constitutional relationship between Borneo and the Federation of Malaya in the Federation of Malaysia. I have no doubt of the successful outcome of its deliberations. We who believe in the concept of Malaysia do so because we have faith in ourselves and in our future, we have confidence that by cooperation and goodwill, we can work together to build a better and brighter future for all our peoples, by creating a partnership for unity and security in one common nationhood.

I do not say that the path which lies ahead of the Borneo territories in relation to the Malaysia Concept has no difficulties; no-one knows this better than the peoples of these areas themselves. But what I do say is this - difficulties can be overcome by cooperation and goodwill of all those who desire the political and social upliftment of peoples of this region.

How can this be done? The ideal of Malaysia is, I think, the only answer. There are some, however, who think that they should wait until the three territories have formed a Federation of their own and then join in the partnership of Malaysia. But to that I say, how long will this take? Years, I am afraid. We cannot afford to wait so long without providing the communists with the weapons they need for subversion, infiltration and disruption with the ultimate objective of capturing these territories. Time is not on our side. The important aspect of the Malaysia ideal, as I see it, is that it will enable the Borneo territories to transform their present colonial status to self-government for themselves and absolute independence in Malaysia simultaneously, and baulk the communist attempt to capture these territories. To say that the peoples there are not ready is wrong. After all Penang and Malacca were British Colonies a little while ago. When they joined the independent Federation of Malaya they became independent. If this can happen here, why not in Borneo? The fact that we in the Federation are independent now and the peoples of the Borneo territories are not is relatively unimportant, because in the Federation of Malaysia we will all be independent together.

After I had put forward the idea of Malaysia in my speech last May, naturally there was intense interest and much speculation by peoples in the Borneo territories. Not being so familiar with the new Malaya, there were misgivings of various kinds expressed in some

quarters. In the months that followed most of these misgivings have resolved themselves, but I think it would be as well to mention them now, as they indicate certain ways of thinking and feeling.

One reaction was that the Malaysia Concept was an attempt to colonise the Borneo territories. The answer to this was that it is legally impossible for the Federation to have colonies as our Constitution provides only for the accession of States. *Another* fear was that Malaysia would mean the imposition of Islam. They know now that all religions are freely practised in Malaya, and this freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution.

There were also some who felt that Malaysia would mean the imposition of one language only. The fact is, of course, that no person in Malaya is prevented from learning or teaching other languages, and the official languages are Malay and English. Others felt that they were not yet ready for independence and might be at a disadvantage. I have already answered this today.

The question was asked, would not Malaysia mean that the government services in the Borneo territories would be Malaysia-nised? The position of course is that Public Services Commissions exist in the Federation and in each State, and each State has the right to employ officers for their own civil service. The Federation Government can only appoint applicants to Federal posts. As a matter of fact, State Service officers are sometimes seconded to the Federal Government Service, because we have a need for the able services of particular men or women.

One strong feeling in the Borneo territories was that they must be consulted. I feel that they have the right to be consulted on the future of their people and the future of their country. I have said on more than one occasion that Malaya can only accept Borneo people "from an expression of their own free will to join us." *Another* attitude taken was that the Borneo territories would first come together in a Federation of their own before thinking of Malaysia. The answer to this is that this procedure would only double the process and take more years to achieve, and in the end the result would be the same. I was happy to read recently that the Borneo leaders now are proposing self-government and independence in Malaysia simultaneously.

Some said that with eleven Malay States and only three Borneo States, the Borneo area would be swamped. My reply is that this is a wrong assumption to make, as the members of our House of

Representatives in the Federation do not represent States. They represent the people and parties. Moreover in our future constitutional arrangements the Borneo people can have a big say in matters on which they feel very strongly, matters such as immigration, customs, Borneonisation, and control of their State franchise rights. *Finally*, there was a misgiving that the territories in Borneo might lose their autonomy. As members of this House are aware, each State of the Federation has powers and control of certain subjects in which the Federation cannot interfere, for instance, land or local custom and religion. In addition, there are certain subjects of authority which are exercised through joint operation by the Federation and the States.

I will now deal with the concept of Malaysia in relation to the British Government. Having decided on the plan for Malaysia here, our next move was to sound out the British representatives in this region. The response was encouraging. The British felt that it would provide for the political stability of Southeast Asia, and so I was encouraged to go deeper into the matter with my colleagues and finally brought it up with the British Prime Minister. I have therefore forwarded the memorandum pertaining to this plan to the Prime Minister himself. The reply received from the British Prime Minister also encouraged me to carry on with the discussion further with the Prime Minister of Singapore. Britain however would give the proposal with regard to the merger with Singapore a close study taking into account a number of different aspects connected with merger. In particular I feel that they are most anxious about the question of the continued use of the important base in Singapore as a SEATO base, as they were committed under the SEATO Treaty to provide a base in Singapore, though the Prime Minister has not said as much. Particularly with the situation as it is in Southeast Asia, they feel that there is an absolute necessity for Britain to maintain confidence in this part of the world, and nothing should be done which might cast doubt on the British capabilities in this area. The British would not commit themselves on the Borneo territories because, according to them, its question needs a lot of thinking about before the idea of finding an eventual political link-up with Malaya can be decided. They recognised the fact that there are similarities both as to form of administration and finance and cultural characteristics obtaining in both the territories of Borneo and the Federation. They did not want to be the sole arbiter in deciding the fate of the people of these Territories without having first consulted them. However the British Prime Minister would welcome my visit to London to discuss the various aspects for such a

development without the agreement of the Borneo people, though the British have no doubt that such a merger with the Federation would be in the interests of the Borneo people themselves. From what I can see and from the exchange of correspondence between the British Prime Minister and myself, he would welcome the idea of a merger by Singapore as soon as these territories are ready, but I still detected the note of anxiety over the Singapore base for he is a little hesitant on the idea of giving up their base for SEATO purposes. However he appears to be willing to relieve Britain of her responsibility over Singapore, except control over their bases, by allowing Singapore to merge with Malaya. On the other hand, he would not be ready to part company with the Borneo territories just yet. In the circumstances I felt that a talk would not bring fruitful results, until Britain agreed on the basis for discussion and I told the British Prime Minister so. To my mind the basis for discussion would, *firstly*, be the agreement on the use of the Singapore base but *not* for SEATO purposes. *Secondly*, the transfer of the sovereignty over the State of Singapore and the Borneo Territories to the Federation of Malaya to form the Federation of Malaysia. When these were agreed to I will proceed to England to discuss the question with the British Prime Minister. On the third of October I received a message from the British Prime Minister in which he said that there is a wide measure of agreement between us on this plan of Malaysia, in that the British Government would welcome and accept the Concept of Malaysia which would incorporate the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the three Borneo territories. And they agreed that the best future for the Borneo territories would lie in close political association with the Federation and Singapore, that it would be necessary for me to go to London as early as possible to have a talk with him so that we could best work together in the attainment of this plan. And it was suggested that in this way we could ensure that any misunderstandings which might arise from a long-range correspondence would be avoided. I have therefore decided to go to London on the 7th of November, but I feel loath to do so without the full support of this House. Hence my motion.

From the developments which have already taken place in the growing reality of the Malaysia ideal I am confident that with unity in will and wish we can achieve our goal. Speaking for the Government of the Federation of Malaya I say now that we will do everything humanly possible to make the road to the future Malaysia as straight and clear as we can.

Sir, I beg to move.

After he had made his statement it was seconded but amidst the applause and thumping of tables in approbation I could not recall the Honourable Member who seconded the Tunku. This could be checked from the Hansard.

I was myself overwhelmed with joy and emotion since the speech of the Prime Minister had laid out the strategy which I could now easily follow. Because of my own feelings which I could hardly control my eyes were filled with tears so that my colleagues in the civil service sitting together with me in the officials' gallery behind the ministers' rows did not fail to notice how touched I was by the speech. Perhaps in cold print one could not see his gestures or hear his emphasis to appreciate the depth of sincerity with which the Tunku evoked the support among his listeners.

I could not recall the speakers who partook in the debate. They could be found in the Hansard of Dewan Rakyat. But I did remember listening to some opposition members who expressed their agreement in principle but criticised the Government regarding its attitude and handling of Singapore. This group of people gave me the impression that they wanted the full merger of Singapore and demanded that the Government should clarify its stand with regard to the financial arrangement in the Malaysia Concept in particular with reference to Singapore.

Tan Siew Sin, the Minister of Finance gave them the answer which I thought was adequate even though it was preliminary since the Tunku had said that the arrangement was being worked out by a joint working party. As for Brunei and the other two Borneo territories, the arrangements would be subject to further discussions with regard to the mechanisms for the new arrangement. Nevertheless the Government stand was explained to the House and this was greatly appreciated by those from the Borneo territories present at the time of delivery. Tan Siew Sin's statement was as follows:

This House would probably wish to know something of the thinking of the Government on the financial and economic implications of merger, if I may be permitted to use this rather loose term. I should emphasise that what I am going to say should be regarded as our preliminary thoughts which are subject to change should subsequent developments indicate the necessity for such a course.

I shall deal with Singapore first. It is clear that Singapore would require rather different treatment from that which has been applied to the eleven States of the Federation. It has been a completely self-contained unit on its own for so long that the measure of integration which might be suitable under normal circumstances, cannot possibly be applied to it. Further, it has been agreed that a certain degree of autonomy would be allowed to it in the fields of education and labour.

At the same time, it cannot be disputed that the Central Government must be a strong one so as to ensure effective government in, among other things, the vital spheres of finance and economics. It is well to remember that political stability must necessarily be founded on a sound economic base, or to put it in another way, a strong economic foundation is an essential prerequisite of political stability. If this premise is accepted, it follows that the Federal authority should have sufficient powers in reserve to ensure that if State Governments pursue policies which could adversely affect the financial and economic stability of the Federation as a whole, such powers would be sufficient to curb these tendencies effectively and promptly.

I should make it clear that the enunciation of this principle does not imply that States like Singapore would not be allowed an adequate degree of financial autonomy to enable them to achieve that degree of self-expression which is so necessary if they are to develop to the best advantage their potential for good, while at the same time bearing in mind the needs of the Federation as a whole. In other words, it is not our intention that the Federal Government should in any way interfere with what one might call the "house-keeping policies" of a State Government but it should clearly have a say, and an effective one, in policies whose effect might go beyond the boundaries of such a State. These are the broad principles on which we have worked in the discussions I have had with Dr. Goh Keng Swee of Singapore. Honourable members will, I think, appreciate that, at this stage, it would not be desirable or appropriate for me to go into greater detail as the implementation of these principles is so complex that disclosure of proposals which have not been finalised would only confuse the general picture.

In regard to Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo, the problems are probably less difficult though the same broad principles would similarly apply. No discussions have, however, taken place so far with these three territories pending a preliminary examination of the financial and economic structure of the countries concerned.

To my pleasant surprise, the Speaker of the House had arranged a lunch for members and he had most kindly invited the delegations from the Borneo territories. This arrangement was a master stroke and I must say that it was the ingenious planning of Zainal Abidin Sulong. The food itself was rather dull; but the ambience for the Borneo delegations was such that I did not think they could forget the occasion. There, they were mingling with Ministers and MPs with whom they had the opportunity to talk before, during and after

lunch. I could not help thinking that many of them if not all would be dreaming, if not actually aspiring to become one of the Members of the House. The lunch was particularly interesting to them because not only were they seated together with the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, but were able to share candid conversations with someone with authority. It was altogether a very satisfying occasion for all.

Immediately when lunch was over after shaking hands with their host the Speaker, the Borneo delegations left for their next programme of visit. I went to the Residency to prepare some points which the Tunku might want to use in his reply. The Tunku took me in his car to Parliament to listen to the afternoon session, and as for himself he spent most of this time in his office the Parliament House listening to the debate through an internal communication system.

That evening again I went to the Residency and worked with Nik Hassan, the PM's most trusted and efficient secretary to supply further points as answers for the Tunku to use if it was necessary. The Tunku detained me to have dinner with him and we were joined by Hamid Jumat and Ong Yoke Lin, the two stalwarts in the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee. It was an uneventful dinner full of pleasantries and naughty jokes which the Tunku never lacked in his repertoire.

The debate on Tunku's Malaysia motion took three days. The Tunku himself wound it up clarifying or debunking points which were raised. When it came to a decision the Speaker simply asked for ayes and noes and the ayes had it though I did hear rather weak dissenting noes coming from the direction of the socialist opposition.

I was pleased with the outcome of the debate and no doubt the British Government would have heard it all. I was thoroughly exhausted and there was a dinner that night at the Palace to which His Majesty Yang di-Pertuan Agong had commanded Tjiah and me to attend. I just could not make it and phoned the Controller of the Royal Household who understood me well as to why I could not bring myself to be present. Later, I was told by the Controller that it was a very exclusive dinner given to Their Royal Highnesses the Sultans and Heads of Diplomatic Missions and that I was the only civil servant invited. I was told later that His Majesty had graciously inquired after me and remarked that I was conspicuously absent. I suspected he would have liked to hear from me the various reactions to the Malaysia Concept debate since not only His Majesty but all the other Rulers were equally interested. Although I regretted very much I did not attend the dinner, I was also happy to be absent because I had always dreaded the kind of encounter with royalties who expected a great deal of decorous stuffiness. I was then in no position to put up with pretentious behaviour after a gruelling three days of following the debate. I remember that afternoon I had expressed my ugly temper, which was quite notorious among the foreign service staff, on Zainal Abidin Sulong for allowing the Borneo delegations to pay for their celebration party which they

held after the Tunku's speech. My temper and mood would not make me a pleasant fellow in dealing with the Rulers. I had since then apologised to Zainal Abidin Sulong who had done the right thing to allow the Borneo people to express themselves in their joyous moment.

* * *

The North Borneo group which witnessed the Parliamentary proceedings on the Malaysia Concept was still in the country. The Tunku had invited them to dinner at the Residency. That afternoon, the October 20, I went to see Razak to get his views on Lee Kuan Yew's draft of the Singapore White Paper. The White Paper was being discussed by a working committee which met from 3.00 p.m. until 7.00 p.m. Razak suggested and it was later agreed that the White Paper should be somewhat amended in particular on such subjects as internal security and the Police Force.

After the working committee meeting whose proposed adjustments were recommended to Lee Kuan Yew for his consideration, I went to the Residency to join the dinner party. There were about 30 representatives from the North Borneo territories with 12 journalists and newsmen present.

The Tunku was in his element and did a marvellous job explaining and answering questions about the Malaysia Concept. I could see from their faces that the Tunku's guests were satisfied and happy. To the Tunku it must be most gratifying to hear them say that Malaysia should come quickly.

After the guests had left, I briefed the Tunku on the draft White Paper and told him that Lee Kuan Yew was coming to Kuala Lumpur on Sunday which was on the twenty-second of October, two days away. The Tunku had decided to go to London on the sixteenth of November. This worried me a little because Lee Kuan Yew might jump the gun. I thought the fourteenth of November would be better but the Tunku somehow held to his date as auspicious. On the question of the Singapore Merger Referendum I noticed the Tunku wanted Lee Kuan Yew to ask the people of Singapore the following questions:

- (a) Are you infavour of a merger or not?
- (b) If you want a merger do you prefer the PAP proposal?
- (c) Dou you want a complete merger?

I suggested to the Tunku that these questions were cumbersome and might pose difficulty if the people of Singapore decided for complete merger. I had assumed that Lee Kuan Yew might find it difficult to pose those questions and that it would be better if we should be guided by Lee Kuan Yew in a matter which he knew best. We must of course keep on telling him that a complete merger was a non-starter.

As we were discussing that subject, a phone call came from Razak in Parliament which was still sitting at about 11.30 p.m. The House was discussing a Bill for the Remuneration of MPs. Razak, on behalf of the

Government, had withdrawn the proposal since the opposition could not give a unanimous and wholehearted support. In fact they were quarrelling among themselves. The phone call amused the Tunku and he complemented Razak for making such a clever move.

That phone call interrupted discussions on the Singapore Merger White Paper which I thought the Tunku did not want to change his mind. He simply said that he would talk with Lee Kuan Yew when he was next in Kuala Lumpur.

Lee Kuan Yew arrived in KL on the evening of the twenty-second but the Tunku was busy preparing for the first meeting of ASA on the twenty-third which he opened at the Dewan Tunku Abdul Rahman. I absented myself from the ceremony and spent the time with the Brunei journalists who had just returned from a tour of the country. They wanted certain clarifications which I gave to their satisfaction.

After that, I went to the Residency. It must have been about noon. There was the Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew and Razak. I was invited to sit down with them as I had arrived only a few minutes after Razak and Lee Kuan Yew. They were sipping tea and therefore I had not missed anything.

After the exchange of pleasantries, the Tunku first spoke regarding the White Paper which Lee Kuan Yew intended to present at the next session of the Singapore Legislative Assembly. The Tunku said that the Exploratory Working Committee of the Federation Government had made a careful study of it and found it necessary to suggest certain adjustments. Without going into the details of the subject, the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew agreed that members of the working party should meet with Lee Kuan Yew and his team of officials after dinner that night at Istana Tetamu.

Lee Kuan Yew then spoke regarding the referendum which he said he would like to present as soon as the joint communique had been issued in London after the talk between the Tunku and MacMillan. He had already obtained assurance from Lord Selkirk that the referendum would be put in the best light. Lee Kuan Yew then explained that his idea was to present to the people the option of agreeing to the Northern Ireland type of merger or a complete merger. He said that already there was no question of whether the people wanted a merger or not. They all wanted the merger.

The Tunku asked if it would be best to ask the questions in the referendum. Firstly, whether they wanted a merger or not and if they did want a merger would they want the Northern Ireland type of merger or a complete merger. If, on the other hand, the people decided for complete merger then the final say should rest with the Malayan Government. By doing so, Lee Kuan Yew would be free from any blame if complete merger were found to be unacceptable, as it was likely to be. This, of course, opened the way for the merger not to take place which obviously would not be agreed to by Lee Kuan Yew if I read the Tunku's mind correctly.

Until then, the British had as yet to give their commitment to the Malaysia Concept which involved the Borneo territories. He could see that Lee Kuan Yew's line might force the Malayan Government to accept Singapore without the Borneo territories which took Singapore out of the Malaysia plan. The Tunku was preparing for a way out.

As I had expected, Lee Kuan Yew argued that there was no point in asking the first question unless the Tunku would accept the decision for complete merger. This, the Tunku replied, he would not do because the people of the Federation would not support him if he were to agree to a complete merger. Lee Kuan Yew said if it was generally known that a complete merger would not be acceptable to the Federation Government then the communists would work their best to get everybody to support the formula for complete merger which in effect would amount to a vote not favouring merger.

Lee Kuan Yew asked the Tunku what he thought of the future of Singapore if the referendum turned out to favour the *Barisan Socialis* type of merger or that if the people of Singapore did not want a merger. The Tunku replied that Singapore should continue to be a British Colony. The British could not possibly give independence to Singapore and retain her base there. The agreement between the British Government and a communist Singapore regarding the base would not be worth the scrap of paper it was written on because it would only be honoured so long as it suited the communist purposes. It must be remembered that the final choice on this matter should rest with the Malayan Government and the only way for Singapore to achieve independence was through a merger with the Federation of Malaya. Lee Kuan Yew should show strength and determination and should not hesitate to say that if the people of Singapore did not accept the Northern Ireland type of merger there would be no merger. Lee Kuan Yew said that the British would not be able to hold on to Singapore and might give it away. He would be happy if MacMillan would be able to say that if Singapore did not accept the Northern Ireland type of merger, Singapore would not be given independence.

Razak said that he was highly nervous of the proposition that there should be an alternative to merger in the referendum. There must not be an alternative dangling before them because that would only encourage the people to vote for the alternative and if the people did vote for the alternative the position would be untenable since the Federation would be presented with a *fait accompli*. It would hardly be possible for Malaya to refuse a merger which had been expressed as the will of the people.

Lee Kuan Yew asked as a matter for conjecture whether the British would cooperate in retaining Singapore as a Colony if the people of Singapore did not want the acceptable type of merger. Both the Tunku and Razak said that they expected the British to cooperate in this matter. In any case, this would be one of the points to be raised in London. They also surmised that the United States would not allow such an eventuality to happen.

The Tunku said that Lee Kuan Yew should not give in to the communists' method. He was simply to give the message of take it or leave it. If the British would not act, Malaya would act, said the Tunku. The Tunku did not say what he had in mind as a Malayan reaction. And then out like a bolt from the blue, the Tunku said that if the United Kingdom were to give independence, Singapore might find Malayan tanks rolling into Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew said that it was a fair suggestion and he would go back to discuss with his colleagues. I had never heard the Tunku speak in that manner before.

Lee Kuan Yew said that he was impressed by the suggestion made by Razak at Cameron Highlands that there should not be any election in Singapore and the Borneo territories for the Federal Parliament until after the following Federal elections, assuming that the transfer of sovereignty would take place before 1963. He also said that he would like to propose that the Tunku should suggest to MacMillan that the British would clear the 150 known communists, of whom 120 were non-Singapore or non-Federal citizens, from the island so that the Federation Government would receive Singapore island on a clean slate.

Nothing further of substance was discussed and the Tunku invited the three of us to a pot-luck lunch.

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The British High Commissioner Sir Geoffrey Tory had been knocking at my door the whole morning. I invited him to see me at my office that afternoon after the pot-luck lunch at the Residency. He had an entirely different subject and not at all connected with the Malaysia Concept or wanting to know about Lee Kuan Yew's attitude. I guessed he had been well briefed by Selkirk about Lee Kuan Yew. Tory wanted to know regarding Malaya's attitude towards South Korea which was anxious to be part of the Colombo Plan. He said that the UK would abide by the majority but aid-receptient countries should know that if their number was increased there would be less to share. The Malayan Government had always supported the anti-communist South Korea who had been encouraged to apply for the Colombo Plan membership. I told Tory so and it would not worry the Malayan Government if the aid programme would be affected by the membership of South Korea. There should be adjustments and programmes based on priority. It was most important that South Korea should be clearly made acceptable in the Colombo Plan.

I took the opportunity of asking Tory about the Borneo territories. He said he had been seeing copies of a number of messages and telegrams going up and down between London and the Governments of the Borneo territories and Lord Selkirk. Tory had the impression that both Waddel (the Governor of Sarawak) and Goode (the Governor of North Borneo) had softened their stand a little. Tory did not explain in detail and as far as I was concerned, I did not feel inclined to get him to say more than he was prepared to say lest it would be a breach of confidence. To me it was heartening to hear that there was some

change of heart which must have been influenced by the visitors to Kuala Lumpur and the work of our teams among the people of those territories in explaining the Malaysia Concept and the Tunku's speech and its debate in Parliament.

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The Tunku left for Vietnam on the morning of the twenty-fourth of October. At the airport, he announced that he would postpone his visit to London to some later date and not on the seventh of November as originally planned. This, the Tunku said, was in view of his desire to meet and entertain the Colombo Plan Ministerial Delegations.

Then the Tunku made known his feeling about the British base in Singapore. He said Singapore could never be used in time of war as a base of operations. It would be too cruel, according to the Tunku, since a few bombs would destroy the city, kill thousands of civilians and he could not imagine that Singapore was invulnerable in the event of attack. It would be wrong, in the circumstances, to think of Singapore as a base. However, he went on to assure the future of the civilian workers. Nevertheless, the Tunku said, the Malayan Government would never use the Singapore base since it would be committing an act of absolute cruelty and atrocity against the people of Singapore.

Of course, the Australians, British and Americans were taking his points very seriously and they had to study the implications of the statement. When they came up to me for further explanation, I told them that it was nothing new and the Tunku had not departed from his original stand on the Singapore base. He was only giving his reasons for his attitude.

The next day was a meeting of the Exploratory Working Party of both Singapore and Malaya. It was held at the PM's conference room and lasted from 3.00 p.m. to nearly 6.00 p.m. Many issues were raised in particular the list of State and Federal responsibilities. I thought the Singapore side was somewhat stiff, particularly Ahmad Ibrahim, who was the Advocate-General of Singapore. The meeting went off well and there was a clearer picture of what each side wanted. Immediately after the meeting, I reported to Razak.

While this meeting was going on, I had passed to me a message from Zainal Abidin Sulong that the meeting of the native chiefs in North Borneo had voted in favour of Malaysia. Only one chief abstained. This, I thought, was a great success on the part of our teams who had been campaigning in various villages. However, I thought, it was Governor Goode who finally made the chiefs confident in their decision. Goode opened the conference and he touched on the Malaysia Concept which he commended to the chiefs. This decision of the native chiefs nullified any previous speculations and uncertainties. The Kadazan Dusun leaders should now be satisfied. The only group which required attention was the Chinese elements. I sent to the Tunku in Saigon a message reporting to him the development among the native chiefs of North Borneo.

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The Tunku returned on the October 26 to Singapore from Vietnam. Razak and I travelled in a Malayan Air Force plane to Singapore to meet the Tunku the next morning. Razak had planned to meet with Lee Kuan Yew. When we arrived in Singapore, I went straight to the Federation House where I found Hamid Jumat who told me that the Tunku was out golfing with Lee Kuan Yew and would not return until about 10.00 a.m.

Since there were so many people who wanted to see the Tunku, I had only a brief moment with him in private after his golf. I was able to tell him that Razak was meeting Lee Kuan Yew. The Tunku said he was happy to have received my message in Vietnam regarding the decision of the North Borneo chiefs and enquired as to the organisers. I told him it was the normal annual conference of chiefs organised by the colonial government. He complimented me on my work.

Then he spoke about South Vietnam which he thought was in a very precarious position. Ngo Dinh Diem had not been managing the situation well. He was not getting enough information since prisoners were killed and there was no thorough debriefing of prisoners. There was a strong feeling of hate and lack of freedom as people turned their faces away when he and Ngo drove in the streets.

The Tunku gave me a piece of some very fine Vietnamese silk which he thought would make a nice waistcoat for me. He kept another piece for Razak. We went out to the same tailor in Colombo Court, Singapore, to have the waistcoats made. Then, after lunch, the Tunku proceeded to Batu Pahat, Johore by car.

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I had arranged with Lee Kuan Yew to meet with him at his office after lunch. He appeared most pleased to see me and inquired if there were fresh developments. I told him that there was nothing new but to convey to him what Razak felt when we talked on the plane coming down to Singapore. Razak wanted me to convey to Lee Kuan Yew that a referendum should be a straightforward question of either a merger of the Ulster kind, otherwise understood as reserved merger, or no merger. The question of complete merger should not be posed. Razak did not want the refusal of the Federation Government in the face of the peoples' wish for a complete merger.

Goh Keng Swee and Rajaratnam came to join in the discussion. Lee Kuan Yew said that his colleagues and himself had given a great deal of thoughts and were all agreed, including advisors and experts, that the best and the most effective approach was to pose the referendum in the form of either reserved merger or complete merger instead of a straight question of "yes" or "no" to the reserved merger. According to his reckoning and that of his advisors, the people of Singapore, if confronted with the two alternative forms of merger,

would choose reserved merger instead of complete merger. I noted the point and I might admit I had already been inclined to this view.

Lee Kuan Yew went on to explain that to the Chinese chauvinists, a complete merger with implications of the special position of the Malays, education policy, complete control of trade and commerce would not be acceptable to them. Even the English educated government workers as well as those in the firms would not want a complete merger. The official Working Committee had made it abundantly clear to the Singapore Government that Singaporeans did not want a complete merger. They had even asked, in the case of a complete merger, for automatic citizenship and a number of seats in the Federal Parliament should be in proportion to population without any link to citizenship or registered electors. They knew that these conditions would not be acceptable to the Federation Government. If it was a question of whether a reserved merger or no merger, then the communist elements would be in no position to stir up feelings and public opinion to reject the referendum. The communist elements and their supporters could then ask for a general election to put *Barisan Sosialis* in power which could ask for better terms for the merger.

Nevertheless, taking the Razak line, I said that the Malayan Government would be in a very awkward position of having to reject the wishes of the people of Singapore if they opted for a complete merger. Lee Kuan Yew, who was the only person speaking, said in reply that he did not think that would arise because the people of Singapore knew that a Singapore on the basis of Penang and Malacca would have only about 350,000 people qualified to vote. I reminded Lee Kuan Yew that the idea of a complete merger would for the time being be a non-starter to the Malayan Government and it was not necessary to make comparison with Penang or Malacca. I reminded Lee Kuan Yew of Article 22 of the Federation Constitution which, in the case of a new territory admitted into the Federation, Parliament might determine which persons were to be citizens, in this case, out of the Singapore citizens. It would be best not to entertain the idea of Penang or Malacca as applicable to Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew appeared somewhat puzzled. Perhaps he was not aware of this clause in the Malayan Constitution. He replied saying that he would bear my point in mind.

Goh Keng Swee at that stage intervened. He said that there was merit in posing the alternative question because even if the people of Singapore were to vote for complete merger the Federation Government still had the last say. Goh Keng Swee came out with a surprising statement that at some later date if it was necessary to occupy Singapore by military means and direct transfer of sovereignty from the British Government to the Federation Government, there would be a strong justification since the people had voted for a complete merger. At that stage I could not help thinking that the Tunku's statement at the meeting with Lee Kuan Yew before the Tunku left for Vietnam must have impressed the Singapore leaders.

I briefed Razak, who stayed behind, that Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues were determined that the referendum should be posed in accordance with the original proposal. I left for Kuala Lumpur with the same air-force plane that took us down to Singapore that morning.

* * *

On the October 13, Roeslan Abdul Ghani came to Kuala Lumpur, no doubt sent by the Government of Indonesia. In a conversation with the Indonesian visitor, the Tunku did not miss the opportunity of explaining the Malaysia Concept to augment what had been conveyed through diplomatic channels. The understanding of Indonesia, according to the Tunku, was extremely vital. The Malaysia Concept would bring an end to colonialism in this part of the world. With that, communism had no leg to stand on as at that moment, Singapore and Sarawak were the objects of subversion by the communists. Roeslan was feted to lunch by Razak and dinner by the Tunku who suggested to Roeslan to get the Indonesian Government, in the context of the Treaty of Friendship and Cultural Agreement, to send a team of *gamelan* (Indonesian musical ensemble) players to teach and live in Malaya. I could not help noticing that Roeslan was moved by the Tunku's sincerity.

In between, I was able to attend the meeting of the Malayan Exploratory Working Party for Singapore Merger and to brief them on what I had gathered as the views of the Singapore leaders. I went to Istana Tetamu to bid farewell to Roeslan Abdul Ghani who was leaving for Malacca and then to Jakarta. I asked him most earnestly to convey to the Indonesian Government the true purposes of the Malaysia Concept so that there would be no misunderstanding. Roeslan Abdul Ghani replied in the most cordial manner that it would be his paramount duty to foster closer understanding between the two governments and people. He said he was extremely impressed by the sincerity of the Tunku and Razak and the goodwill shown by Ministers and officials and indeed the people in general. He left a little advice with me that the Malayan leaders should avoid emphasising the anti-communist aspect in the Malaysia Concept. He was referring to the situation in Indonesia which had to live with the *Parti Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) and any anti-communist sentiment would not be well received by President Sukarno and the Government of Indonesia.

That little message had a big impact on me. I knew at once that the Malaysia Concept as presented had been inimical to the PKI and communist China. There would be resistance and I feared that Sukarno's Indonesia would not accept Malaysia which was becoming well-understood in Indonesia as an anti-communist ploy and therefore in the context of the cold war a part of the Anglo-American scheme of things. For their own reasons, the people of Singapore, as led by Lee Kuan Yew, would want Malaysia but there was apprehension that the Tunku would change his mind if there was strong objection from Sukarno. Should the Tunku change his mind about merger, Lee Kuan Yew might devise something to create a *fait accompli* and the Tunku

would have to face an awkward situation. However, my strong belief was that the Tunku could not care less if Sukarno objected but he would not look with favour if Singapore had taken the precipitous step of formally seeking a merger with Malaya before the Malaysia Concept was accomplished.

Razak had telephoned me after Roeslan left for Malacca by car. He had heard from Tory that Lee Kuan Yew was insisting on going ahead with publishing his White Paper. I could not believe it but Razak was emphatic that Tory had told him so. Razak sounded extremely nervous and asked me to come up with some kind of statement in the event that Lee Kuan Yew would come up with the White Paper. In short, Razak wanted me to talk to Aziz, the Secretary to Government, to prepare a statement to the effect that the Singapore White Paper was a unilateral exercise without the knowledge of the Malayan authorities.

* * *

UMNO members as a whole wanted the Tunku to explain to them regarding the Malaysia Concept. The Supreme Council had been briefed. Members had heard his speech in Parliament but they wanted the Tunku, as leader of the Party, to speak to them directly. The Tunku had asked me to assist in drafting his speech. I found it difficult since it was in Malay and my Malay was not that of the Tunku's who was highly immersed in the Kedah dialect of which I knew little. However, Nik Hassan knew the Tunku's style and between us we created one very much in line with his Parliamentary speech.

As soon as I got back in my office, Lee Kuan Yew rang up saying that he had received a message from Aziz Ishak, the Malayan Minister of Agriculture, to the effect that Singapore should cancel the pioneer status given to a Japanese oil company since this would damage his programme of setting up a urea plant in Malaya. Aziz, according to Lee Kuan Yew, had threatened the Singapore Government that if no such steps were taken by the Singapore Government, he would oppose the Singapore merger since Singapore was working against the interest of the Federation. Lee Kuan Yew also said that Aziz had written a letter to Goh Keng Swee some ten days previously but Lee Kuan Yew had sent Aziz a message to the effect that if he wanted action to be taken in that matter, he would entertain it only if Khir Johari the Malayan Minister of Commerce and Trade would address the Singapore Government on the subject. Lee Kuan Yew wanted the Tunku to know of the development.

As usual, before the General Assembly of UMNO, the Supreme Council (Majlis Tertinggi) met on the evening before. I was invited to attend the meeting. We had dinner first and I was able to brief the Tunku regarding the message of Lee Kuan Yew.

The Tunku looked very annoyed and said that Aziz would not dare oppose Malaysia. Using his own words, the Tunku said if Aziz did that he would be dealt with accordingly.!

Aziz Ishak was a member of the UMNO Supreme Council and he was present. The Tunku told the Council about the episode but Aziz Ishak never once said anything. Poor Aziz received a very severe criticism from members of the Council. The members were extremely alive to the issue of the Malaysia Concept. All they wanted the Tunku to make clear was that in Malaysia the special position of the Malays would continue to be well safeguarded. They were unanimous that the British Borneo territories should first come into Malaysia or at least simultaneously with Singapore.

The next day, November 6, 1961, the UMNO General Assembly started at 9.30 a.m. The Tunku delivered his address extremely well and with conviction and sincerity. Ghafar Baba then proposed the resolution in support of the Tunku's statement.

The debate was exciting, full of life. Not being an UMNO delegate, I could not claim any right to be present but the Tunku, who brought me in his car, informed the officials of the Assembly to get me a seat. Hence, I was able to witness the demeanour of the members and their speeches in support of the Tunku. Speeches reflected a great deal of the misgivings but at the same time recognised the importance of the choice they had to make. What impressed me most was that the speakers knew what they were talking about and there were no irrelevancies nor had anyone gone off tangent as often happens in UMNO assemblies. They gave tumultuous support to the Malaysia Concept as expressed in the unanimous votes given to the Tunku. After the Assembly, the Tunku took me in his car to see his private house off Kia Peng Road which he was going to rent out to an Ambassador as residence.

* * *

The following morning after the one day Assembly of UMNO, Lee Kuan Yew came by train from Singapore and I met him at the station. He was scheduled to play golf with the Tunku, Razak and Dr. Ismail. We went straight to the Selangor Golf Club and the four of them teed off. I arranged for breakfast for them after completing nine holes. It turned out to be a business breakfast. The Tunku told Lee Kuan Yew that the Federal Government would wish Lee Kuan Yew to accept that the White Paper he was proposing to publish would serve only as a transitional provision of the merger. For that, the Federation would offer fifteen seats in the Federal Parliament, to be elected by the Singapore Legislative Assembly from amongst themselves on the basis of the respective political strength. Lee Kuan Yew did not express any opinion.

That night, the Alliance Council met and again I was asked by the Tunku to be present to explain regarding any new developments. As it turned out the MCA members in the Alliance were mainly interested in the question of business opportunities in Singapore as well as the Borneo territories. I was not called upon to explain on anything political or constitutional.

On the morning of November 8, 1961, I played golf at the Selangor Golf Club with Lee Kuan Yew. I asked him if he had new ideas as a result of the

previous day's meeting with the Tunku, Razak and Dr. Ismail. If he had any, I would arrange for a meeting with the Tunku. This I did and they had lunch together where I was not present.

Lee Kuan Yew had agreed with me that he should have a meeting with Aziz, the Chief Secretary to the Malayan Government at 4.00 p.m. to finalise the White Paper. Tan Siew Sin and Dr. Ismail also came. So did the Tunku. There was a lot of bargaining with regard to the Federal and State lists. Lee Kuan Yew proposed that the White Paper should be regarded as an agreed document. The Tunku agreed but the Federation Government should be allowed to amend it. There were some serious discussions on the matter and it was eventually agreed that there should be an exchange of letters which would contain the transitional provisions and that any amendments to the provisions should have the agreement of both governments.

The meeting did not end till about nine in the evening and after the Ministers had left, the Tunku invited Lee Kuan Yew and me to a private dinner. He had also asked me to ring up Tijah but it was rather late and she had her dinner already.

* * *

The Tunku was in good heart and very relaxed. He made a few jokes about Lee Kuan Yew which meant that the Tunku had a special liking for him; those he was fond of he made them the butt of his jokes. The Tunku said that this merger and Malaysia should come quickly because after one year he would make Lee Kuan Yew into a human being!

The Tunku produced a 100 year old brandy. In the *tete-à-tete* Lee Kuan Yew made what I thought was an unnecessary remark by suggesting to the Tunku that I should be given an award for my work. The Tunku majestically responded by saying of course; I thought the matter should not have been mentioned at all. It was quite an embarrassment for me.

Then in a very sentimental mood, the Tunku revealed something of his inner feeling and I did not know if Lee Kuan Yew understood then its full implications. The Tunku repeated what he said previously that the Chinese in Malaya did not really have a leader at that time. Lee Kuan Yew replied that he would do his best to assist the Tunku and Razak to rally the Chinese.

I did not share this information with Razak or anybody else lest it would upset the Malayan leadership particularly that of the MCA. I thought I read the Tunku well in that he wanted a leader for the Chinese but that was all. I also surmised that at that time Lee Kuan Yew would never be content to be a leader in Malaysia of the Chinese community only since his PAP was non-communal.

In the course of the conversation during dinner, the Tunku said that it would be helpful if Lee Kuan Yew would write him a letter detailing the dangers of the communist activities in the labour movements in Singapore where industrial unrest was an ever present threat. That would strengthen his

hand in London when talking to MacMillan in particular if Lee Kuan Yew had asked for Malaya's assistance even if Singapore was still a British Colony. The Tunku was talking of internal security and not external aggression.

The next day the Tunku was still in a sentimental mood. Both of us played golf in the morning. As we walked the course stepping on the dew with all kinds of birds chirping and digging for worms, the Tunku, in the most intimate manner, began to talk of the future and the next line of leadership. Of course Razak would succeed him but he needed a few reserves and supporters. Suleiman was a sickly man and his brother the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. Ismail, was temperamentally unsuitable. He had high regards for Ghafar Baba who was a good orator but Ghafar needed to learn English. I was asked to get him a place in London as a home based staff so that he could attend English classes for a year or two. Then the Tunku turned to me and said I should enter politics but not just yet. In the meantime, I should learn the art of handling men and try to emulate the lives of good people. Then I understood why he had always brought me to all the important political meetings.

I told the Tunku how grateful I felt for his thoughts for me. However, I reminded him of a promise that I made to him and Razak before Merdeka that some people had to be in the civil or diplomatic service to help the politicians and that I was resolved to be one of those persons. I told him I had no political ambition except to assist in the building of an independent and proud nation. I told him I did not have the temperament nor the patience to deal with petty politicians who whine at the slightest discomfort. I could be of a better service to assist my political masters whom I respected at the same time as friends I could relate to like the Tunku and Razak.

The Tunku agreed that there was much to be done at the civil and diplomatic services level. In any case, he said, I could not retire then because of my age without losing my pension. He was well aware of my temper and temperament and that I could not stand fools easily and there were many fools in politics. Nevertheless, the time would come when he thought I should be directly involved in politics perhaps when Razak took over from him since Razak would need a strong support. The Tunku thought I could give that support as much as I had been supporting the Tunku. Anyway I closed the subject and concentrated on our game which I must admit meant little to me then.

During golf, I could not help noticing that he never mentioned a word about Khir Johari, neither positive nor negative. Yet I knew he was extremely fond of Khir but I could never know until now if he favoured Khir to take the place of leadership after Razak. And why should Ghafar have to leave the country just to study English which might take a year or two? Later, when I offered to Ghafar the position of a second secretary in the London High Commission, Ghafar after a couple of days, declined and said that it would not be necessary for him to leave the country just then for the purpose as stated by the Tunku.

That night, Tjah and I took Lee Kuan Yew to a satay dinner at the old Sungei Besi airport open air restaurant. With only three of us, we never spoke anything serious and I thought Lee Kuan Yew was very relaxed.

The next morning I arranged to play golf with Lee Kuan Yew. As we walked, enjoying the fresh morning air, each chasing the little white ball, we talked generally of Malaysia and the merger. We concluded that the proposed White Paper should be the subject of an exchange of letters between himself and the Tunku, confirming the agreement between the two leaders and that I would put up a draft for him.

I had arranged for lunch for Lee Kuan Yew, Razak and Dr. Ismail at Istana Tetamu. Before the lunch, I had a meeting with Razak and told him what I thought Lee Kuan Yew had in mind. During lunch, a great deal of ground was covered. Lee Kuan Yew had agreed to the draft which I had prepared which contained no reference about amendments to the transitional provisions.

The tricky part was that Lee Kuan Yew had wanted that any amendments and modifications to the transitional provisions should have the agreement of the two governments, and the approval of the Federal Parliament. On the role of the Federal Parliament, Razak and Dr. Ismail did not agree. Any involvement of the Federal Parliament would place Singapore in a difficult position regarding amendments to the State List. That amendment in Parliament would require a two-third majority. It would be best for Singapore to request that any amendments to the transitional provisions should obtain only the agreement of the two governments without the parliamentary approval.

Lee Kuan Yew left for Singapore with a promise to return in a day or two.

* * *

Sir Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner, called at my office in the afternoon of the ninth of November. He had received nothing new but assured me that everything was under control. He said the British Government was very much under the old rule of playing cautiously and had to reckon with the question of self-determination. I told him in the most candid way, since we had become close friends, that if the British Government could not make up its mind and its firm intention about the Borneo territories in Malaysia, it would not be of any use for the Tunku to meet MacMillan. These two leaders would have to face the world in respect of their responsibilities towards the people of Borneo. In that process, a few eggs would have to be broken and some dust will be treaded upon for the common good of the majority of the inhabitants of Borneo.

The question we should ask ourselves was whether Malaysia was desirable. If the answer was in the affirmative, then there was no reason to be slow. Tory interrupted by saying that the Conservative Government would be attacked by the backbenchers. That, I told him, was a choice the Conservatives would have to make. However, once the principle was agreed,

then the transfer of sovereignty must take place forthwith. The rest could be arranged by means of transitional provisions. Arrangements could be made for the State List, the Federal List and the Concurrent List, Borneonisation of the state services and all that. In the meantime, the Federal Parliament might provide for seats representing the people of the Borneo territories and this could be effected by nominations or elections from amongst the members of the present legislative councils. I was concerned with the time frame.

I reminded Tory what I had told him many times before that with any postponement or procrastination to the entry of the Borneo territories into Malaysia, the problem of Singapore would stick out like a sore thumb. We both knew that without the Borneo territories in Malaysia, there would be no merger for Singapore. We also knew very well that the British Government could not hang on to Singapore for very long.

Tory was a kindly fellow and a true professional. He was not in the least ruffled by my rather undiplomatic demeanour but instead thanked me for the candid way I spoke to him. He understood Malaya's position and his only hope was that the Tunku would be able to persuade MacMillan in the way I had persuaded him. I must admit that to talk in the manner I did was thoroughly exhausting.

* * *

Lee Kuan Yew, as promised, arrived with Dr. Goh Keng Swee on the morning of the November 10. I had spent the whole morning with Razak studying the Singapore-Malaya Merger Memorandum as commented by our working party. A special meeting of the Alliance Party leaders was called that night at 7.30 p.m. to consider the Singapore merger. I was invited to attend.

At this meeting, I witnessed a strange spectacle when Aziz Ishak, working himself to a pitch, attacked Tan Siew Sin who had commented something about the English text. This must have been a pent-up feeling because of the way he had been treated at the recent UMNO Supreme Council Meeting. Aziz Ishak said that Tan Siew Sin was not the only one privileged to understand English. The Tunku calmed him down. Then the Tunku raised the point about representation in Parliament on which he thought fifteen for Singapore would be reasonable. Sambanthan, the MIC leader and a member of the Malayan cabinet, vehemently spoke against it saying that there was no basis for the figure. Aziz Ishak kept on interrupting that everybody had been too much in a hurry and he wanted more time to consider the Memorandum. I intervened, with permission of the Tunku, to explain the comments presented by our own working party. Dr. Ismail who had already studied the Memorandum replied to Sambanthan that the proposal of the Tunku was not based on any calculation but was purely a political decision. If it was based on any mathematical calculation the MIC should not have been represented in the Cabinet. At this point, I saw Aziz Ishak becoming red in the face and vented his wrath by an explosive remark that Dr. Ismail should not have made such a flippant

statement. To that Dr. Ismail took exception and demanded a withdrawal of the remark or an apology from Aziz Ishak who adamantly refused both. Some exchange of words ensued. It was soon sorted out after the Tunku appealed for calm and patience. What a stormy session!

Lee Kuan Yew was waiting at Istana Tetamu and I met with him after the meeting had dispersed. The Tunku had left at about 9.30 p.m. to attend a Women's Football Association dinner. Lee Kuan Yew agreed with most of the proposed amendments of the draft document. It was not until midnight that we completed our work. I took Lee Kuan Yew to Campbell Road for a satay supper. It was indeed a rough day for me, having to deal with the details of the merger plan and to witness the ministerial outbursts but, for the Tunku's crisis management skill, the meeting might have ended in a political explosion.

On Sunday, November 12, 1961, Temenggong Jugah and Pengarah Montegerai had lunch at my house. Lai Eng Kong from North Borneo and Donald Stephens also came. Lai Eng Kong had misgivings about the Borneonisation of the state services. He wanted assurances that the native people should be given priority.

In my discussion with Donald Stephens, I asked him if he ever thought of serving in Kuala Lumpur as a Minister in the Malaysian Cabinet. He had to think of someone for North Borneo and I had in mind Mustapha. Stephens never gave me a reply one way or another. Instead he asked why I had sent the Socialist Front members to Borneo. I replied that in a democratic system, it was important to give equal opportunity to all and also a chance for the North Borneo people to talk to members of the Opposition. The impression among Borneo people had been that everyone in Kuala Lumpur were like the Alliance members who were all supportive of the Malaysia Concept. I thought that if some of the Borneo people could unite with the Opposition in making certain demands, they might create an impression although I could not guarantee that they would succeed. Stephens seemed impressed with my explanation.

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As decided by the Tunku, the delegation led by him left for London on November 16, 1961. In the party was Razak, Tan Siew Sin, Kadir Shamsuddin and I.

A number of meetings took place and high on the agenda was the future of the British base in Singapore, the timetable for Malaysia which had to take account of the wishes of the people of the Borneo territories and the merger of Singapore. On the issue of Singapore, the British side insisted that due to the highly volatile nature of the internal political situation, merger should come quickly. It was only when the formula for the use of the British base in Singapore being part of Malaysia was agreed to by both sides that these issues would be resolved. It was also agreed that the merger of Singapore would take place simultaneously with the entry of the Borneo territories in Malaysia.

The text of the Joint Statement issued on November 23, 1961 after a series of meetings clearly indicated the areas of agreement and also a glimpse of the difficult negotiations which took place. The statement said that in the light of a full study of the problem which has been going on for some months, the British and Malayan Governments were convinced that the formation of Malaysia was a desirable aim. The statement noted with satisfaction the areas of agreement recently negotiated between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore for the merging of Singapore in Malaysia. On the Borneo territories the statement said that before coming to any final decision, it was necessary to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak. In the case of Brunei the views of the Sultan were being sought.

The task of ascertaining the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak would be carried out by a Commission which would be required to make recommendations. The Commission would be composed of a chairman jointly appointed by the two governments and four members, two nominated by the British Government and two by the Malayan Government. In the light of the Commission's report, the two Governments would decide what steps should be taken.

On the tricky question of the British base in Singapore, in the event of the formation of Malaysia, the British and the Malayan Governments agreed that the existing defence agreement between Malaya and Britain should be extended to embrace the other territories concerned and the proposed Malaysian Government would offer to the British Government the right to continue to maintain bases at Singapore for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia.

It must be placed on record that Razak gave the Tunku tremendous support in the form of words that would meet with the agreement of the British side. There was some difficulty with regard to the bases being used for SEATO purposes. In my private discussion with Razak, I offered the following words, "preservation of peace in Southeast Asia"; he in turn offered to the Tunku and this did the trick. Without the defence formula being reached to the satisfaction of both sides, I doubt if any agreement on Malaysia could be reached. The final statement was signed by MacMillan and the Tunku.

As expected, the British Members of Parliament queried the Conservative Government on the defence arrangement. Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth Secretary, told the House of Commons that the agreement had not excluded the use of the Singapore bases in discharging British obligations to SEATO.

It was reported that James Callaghan, who was then the colonial spokesman for the Labour Party, asked the government if it was the case in the proposed Malaysia the British could not move troops for a particular purpose without the consent of the Malaysian Government. Yet in Singapore then the British had been free to use troops with or without such consent and he expressed that the British in the proposed Malaysia were in an impossible

situation. Callaghan went on to say that if Singapore had been reduced in its value then the British Government should acknowledge and re-examine the use of those bases and how worthwhile they were to the United Kingdom. Sandys, an old parliamentary hand, dealt the question with a very forthright statement to the effect that the agreement did not exclude the use of the bases in Singapore by Britain as she deemed it necessary to discharge her obligation to SEATO which existed for the purpose of preserving peace in Southeast Asia besides assisting in the defence of Malaysia and the Commonwealth.

* * *

The Tunku, after the joint Anglo-Malayan Statement on Malaysia had been issued, told the BBC that Malaysia might be established within a year as both Britain and Malaya had realised the need for urgency. On the question of whether Singapore British bases in Malaysia could be used for SEATO purposes, the Tunku replied that if it so happened that SEATO had to perform certain duties in that area to maintain peace there would be no objection. However, he added that the situation depended on the three conditions stipulated in the Anglo-Malayan Defence Arrangement:

- (a) British bases in Singapore would be for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaya and its successor Malaysia;
- (b) for Commonwealth defence;
- (c) for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia.

Diplomatic words served all things to all men.

* * *

I had been away in London for more than ten days. On my return, I found Zainal Abidin Sulong busy preparing for the second Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC), this time to be held in Kuching. Various documents had to be prepared and talking points for the delegates to use if they wished. The meeting was to take place from the December 18 to 21, 1961 and this time it had the advantage of the Tunku-MacMillan Joint Statement. The most important part for them was to secure the agreement on the ascertainment of the wishes of the people by an independent Commission.

Together with Ong Yoke Lin and Ismail Yusof, I left on December 16, 1961 for Kuching by an Air Force plane. The plane stopped in Singapore to pick up Rajaratnam. In the plane, I was able to go through the speeches of the delegation and offered some suggestion for improvement.

On arrival at Kuching, we were met by Jakeway, the Sarawak Chief Secretary, Ong Kee Hui, who was the Chairman of the Sarawak United Peoples Party as well as the Chairman of the Kuching Municipal Council and Yeo Cheng Hoe, the leader of the Sarawak delegation. After exchanging

pleasantries, I excused myself to meet Datu Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha, the leader of Party Negara Sarawak.

When I met Datu Bandar at his house, there were a couple of his men with him. They disappointed me when I discovered that the Malaysia rally they were supposed to organise for the nineteenth had not been arranged as yet. They were giving me all sorts of excuses. In no uncertain manner, I told them that the political struggle for independence could not be done half-heartedly. The occasion also gave me the opportunity to tell Datu Abang Mustapha that from my report, his Party was not getting as much support as it should. There was no passion and enthusiasm in their activities. I had been informed that the Party leaders were not at all popular and they never had new elections for the party leadership.

Many Malays of Sarawak were anti-colonial and some preferred the rule of Brooke as the Rajah. The Malays had always been the administrative and military class and trusted by Brooke, hence the Istana was on the Sarawak river bank where the Malays were living. Brooke inherited the idea of using the Malays from the Brunei regime previously. Datu Abang Mustapha was known to be pro-colonial administration and actually could not get the support of the majority of the Malays. He had some Bidayuh, Iban and Chinese including Jugah and William Tan in his Party and they were mostly people who were close to the colonial administration.

I took Datu Abang Haji Mustapha aside and told him once again to take advantage of his pro-colonial stance. He should explain to the people that if Sarawak desired a true independence from white rule, it would be easier to deal with the colonial government to get independence than to remove Brooke. I reminded him of what I said to him before. Colonial powers were on the way out anyway; it was a matter of time. With Malaysia the process would even be faster. He had therefore the right policy of being pro-Malaysia and should not hesitate to say so openly.

Although I had spoken to him once before in this vein, Datu Abang Haji Mustapha listened to me intently taking in every word I said as if it was something of a novelty. Then he thanked me for giving him a new spirit to fight for the people of Sarawak. His main difficulty was that of ill-health. His men then undertook to organise the rally on the nineteenth.

At that time, the premier hotel in Kuching was the "Aurora". As soon as I got there I received a message from one of our activists that a group wanted to meet with me in strict secrecy and confidence. Since the message was genuine enough, I arranged that I should meet them at a rendezvous of their choice at 7.30 p.m. A guide brought me, at the appointed time, to a house in a kampung which until today I don't know where.

The activist in his message made the point that the people meeting me were extremely important and had indentified them as potential leaders for Sarawak. Zainal Abidin Sulong and his team had been working on the idea that the Party Negara alone could not be relied upon to rally support of the

indigenous people, therefore an alternative should be created as another pro-Malaysia Party.

When I entered the house, four people greeted me and I recognised them at once:

- (a) Abdul Rahman Yaacob. He was qualified as a lawyer and working in the Attorney-General's chambers, Kuching. A self-made young Melanau who rose from the ranks of a clerk and was well-respected. He was active in the affairs of *Barisan Pemuda* led by Ahmad Zaidi. Abdul Rahman also assisted in the drafting of the Constitution of Party Negara of Datu Abang Haji Mustapha;
- (b) Dawi, a staunch nationalist and active in youth work. He was employed in the Health Department. He visited Malaya as leader of the Youth Delegation, attending the Malaya Youth Conference that year;
- (c) Attaallah Zainuddin, Secretary of the Muslim Welfare Association and a member of the Kuching Municipal Council;
- (d) Datuk Tuanku Bujang. He was by far the most interesting person and highly respected in Sarawak. I had known him for some time when I regularly visited Sibul, where he lived. His hospitality was overwhelming and like an old Malay gentry, he would provide a meal at whatever hour one visited his home. The man had a long career in the service of Brooke and the colonial government. He started as a police officer and a member of the Sarawak Rangers. He was known for his courage in putting down hostile elements against Brooke. There were many legends of heroism attached to him; the British made him a Member of the British Empire (MBE). He was then a pensioner.

I was more than pleased to meet these four gentlemen but I was even more curious as to the purpose of the meeting. As for their pro-Malaysia sentiment I had no doubts. It soon confirmed my suspicion that the purpose of this meeting with me was to seek my opinion about their proposal to set up a new political party. I had decided to let them steer their way and I would simply follow the drift. They explained that their biggest worry was that while they themselves were happy to support Party Negara to which they belonged, or at least they claimed to do so, they were worried that many people in Sarawak would not wish to be identified with Party Negara in view of the present leadership. It was imperative to change the leadership but the present leaders particularly Datu Abang Haji Mustapha did not favour a party elections. They revealed to me that the two leading members of the party, Temenggong Jugah and William Tan were anxious to leave the party. This was confirmed when later I personally checked with Jugah and William Tan who intended to resign at the end of the year.

The four gentlemen impressed on me that the biggest danger at the time was that people would be more attracted to the Sarawak United Peoples Party which was known to be anti-Malaysia. They referred to the coming of the Commission as agreed to in London which would determine the wishes of the people. Should SUPP get more popular support the Malaysia Concept would be doomed. Already one of their friends, by the name of Merican, had defected to join SUPP. That defection made them feel even more convinced that a new party should be formed. And this should be done as soon as possible to assist in persuading the people to support Malaysia. They wanted to have the party formed and registered in January the following year.

I accepted this explanation which to me was done in earnest and good faith. However, I had to warn them of the dangers of forming a new party which could create confusion in the minds of the people. I was apprehensive of that point and would require further clarification as to how to avoid the splitting of support. I also wanted to know if the new party was open to all races or whether it was only for the natives. I reminded them that one of the reasons which the Tunku had agreed to seek popular support of the Malaysia Concept was that a better opportunity would be available to the natives with the support of non-natives for more development and education through independence for Sarawak in Malaysia. They admitted that they had a great deal of setbacks in the colonial administration. Abdul Rahman Yaacob could not leave the government service for a number of years since the colonial government would require him to pay back the expenses for his education if he left before the period stipulated for him to serve the colonial government. They said that the Brooke regime had not done much for the natives particularly the Malays who had shown and proven their loyalty to the Rajah.

They explained to me that it was not their intention to oppose Party Negara which might split support for Malaysia. They would work together at least until Malaysia was a reality. The new party would have the aims and objectives, very much like UMNO, which was to fight for the special position of the Malays, in their case of the native peoples. The party would of course be open to all natives and non-natives but those who joined would have to subscribe to the professed ideals of the party. They had as yet not thought out the name. However, they said that Malaysia would be the main objective and future object of loyalty; they expected to be embodied in the party constitution a clause that would ensure forever the president of the party would be from the native community. They were grateful for the UMNO Constitution which I made available to Abdul Rahman Yaacob a few weeks before.

I asked them as to the attitude of Ahmad Zaidi towards the formation of the party. I wanted to know since I had a great deal of respect for Zaidi's opinion. They said Zaidi was under the impression that the party would be too glaringly native based and would not favour its formation although he promised to cooperate with the party if it was formed. Zaidi had declined to be a member.

On Party Negara, the four gentlemen gave me the assurance that in the case of a general elections where Party Negara was strong, they would not put up a candidate but support Party Negara. I was gratified to hear that and enquired if they were ready to talk to Datu Abang Haji Mustapha. They said they were ever willing to do that but their past experiences had been that it was Datu Abang Haji Mustapha and his supporters who were unwilling to have a dialogue. I took the opportunity to tell them that whatever might be their misgivings, they should not ignore Datu Abang Haji Mustapha although they tried to tell me that Datu Abang Haji Mustapha was not as influential as he claimed to be.

I then asked them regarding the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) which was Iban based. They said they were quite prepared to cooperate with that party but it had at the moment openly declared its anti-Malaysia Concept. This was stated by its Secretary-General Stephen Kalong Ningkam. It seemed to me then that with the formation of the new party, the votes particularly of the natives, would split three ways.

The Sarawak Nationalist Party had some of the ultra nationalist Ibans as its members. The British officials too had been flirting with the Iban nationalists and fuelling their emotions reminding them of the early Brunei days which would be repeated in Malaysia with Malays oppressing the Ibans once again. I asked the four people if they were willing to talk to SNAP. They said they were but could see that it would be a futile exercise. They also said that they were willing to meet with Kalong Ningkam if I could persuade the Secretary-General of SNAP to meet with them.

Finally, I said that if they could manage the new party well it might be helpful in the quest for Malaysia. They were uncertain of the name of the party but were tinkering round with acronyms. They wanted a nice acronym and the name of the party could follow that. The word *BERJASA* was a good acronym and later the *Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak* was born.

As I went away, I could not help thinking of the importance of SNAP and together with Party Negara and the new *BERJASA* they would form a united front which the British Government could not take lightly. I also thought it was important for me to meet Stephen Kalong Ningkan with whom I had never had the occasion to discuss matters of political development for Sarawak.

As soon as I got back to the hotel I alerted one of the workers to make the arrangement for my meeting with Kalong Ningkam. I also wanted to meet Datu Abang Haji Mustapha to gauge his views about the proposal of a new party. I had arranged for Ong Yoke Lin the next day to have a chat with Temenggong Jugah who, I had noticed, needed an explanation in great detail about the Malaysia Concept so that it would not be too difficult for him to understand the debate in the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC). Temenggong Jugah was an illiterate. But he was a man of great experience and wisdom. He was also a natural leader of men, not just of his

Iban people. He was generous, kind and was always careful not to hurt anybody. It was important to have Jugah on the side of the Malaysia Concept.

* * *

Ong Yoke Lin and I had an appointment to meet with Governor Waddel. The conversation was extremely cordial. But the Governor was out of line when it came to the Malaysia Concept. He appeared to be oblivious to the Tunku-MacMillan Joint Statement. He kept on trying to impress on us that we should not actualise Malaysia too quickly and that we should not hurry the arrival of the Commission until the people were fully aware of the implications of the Malaysia Concept. Waddel espoused the hope that the MSCC would throw some light and clear the doubts and misgiving of the people. Ong Yoke Lin made the point that speed was most essential in the whole exercise and spoke in great detail regarding the Anglo-British statement. Ong Yoke Lin revealed to Waddel that it was the British Government which gave full support to the idea of the Commission to start its work in January next year and finishing it within three months.

I asked the Governor if the colonial officials since the London meeting would start to explain in detail regarding the Malaysia Concept. The people living in longhouses and the Chinese had a great deal of respect for the colonial administrators and if they made the proper approach in line with what was understood in London it would not be too difficult for the people in Sarawak to make up their minds.

I received one of the greatest surprises in the episode of the formation of Malaysia when the Governor told me that he had no idea whatsoever with regard to the Malaysia Concept although he had without instructions on several occasions commended it in principle to the people including the State Legislative Assembly. I then suggested to him if he would consider arranging for some of the Sarawak colonial officials to meet with me and some other Malayan officials in order to brief each other on anything that might be of importance in the matter of presenting the Malaysia Concept to the people. The Governor gave me the impression he was not at all enthusiastic and indeed his answer was non-committal. It would seem to me he was utterly unsure since my proposal might work against the interest of the British colonial administration. I decided to tell him that the British Government was just as anxious as the Malayan Government was to see that the right answers would be produced to the Commission. The Malayan Government would not want an unwilling Sarawak but it was important that the people had an opportunity to understand the concept, that when they should appear before the Commission to give evidence, they would have had some idea of what to say which might assist the Commission in making an assessment.

The conversation took about an hour and it ended with the request from me that he consider the idea at least of exchanging information if not an

unofficial meeting of officials to work out a common line of action. I don't know if I had made any impression on the Governor.

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I managed to get an appointment with Datu Abang Haji Mustapha that afternoon but it had to be in Santubong, a fishing village down the river. Datu Bandar was convalescing there. At that time there was no other easy way to go to Santubong except by boat down the river. My guide, one of the local activists, took me alone by a speedboat.

The down river trip took us approximately one hour. It was a beautiful sunny afternoon and there were a few people fishing among the mangroves. There were kingfisher birds flying among the branches with monkeys chattering as the motor boat passed by. Because of the tidal behaviour of the river it was difficult to know if one was going down or upstream. The boatman told me it was high tide.

When I reached Santubong, Datu Abang Haji Mustapha was at a house waiting for me. There were several people who were the local committee members of Party Negara branch. I enquired after his health and was gratified to learn the he was better but was advised to take a rest. I told him that his health was more important in the struggle for Malaysia at a later date when the Commission started to work. I advised him not to be too anxious if he did not attend the second Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC) conference the next day. I thought he felt comforted by my words of encouragement.

When I brought up the issue of the waning support for his political party, he seemed already aware of the move by Abdul Rahman Yaacob and Datuk Tuanku Bujang to form another party. He was rather philosophical about the whole thing and said that it was good for democracy and could see no objection to the development.

This gave me the opportunity to be very candid with him and told him what I heard regarding the way he ran his organisation. It did not disturb him at all and he appeared to want to know more from me. I told him that the people who were organising the new party were not personally hostile to the Datuk Bandar but they felt that in view of the coming of the Commission and the growing support for SUPP, the only way was to have another platform for the people who did not support Party Negara.

I then requested Datu Abang Haji Mustapha if he would consider the formation of a United Front for Malaysia with the new party. I also enquired if he was disposed towards the idea of meeting the leaders who were forming the new party. I was not sure if he would agree to this since he might have regarded them as treacherous. To my great satisfaction and pleasure, he agreed to meet with them if that could be arranged. I also obtained from him the assurance that he or his party would not make any negative statement against the new party when formed. He said he would instruct the Party

Negara information officer to that effect. He said this loud and clear in the presence of his supporters. After about an hour, I asked for leave to get back to Kuching. He was extremely hospitable when he asked me to stay for dinner but the boatman did not feel confident to go up river in the dark because of the debris and flotsam particularly during low tide.

He was kind enough to let me go as the sun was already beginning to be hidden behind the hills. The journey was somewhat pleasant as the water was less choppy. I saw more people, particularly children exposing their shiny naked brown bodies, bathing in the river. Apparently they were Malays or Melanaus and looked rather cheerful, almost contented, with their lot. Even from a distance it could be seen that their living conditions were appalling as some of their houses were ramshackle attap huts. It was then in my thoughts that whatever might be the shape of Malaysia, these people would stand to gain in rural development and education for their children. Hopefully, the carpetbagger politicians would not upset what I thought the Tunku had for these people.

The uneventful but pleasant boat ride brought me to Kuching before dark. I soon discovered that Ong Yoke Lin had gone together with Jugah on a car ride organised by William Tan to see a gold mine in Bau. I thought Ong Yoke Lin and Ismail Yusof had a private talk with Jugah but I had not thought of them seeing a gold mine. I certainly would have advised them to avoid such a thing if only to avoid the kind of allegation which SUPP might hurl at an MCA leader who had shown interest only in the gold mining business and the profit which might accrue. Perhaps, I was over-cautious and oversensitive and if William Tan and Ong Yoke Lin could convince Jugah during the journey, then the trip to the gold mine would have been worthwhile. It turned out to be worthwhile.

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Waiting at the hotel on my return from Santubong was one of our workers who had succeeded in organising a meeting with Stephen Kalong Ningkan that same evening at a place in a nearby kampung. He warned me that the meeting might be rough since Kalong Ningkan, only a few days before, had issued a statement for the benefit of the MSCC that SNAP was opposed to the Malaysia Concept and that the Party would work for the independence of Sarawak. Ningkan was extremely critical of the Tunku and the opinion of his party had hardened against Malaysia.

I had invited Stephen Kalong Ningkan to Kuala Lumpur a few weeks before but he had not given any reply until the day before I left for Kuching saying that he had been away from his address and did not get my message until he returned. I gathered from our man that he had been busy going round from place to place talking against Malaysia and appealing to the nationalism of the Iban people to join his party. He had been spreading the message that Malaysia meant putting Sarawak under the domination of a foreign power which must be opposed. His party preferred Sarawak to remain in the

Commonwealth. Kalong Ningkan had by that time gathered about 37,000 members for his party whose main platform was Iban nationalism.

After I had my dinner, I was taken by my contact to the rendezvous. I did not know where it was but in a kampung very much like the place where I met with Tuanku Bujang and Abdul Rahman Yaacob. It was the same rather badly lit road and a footpath leading to the house. Much to my surprise, our local worker had managed to get not only Kalong Ningkan and other important members of SNAP but also some leaders of the proposed new party.

It was a wonderful sight to see them sitting together sipping coffee or tea, some smoking and all smiling as I greeted them. Kalong Ningkan was seated next to the Vice President of SNAP, a gentleman who had been introduced to me as Edwin Howell. The members of the new party were Tunku Bujang, Alfred Mason, Philip Jitam, a very well-respected Iban and Abang Haji Openg who was a member of Council Negri and a prominent Malay who had been very involved in the Islamic Affairs of Sarawak. Other luminaries of Kuching were Haji Satem, Haji So'od and Dawi. There were a couple of others whose names I could not recall or what they were. They could have been SNAP members.

My contact had been encouraged by both sides to arrange the meeting because they had hoped that I would be able to bring about some form of rapprochement between SNAP and leaders of the proposed new party. The encouraging part was that it came from the new group and Ningkan was willingly responsive. Tuanku Bujang's group was working extremely hard to persuade the SNAP leaders to change their mind. It was quite a tall order since the meeting was not just between Ningkan and me but my contact thought that there was a good chance of achieving the almost impossible since both sides had, according to him, a very high regard for me.

I had not met Stephen Kalong Ningkan, personally before though I had known him by name and repute as if I had already known him personally. He was a very pleasant fellow, spoke English and Malay and was very well-mannered. I found it difficult to fault him in his demeanour and speech although his statements against the Tunku and the Malaysia Concept could be regarded as intemperate. He was very cordial but I noticed that when he responded to my greetings, he did not look me in the eyes as if he was hiding something or guilty of a conspiracy. My contact had advised me that Kalong Ningkan then was very much under the influence of the colonial administrators.

I made a special effort not to speak about Malaysia although I wanted it very much; I wanted them to start. Instead I spoke to Openg about Islam and pilgrimage matters. I had to think of everything else and must have been quite transparent that I was avoiding the subject. It was Alfred Mason, the prospective Secretary-General of the proposed new party who asked a direct question to me about the Malaysia Concept and what advantages it would bring to the people of Sarawak. From then on, questions and answers were

pouring out and there seemed to be no stopping their thirst for information on subjects such as freedom of worship, the national language, state autonomy and the like.

Having known and understood the strength of the Iban nationalism in Stephen Kalong Ningkan which I had respected very much, I gave my views rather on what I thought to be the obverse side if Sarawak did not get independence through Malaysia. On her own, Sarawak natives could never hope to compete economically with the Chinese who were already in an advantaged position. I enlarged on the theme by saying how dangerous it was for Sarawak when the gap between the natives and the Chinese should get bigger and bigger simply because someone had planted the idea as if at that moment in time everything was equal and that the playing field was level. I told them in Malaya the Federal Constitution had recognised the disparity and had given a special position to the natives not to make him superior as alleged by the enemies of the Malaysia Concept but to correct an anomalous situation brought about by history. Because of that, great things had been achieved in nation-building which brought about improvements in income differentials and education.

As I knew that the Iban people, particularly Kalong Ningkan himself, had attached a great deal of pride to their native prowess and bravery, I told them that under the British they would have no military future and if placed on equal footing with the Malays or Chinese after independence on their own they would take a few generations before they could rise above the rank of non-commissioned officers. Even then they would be relegated to being Iban trackers which was indeed a lowly and humiliating role in the armed forces. I could see in Malaysia the Iban playing their rightful role in the police and the armed forces.

Kalong Ningkan was rather hostile to the Malaysia Concept at the beginning of the meeting. However, as the evening wore on past midnight to 1.30 a.m., Stephen Kalong Ningkan altered his tone and broke into tears when he admitted that he had been ill-advised about the Malaysia Concept. If he had known the concept, he and his party would not have opposed it. He did not reveal as to who had been feeding him with negative ideas of Malaysia.

He said his party was against Malaysia and for Sarawak independence because the Iban people believed that one of them would be a Prime Minister and not just a Chief Minister. I said that not only one of them could be a Chief Minister of Sarawak but he would be eligible to be the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the successor to a nation which had already gained world renown and respect.

Then one from the side of Tuanku Bujang, perhaps it was Mason an Iban, said that Kalong Ningkan should make a statement withdrawing the objection against Malaysia. Kalong Ningkan, for the first time looked at me in the eyes in the most pathetic way as if he was in dire need of help. Firmly, I told the meeting that Kalong Ningkan should not retract his statement immediately

because that would place him in a very awkward position and he would lose credibility.

It was important that Ningkan and his party should not suffer any setback because that would make it easy for the enemies of Malaysia or those anti-Malaysia British colonial officials to exploit the situation. In fact, if Ningkan now had spoken in public or to his party that they should change their stand, he would be regarded as mad or being unduly influenced or intimidated since the story would soon spread in Kuching that he had met with me. I ventured to suggest that Kalong Ningkan and his party should have an open mind and appear to be so and that they were prepared to be persuaded. Soon, at a propitious occasion, Kalong Ningkan and SNAP should make a public statement reiterating his stand regarding the Malaysia Concept because the concept had not been explained particularly by the British. Once SNAP had been given a clear picture of the concept it would be prepared to give further consideration on the matter.

The people present, including Ningkan and Howell, agreed with my line of thinking. This made it quite easy for me to persuade both sides to agree to work together in furthering the Malaysia Concept for the benefit of the indigenous peoples. It was not until 2.30 a.m. that we dispersed after having consumed a great deal of coffee. I was thoroughly exhausted by the time I went to bed and immediately into slumber for a couple of hours to face the second MSCC the next day.

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The Kuching MSCC which started at 10.00 a.m. on December 18, 1961 was well attended and concluded its business on the twentieth. These three days gave sufficient opportunity for publicity in Sarawak since the press was all ears. For some reason, while listening to the debates as each member spoke, I found the leader of the Sarawak delegation, Yeo Cheng Hoe, a member of SUPP, most venomous in his choice of words and epithets.

The British officials had admitted that SUPP had been subverted by the Communist Clandestine Organisation (CCO). International communism had opposed the Malaysia Concept as an imperial design basing their arguments on the well-known aversion of the Tunku against communism. Yeo Cheng Hoe was full of sarcasm when he referred to the Malaysia Concept and the Tunku-MacMillan Joint Statement. It was far from reassuring. Yet he claimed complete ignorance of the concept which he condemned and sought more explanation, and therefore he and SUPP needed more time.

Donald Stephens, who was the chairman of the meeting, handled the situation extremely well. He emphasised that the meeting was intended for people who subscribed to the Malaysia Concept and that the job of MSCC was to expedite the realisation of Malaysia.

From North Borneo, Pang Tet Tshung said that it was the business of MSCC to prepare the people and provide them with all the necessary

information. The Brunei delegation led by Pengiran Ali made the point that Brunei did not get any satisfactory explanation from the other two Borneo territories. Soon, it became transparent that Brunei, although keen to support the Malaysia Concept, would wish to have her own terms and conditions.

Lee Kuan Yew led the Singapore team. He strongly claimed that the Malaysia Concept was the answer to the problems of viability and survival in one of the more sensitive regions of the world.

The MSCC meeting continued on Tuesday the nineteenth of December. Pang of North Borneo urged for further clarification in view of the impending visit of the Commission. Ong Kee Hui of Sarawak, the Chairman of SUPP, said that Sarawak had made constitutional progress since the Brooke days but this progress had left some scars like the murder of Governor Stewart and such things should not happen again. He felt that the secession would not have left such a bitter experience if it had been done properly. In the case of Malaysia there was room for negotiations, accommodation and compromise. If the idea could not be achieved in one big leap then it should be taken step by step. He then asked if Malaya would agree to another form of association than Sarawak entering as one of the states. Sarawak needed time. No one wanted to travel by night without a torch because it was dark. And he quoted an Iban proverb which translated said, "slowly must one climb the pine tree but be not in haste climbing the *nibong* palm."

Listening to Ong Kee Hui, I thought he was at pains to demonstrate sweet reasonableness. However, he was the Chairman of a party that did not want Malaysia. And he had to say something that was sure to be rejected like the kind of association other than federation. He even suggested in his speech that the Malaysia Concept should provide for secession. If not for his party which was then riddled with communists, fellow travellers and sympathisers and Chinese chauvinists, Ong Kee Hui was a natural leadership material for Malaysia. Some way had to be devised to help him rid of those subversive elements and SUPP could turn out to be a positive and constructive party for an independent Sarawak in Malaysia. I made a note that I should discuss this personality with Zainal Abidin Sulong.

Fadzil from Labuan, North Borneo, spoke emphasising the need for more explanation in the vernacular languages. He also reminded the MSCC that the native chiefs of North Borneo had already accepted the concept of Malaysia on certain terms and conditions. Sundang, a native chief of North Borneo supported Fadzil. He said the natives and chiefs who had visited Malaya were very impressed with the development there. However, Sundang wanted a bit more time to explain further and deeper the concept and its implications. He wondered if the Commission could come in March or April.

Lee Kuan Yew, talking as a Singapore member, said he was extremely unhappy when Ong Kee Hui spoke about the right of secession. It appeared to him that before a marriage was concluded the parties were already talking of filing a divorce suit. Having decided on this divorce, they would then begin to

list out the causes for divorce ranging from non-consummation to adultery. Such an attitude was negative and he did not know of any federal constitution which provided for the right of secession.

With regard to state powers, Lee Kuan Yew told the meeting that the more the powers were retained by the state, the more money they would want and less representation they would get in the centre. Lee Kuan Yew suggested that instead of talking at random, the people of Borneo territories should list out the state powers they wanted and grade them according to priority. For instance, he said, certain powers should be automatically regarded as federal; others like land should go to the state without argument. It was important that they should be certain as to what they wanted either reserved in full or partially so. It would be easier to claim certain powers if they were clearly intended to protect local interests absolutely. However, it would be difficult to consider any claim for state powers if it would ultimately make the component parts of a single federation go in different directions.

There was a great deal of interest and attention given to what Lee Kuan Yew said. And the meeting was able to move to discuss specific subjects like religion. It was already acknowledged that in the Malaysia Concept as in the Constitution of Malaya, there would be complete religious freedom. Relevant chapters of the Constitution were mentioned.

On being asked by Donald Stephens, Lee Kuan Yew clarified that Singapore had accepted Islam as the religion of the Federation of Malaysia although in Singapore only about 15% of the population were Muslims. There were some discussions and disagreement among the North Borneo delegation when someone said that the number of Muslims in North Borneo was not big. Fadzil of Labuan intervened by quoting the North Borneo Government statistics for 1961 that Muslims were the single largest religious group in North Borneo.

Cheng Hoe of Sarawak SUPP objected to Islam being the religion of the Federation. In listening to him, I was not quite sure if he himself was convinced with his own argument but the point was clear to me then that the issue of the status of Islam in the Federation and the territories would be one powerful item to thwart the progress towards Malaysia. This had to be carefully considered and presented.

Jugah of Sarawak changed the subject to the question of Head of State meaning, if anyone other than the rulers could become the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. He reminded the meeting that there were the descendants of Brookes' who could be called Raja. Oyong Lawai Jau, a Temenggong of the Kenyah people, interjected by saying that he was a Raja of his people. Abang Haji Openg then stood up saying that his ancestors had lived in Sarawak for the last four hundred years and as far as he knew every river and every valley had a Raja in Sarawak. Durin, the Land Dyak chief stood up and confirmed what Openg said claiming that he too was the descendant of a Raja. Durin asked,

amidst laughter, a very serious question as to whether Malaysia should have a president instead. The Chairman adjourned the meeting for lunch.

During lunch, I gathered that the Malayan delegation would reply or explain the various points raised in particular the new memorandum from Sarawak. The British colonial officer who was attending the meeting apparently prepared the memorandum for the Sarawak delegation. I knew this to be true. He was then approached by the Malayan delegation to assist in summarising the memorandum into specific questions. He agreed and produced a sheet of paper with a list of questions. Then the Malayan delegation got into a huddle to work out the explanations. I had asked Lee Kuan Yew and Abdul Aziz, a Malayan employed by Brunei as the legal adviser, to assist which they did.

While this group discussion was examining the various questions, the subject of the special position of the natives came up. Ong Yoke Lin at first showed reluctance because he said that the special position of the Malays were given by the British and there was no desire to have it removed. Lee Kuan Yew thought the special position would not be acceptable to SUPP. I intervened by saying that the special position should be extended to the natives of Borneo territories but it had to be carefully presented. With regard to SUPP, I had concluded that they were opposed to the whole concept and that one issue would not make SUPP change its mind but the special position accorded to the natives would have very positive implications. The real local opposition to this would come from the communists and their cohorts and Chinese chauvinists and in terms of numbers they were comparatively small though vociferous. There would be enough non-natives who would support this. And the natives being about two-thirds of the populace who would benefit from this arrangement would be supportive. In any case I said in Malaysia this would be necessary in order that there would be no disjunction in the relationship between the natives of Borneo and the Malays of Malaya. Lee Kuan Yew and Ong Yoke Lin then wholeheartedly supported the idea of extending the special position of the Malays in Malaya to the natives of the Borneo territories.

The itemised questions were answered one by one at the resumed session. The paper was read and when it came to the item of the special position of the natives, I saw the faces of both Ong Kee Hui and Cheng Hoe change colour as if they were shelled-shocked. At the same time, I saw Abang Haji Openg's face brighten up and so did Durin's. I was not certain if Jugah and Oyong Lawai Jau understood what went on since the answers were in English and I did not think that the Malay translator was able to put the issue over as convincingly as it was expressed in English. After that, the meeting was adjourned until the next day when the communiqué would be discussed.

It fell on me to prepare the communiqué or the statement of the meeting. I had to prepare it that evening and I recruited Rajaratnam of Singapore to assist me. We made sure that issues like internal security had prominence.

Rajaratnam and I agreed that we should not distribute the draft to the delegations that night because we did not want the Sarawak delegation to consult their bosses who might think of some mischievous ideas to undo the consensus.

That night, the Malayan delegation had a reception on the roof top of the Aurora where I was staying. Rajaratnam and I joined them after the draft was ready. They were in the middle of a film showing the rural development in Malaya. It ended with a film showing the latest Merdeka Day celebrations.

Jugah was at the party. He was quite high I thought. Being a very amiable man he was quick to see me and held me by the hand affectionately addressing me as *anak* and I addressed him as *Apai*. These are endearing terms and I felt very privileged that this brave, wise man would regard me as *anak*. However, that gave him an advantage when he started scolding me for not inviting the Iban people to the last Merdeka celebrations in Kuala Lumpur. I told him that we could not directly invite them but we did extend an invitation through the Government of Sarawak. His words got looser and looser as he became tighter and tighter. He would not accept any explanation and went on ranting away that Malaya never did regard the Iban people as important until this idea of Malaysia. The situation was saved by Shaw, the British Deputy Chief Secretary, who came to my rescue when he apologised for not extending the invitation to the Iban people. Malaya was not to blame. That cooled Jugah and we sat down together and talked until after all the guests had gone. At about 10 p.m. I helped him to the elevator and at the bottom were some friends of his who took him away for another session of *ngirup* (drinking party) no doubt. At 11 p.m. Jugah, Ong Yoke Lin and Lee Kuan Yew had a discussion in a radio forum on the question of Malaysia. I did not know how Jugah fared with Lee Kuan Yew and Ong Yoke Lin and how he was received by the Sarawak listeners. Perhaps all was well.

After I had seen Jugah off, I went with one of my contacts to a political rally. It was still on although the Malayan ministers and Singapore leaders had spoken. There were about 6,000 people. After that, I went to meet a few teachers who wanted to know a little more about Malaysia.

* * *

The Governor gave a lunch to the participants. A colonial officer whom I knew well, spoke to me that the Malayan Government should explain the Malaysia Concept to the people of Sarawak. He was a kindly person and his statement was made in good faith and he meant well. It also revealed that there was a break in communication between him and his masters in Kuching or Whitehall. When I asked him why the British colonial administration should not do it, he replied that the colonial administration had no knowledge of the concept. He did not have an answer when I asked why MacMillan thought the way he did in the Tunku-MacMillan Joint Statement. It was obvious there was inertia.

During the same lunch which was in the style of a buffet, S.T. Bani of the Singapore Barisan Sosialis was teasing Ong Yoke Lin the leader of the Malayan delegation by saying since Malaya did not legalise the Communist Party, there was no democracy in Malaya. He went on by saying that communists arrested should be tried. After a while, I asked Bani if he could tell me which country had the democracy he talked about and I told him that he could easily get a one-way ticket to go and live in that utopia. He looked stunned and told me that some day he would tell me the name of the place. The discussion ended there.

After lunch I attended the afternoon session. The leader of each delegation was making a progress report since Jesselton. The Malayan delegation reported that Parliament had endorsed the concept which the Alliance Party had supported unanimously. So also were the Chambers of Commerce which had taken various steps to identify themselves with the Malaysia Plan. Since then, the Tunku had gone to London and had the agreement of MacMillan to issue the Joint Statement.

Rajaratnam of Singapore spoke about the White Paper containing heads of agreements which had been adopted by the Singapore Legislative Assembly. The same S.T. Bani who had not as yet told me about his utopian country came out with the statement that he would categorically and fully endorse the principles of the Malaysia Concept if it was intended as a constitutional advancement for the peoples of the territories concerned and if they were happy with it. It was a masterly statement in vagueness and double talk which had characterised that particular ideological group.

Lai Eng Kong of North Borneo wanted a paper to be published giving the economic and political implications of Malaysia. These could be made into leaflets and distributed as widely as possible. Donald Stephens, as Chairman supported the idea by suggesting that a committee should be established to undertake to do that and no government should be involved so that the product would not be bias or held suspect.

Yeo Cheng Hoe of Sarawak SUPP and leader of the Sarawak delegation said that in view of the coming of the Commission, as agreed to between the Tunku and MacMillan, should the MSCC continue to exist and function since its job would be taken over by the Commission. Someone replied to Yeo Cheng Hoe that if the Commission had put up a report in favour of Malaysia, the MSCC would have the task of explaining the recommendations of the Commission to avoid any misunderstanding or wrong interpretation.

Temenggong Jugah said that many people had gone to Malaya from his area and other longhouses but none of them were able to explain to him what the Malaysia Concept was all about. He stressed that the decision should not be made hastily. Like the stand taken by British colonial officials, Jugah needed time.

Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau, who was from the Baram valley, thought that Malaysia Concept was a good thing; otherwise the Tunku and MacMillan

would not regard it as desirable. All he needed was an early explanation as to the aims, objects and form of Malaysia and he wanted the colonial government to do the explanation. I thought he was rather cute when he said that some people were indulging in political gimmicks, when they claimed that Sarawak was ready for independence by herself. He implied quite clearly that it was the communist groups who said that. The Temenggong said that those groups were waiting to pick up the fruit from the Sarawak orchard. He expressed the hope that the British and the Malayan Governments should get together to think about this so that together they could prevent the communist expansion to Sarawak.

Durin, the leader of the Land Dayak, in a very clear voice, spoke of the need for the people of Sarawak to be informed fully but that it should be done by the Sarawak colonial government. He knew that the people of Sarawak were loyal to the government and would follow any advice of the government. As for him he had already understood the idea and did not find it disagreeable. But he gathered his knowledge from the Malayan side. He now wanted the Sarawak Government to tell him and others about the concept. I could recognise the Zainal Abidin Sulong hint in his statement and it made a lot of sense anyway.

Durin supported Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau regarding the dangers of communism since he had seen in Malaya how the communists operated and how the Malayan government had dealt with them. On the role of the MSCC, he expressed the hope that it would continue its work until Malaysia had become a reality.

The statements of Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau and Durin were most significant. They came from leaders of the Orang Ulu and of the Land Dayak respectively. Only the Ibans among the natives then were dragging their feet. They looked as if they were very much under the influence of the British colonial administration, big timber tycoons of Sibuan and the Communist Clandestine Organisation (CCO). They seemed to be intimidated into taking the same old line, as Pengarah Montegerai claimed at the MSCC that he was completely ignorant of the issue and did not know what advantages Sarawak could gain from Malaysia. As if he had given a great deal of thought about it, he wondered why the Tunku would not take Singapore first if he thought that Singapore was falling into the hands of the communists, a mind boggling statement out of the page of the British colonial official line. Later I came to admire the man and we became great friends after some very serious discussions. Since then, he had visited me in my house in Kuala Lumpur and I his longhouse in Kanowit where I had enjoyed his ample hospitality.

Ling Beng Siew, a timber tycoon of Sarawak spoke of the need for explanation on the details of the concept but expected the Malayan delegation to do so. He somehow continued with his speech as if Malaysia was inevitable. He wanted the Central Government to control internal security, defence and external affairs. He suggested that there should be autonomy in Sarawak in

matters like immigration, civil service, education, labour and citizenship. He said Sarawak was not that backward as not to be able to manage those autonomous subjects.

Abang Haji Openg, commenting on the present state of affairs, said that he did not deny that Sarawak had made some progress but they were not adequate. People in Sarawak, particularly the natives, were not advanced; they were illiterate and needed help. Malaysia would correct all that. He urged the British administration to start explaining to the people regarding Malaysia.

Pengiran Yusuf of Brunei spoke of the need for the people of the Borneo territories to make their points clearly heard as to what they wanted. As far as he was concerned presently, he was satisfied with the concept that the Borneo states should get the same status as the other existing states of the Federation. I was not at all clear then if Yusuf was out of line but I believed that it was his personal view and that he had said it most sincerely. My regard for the man inclined me to accept his statement as his own. I had known by then that the Sultan had ideas quite different from the stand taken by Pengiran Yusuf.

Ong Yoke Lin spoke of Malaya's struggle for independence by peaceful means which resulted in good feelings between Britain and Malaya. Malaya also had decided on independence to continue with the Commonwealth relationship. He told the meeting that they should give credit to the British Government which would not just abandon the Borneo territories. I thought Ong Yoke Lin delivered his speech well although it sounded somewhat patronising when he likened the comfort of a territory remaining as a colony to a bird enjoying its position in a gilded cage.

* * *

For some reason, Donald Stephens the Chairman, requested me to prepare a communiqué for the day to be released after the meeting. This I did just in time before going to a cocktail party given by Jakeway the British Chief Secretary of Sarawak, at his house. I noticed Lee Kuan Yew was also at the party.

I had spent rather a busy and tiring day and was not too inclined to talk. But Jakeway was a nice fellow and was such a good host. I took advantage of his kindness and in the most candid way, I expressed disquiet at the fact that delegations from the North Borneo and Sarawak were uninformed regarding the Malaysia Concept. I said I could not help concluding that the colonial administration in the two British colonies were dragging their feet.

I reminded him that ever since the Tunku launched his plan, he had always emphasised that Malaysia meant the coming together of the Borneo territories with the existing eleven states and Singapore. This concept had been communicated to the British Government and pursued again at the Tunku-MacMillan talks in London recently. As far as I could gather in London, the British Government had accepted the Tunku's idea as commendable. The Tunku had always stressed the point that there would be modifications here

and there in the Malayan Constitution which would be turned into that of Malaysia to meet local requirements so long as the Constitution did not become anomalous. I had sincerely hoped and expected that as soon as the London meeting was over there would have been instructions from Whitehall to the colonial governments of North Borneo and Sarawak that they should take the initiative to explain to the local people what Malaysia would be all about and its advantages to the two territories. I informed Jakeway that I had on Sunday, the seventeenth of December, met with Governor Waddel and I had suggested that there should be a meeting of top colonial officials with me and other Malayan officials either in Sarawak or in Kuala Lumpur to clarify points arising out of the concept so that it would be easier to explain to the people. I would of course prefer this meeting without publicity.

Jakeway sounded rather pathetic when he said that he had no instructions and did not know the details of the Plan. He only got the Tunku's speech from the newspapers. I could not contain myself but blurted out that it was a poor show on the part of Her Majesty's Government not to have transmitted the copy of the Tunku's speech and what was agreed in London to the British Borneo territories.

On using the existing Malaya Constitution as a starting point for any examination of the implications of Malaysia, Jakeway said that would be a wrong approach. He preferred to present Malaysia in the form of a new Constitution, perhaps that of a confederation. Then it occurred to me that it was not ignorance but antipathy which really ruled the day. Lee Kuan Yew who was with me listening to the conversation did not hold his fire but shot down the idea of a confederation as neither feasible nor acceptable.

Jakeway continued, what I thought was very naive and feeble, to tell Lee Kuan Yew and me that Sarawak could not be likened to any one state of the Federation of Malaya. There was a sense of local nationalism that should be allowed to find expression. For instance, they could not accept Malay as the national language. The native people always liked to make public speeches in their own languages. Then there was the question of the civil service and revenue and so forth. These points, according to Jakeway, had not been clarified.

While he was referring to native nationalism, my meeting which Stephen Kalong Ningkan kept flashing in my mind. I knew now the source of Iban nationalism not from the Iban themselves but from some outside force which instigated such ideas. I became more determined than ever that the colonial officials had to be proved wrong and that they should not hide behind the nationalism which they created. The points he made I could take up with the native leadership and a solution could be found. The Tunku was not averse to modification of the Constitution to satisfy local needs. Already the Bidayuh and the Orang Ulu had been won over. It was now the Iban. I had to be prepared that even if the Iban could be persuaded to support the Malaysia Plan, I suspected that the colonial officials would still try to make life difficult

for everybody. In what form these colonial officials would take such a measure I could not conjecture, but I decided to warn Zainal Abidin Sulong not to be caught by surprise.

Lee Kuan Yew intervened by saying that it was a matter of presentation and that the existing Constitution of the Federation was adequate to be the new Constitution when suitably amended.

Without going into details, I supported Lee Kuan Yew but also added that the present Constitution had provided for the entry of new member states and there was nothing to prevent the new state to join with whatever conditions it wished. On the other hand, the Constitution once unscrambled would be bristling with problems of state sovereignty and the disappearance of the central government. There would have to be fresh negotiations among the Sultanates which were independent and the status of the former colonies of Penang and Malacca would be fraught with uncertainties. I did not know if Jakeway understood the seriousness of the problems but he seemed to accept that it would take a bit of time, which was another ploy of the British colonial officials that made Lee Kuan Yew very nervous, since he knew that the Tunku would not have a Singapore merger other than Singapore being a part of Malaysia.

I informed Jakeway that the MSCC had prepared the memorandum which spelt out its opinions regarding the Malayan Constitution. Jakeway said the MSCC should try to give answers to those points regarded as misgivings. My response was that the MSCC, as the name suggested, was consultative in character and therefore limited in its scope. The Malayan delegation could not give more than what they had in their Constitution. Anything beyond that would have to be negotiated with the Federation Government which had to refer to the Conference of Rulers. So it was proper for the MSCC to collect these misgivings and to pass them on to the Malayan Government through the Malayan delegation. Jakeway appeared to have accepted my explanation and, Lee Kuan Yew in giving support to me, urged Jakeway to get his officials together with the Malayan officials and between them something positive might emerge.

According to Jakeway, the whole business had been wrongly handled. There had been too much emphasis on speed in speeches but not in action. Jakeway said, in all earnestness, that the colonial administration could not be dictatorial and I was silently amused by such a contradiction in terms. District Officers would have to spend long hours in discussions in longhouses. There must be sufficient time to sell the idea. Again I noticed that the longhouse factor as well as the time frame were paramount. I said almost in passing without any emphasis that if the procedure was wrong the British Government particularly, the Colonial Office, had to bear the blame.

I turned round to Lee Kuan Yew and requested him to deal with the question of speed. Lee Kuan Yew asked Jakeway how much time he needed. He warned that all would be lost if the merger of Sarawak could not be done

before June 1963. He had in mind the impending Singapore constitutional negotiations with the British. After some mental calculation Jakeway replied that he would need up to early 1963 and there should be no rush for August 1962. I then repeated my request for Sarawak officials to meet with Malayan officials and work together to produce positive selling points.

Jakeway agreed to work out a paper giving the relevant points based not on his own but on the views collected from the local people. Lee Kuan Yew said the paper must show good faith and that it should remove any impression that the British officials were dragging their feet. I thought Jakeway's face revealed some irritation and as I expected he blurted out that he had presumed the question of good faith to have been taken for granted. Lee Kuan Yew almost apologetically said that if the impression of feet dragging were not removed, the Malayan people had the experience in 1957 that while the top level had agreed to Merdeka, the lower level officials were meeting certain sections of the people in the opposite direction. Jakeway said coolly, that there might be cases of individual officials not in line. If the majority of officials appeared to be out of line, it was because they did not know what official line to follow. Once the agreed line was reached, it would be easy to spread the words.

When I got back to my hotel rather tired, bothered and somewhat bewildered with the various encounters, I almost collapsed when I found Stephen Kalong Ningkan and Howell waiting for me. I did not know if I could manage any serious discussions with them particularly if they were coming back in greater opposition to the concept than Ningkan's speech that day. But I was wrong. Ningkan had come to give me something which made me almost shout with joy. My fatigue and frustration at once disappeared when he gave me a piece of paper which he said was a statement he had given to the press very much in line with my proposal. It read as follows:

Recent press report had indicated that the Commission inquiring in the Borneo territories of the views on Greater Malaysia may arrive in January 1962.

Up to the present, the Sarawak National Party had declared its opposition to Greater Malaysia, and until such time as the details of the Plan are made public the Party will continue to oppose this indeterminate proposal. Only when full details of the Plan are made public can Sarawak National Party or any Political Party or person make a final decision.

In view of the fact, it would appear that the Commission would visit this country in the near future. The S.N.P. earnestly requests the Government to make known the proposed detail of Greater Malaysia in order that there would be sufficient time for them to

be explained and understood by not only people dwelling in towns, but the persons of the ulus.

Ningkan
Secretary-General

Ningkan was now ready to support the Malaysia Concept. All that I needed to do was to suggest to him that if all went well I should commit myself to working for his elevation.

I had already been informed by the Tunku that for the first term of the Sarawak Governor's office of two years and the Chief Minister's office, he would want to see if an Iban was made the Chief Minister, the Governor should be a Malay. If an Iban was the Governor, the Chief Minister should be a Malay. After the first appointment, then it would be a matter for the people of Sarawak to decide according to the state constitution. I had toyed with the idea of Jugah being a Governor since I thought the man had dignity, bearing and respect of the people. Such a ceremonial post would be most becoming. The Tunku threw a question at me whether I had known a governor or head of state anywhere in the whole world who could not read or write. He said we would look ridiculous in the eyes of the world to have Jugah as the Governor, not that he disliked the man. However, he asked me to scout round for candidates to the two offices for the first term. The Tunku was correct because it would indeed be extremely awkward for the governor to be unable to read the address at the State Legislative Assembly.

When these thoughts came to me, I could then see a Malay becoming the governor for the first time and an Iban would have to be found who could be made the first Chief Minister. Therefore I should be looking for an Iban who should belong to the Alliance to propose to the Tunku.

When I saw Ningkan that night, I thought he was the man that could fulfil the Tunku's requirement. In the course of the conversation, I managed to get Kalong Ningkan to be committed to the arrangement that, on Sarawak joining Malaysia, he and his party would agree to the principle of an Iban serving as the Chief Minister and the Governor a Malay.

That evening we sat down till past midnight and I was so elated that I forgot how tired I had been. Ningkan had given me the tonic and I could now clearly see Sarawak in Malaysia.

For me, the third day of the MSCC meeting was a formality although there were some serious business being discussed. It was an open meeting with the press waiting for scoops in the gallery. I had helped in drafting the communiqué which had been circulated. The delegates did not agree with the proposed words to the effect that Malaysia was inevitable and they amended it by simply stating that Malaysia had been discussed. I did not think that was too important to quarrel about and the communiqué was adopted.

However, that was not the end of the story; because immediately after the meeting, I went to the airport to send off the North Borneo delegation and Ong Yoke Lin who was going to Sibiu. At the airport, the Secretary of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association came to see me saying that a group had suggested certain changes in the wordings relating to security. It was obvious to me that the objection came from SUPP which must have been chided by their headquarters for accepting words which were inimical to the CCO. Donald Stephens, the chairman, was there and he ruled that no change could then take place. It was too late.

It must be admitted that the Kuching MSCC was the turning point. Waverers there were but the number had dwindled. This was due to the deft and extremely able handling by its chairman, Donald Stephens assisted by Lee Kuan Yew. What happened at the first meeting in Jesselton on August 24, 1961 was to work out the aims and objects of the MSCC. They were to collect and collate views and opinions concerning the creation of Malaysia, to disseminate information on the concept of Malaysia, to initiate and arrange discussions on Malaysia and to foster activities that would promote and expediate the realisation of Malaysia.

At that meeting, a beginning was made to clarify points and consequently interest in the Borneo territories began to mount. The message was clear that there would be no bulldozing of the idea on the people of the three territories and that the wishes of the people would be respected and their interests safeguarded.

This time in Kuching at the MSCC there was a sense of partnership and seriousness in the matter of details. The Brunei delegation which attended as observers were regarded as full participants when it came to discussing matters.

The Kuching MSCC also provided an opportunity for a public political rally which attracted a great deal of attention. Datu Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha and his party had done their work well. It was proving that the process was democratic where all views for and against were aired in public. The response was tremendous.

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Having heard the comments made by the various delegations, I was convinced that something had to be done to persuade the colonial administration to be more supportive in line with London. I hit upon the idea of using the local press, not that they should support the Malaysia Concept since a few of the journalists were members of SUPP or its sympathisers and naturally hostile but it would be reasonable for them to demand an explanation by the colonial administration.

A few leading journalists were collected and I spoke with them, taking the line how disappointed I was to learn that the people of Sarawak had been kept in the dark by the colonial administration. If the fever of Malaysia was raging

it was only fair that more information should be forthcoming from the colonial administration. In reply to a question, I said it would be well-nigh impossible for the Government of Malaya to have any impact in Sarawak if it tried to. As far as Malaya was concerned, it could only explain to the British Government. Since as it turned out, according to the Tunku-MacMillan Joint Statement, that Malaysia was a desirable aim, then the British colonial administrators should make it their responsibility to explain to their subject peoples about the Malaysia Concept in the Borneo territories.

As a consequence, immediately after the MSCC meeting, articles and editorials came out. I quote here a couple of those that were published.

In a leading Sarawak daily of the twentieth of December (Wednesday) the Editorial contained the following:

Malaya and its Government may well feel that it is neither diplomatic nor appropriate for it to take on the responsibility of telling the people of Borneo territories what the concept is since these are territories not under its sovereignty, and since Britain is the country having suzerainty over them the authority for this job should really be Britain's, particularly when at the London meeting, agreement in principle had been reached between the two governments that the principle of Malaysia is accepted.

Another article published the following day (Thursday the twenty-first of December) read as follows:

O MASTER, GIVE US THIS DAY . . .

Malaysia, Malaysia, Malaysia, everywhere in Sarawak today this word is a topic for discussion, be it among politicians, businessmen, the town residents, the ulu dwellers, the tuai rumahs in fact almost among anyone except those not gifted with the potentials of thinking. Even today, this is the subject of discussion in the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee's Second Meeting by the Malayan-Borneo group in the Kuching Rural District Council's chambers in Kuching. Up to today; this subject had been widely controversialised upon in the local commercial and government press and even our government-controlled radio aired this same important subject.

However, not one source had ever managed to expose the actual details of the Malaysia Plan. Let alone unauthoritative sources, even sources of authority are seemingly hesitant to expose the imminently-required details for public information. Of course, many had blamed the Malayan Prime Minister for failing to give details of

the Malaysia Plan and due to such absence of detailed information by him, our people in Sarawak – those who do not as yet support the Plan – became suspicious and full of questionings.

We cannot in the least blame the Malayan Prime Minister for this misgiving, because it must be realised that he has no authority to do so in the light that our country is not under his control. It must be remembered that our country is a Crown Colony and is under the control of Her Majesty's Government. Rightly and fairly, it is the obligation of Her Majesty's Government to expose the actual details of the Malaysia Plan to the peoples of Sarawak, or North Borneo who are still her rightful subjects.

To say that the Government of Her Majesty also does not know the actual details of the Malaysia Plan would be almost impossible if not nonsensical. The British Government would not and never will be so short-sighted as to concur and support as "desirable aim" this Malaysia Plan had she not had the actual details of the Malaysia Plan as to merit such support by her and her Representatives in this part of the world.

I, as one of the thousands of Sarawakians who feel like-wise, would now respectfully request that the British Government, our Masters, will not now fail to hand out the details of the Plan before the arrival of the Enquiry Commission to this country. This will be one of the only ways to enlighten the peoples of Sarawak about the "desirability" of Malaysia. We realise that no one, no party, not even the Prime Minister can authoritatively fulfill this obligation and expect the people to consider, let alone accept, this Plan of Salvation.

The Kuching MSCC and the various editorials in the local papers changed the attitude of the Sarawak colonial administration which later published a Paper entitled "Malaysia and Sarawak" which explained the progress so far achieved with regard to the formation of Malaysia. This gave a new meaning to the whole exercise because the people in Sarawak was given the correct idea directly that Malaysia was not a sinister device by the "imperialists" of Kuala Lumpur. The message of the colonial administration was clear when the Paper stated that: "Now an opportunity is provided for independence as part of a larger Malaysia unit. There are obvious advantages to this ..."

This Paper was translated into many of the local languages and radio Sarawak gave the Paper the widest possible coverage. Malaysia from then on was at the tip of every tongue and there were many who were free to give their views one way or another.

North Borneo also produced a similar Paper entitled "North Borneo and Malaysia" . It posed with emphasis the issues the people had to consider:

They must assess the future advantage of Malaysia; they must weigh up the prospects Malaysia offers of security from external aggression and internal communist subversion, of stability and prosperity, and they must consider how far they are prepared to give powers to the Central Government of Malaysia to achieve these ends. The Central Government must be strong and provide security; it must have powers sufficient for this purpose. But local aspirations and needs must also be recognised and safeguarded. The State Government must be able to protect vital local interest.

It was clear to the people in the territories concerned that the British colonial administration had taken an active interest. They were now prepared to collaborate with the local people in protecting their interests in Malaysia. While they were playing the role of "protectors" as opposed to "colonialists" they were making pretty sure that the people had the opportunity to express themselves. They had in mind the Commission which the Tunku-MacMillan envisaged. The people when asked by the Commission should know what they were talking about. Nothing should be left to chance nor should there be parrots who could be trained to speak without thinking. It was the dawn of democracy for North Borneo and Sarawak.

Brunei was different. The Ruler did not require the wishes of the people. Only the views of the Ruler were relevant. There was no glimmer of light in terms of the coming of democracy. But the people were interested to know all about Malaysia. Right from the start, Brunei to me was one big question mark. If the Ruler was not prepared for democracy and unwilling to become a constitutional head of Brunei, where would Brunei's place be in the Malaysia Concept?

Having seen the positive trends in the Borneo territories and that the Singapore end of the problem appeared under control with the close collaboration from Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues, the job of intensifying the information in North Borneo and Sarawak was left entirely to the devices of the Task Force under Zainal Abidin Sulong. Zainal Abidin did a splendid job by cooperating closely with the colonial administration particularly in the exercise of learning through visiting Malaya. The correct people were nominated and it was no longer necessary to be clandestine in this regard. But the Task Force could not neglect the mavericks among the colonial officials and once detected they were to be nipped in the bud.

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My time was spent now more on the relationship with the British Government. The matter of utmost urgency was the appointment of the Commission. The

appointment of the chairman should be agreed to by both sides. MacMillan had warned the Tunku that the failure to agree on the chairman would create a most unfortunate impression. MacMillan had sounded to the Tunku the name of Alan Boyd. Boyd was unable to accept the appointment. MacMillan and the Tunku were looking for a man in whom they had complete confidence and who also should be fully convinced that Malaysia was a desirable aim.

MacMillan offered such names as Malcolm MacDonald, a former British Commissioner in Southeast Asia, Donald MacGilvary who was the last British High Commissioner in Malaya. Then there was McCorquodale, who was created a baron in 1955 and had experiences as chairman. The Tunku had whispered the name of Lord Ogmores when they met in London but MacMillan did not agree. The Tunku so far had declined to agree to any of the names put forward by MacMillan.

On the British proposal to make my old and dear friend Malcolm MacDonald chairman, I gave my most candid view to the Tunku. Malcolm, as I had gathered in India, had his own view of the grand design which might contradict the Malaysia plan as we had envisaged. Also Malcolm had a great deal of influence amongst the Iban and Chinese which might work against the interest of the other communities. But I confessed to the Tunku my worst concern which was that with Malcolm MacDonald as the Chairman all the credit would go to MacDonald and that it would be easy for the opponents of Malaysia plan to brand it as a British design. Although I noticed the Tunku took the point about the credit rather lightly as one must expect him to do, I thought he was impressed with my other reasoning. He told the British High Commissioner that it would be best not to project Malcolm MacDonald's name. Both sides continued the search for a chairman.

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The MSCC in the meantime went on with its works. It was furiously busy preparing for the third meeting this time scheduled to be in Kuala Lumpur on February 6, 7 and 8, 1962. By Friday the fifth, delegates had begun to trickle in. Donald Stephens and the North Borneo delegation arrived on that day and I went to the airport to meet them.

Very quickly, I went into a huddle with Stephens and discussed the line of action. It was in the course of the discussion that Donald Stephens revealed to me his unhappiness with Datu Mustapha who he said had been treating him rather shabbily, and he had been ignored on several occasions. I tried to console Stephens and had to admit that I had noticed Mustapha's autocratic ways; but this I thought would be a phenomenon as a carry-over from his days of how he had been dealing with the Suluks and other coastal natives who had been regarding him as their chief. I shared my thought and belief with Stephens that all these would change with a bit more time and exposure and I urged Stephens to be patient and maintain his personal friendship. Donald Stephens remarkably said he would try his best to maintain the relationship

but he knew that it would be rough since Mustapha had been heard to say that Stephens was working to usurp his authority among the coastal natives. On that point I told Stephens that had been the core problem since Stephens had been successful because of his hard work, charisma and credibility to attract a greater audience. Knowing that, I said Stephens should know how to handle the situation. Stephens himself should not show any sign of competing for leadership but to make public demonstrations that Mustapha would always be the *Abang* (Big Brother). Stephens again and again assured me that he would always maintain solidarity with Mustapha.

Mustapha arrived in the evening with a group of young Muslims including two females who were to undertake a study tour and be made familiar with the working of UMNO. I met him at the airport and like Stephens I had a close meeting to find out what he was going to say. He had a good line and later he followed it when he made his delivery at the MSCC with a clear message of his support for the Malaysia Concept.

Dinner that evening was with Razak, Donald Stephens and Lee Kuan Yew. They appeared quite happy with the prospects of the third MSCC. In the meantime, my mind was on the speech of the Tunku. He had drafted it himself and when I read it I knew he was in a fit of temper and if I was not mistaken, over something concerning Aziz Ishak, the Minister of Agriculture. The speech if delivered, would have been hopelessly knitted with ill-chosen words. In one part, he even referred to an incident when he met a person from Brunei who accused the Malaysia Concept as depriving Brunei of its sovereignty. He had as a response drafted something which would have exploded in our faces.

With the help of Zainal Abidin Sulong and Nik Hassan, I had removed those points and remarks which in our view would create problems. After it was completed before dinner, I showed it to Razak who improved on it further. The Tunku was then in Alor Star and I had it sent up to him by a special courier. He was coming down only on the sixth morning, straight to the MSCC conference to open it. I kept my fingers crossed that he would not mess it up again and hopefully, the rest at his own home in Alor Star, would cool him down.

In amending the Tunku's draft, I had in mind that the Tunku would give some indications as to his thought on matters which were foremost in the mind of the Borneo territories. I had sent Zain Azraai, a senior foreign service officer, to talk to the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Home Affairs. I was utterly disappointed with the bureaucratic papers on the subject of education and citizenship. Zain told me that he could not convince them that it was a political exercise and that there should be options for the PM to

decide. They had been true to their professions and found that they could not provide anything other than what had been the existing policies.

When I met Razak I was able to persuade him to include certain important matters and prepared the lines. On the question of citizenship I suggested that the Tunku could offer that all permanent residents of North Borneo and Sarawak who were born in these two territories and being British subjects by virtue of their states being British colonies should, on Malaysia day, be regarded as Malaysian citizens. If they were not permanent residents but if their parents were permanent residents and British subjects and that they were born there they too should be regarded as citizens of Malaysia. I suggested fifteen years as a limit to determine permanency. Razak agreed to my suggestions and added that for the purpose of calculating time limit both the Chartered Company of North Borneo and the Brooke regime in Sarawak and the Japanese occupation should be regarded as British colonial administration. With regard to the Education Policy and National Language, Razak insisted that there should be a transitional period before a national education system could be applied to these territories. English would not be a problem as to its status. I thanked Razak for his understanding and magnanimity in matters which were extremely sensitive.

The following day, the January 6, the Sarawak delegation arrived in the morning and I had very little time to be with them since they had to go straight to their hotel and then to the Conference. I had to rush to the office of Ong Yoke Lin who wanted me to have a final look at his draft statement. The Tunku arrived late and I passed the message to the Conference Hall that the Opening Ceremony would be at 11.30 a.m.

I rushed to the Residency because the Tunku wanted to change his attire and then rode with him in his car to the Conference Hall. He was then in a fine mood and complimented me on my proposed amendments to the draft and he had also made some minor amendments mostly in style. I told him it was a work with the help of Razak, Zainal Abidin Sulong and Nik Hassan. He said he would happily use it. This assurance also made me happy because I had seen the Tunku a number of times to have put aside a prepared text and would merrily go on his own. One such occasion had caused some embarrassment with the Government of Saudi Arabia when the Tunku told Parliament that the Malayan application for opening the embassy and a consulate had not been responded to for a long time. The Tunku attributed it to our application and reminders having gone astray because the Saudi Government had no filing system! This was not part of the official statement but entirely his own words which created some displeasure in Saudi Arabia. I had to do a great deal of repair job after that.

The opening ceremony by the Tunku started as scheduled on the sixth at 11.30 a.m. The Tunku delivered his speech in a measured tone which I thought was most convincing and effective. His assurances regarding the indigenous peoples, Borneonisation, the question of citizenship, the security forces were

well-received with thunderous applause. All the members of the diplomatic corps and cabinet were present.

Donald Stephens was excellent in his handling of the Conference as Chairman. After the Tunku had left, the speeches began. Everyone, except the Sarawak delegation spoke positively and with confidence. As a result Yeo Cheng Hoe of Sarawak sounded somewhat hollow and he, seeing the trend, claimed that he was there in his personal capacity and not expressing the views of the people of Sarawak. He suggested that the MSCC should be wound up to make the Kuala Lumpur meeting as the last and that the matter should be left to the respective governments to deal with.

Lee Kuan Yew, in his element, spoke most eloquently. He reminded the meeting of the speech of the Indonesian delegation at the Colombo Plan conference which took place in Kuala Lumpur a few weeks before this meeting. He was extremely unhappy because the Indonesian said that he was very much at home in Kuala Lumpur. The Indonesian also spoke of a common heritage which had existed since the old Indonesian empire, no doubt Lee Kuan Yew was frightening the MSCC audience with the spectre of Sukarno's hegemony in this region. Lee Kuan Yew challenged SUPP to declare publicly that morning that they had disassociated themselves from communist elements. To oppose Malaysia would be selfish and shortsighted. I thought that part of the speech made Ong Kee Hui and Yeo Cheng Hoe extremely uncomfortable.

After the morning session, we adjourned for lunch given by Razak at the Selangor Club popularly called the "Spotted Dog" or simply "The Dog". This name started during the colonial days when a British lady would leave her dalmation chained at the front door almost daily and it became a part of the scenery. Local people were not generally allowed to be members and perhaps for that reason it was given the derogatory name of "The Dog" which the British otherwise thought was an apt nickname for the Club House. After independence, the Club had constructed a disco in the basement and local people had then been allowed to be members. But the young crowd that patronised the disco were then regarded by the snooty older members as "The Underdog". When the Club caught fire and half of it was badly burnt it came to be known among certain circles as "The Hotdog"!

The Club House was pleasant and spacious for Razak to entertain the delegations. It looked into an open playground with football goals and a cricket pitch, even a croquet lawn, and a church standing on the side by a river. The building itself was rather a bad copy of a Tudor house but it was enough to remind an Englishman of his "kampung".

Some colonial officials from Sarawak had accompanied the Sarawak delegation. This, I noticed, was the difference between Sarawak and North Borneo. In the case of the latter the colonial officials left the delegation alone but never those from Sarawak. Razak was very kind to include the

accompanying officials as his guests and they were also in the distinguished gallery catching every word of every speaker.

One of those Sarawak colonial officials whom I knew was rather obnoxious. I had already been told he was the mastermind that worked amongst the Iban and the Chinese to oppose the Malaysia Concept. He never did hide his feelings and opinions. This British maverick told me that the people of Sarawak were confused by the Tunku's statement of the 16th October when he said that the sovereignty of the territories would be transferred to the Federation of Malaya. I told him very politely this would be in accordance with the constitutional law and only through such transfer of sovereignty could Malaysia be formed. Hence, the British Government spoke to the Malayan Government on whom sovereignty would devolve. He became somewhat agitated and said that would not be acceptable to the people of Sarawak and that people in Kuala Lumpur had regarded the people there as savages and there was a wealth of ignorance in Kuala Lumpur about Sarawak. By this time I too had become somewhat irritated by the demeanour of the colonial official and remarked that the point he made was a pure quibble because I had visited many longhouses whether of the Iban or Bidayuh or Orang Ulu and Melanau or Malay kampungs I had heard of misgivings about Borneonisation and other things but never had I once heard anyone raising the question of sovereignty. It was only the people like him and his colleagues in the colonial administration who were afraid of losing their jobs or being bossed by a native. To be fair, I did hear the question of sovereignty being put by SUPP but that I believed was the work of CCO. I requested him to watch out for the reply given on this issue if asked at the MSCC. He still insisted that we in Kuala Lumpur did not know Sarawak. I told him now, in a voice that was stern, that it was people like him who were dragging their feet about Malaysia; in fact such people were not in touch with the local and native sentiment except that of the SUPP and its CCO supporters. If the people of Kuala Lumpur did not know anything about Sarawak, the Malaysia Plan would not have reached the present pitch. I did not want to continue talking with him in that way any longer. Before leaving him to his own thoughts, I said the people would have a chance to tell the Commission on the question of sovereignty; and if for that reason they would not want Malaysia then the Malaysia Concept could be abandoned. In parting, I asked him to consult the colonial office on the procedure of the transfer of sovereignty.

The afternoon session, I thought, went at a very fast pace. Questions and answers were prompt and proper. Yeo Cheng Hoe of Sarawak at first tried to be difficult but ended looking very peeved. Durin the leader of the Land Dayak, in respect of citizenship, said that this subject would only find difficulty among the unenlightened community who were divided in their loyalty.

After the afternoon session, I sat down with Cecil Sheridan, the Malayan Attorney-General, one of the British expatriates, who opted to continue

serving in Malaya after independence, to draft the communiqué. I had to make sure of the legal implications of the various commitments. I must admit that Cecil Sheridan had always been helpful to me and had treated me with the highest consideration. The speaker of the House of Representatives was giving a cocktail party at the Federal Hotel and we went there after we had drafted the communiqué. After that, I took Abang Haji Openg to a public rally in Datuk Keramat, Kuala Lumpur organised by the Alliance Party.

* * *

The rally was most impressive. More than 5,000 people crammed the little space. Others were listening from a distance and from nearby houses since the loudspeakers were loud enough. We went up the platform. There were 28 Dayaks from Sarawak. Temenggong Jugah and his four Penghulus were there. They were in resplendent headgear of hornbill feathers and beaded garments. It was a beautiful sight.

Razak opened the rally. After he had made his speech he was followed by Donald Stephens, Mustapha, Jugah, Lee Kuan Yew, Pengiran Yusoff of Brunei and Durin the leader of Land Dayak from Sarawak. Jugah spoke in Iban. The language was akin to Malay. For instance, the word "I", unlike Malay which had been adulterated by feudalistic influences, had only one word "Aku" a word which a Malay refers to himself when making a religious prayer. However, I doubted if the audience understood everything he said but for all that he received a tremendous applause. The crowd simply adored him.

However, it was very funny to see him speak because he kept looking back at the four Penghulus and myself. He knew that I then knew a little Iban and he looked as if he did not want to go off the line. I had been informed that the Pengarahs and Penghulus that morning had succeeded in persuading him to change his mind about Malaysia. He had been expressing hitherto, that he wanted more time to understand the concept. This time his speech was positive because he knew well that the Pengarahs and Penghulus who would be speaking after him would be supportive of the Malaysia Concept and wanted "Merdeka" through Malaysia quickly. He could not be seen to be out of step with his own men. I could well imagine that he was in utter confusion hence he kept turning back looking at me as if calling for help. I encouraged him by giving him the thumbs up everytime he turned to look at me. Jugah knew that his speech was recorded and his men would use it against him if he changed his mind.

Lee Kuan Yew was a hit. His Malay was impeccable and oratory was the like of which seldom heard. What intrigued the people was that he was a Chinese and the way he put over his views in the proper idioms endeared himself a great deal to the Malay crowd. The Malays of Malaya would have loved to have Lee Kuan Yew as the leader of the Malayan Chinese but I did not know if that was what Lee Kuan Yew then had in mind.

The crowd cheered after every speech and the rally lasted until midnight. There was no untoward incident, no jeering or heckling but there were interruptions made in good humour and wit which lent colour to the occasion. The master of ceremony - Ambassador Mohamed Soviee - did a superb job to hold the crowd together for more than three hours.

The second day of the MSCC meeting was concerned with economic matters. The economic papers were tabled and after that the meeting adjourned and delegates were brought to the Rural Development Operations Room.

The MSCC had already been supplied with economic documents even before the sixth. But Lai Eng Kong insisted on a breakdown of the information according to his questions. He was most anxious to know about the national debt. Officials had, the previous night, worked until 2.00 a.m. to address Lai Eng Kong's questions and their answers although if one was willing to seek the answers the previous documents had contained them all. Hence the distribution of the economic papers had to take place that morning.

At the Red Book Operations Room, Razak gave a briefing on rural development supported by films. The delegates found the command and control of development rather interesting. The Operations Room concept had been developed to the extent that the Centre could know what the people wanted and what they had received. The system had been designed in such a way that the whole Peninsula was divided into little squares and the people in each square would express their needs and desires through their local development councils. All information would be centralised and the Planning Unit would work out projects, implementation policies and costs. Each square was then monitored everyday to check on progress. Razak would make surprise visits and it had been found that the system worked extremely well. If there was a shortfall in the implementation the development officer concerned would have to face the music.

After the Rural Development briefing, Ong Yoke Lin entertained them to lunch at Lake Club. The Dayak chiefs were invited to lunch with the Tunku. Here again the Lake Club was another club reserved for white expatriates only during colonial days. There was a story that His Royal Highness the Sultan of Selangor was once denied entry. After independence, the Club was patronised a great deal by civil servants of all races.

I accompanied the 28 Dayak chiefs at lunch with the Tunku in the Residency. The Tunku was a wonderful host and ever so generous. There was plenty of "ngirup" to go round and everyone felt merry and extremely at home. After the lunch the 28 chiefs sat in a semi-circle and made the Tunku sit facing them. One by one they spoke, a few in Iban, others in Malay, to the effect that the Tunku should expedite the formation of Malaysia. I noticed the Tunku was very moved by such gestures of confidence and respect.

The afternoon session of the MSCC had already commenced when I arrived at the meeting. When I entered the hall, Datu Mustapha of North Borneo was

speaking. He expressed impatience to listen to the delegates who were obstructive and not at all constructive. He was hinting at people like Lai Eng Kong of North Borneo and Yeo Cheng Hoe of Sarawak.

T.S. Bani nearly created a scene when he refused to associate himself with any decision made by the MSCC although he was a party to it. The Chinese delegates from Sabah and Sarawak said they too could not agree to the decisions of the MSCC since they were not representatives of the people.

The Chairman, Donald Stephens said that at no point had the MSCC pretended to represent the people. All who came were individuals and he reminded them of the aim and purpose of the MSCC when it was formed. Nevertheless, Donald Stephens said, even as individuals, they should not be afraid of agreeing to what they considered as agreeable or right. Delegates had the duty to tell the people that whatever was agreed in the MSCC it had the support of all delegates. In a tone almost filled with anger if not contempt, Donald Stephens clearly spoke that if nominated members could shoulder responsibility in the Legislative or Executive Councils in North Borneo and Sarawak, then they should also be prepared to shoulder responsibility in the formation of Malaysia. Datu Mustapha supported Donald Stephens.

T.H. Tan, Secretary-General of the Malayan Alliance Party said that he had faith and confidence in the ability of the delegates to convince the people regarding Malaysia. Ong Yoke Lin made an impassioned speech that the delegates should feel proud and privileged to be counted among the few people in history to play a leading role in the creation of a new nation.

James Wong of Sarawak, I thought, brought the discussion to a happy end when he said that if they could agree on the press statement the previous day he saw no reason why they should not agree to a communiqué at the end of the meeting. After all, the communiqué would be no more than their agreed decision.

Delegates then went to the palace and had tea with His Majesty Yang di-Pertuan Agong. I did not join the tea but stayed behind to draft the communiqué with the help of Cecil Sheridan and Zainal Abidin Sulong.

We completed our work at about 10.30 p.m. and went straight to the Residency where the delegates were entertained to dinner by the Tunku. I managed to get all the leaders of the delegations and went through the draft communiqué with them. One expatriate colonial official from Sarawak, speaking as if he was representing the people there, said that the people could not accept the word "urgency" in the draft which read, "... all delegations once again reiterated the acceptance of and support for the concept of Malaysia and the urgency for its realisation." I clarified that the draft reflected what I thought nearly all the delegates had said. I asked him if he could deny that the delegation from Sarawak and others had used the word "urgency". The man said he could not but for the purpose of presentation it would be bad. I said in that case the delegates should say that while they agreed on the urgency, they felt that the word should not be used in the

communiqué. What word, I asked, should the delegates use. He said, "as soon as possible". Then, in that case, I told him to persuade the delegates to change the word "urgency" to "as soon as possible" at the meeting the next morning when the communiqué would be considered and adopted. Only the delegates could change what they had said.

A few Sarawak delegates came to our corner and had heard us discussing the problem. They, including James Wong, said that while the word "urgency" was bad for presentation purposes he said the thinking in the meeting was reflected as "urgency". Lee Kuan Yew had also appeared in our corner and I took the opportunity of letting him know the problem we were facing. I asked him as to what he thought would be the appropriate form of words which would reflect the meaning of "urgency". Lee Kuan Yew said why not use such words as, "vital necessity for its realisation as soon as possible". The Sarawak delegates seemed to like this convoluted phrase. The expatriate official kept silent with a dejected look seeing that the Sarawak delegates were favouring Lee Kuan Yew's proposal with the words "as soon as possible" thrown in. He probably realised that the new form of words might for his purpose have been worse than "urgency" but he could not back out without loss of face.

The next thing that happened at the Tunku's dinner was someone proposing that the MSCC should meet for the fourth time, this time in Singapore. Again it was the Sarawak Chinese and the expatriate colonial official who objected on the ground that the people of Sarawak did not think it was necessary. I was beginning to lose my cool but nudged Ambassador Mohamed Sopiee to rub the colonial official up a little. I did not know what Sopiee said or did but he went into a huddle with the Sarawak delegation including the expatriate official and the natives and they all came out agreeing to another meeting in Singapore.

Assistant Minister Ismail was a little tipsy and came to me saying that I was rude to the colonial expatriate officer and he had told Razak about it. I took him to Razak and explained what had happened and Razak quietly told Ismail not to be disturbed by it.

The next morning's meeting was only to pass the draft communiqué and to resolve that the fourth MSCC should be held in Singapore. The meeting, after highly complementing the organisers concerned with the Conference, decided that the full record of the third MSCC should be submitted to the Commission.

The Kuala Lumpur MSCC was a tremendous success. The Tunku had opened the meeting and his statement was as positive as ever on the need for Malaysia which should not be delayed in its formation. A public rally was held in K.L. and for the first time the people of Kuala Lumpur and Malaya saw the natives of the Borneo territories and the way they performed. They were most impressive particularly those who wore their traditional garbs. At the end of the meeting, the MSCC decided to issue a booklet containing the record of proceedings of the meeting in Malay, English, Iban and Kadazan which would be used in the publicity campaign for Malaysia.

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Sir William Goode, the Governor of North Borneo, had been spending a few days' holidays in Fraser's Hill from where he had taken the opportunity of visiting Raub where he was once a District Officer. On his way down from the Hills, the Tunku had invited him to dinner to which I was also invited. When speaking about Fraser's Hill and Raub, he was very nostalgic and remembered the time when he taught me to play rugger. I was then still in school and spent most of the afternoons as his golf caddie for which I earned and saved enough to pay for new canvas shoes. It was in the '30s at the height of the depression when rubber was about five cents per pound. He remembered that I used to collect ten cents per nine holes of golf and that was big money then with an opportunity to borrow golf clubs for practices. This, similar to Ghafar Baba, put me in good stead in my golf later in life.

Claude Fenner, the number one policeman, a British expatriate officer, was still in the service of the Malayan Government. He was one of those who opted to stay. I had known Claude during the Force 136 days. He assisted me a great deal by lending the expertise from the Malayan Police Special Branch which could be considered second to none in counter insurgency and counter espionage work.

I had been able to persuade Fenner to visit the British Borneo territories and to report to the Tunku and myself as to his observations. This he had done. The Tunku thought that Claude Fenner would be an extremely good guest at dinner with William Goode.

As it turned out, the dinner was most successful. Fenner was able to tell Goode that his visit to the Borneo territories had been a splendid experience. He was amazed at the lack of information the expatriate officers had in both Sarawak and North Borneo regarding Malaysia. It would appear to Fenner that the biggest worry of the British expatriates was their future jobs and position. Therefore, it was most reassuring to the colonial officials when Fenner took the opportunity of sharing with them his experiences in Malaya as an expatriate and head of the Malayan Police. They were inquisitive and curious and Fenner was able to answer all their queries. It was Fenner's opinion, as he told Goode in the presence of the Tunku and other guests, that those expatriate officers had a very vital role to play in shaping the opinion of the local people. Therefore, it was most essential that the officers themselves should have a thorough knowledge of what Malaysia was all about.

The Tunku urged Goode to assure his expatriate officials that their position in Malaysia would be well safeguarded. Goode was most enthusiastic about this and I threw in the suggestion which I had made to Waddel of Sarawak that some senior officials should visit Kuala Lumpur and exchange ideas with their counterparts here. They could even get the assurance from the Tunku himself. Goode warmly responded and promised to do something about that. It was a rather different reaction to Waddel.

When Goode asked the Tunku if he would visit North Borneo the Tunku said most willingly he would and at this juncture Fenner chipped in by saying that the British expatriate officers of North Borneo would welcome the Tunku's visit because he had the impression that the officers there thought that the Tunku had not paid sufficient attention to their position in the Malaysia Concept.

Goode kept on saying that time was of the essence and there was not much of it for the information to percolate to the remote areas. The Commission was coming and he therefore wanted very much to know more about the details of the concept. The Tunku pointed a finger at me and said that it was being worked out by that curly headed man! I informed Goode that a paper would be presented by the MSCC at its next meeting and that would form the basic concept of Malaysia.

Goode complimented the Tunku on the success of the third MSCC meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, in particular, the speed with which the records of the meeting were made available.

After Goode and other guests had left, I remained with the Tunku who appeared extremely relieved and even elated that he was able to speak directly with Goode. He appreciated the role of Fenner who, he thought, would be able to round up the police force as a single cohesive unit on Malaysia Day.

* * *

In the meantime, UMNO had organised a seminar on the Malaysia Concept in Ipoh, Perak and the Tunku was to open it. It was January 14, 1962. The Tunku had asked me to accompany him and I flew with him to Ipoh in a Malayan Air Force plane. The Tunku, in his opening speech, mentioned to the seminar participants that he had invited me to be present to give an opportunity for them to seek further clarification or details, if necessary. The Tunku said that I was the man who knew about the concept from A to Z which of course was an exaggeration.

After he had finished his speech on Malaysia, I noticed he changed his tone. He appeared somewhat angry and this could easily be discernable by those who had been used to his ways. There was some body language which made me worried. Then it burst. He lashed out mercilessly at the Perak UMNO leaders for bickering among themselves and the worst among them were highest in the state party hierarchy of Perak. I knew a little about the rift and doubted that it could be repaired. But I knew the Tunku was genuinely annoyed and the people who heard him were as quiet as mice with all eyes on the floor.

My turn came to speak in the afternoon after UMNO Publicity Chief Syed Jaafar Albar and Hamid Khan had addressed the meeting. Since UMNO members were presumed to have the background and general information on the concept, all I did was to update the development towards its realisation including implications of the Tunku-MacMillan meeting. However, the

participants told me that their opponents in the districts kept on attacking the UMNO, relating to the defence arrangement and SEATO, on citizenship, education and Malaya's attitude towards the indigenous peoples in the British Borneo territories.

Razak was also present and he assisted a great deal in providing some of the answers. The Tunku, after the opening address, spent his time with the Mentri Besar and I was to go back with him at about 6.00 p.m. Razak left earlier by car. When I went to the airport at the appointed time after the conclusion of the Seminar I found that the Tunku had left because someone had mistakenly told him that I had left with Razak by car. There I was, stranded until I met Hussain the Secretary-General of UMNO, who gave me a ride in his car back to Kuala Lumpur which took us about four hours. I had never liked that night journey because of the deadly traffic between Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur.

However, the car ride was not altogether unbeneficial. I learnt a few things from the party Secretary-General regarding the in-fighting. According to him, the Malaysia Concept was very much an issue among aspiring leaders. As if it was intended for the Tunku's ears, Hussain said that the choice of party members to help in the realisation of Malaysia should be made well. At that moment there was a great deal of unhappiness regarding the role of the Assistant Minister of Interior, Ismail, who had been boasting that had it not been for his efforts there would have been no prospect for Malaysia to become a reality. He would be more vociferous if he had a little more to drink and UMNO members did not like that.

I requested Hussain to pass the word not to worry over such things. Since in the party in-house struggle, little feathers in the caps would become scoring points, anybody in Ismail's place would have behaved in the same way except perhaps without the spiritual influence! When a project was moving smoothly with a good prospect of success, many would wish to jump on the band wagon. When things get rough, only the tough and the committed ones would remain. I also told Hussain that as far as I knew, not one single person could make any claim for the success of the Malaysia Plan. It would take team work and together with the people of the territories concerned and also the British Government. Malaysia's success would be the will of God and not by the design of any one man.

I assured Hussain, as the Secretary-General of the party, he had played an important role in particular to organise the political thinking in UMNO and to influence the thinking of political parties in Sarawak, North Borneo, Brunei and Singapore. With my assurances, Hussain became elated. His elation made him bold and he was even mocking at Ismail who he said did no more than making speeches drafted by Zainal Abidin Sulong. I did not wish to encourage him to get further in that state of mind and pretended to fall asleep until we reached Kuala Lumpur.

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The fourth and final meeting of the MSCC according to its decision took place in Singapore from the first to the third of February 1962 before the Cobbold Commission arrived in Sarawak. The MSCC meeting in Singapore was opened by the Yang di-Pertuan Negara, Yusof Ishak. He told the meeting that MSCC had reached common ground on broad constitutional and political issues, like a strong effective Central Government in charge of defence, external affairs and internal security, and on details such as immigration control, religion, education, national language and other safeguards for local interests.

In the speeches by the delegations, I noticed some new negative lines were emerging. Donald Stephens said the Malaysia issue had tended to divide the people of North Borneo on racial lines and Yeo Cheng Hoe revealed that there was more mutual suspicion in Sarawak than ever before. But Stephens and other members of MSCC, perhaps with the exception of the SUPP member from Sarawak, did not indicate any desire to abandon the Malaysia Plan. They had spent a great deal of time and energy explaining and persuading the local people and they were not going to pack up and go particularly when the Commission was soon to arrive. They decided to prepare a memorandum setting out all the proposals and recommendations arising from their four meetings. This memorandum was prepared and signed by all the leaders of all five delegations including Brunei.

Yusof Ishak, the Singapore Head of State, aptly summed up that the MSCC had given the concept of Malaysia sufficient definition and content to make its realisation in only a matter of time.

PART THREE

Cobbold, Brunei and Lansdowne



The busy traffic of communication between the Tunku and MacMillan went on in the quest for the chairman. Finally, both sides agreed to the appointment of Lord Cobbold, a former Governor of the Bank of England. The British appointed, as their nominees, Sir Anthony Abell, former Governor of Sarawak and High Commissioner in Brunei and Sir David Watterston, a former Chief Secretary of the Federation of Malaya before Merdeka. The Malayan Government nominees were Wong Pow Nee, former Chief Minister of Penang and I.

On the point of my appointment, it took sometime for the Tunku to persuade me to accept it. I had been too involved in the marketing of the idea and the appointment might not be well-received. Also the time taken away from my desk would leave ourselves exposed to many problems since we had begun to suspect that Sukarno and Macapagal had negative ideas about Malaysia. The Tunku finally said that he had nobody else in mind since I was the one who "dragged" him into the exercise of forming Malaysia. He reminded me of my pestering him with the subject before Merdeka on various occasions. He was disappointed that I had cold feet when faced with what might be the truth based on the wishes of the people. He said I was to honestly find out about that or forever keep my peace!

It was a hard hitting talk and I found myself unable at that time even to look straight into the Tunku's eyes. He was not angry but had the look of utter disappointment. I did not want him to feel let down since I knew that Malaysia was his pet project. I gritted my teeth and asked him that if I were to accept the appointment, would I have the complete liberty to say what I liked in the recommendation even if Wong Pow Nee disagreed with me? He said, of course, but surely I would have the common sense not to appear in public at variance with my colleague who should be persuaded to my line of thinking whatever that might be. In that case, I told the Tunku, I would accept and the announcement about the Commission was made on January 17, 1962. The Secretary of the Commission was an official from the colonial office by the name of J.H. Harris.

The terms of reference of the Commission was worked out together between the British and the Malayan Governments. They read as follows:

Having regard to the expressed agreement of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya that the inclusion of

North Borneo and Sarawak (together with other territories) in the proposed Federation of Malaysia is a desirable aim in the interests of the people of the territories concerned

- (a) to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak on this question; and,
- (b) in the light of their assessment of these views, to make recommendations.

Lord Cobbold and members of the Commission would arrive in Kuching on February 19, 1962 when they would begin their work.

Before the Cobbold Commission began their hearings, the people of the two British Borneo territories namely North Borneo and Sarawak, had sufficient opportunity to know what Malaysia Concept was all about. In no small measure, the endeavours were successfully taken by Zainal Abidin Sulong and his team which later received the collaboration of the two colonial administrations. A special mention should be given to the role played by both Donald Stephens and Datu Mustapha who untiringly, without care regarding their personal popularity, even security, stomped around not only in North Borneo but in Kuching, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.

Other political leaders who made their imprints were Lee Kuan Yew, Abang Haji Mustapha, Ong Yoke Lin, Ismail Khan, Khir Johari, Ahmad Zaidi, Goh Keng Swee, Rajaratnam, Abang Haji Openg, Abang Louis Barieng, Pengiran Gulpam, Temenggong Jugah, Oyong Lawai Jau, Durin, Ong Kee Hui, Yi Kian Tan, Khoo Saik Chew, Montegrai, Sibat, Banyang, Yassin, Pang Tet Shung, Rahman Yaacob, Aini Dobi, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, Jakeway, Shaw, Ratcliffe, Taib Mahmud, Jitam, Turner and Goode, Assistant Minister Ismail, Nordin Hussein and Jaafar Albar. Indeed all those concerned with MSCC should be mentioned. There were many more who had given tremendous support and some came from the various branches of the government services like the Police and Customs, the civil service and diplomatic service; and I find it impossible to remember their names. Within a matter of months, from the time the Tunku made the historic speech in Singapore, people like Donald Stephens and Jugah who were sharply against the Malaysia Concept through explanations, persuasion and exposures to indisputable evidences of development remarkably had changed to be ardent supporters of the concept. When the Cobbold Commission started hearing in Kuching on February 20, 1962, the people already knew what they had wanted.

Having visited a number of times the Borneo territories, I had begun to see certain developments as the Malaysia Concept fever began to gather its momentum. There was a serious misunderstanding that the Plan was a connivance by both Malaya and the British Government to have the colonial authority transferred to Kuala Lumpur. This was due to ignorance rather than

malice since it would not occur to most people that the aim of the Malaysia Plan was the liberation of the colonial territories through Malaysia. It could not be otherwise since Malaya was wedded to anti-colonialism. Secondly, the Malayan Constitution had no provision to administer territories as colonies but there is a provision to include territories as members of the Federation and in the circumstances, it would be possible that such entries could be the subject of special arrangements by having Federal, State and Concurrent Lists dissimilar to the existing ones. Nevertheless, the territory would have the status of a state in a federation with residual rights.

On the issue of transfer of sovereignty and authority, there was no sufficient explanation. The colonial dependency syndrome was still very strong in the British territories and most people then could not imagine that Malaysia meant independence for them. Hence, the concept could be distorted as mere sugar coating to the real intention of colonialism by Kuala Lumpur. The groups opposing the plan had different reasons but the line of a Malayan colonialism was a single cogent argument in their endeavours to cause an abortion.

It was also becoming clear to me that a situation like in Malaya before Merdeka was emerging among expatriate officials. While London had the idea of Merdeka, some of the expatriates had ideas of their own either to frustrate the process or to slow it down according to their timetable. This sort of development among expatriate colonial officials of British Borneo, including Brunei, was evident. The same sentiment was also shared by expatriate officials of private companies.

Another group was the Christian Missionary of all denominations which would tell their flocks that the future fate and presence of the missionaries in the country could not be assured. Since the dependency syndrome was strongest amongst the natives they feared that expatriate priests and pastors would be sent away. While the natives might be convinced that there would be freedom of worship, they had always depended on expatriate European church officials for leadership and handouts. Somehow, the colonial policy of spreading enlightenment through the Cross had identified the white pastor as equivalent to a white district officer who could provide advice as well as simple material things like writing books and pencils for their children. With the encouragement of the colonial administration on education, brother schools became the centre of village life; hence there was a genuine fear that a different education policy would upset all those that the village folks were accustomed to. This was "the Crown and the Cross" policy of colonialism.

Because the colonial policy was clearly discerned during the interwar years of encouraging the Chinese to think of themselves as Chinese of Mother China, even importing school teachers from China, there was a genuine fear that the change of the education arrangement would deny the Chinese of a Chinese education.

I had visited a few government schools teaching in English and the Iban

language. I had come from a very humble Malay school but what I saw in Sarawak was pathetic. It was learning without a future. But for the poor folks in longhouses who did not know any better, it was progress and they did not want that progress to be obstructed by this strange thing called Malaysia.

Therefore, the obstructions came in many forms either intended to frustrate the Malaysia plan completely or to delay it even indefinitely. Hence, I found in the beginning, the people and chiefs who were invited to visit Kuala Lumpur were intimidated or discouraged from making the journey. Kalong Ningkan, for instance, took a long time even to reply to the invitation and Temenggong Jugah had two attacks of diplomatic flu. When Donald Stephens, against the local expatriate officials advice, began to show support for the Malaysia Concept after the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting in Singapore, there was encouragement by the colonial officials for the natives to create political parties which would have anti-Malaysia plan as its platform. *Pasok Momogun* and the *Persatuan Anak Negri Daerah Tuaran* were cases in point.

There were many reasons for opposition by the Chinese depending on what group he belonged. If he was an extreme chauvinist he would oppose the Plan for fear of education, language and native dominance. If he was a tycoon businessman, he would fear Malaysian regulations would work against his own wealth accumulation; in the colonial administration his exploitations would be uninterfered even if the forest and environment were being degraded. If he was just a middle-class businessman, his anxiety would be the intrusion of MCA and Singapore Chinese businessmen with large capitals that could injure his business. This might sound a bit preposterous but the concern was a reality. In Singapore, the worry was among some Chinese businessmen who were supporters of the PAP who thought that an MCA investment and business in Singapore would reduce the influence of PAP among Chinese. Again this sort of fear was unfounded but it was easy for the anti-Malaysia groups to exploit those concerns and fears.

To my great surprise I found opposition in a subtle way from Selkirk. Selkirk's men were generally apprehensive about the role of Britain in SEATO if Malaysia would insist that the British bases in Singapore could not be used for SEATO purposes after the merger. They were faithful civil servants of the Crown and therefore could not see at that time that the anxieties could be overcome by a political formula. There were no indications at the early stage that HMG would agree or even understand the Tunku's statement on the British Singapore bases.

Much of these difficulties could have been averted if in the beginning Whitehall had shown some interest as to details. But the difficulty at the London end stemmed from the confusion confounded by the advice from two governors of Borneo territories, two high commissioners one in Brunei and the other in Kuala Lumpur and one commissioner, Singapore. These officials were not mere civil servants though their underlings were. They had also a political

role and this could be coloured by their own prejudices. The Colonial Secretary would accept the advice of colonial governors more often than not without question. The Commonwealth Secretary and the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur who were in touch with the Tunku certainly have different ideas. The defence chiefs would have a set of ideas of their own. After many encounters with the local British High Commissioner, I formed the opinion that in so far as the Malaysia Concept was concerned there was none, at least not a cohesive one in Whitehall. It was a perfect illustration of the story of the six blind men of Hindustan!

The communist oppositions both internally and externally thrived on this confusion. Its mouthpieces like Lim Chin Siong and SUPP condemned the plan as an imperialist design and would put conditions for merger in such a fashion as to court rejection. The communist elements aspire for independence but not through Malaysia. I appreciated Lee Kuan Yew's dilemma and at that time he was much maligned as a fellow traveller. He knew that there could be no merger of Singapore without Malaysia and if the communist elements knew about this they would demand for a merger without the concept of Malaysia knowing well it would be rejected. Lee Kuan Yew would prove to be a useless leader of Singapore if he could not manage the so-called feudal Malayan leadership. The idea of independence first for all the territories would suit the communists best. It was such an attractive proposition that well-meaning people could easily be drawn into the trap.

While some British colonial officials including my dear friend Malcolm MacDonald would favour the formation of Federation of Borneo States, they were quite oblivious of the snares of the communists which saw in the scheme a chance of the United Kingdom being forced to give independence to Singapore in which case all sorts of possibilities might emerge. Individually, Sarawak and North Borneo would not last long as independent states knowing how the PKI and the CCO wanted Sarawak to be a client state while North Borneo would be a part of the Philippines.

For the Cobbold Commission to come out with a positive answer, more work had to be done to familiarise the people with the true intention and concept. Those who were communists whose number was small could not be influenced but the others who formed the bulk of the populace were not hopeless cases.

In my discussions with the Tunku, Razak and Zainal Abidin Sulong, I emphasised on the need to get better cooperation from the expatriate colonial officials who were then extremely influential. While external opposition from communist countries and those influenced by the communists and even such countries with misconceived ideas in opposing the Malaysia Concept had to be reckoned with, it was more important to get the local people to know exactly what choice they had to make. I told the Tunku and Razak that we should feel no shame if the Commission found that the people of Borneo did not support Malaysia. On that basis we too should reject the concept. We should not be

used by the colonial power which wished to dump their problems on Malaya. If there was a desire by the people to be independent through Malaysia then the terms of their entry should not be unreasonable. I told the Tunku and Razak that in Malaya besides the communists, there were rumblings of opposition from some Chinese and Malays for different reasons. They too had to be satisfied not with placebos but with entrenched constitutional guarantees. Malayan political parties too must show wisdom in restraining from interference in the internal affairs of those territories. If UMNO and MCA show intentions of intruding into the Borneo territories then it would be the kiss of death to the Malaysia Concept. Given time, I could see national political parties covering the whole nation of future Malaysia but at its early stage it would be important to let the local people develop their own political styles. There would be many roads towards success in the development of a single Malaysian nation but let the people of Borneo states choose their own routes towards the common objective.

The thought regarding political parties came to my mind when I recalled a question by Lee Kuan Yew at one of the MSCC meetings which took me by surprise. T.S. Bani, a member of the Singapore delegation, on record, was opposed to Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew, in his absence asked, "on behalf of the absent Singapore delegate Mr. Bani," if parties which were not loyal to Malaysia would be allowed to operate. It was a kind of a devil's advocate way of a supplementary question. The original question was put by the North Borneo delegation inquiring if it would be possible for political parties to operate on a Malaysia-wide basis. Khir Johari had replied to the effect that it would not be undesirable for parties to be on a Malaysia-wide basis to give weight to the needs of the Borneo people. Khir rightly had in mind the Alliance Party (UMNO, MCA and MIC) to embrace Borneo political parties as members thus forming Alliance governments in both states. Khir Johari also replied that those parties which were not loyal to the new Malaysia would naturally be unacceptable in the Alliance and even proscribed, having in mind the CCO. This answer was genuine. However, it must have sent shivers into the narrow of SUPP which contained CCO elements.

I related this incident to the Tunku and Razak that no impression should be given that the Alliance Party would not tolerate opposition and that opposition to Malaysia Concept should not be read as disloyalty. At worst, they could be in the opposition and at best these parties might change their mind and join the government. Loyalty to a future Malaysia should not be determined by its opposition to its formation.

When Lord Cobbold and the Commission arrived in Singapore on February 10, 1962, I went to the airport to meet them although I was supposed to play golf with Lee Kuan Yew that morning. It was difficult for me to assess the man at the first encounter but he was extremely polite and kind. I found Lord Cobbold towering over me and had a posture that was upright. He probably would brook no nonsense yet I found him bending very low when

speaking to other people in order to catch their eyes at the same level. This made me think that Lord Cobbold was prepared to go out of his way to get viewpoints of other people. I had a feeling that I would be able to put my views across yet to be accepted I should be prepared to work very hard.

Lord Selkirk invited the whole of the Commission to dinner at his home. Also present were Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee. The dinner was rather miserable, in fact boring, because everyone cautiously avoided the obvious topic. Furthermore, I could not get it off my mind that Selkirk could never attend to details no matter how sensitive. I had been invited by Lord Selkirk to meals a number of times and everytime his meal would include pork which was not kosher or *halal* to me. He had already been made aware of this problem but that evening the dinner again had pork in the menu without substitute. It was most unfortunate that it was a *puasa* month (fasting month) and I just kept my hunger in control by devouring lots of fruit and water.

After dinner I managed to speak with Lee Kuan Yew in private. I told him that the Tunku was formulating in his mind policies with regard to security and since the subject had relevance to Singapore I thought it would be helpful if Lee Kuan Yew would go to Kuala Lumpur and exchange thoughts on the matter. The subject was vital and Lee Kuan Yew agreed to meet with the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur.

* * *

As the Cobbold Commission was not as yet ready to start work, I returned to Kuala Lumpur. On the morning of February the twelfth, I was at the Residency to report about my meeting with Lord Cobbold and my cursory first impression of the man which I admitted might be utterly wrong. In any case, there was nothing negative about them. I also told the Tunku he should expect to see Lee Kuan Yew after his return from Alor Star where he was flying to that morning.

The Tunku then said he had a few things to talk to me and therefore asked me to fly with him and return by the same plane. In flight, he mentioned about Lim Yew Hock taking up the case of an Indian applying for permanent residence when the Home Ministry had already rejected it. He was not pleased with Lim Yew Hock on the matter because to give Lim Yew Hock face he had to give the Indian an extension of three months' stay overruling the Home Ministry. Since it was not within my portfolio, I paid little attention to the subject. However, on my Ministry's problem like heating, gas and lighting for Malayan Ambassadors' residences, staff and chanceries which were not adequate I was able to persuade him to provide adequate funds. I also took the opportunity to mention to the Tunku my view with which he concurred that Malaya, which had been invited by South Korea to attend the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League (APACL), should desist from attending with good foreign policy reasons. The Tunku murmured to himself that the APACL was an instrument of US foreign policy, a view which he never made public. There

were some housekeeping problems including the appointment of ambassadors. We agreed to propose to Heah Joo Seang to go to Burma and Ong Yoke Lin to Washington and concurrently the UN in New York.

The Tunku's mind was preoccupied with more important subjects than the mundane foreign office chores. He said he had a strong feeling that the *Barisan Sosialis* and the communists and those opposed to the Malaysia Concept would now mount their best efforts and even actively plot to make as much trouble on the eve of the merger or just before the realisation of Malaysia. He admitted that he had no information but he had a clear hunch or intuition which he felt strongly. He envisioned strikes, arson and wilful damaging of government property everywhere. There would be terrorist intimidations and shooting of policemen. He saw the scenario that, in order to bring about peace and order, some emergency measures and force would have to be used. This, according to the Tunku, would mean that the hands of the government would be soiled with blood. Such a situation must be avoided to preserve the good record of the government.

The communist insurgency was different. It started during the British time and the independent Malayan Government was able to successfully manage the country saving lives and property. In the case of Singapore it would seem to be quiet then but there would be spilling of blood and disorder making a bad beginning for Malaysia.

The Tunku then instructed me to inform Dr. Ismail, the minister responsible for Internal Security, that he should consider establishing a strong liaison in intelligence with the Singapore Special Branch. The Tunku was anxious to substantiate his hunch. He also wanted to know how much Lee Kuan Yew knew about the situation and whether he had facts and figures to support his surmises. With regard to the Singapore *Barisan Sosialis* he had been toying with the idea of having a heart to heart talk with its leaders at an appropriate time.

According to the Tunku, the British authorities in Singapore should start cleaning up operations to remove the communists. It would be impossible for the British to deny any knowledge of communist activities. Unless the British was prepared to clean up Singapore before merger it would be difficult for the merger to take place.

The Singapore and the British Governments should go through the motion of preparing for a state of emergency by making laws, regulations and plans for curfews, etc. to meet the communist threats. They should take concrete steps to prevent any outbreak of violence on merger day. With the existence of those arrangements, if violence took place after the merger the new Malaysia authorities would simply implement those laws and regulations.

I thanked the Tunku for sharing his thoughts on such a vital issue and promised him that I would get in touch with Dr. Ismail, Lee Kuan Yew and the British Government. However, I told the Tunku that I could not see Lee Kuan Yew or the British taking the initiative in that direction. The British would

only act when violence had taken place or at least in their view, imminent. Anyway, I undertook to speak to the people concerned.

Then I enquired if he had given any thought on the title of the head of state of the two British Borneo territories in Malaysia. He requested me to ask the leaders there about the matter and if they would want a local personality or would they mind if someone were to be appointed from the Peninsula. At once I said that I could not see the people in either North Borneo or Sarawak agreeing to a Peninsula personality to be their governor. I doubted if they would like the title "governor". They might prefer titles like Yang Di-pertua Negri. Perhaps Penang and even Malacca might think of a new nomenclature though I did not think that the issue of nomenclature was important.

Several feelers had been made by Party Raayat of Brunei that some of their members would wish to visit Malaya. I revealed to the Tunku that David Marshall of Singapore had been used as a conduit. The Tunku welcomed the idea of meeting with the Party Raayat leadership.

After the Tunku had alighted, the plane turned around and we left for Kuala Lumpur.

The Tunku's intuition could not be dismissed lightly. He seemed to have that uncanny ability to read signals or to have gut feelings which would give meaning to him. He believed in dreams and there were times when he told me of his dream and he would predict something good or ill would come. A few of his friends believed in his oracular abilities although I was not one of them. But when he talked of riots and bloodshed and the burning of cities on or after Malaysia day, I could not take any chances. I talked to Razak, to Dr. Ismail and to Lee Kuan Yew about the Tunku's anxieties. The communist negative action and subversion just could not be ignored nor wished away.

Lee Kuan Yew, more than anyone else at that time, understood the dangers from the communists and their henchmen and what they were capable of doing in Singapore. And Lee Kuan Yew had been very sensitive to whatever political action or statement against the PAP from any quarter. To him any attack on PAP could be dangerous in terms of the struggle for Singapore against the communists. Many people, as a result, read Lee Kuan Yew as simply intolerant of criticism against PAP and he would be devastated when such an attack was levelled against him by the press, local and foreign.

Therefore, political parties in Singapore which attacked the policies and action of PAP and Lee Kuan Yew was in his view a weakening process in the fight against communist elements, while armchair liberal or Fabian critiques who regard Lee Kuan Yew as an intolerant dictator would only further the communist cause.

I knew for sure that Lee Kuan Yew shared the Tunku's concern if not his premonition and he had been extremely worried over the statements which came out from the leadership of the Singapore People's Alliance (SPA) especially those emanating from Lim Yew Hock. Lee Kuan Yew knew the personal relationship which then subsisted between the Tunku and Lim Yew

Hock and between the Alliance Party of Malaya and the SPA. And the SPA never lost an opportunity to politically attack the PAP in the name of democracy.

After having told Lee Kuan Yew of the fears expressed by the Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew took the opportunity of letting me know about his misgivings of the SPA which had to be prevented from attacking the PAP at least until Malaysia had been realised. He was extremely concerned about the impending referendum.

The one particular case which Lee Kuan Yew brought to my attention was when the SPA on February 16, 1962 or thereabout held a current forum at its premises attended by about one hundred people. It was not a public rally but an internal party activity. However, Lee Kuan Yew was very upset because he heard that Lim Yew Hock attacked the PAP's call for merger. Lim Yew Hock said that in the past, the Tunku had never wanted a merger of Singapore with Malaya but recently, as a result of Lim's persuasive effort, the Tunku had agreed. Lim Yew Hock said that he had taken it upon himself to study the Tunku's refusal which would cause endless hardships to the people of Singapore and had therefore begged the Tunku to reconsider.

According to Lee Kuan Yew, Lim Yew Hock claimed that when the Tunku agreed with him to the merger, the Tunku had asked Lim Yew Hock to form an alliance of the SPA with UMNO, MCA and MIC. Lim Yew Hock in front of his audience claimed that he had formed the alliance and it was only after that the Tunku informed the PAP that he was now better disposed towards merger provided the Central Government would control Defence and External Affairs. The PAP in agreeing, had asked for and accepted by the Tunku that labour and education should be under the jurisdiction of Singapore.

Lim Yew Hock, according to Lee Kuan Yew, revealed that immediately after the PAP had made known to its members about this understanding, the communist faction in the PAP protested and instead asked for a complete merger which led to a serious cleavage in the PAP. Both factions began to expose each other's weaknesses. It would seem that the Lee Kuan Yew's faction had to redeem its credibility especially over the question of citizenship. The SPA forum was given a thorough explanation as to the legal and constitutional difference between citizenship and nationality.

According to Lee Kuan Yew, Lim Yew Hock drew the attention of those present to the embarrassment of the PAP because of the quarrel between the two factions. When the referendum would be put the SPA could support neither the Lee Kuan Yew's faction nor the PAP as a whole nor *Barisan Sosialis*. According to Lim Yew Hock, to support the sinking ship of PAP would bring the SPA down with it. Nevertheless, a merger would be a victory for SPA since it was in the Alliance.

Lee Kuan Yew went on to relate that during the period of questions and answers Lim Yew Hock said that Singapore Police Force and the civil service would not be under the jurisdiction of the Central Government. On the

question as to why Singapore was not given the same treatment as the Borneo territories, it was explained by Lim Yew Hock that the Borneo territories would be given a full merger while Singapore would enjoy a "close relationship". Lim Yew Hock accepted the fact that some of the PAP's proposals could be supported because they appeared to benefit the people of Singapore.

This little story would seem quite innocuous and could be regarded in a democracy as a political speech trying to gain mileage. However, in the atmosphere of Singapore at that moment in time when the subject of Malaysia was a matter of life and death, it must be understood that PAP leaders especially Lee Kuan Yew would prefer a monopoly of policy and action in the face of the *Barisan Sosialis* opposition and threat. It was very easy for the PAP to regard the speech of Lim Yew Hock as subverting the credibility of the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and his faction. In view of the personal relationship between the Tunku and Lim Yew Hock, what the latter had said would be accepted by the Chinese press as the mirror of the Tunku's mind. To that extent I agreed that Lim Yew Hock should exercise restraint and circumspect as I told the Tunku who agreed to try to speak to Lim Yew Hock, but said he would find it difficult to muzzle that Singapore politician!

In the meantime there had been reports in Singapore that the *Barisan Sosialis* led by Dr. Lee Siew Choh and Fong Swee Suan had been very active in its political work amongst the people. Malaysia Concept, according to the party statements and pamphlets, was a colonial connivance between Malaya and the United Kingdom and all trade unions and associations under the communist control had come out condemning it. They organised rallies and some were without police permits as exemplified by the incident when Dr. Lee Siew Choh was fined S\$40 on a charge that he had promoted such a public rally.

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Before the story of the writing of the Cobbold Commission report is told, the Singapore developments in relation to Malaysia in Singapore should be a matter of interest since they were in tandem. While initially the Tunku was not attracted to the idea of Singapore becoming a part of Malaysia based on affinity of people, history and geography the more worrying aspects for the Tunku were the elements of security and stability. However, the political developments in Southeast Asia in particular in Indo-China and the PKI influence in Indonesia, made the Tunku revise his views. He would be able to accept Singapore if she became a part of Malaysia on its formation but not before. It may be recalled that the Tunku recorded his thoughts rather succinctly in his May 27, 1961 speech in Parliament: "Times have changed and so must our outlook; hence what was not agreed to yesterday might be agreed to today when we give a second and serious thought; and so the idea of Malaysia took shape."

In the various references to Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku's conversations, it was mentioned that the Singapore Constitution was due for review in 1963 and in anticipation the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew had reached broad agreements in principle for a merger. In those broad agreements Singapore would have a number of seats in the Federal Parliament. The Singapore Government would control labour, health and education while internal security, defence and foreign affairs would be federal subjects. They had as yet at that time not worked out the finance which would be done later.

After that, Lee Kuan Yew called on leaders of all political parties in the Legislative Assembly to state their stand on the Agreement but it was put in two parts: (a) The Federal Government should have control over defence, foreign affairs and internal security, and (b) Singapore should have local autonomy in education and labour policies.

All the political parties except Singapore UMNO accused the PAP of having carried out negotiations with Malaya without first consulting the people.

The Singapore White Paper was released setting out the framework of the proposed merger. It was called a Memorandum Setting Out Heads of Agreement for a merger between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore and contained those items which had been agreed to, for example Singapore would have fifteen seats in the *Dewan Rakyat* and two in *Dewan Negara*. In Malaysia, while retaining their Singapore citizenship, Singaporeans would acquire a Malaysian nationality. The Head of Singapore State would be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in consultation with the Prime Minister of Singapore. The White Paper at once became the hottest topic of the day. It received the approbation of the Singapore Legislative Assembly by 33 for which 18 opposition members absented themselves. While the debate was raging in Singapore, the Tunku-MacMillan Joint Statement was issued regarding the formation of Malaysia with Singapore included as a "desirable objective".

The various communist front organisations never missed an opportunity to attack Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku. Various points were identified as issues for controversies. The attacks were harsh and incessant while the Cobbold Commission went on with its work. If the intention of the communist was to intimidate the people of the Borneo territories it had produced an opposite effect. The people there began to see what the communists were capable of and as I anticipated made them, particularly the natives, more than ever determined that Malaysia should be formed as soon as possible.

In between my Cobbold Commission work visiting the two territories, Singapore was a transit station and provided me with the opportunity of meeting Lee Kuan Yew to keep up with his political manoeuvres. He was under great pressure but he weathered it well. He was always ready for a game of golf, at least in the Istana ground, if time was pressing.

It was at one of these stops that Lee Kuan Yew talked from dinner to well past midnight. Lee Kuan Yew had kept himself well-informed regarding the Borneo territories. He made the observation that those anti-Malaysia in Singapore were communists and their supporters. In Sarawak they were the CCO and their fellow-travellers. In North Borneo, Chinese businessmen, natives and Chinese who were under the influence of individual British officials were opposed to or ignorant of the Malaysia Concept. I said his observations were not far wrong although it might not be so clearly discernable since the pro- and anti- had variations. These would only become clear after the Cobbold Commission had completed its work.

We also, in one of those informal meetings, spoke about cleaning up Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew said the Tunku should allow him to conduct the affairs of Singapore in his own way since he knew the communists. Lee Kuan Yew was working on a plan to lead public opinion to such a point that when action was taken against the communist leaders, nobody would sympathise with them. If action was taken without any preparation those subversive elements would be regarded as martyrs which must be avoided.

Lee Kuan Yew said that the communist hold on the people of Singapore had somewhat loosened. They had been calling for strikes but with little success. Their greatest failure, which had never happened before in the whole history of communist existence in Singapore was their inability to call the student's strike. No doubt, according to Lee Kuan Yew, during the Referendum exercise the communist elements would call for strikes and riots but at that stage it would not be too difficult to manage.

We once talked at length about the Chinese as a whole in the proposed Malaysia. According to Lee Kuan Yew, there would be direct links in the Chinese thinking throughout from Perlis to North Borneo through Chinese newspapers. I was inclined to agree with him because of the power of the common written characters and we thought that this aspect should be the subject of a very careful study. Lee Kuan Yew said the Chinese chauvinists should be separated from the communist elements and the Chinese in Malaya as well as the Chinese in the Borneo territories should be separated from both of these elements. Otherwise trouble would be in store.

I suggested to Lee Kuan Yew that in this regard the importance of his leadership role would be immeasurable. The Tunku had already given such a hint. The Chinese in new Malaysia should be guided into understanding the reality that currently politics was native-based and without such an acceptance, stability could not be assured. And without stability there would be no progress and no development.

Lee Kuan Yew appeared to be giving some thought to what I said and agreed that it was a matter of great importance which would require careful thinking. We promised to meet often to exchange views whenever possible and necessary. He said he had plans to come to Kuala Lumpur often to meet with Malayan leaders. Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku were indulging in a golf

diplomacy. It was the Tunku's way to impress on Lee Kuan Yew who played a brilliant game as compared to the Tunku that in order to be able to play together the handicap system was essential.

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The Cobbold Commission had extended invitations to all persons to appear before it if they wished to give oral evidence. The itinerary of the Commission was planned in such a way that representatives from each district had an opportunity to meet the Commission at selected centres. There were designated twenty centres in Sarawak and fifteen in North Borneo.

Over 4,000 individuals appeared before the Commission. Some of them were in groups of different sizes. The Commission had invited anyone who wished to submit written memorandum to do so. A total of about 600 memoranda were received from people in North Borneo and about 1,000 from Sarawak. These written representations came from individuals, various associations, political parties, chambers of commerce, trade unions, native chiefs, members of Executive and Legislative Councils and community leaders. They were given every assistance to make known their views and oft times interpreters were required. All interviews were in camera and evidence and memoranda submitted were treated with the utmost secrecy.

The Cobbold Commission arrived in the morning in Kuching on February 20, 1962 on its first leg of their work in the Borneo territories. At the airport, Governor Waddel, the Chief Secretary and some dignitaries were there to greet us. I noticed Datuk Abang Mustapha was among those who met us. I thought he was still off colour but a little better than I last saw him in Santubong.

Cobbold, Abel and I were quickly whisked away across the river to the Astana. But Wong Pow Nee and Watherston went to stay with Jakeway, the Chief Secretary. The splitting of the Commission particularly between myself and Wong Pow Nee did not please me. However, the Waddels were extremely nice people and they made me feel very much at home.

I have always liked the Astana. It was nothing much to look at but the stone gate would not be missed for the motto inscribed by the Brooke's in Jawi "BERHARAP LAGI BERNAFAS". How apt. Perhaps the motto motivated the colonial official who did not want Sarawak to be part of Malaysia during their tour.

The view of the river and the town of Kuching with fishing boats and passenger *perahu* (boats) from the Astana was very scenic when lit by the red glow of the setting sun. Children were bathing and splashing water in the Sarawak river with their naked gleaming bodies without care that at that moment five people were in their midst whose opinion might change their future. The river was tidal. Quite often it did not appear to know which way it was flowing. Even if it did flow it was very slow and with it were drift woods and flotsam creating impediments to boats cruising by. It was almost a

grotesque mimicry of the attitude of the colonial expatriates towards the Malaysia Concept! I entertained the hope that someday in Malaysia, the banks of the river would be upgraded as promenades while the flotsam and jetsam would no longer be littering the waters.

The Malay villages were on one side of the bank, the same side as the Astana. Next to it was a building which looked like a fort. Indeed it was called Fort Margareta after one of the ladies who graced the Brooke lineage. The Chief of Police lived in it. On the opposite bank was Kuching town, populated by Chinese merchants and the backdrop of administration and the court building. It was symptomatic of the compartmentalisation of the society.

The Brooke regime depended on the Chinese for its prosperity, brought about by good trading practices and law and order while its safety and security depended on the Malays. On one side of the river it was rural, the other urban and they were each identified according to race.

To cross the river, the only means of communication were boats and *perahus*. The Rajahs, and later the British colonial governors, crossed the river by royal *perahus* paddled in unison by uniformed oarsmen. They looked very impressive and I could well imagine the scene when the Rajah or the colonial governor in his white tunic and feathered cork hat sitting regally being paddled across the river to return the salute of a guard of honour before presenting the colonial policy to the Legislative Council. It must have been an impressive sight to demonstrate authority, something I could not conclude in my mind whether it should be retained or not after Malaysia Day. That surely must be left to the people of Sarawak to decide, as in the case of many other issues, to manifest their autonomy. I was certain many would like to abolish the practice of the official oarsmen rowing the Head of State even if he was one of their own if only to demonstrate that human dignity should be preserved and never compromised in the age of motors and engines of the modern society.

The first meeting of the Commission was on the same afternoon of our arrival when for the first time I saw the bulk of the memoranda and other documents connected with the work of the Commission. The meeting first considered the itinerary, programme and any special needs of members. We decided that as far as possible the Commission should work as a whole unless it was absolutely necessary. I had suggested that wherever possible we should stay in hotels but later in practice we found it difficult to turn down the hospitality of government officials even if we wanted to give the impression of arm's length relationship with them.

Because of my frequent visits to Sarawak before the Commission, I had made many friends among the expatriate colonial officials. One such officer was Tony Shaw. This time I went to meet with him in the evening at his house as I was anxious to hear his views regarding the attitude of the government officials. Shaw shared with me the fears and needs of the expatriates, some of whom he said wanted too much. Later, I wrote to Razak about it. The most

important point was a clear assurance from the British Government and to be agreed to by the Malayan Government.

With regard to the other matters, Shaw assured me that they were under control. We talked about Rahman Yaacob as he told me that Rahman was thinking of resigning to be involved full time in politics. Shaw said there was a shortage of native officials and in any case Rahman had no money to buy himself out, meaning that he had to pay back the amount expended for his studies if he chose to resign according to some arrangement he had with the Sarawak Government. The Government had also heard that if the Government would allow Rahman to resign without penalty, he would prefer to go to Brunei to work. The Government would never look at that sort of plan with favour. Shaw was a senior officer and I knew he had a great deal of influence in the Government. I suggested to him that the Kuching Government should regard Rahman's full time political activities as contributing to the well-being of Sarawak as if he was working for the Government and should not be penalised. I agreed that if Rahman wanted to seek fortune elsewhere then he should not be exempted from his obligation. He noted my suggestion seriously with a murmur that Rahman might well serve Sarawak politically in Malaysia.

He was also extremely sympathetic with the concept of Sarawak attaining independence through Malaysia and I detected a tone of sympathy towards Rahman being released of his obligations if the resignation was bona fide to participate in politics which very badly needed young intelligent and educated natives. I requested Shaw to do his best to assist Rahman since Sarawak would benefit from such a move. Indeed, I told Shaw that Rahman was a federal material and the kind of person who would not be difficult to promote. Shaw agreed that a move to get Rahman committed to politics would be a good one and I left it to Shaw to manage it.

Dinner at the Astana was a black tie affair and therefore rather stiff except for Abel who had a lot of funny anecdotes of his experiences when serving as the governor in Kuching. The Astana was familiar to him and he said that there was a friendly ghost which had been known to visit the room where I was billeted. Only he did not know as who would be frightened by whom! It was the month of Ramadan and I was too tired to decide whether I would favour being visited.

The actual interview started in the afternoon of February 21, 1962. The first group was led by Abang Mustapha, the Datu Bandar of Kuching. This group was extremely pro-Malaysia; all they asked was for the Sarawak natives to be given the special position as the Malays in Malaya. This, Abang Mustapha pointed out to the Commission, was very little compared to what they used to enjoy during the time of the Brookes.

The next group was SUPP led by Ong Kee Hui. They were very clearly opposed to the Malaysia Concept. It became obvious to me quite early in the interviews that having made up their mind just like Party Negara except it was contradictory, they were looking for excuses and reasons to tell us. Wong

Pow Nee, I thought, handled the situation very well indeed despite provocations and sarcasms.

Wong Pow Nee asked several questions which required Ong Kee Hui simply to answer yes or no. For example, on the question of special position of the natives, Ong Kee Hui had to admit that there should be a provision for a special position. He often used the term privileges and racial rights almost giving a lecture on Orwellian equality. While agreeing to the concept, he was of the opinion that it should not be written into the Malaysia Constitution. Ong Kee Hui admitted that many of the recommendations of MSCC were acceptable. The way Ong Kee Hui presented his case looked very much as if he was under some instructions and not absolutely free to say other than the party line. Stephen Yong, in giving his views, used some lawyers' sarcasms. However, in the end we found that Ong Kee Hui and Stephen Yong to be reasonable; they prevented the extremists amongst them to project the idea of independence first which we all knew, and they knew it too, to be the communist line. The one negative aspect of the SUPP group which I disliked was their contempt for the backwardness of the natives and had regarded their leaders including the Pengarahs and Penghulus as men of no consequence.

It was an exhausting afternoon. My patience was truly tried by doses of SUPP sour unreasonableness. I decided to return to the Astana delightfully anticipating that the short boat ride across the river with the wind beating against my face would reinvigorate me and to be ready again to face the evening reception.

At that reception, I heard that Bangau, an Iban who SUPP had appointed to lead the Party in Sibu of the Third Division which was greatly populated by Iban, had decided to resign. If that was true, it would be a terrible blow to SUPP. I decided to find out more about the story and left for Kuching town with the rest of the Governor's guests after the reception. It took me a while to find our contact man who confirmed the story which was the result of the work of the Task Force among the Dayaks of the Rejang and in no small measure assisted by Temenggong Jugah. I also suspected that Ling Beng Siew or his men too had a hand in the resignation of Bangau.

The next day in Kuching was another long day. We must have seen more than six hundred people. Some individuals claimed they were independent but we soon discovered they were affiliated to one or another party or group. Their replies and demands revealed their true colour. A couple of Chinese came out in support of the Malaysia Concept but they were so obviously following the Party Negara line; a few Ibans or Bidayuh spoke as if they were coached by SUPP. One group of Chinese with a sprinkling of native faces looking very blank was particularly hostile. They were members of SUPP. Their spokesperson was a woman who I thought was really bloody-minded. She had twisted and distorted events in Malaya as something truly hateful. She accused the Malayan Government of policies that made very young girls into prostitutes and that the labour policies and laws were oppressive. Wages were no more

than \$1.50 per fourteen hour working day without holidays! I was appalled at having to listen to such a drivel.

On that score I could not contain myself but asked if they knew a member of any trade union in Malaya. They did not know any. Then I asked if they had ever read the Malayan Labour Legislation. They had never done so. Then I explained to them that it would be helpful for them to know exactly what went on in Malaya before arriving at any final conclusion. I told them the Commission was in Kuching to collect their views and we would prefer their views and conclusions were arrived at on the basis of facts and not hearsay knowledge.

I saw them looking quite upset having been caught unawares. One of them, in a hostile manner, asked me to prove which of the facts were wrong to which I explained the working hours, labour legislations and the measures of the Government to stamp out prostitution. I gently enquired as to the sources of their information. They replied that they came from newspapers and I heard Wong Pow Nee murmuring in their hearing that they must be communist publications. Then one of them rather arrogantly said that they knew an MP by the name of David who had told them all those things and since he was a member of the Malayan Parliament, his stories must be credible and they believed him. They confirmed my surmise that they had never actually checked the accuracy of the stories; I even doubted that David would have made up such a story. The chairman intervened by saying that they should always obtain their information from reliable sources which could stand scrutiny. When they left the room, they looked sulky and sure enough they told the press who were waiting outside that the Malaysians on the Commission were bias.

That night, I slipped out of the Astana to meet with Wong Pow Nee and to request him to join me for breakfast in one of the restaurants the following morning. The purpose of my inviting Wong Pow Nee was to introduce him to a few Chinese leaders from Sarawak. After dinner, I had an opportunity to speak to Ling Beng Siew, a well-known timber tycoon of Sibuan and had worked extremely hard as a member of the MSCC. Ling Beng Siew said that as a result of his MSCC connection and pro-Malaysia attitude, he was placed in a terrible mess. He owned a newspaper where his workers who were either communists or supporters of SUPP had gone on strike. He retaliated by closing down the company.

I told Ling Beng Siew that he should think very clearly and carefully about his role and the future of the Chinese in the area. The Chinese should get off from their neutral attitude, waiting to back the winner because that attitude would only bring victory to the communists. The Chinese community, by default, was allowing the communists to shape the future of Sarawak.

Ling Beng Siew asked me as to how best to deal with the politics of Sarawak. I told him in all earnestness that I did not know. However, if it was any help at all my analysis of the situation in Sarawak was that it would be

very difficult to form a political party which would claim to be non-communal. This was because it was dictated by the dominant structure of the society which was clearly defined along certain lines. Politics in adversity would naturally tend to find security in polarised arrangements. Since the big finances were in the hands of a few Chinese, no non-communal political party with rich Chinese members could survive the allegations that the party was Chinese-owned. Therefore, at that juncture, one should not despair if one saw the development of parties inclined towards communal lines. That would be a natural tendency but it should be harnessed to bring together the various political parties, like the Alliance Party in Malaya, where each community would feel secure and comfortable in the embrace of their own respective communal parties. The validity of that thinking whether in Malaya or later Malaysia in which Sarawak would belong had to depend on the strength of a native political party which should be the base of the "togetherness". If, on the other hand, the natives were split, then of course such an alliance would not have a core party as a base. Therefore, for Ling Beng Siew, if he had followed my line of thought, should ensure that one or a bundle of native political parties should be strong to serve as the base and in that situation the Chinese party could tag along as a full partner with full assurance of future security and well-being.

I did not know if Ling Beng Siew truly understood me. However, I had no difficulty in promising that I would help to get someone to help him to start a political party very much on the line and role of the MCA which would be a major partner in a cluster of political parties that would be supportive of the concept and to take over the state government in Malaysia. His conversation with a strong MCA member like Wong Pow Nee could not fail to impress on him that the Malayan model was the most suitable for the new Malaysia. To help further, a group of MCA members would be arranged to meet with him.

Ling Beng Siew also promised me that he would get a job for Bangau who had just resigned from the SUPP whose chairman he was in Sibul.

It is not possible for me to remember all that took place during the interviews with the Commission in Sarawak and North Borneo. But there were a few that stuck in my memory. There was that incident when the Commission was going to Bau a little town not far from Kuching. It was a SUPP stronghold. The route to Bau was plastered with placards and posters expressing anti-Malaysia slogans in Chinese characters, in English, in romanised Malay and Iban. One of them in English said, "WE ARE FED UP WITH MALAYSIA". It was raining all morning. Those posters were written on rather thin paper hung up on trees and telephone poles. On the way back, I was in the same car as Watherston and we both were taking note of the various posters as to what they stood for. He and I noticed the poster bearing the slogan mentioned above. On the way back, rain and wind had conspired to bring about change. The poster was torn into two; one read WE ARE FED and the other, UP WITH MALAYSIA!

During the tour of the two territories, I found Cobbold to be a highly sensitive person. He would get upset at the slightest provocation which he thought might make his work difficult. There was one occasion when the local papers quoted the Tunku that the British colonial officials in the Borneo territories were apathetic even hostile to Malaysia. Cobbold told me that he would not wish to continue if such statements were to appear again. He said the work was hard enough without the intervention of such statements. He feared the British officials would, as a consequence, not want to stay after Malaysia was formed. He showed me a telegram he was sending back to the Colonial Office in London. The telegram paid tribute to Wong Pow Nee and me and the officials but mentioned about the Tunku's statement and his threat to pack up. I sent a message to the Tunku telling him about Cobbold's unhappiness and the telegram.

Sometimes we were transported by a Twin Pioneer aircraft. On one occasion in Bintulu, Sarawak, one of the engines refused to start. We had stopped there merely to shake hands with groups of people who were all demonstrating for Malaysia. I had the opportunity of meeting some of the community leaders who expressed their desire that Malaysia should be realised quickly. Because of engine trouble, we took refuge in the house of the District Officer who was a nice young Malay. The Police Special Branch inspector who also came to the District Officer's house to be with us complained to me that during his training in Kuala Lumpur he found his instructors and colleagues were arrogant and patronising. I decided to tell Fenner about it, which later I did.

I requested the District Officer to organise a group of people for a study visit to Malaya from his area. After two hours, the Twin Pioneer was able to start both engines and we left for our next destination.

The Governor of Sarawak, Waddel was kind enough to allow us to use his Government boat to take us up the Rejang. The boat was called *Zahora*, quite comfortable and air-conditioned. It was during this river trip that I met my old friend Jarrow who once told me in Kuala Lumpur that he wanted to see a Malaysian currency note after I had showed him a fresh new Malayan note. He was intrigued with the process of minting and printing of money. For him to have Sarawak in Malaysia meant he could see his own country produce her own money, and he was looking forward to that day.

Banyang was another Iban Pengarah who had been very supportive of Malaysia. He assured me that all the longhouses under his jurisdiction were for Malaysia. Whenever we stopped for the night we would be entertained in one of the longhouses where the *tuak* (rice wine) flowed rather freely with the Iban gongs sending their resonances into the late night.

Up the Rejang from Kanowit on board the *Zahora* was an unforgettable experience for me. The journey without the mission could have been monotonous. There was not much to see except some Chinese pepper farms and houses and patches of rubber. It became interesting when we passed

longhouses with the women of the villages bathing and fetching water. Malcolm MacDonald, while I was in India as his guest, had described to me the scenes and his experiences in the Rejang. Everything was as he had said except now the forest were more scarred by shifting cultivation. An Iban District Officer greeted us when we reached Kapit. We had arrived late in the afternoon and I took advantage of the few hours of daylight to walk the only street of the little town of Kapit.

Everywhere I went I was followed by giggling children and greeted by tattooed men full of gold in their grin. One of the chiefs was with me all the time. He and I walked holding hands, a sign of great friendship without any other nuance!

I met many who had visited Kuala Lumpur. Zainal Abidin Sulong had done his job well to familiarise the elders with Malaya and what Malaysia was about. Everyone gave me the signal that all would be OK and Kapit was in a festive mood delightfully awaiting the arrival of Malaysia.

However, I had learnt more than a little about the Iban under the colonial administration. The Iban people had experienced oppression and suppression from the Brunei sultanate administration, to the Brookes and then the Colonial Office. As a defence mechanism, they had learnt how to survive and to be all things to all men at all times.

During that visit to Kapit, Banyang a chief, had met Abel at the house of the District Officer during the reception. Abel told me later that Banyang was worried about the Malaysia Concept and that his people too shared his anxieties. They were suspicious of the Malays.

When I met Banyang later, I told him that I was sorry to hear that he was worried about Malaysia although he had visited Malaya. He confirmed that he was worried but his anxiety was if Malaysia was not realised quickly there would be trouble! I checked this point with one of his minor chiefs and our contacts. It was the general feeling that Malaysia should be formed quickly because the Iban in the third division had begun to feel the pressure of the CCO and a few young Ibans had been contacted inviting them to join the bands of terrorists. In any case when they faced the Commission, they were all for Malaysia and some emphasised on the need for speedy arrival of better education and development for the Iban.

The District Officer was a sporting fellow. His reception was most lively except, to my horror, the band with its local singing and electric guitars was exactly the same I could find in Kampung Baru or Datuk Keramat, Kuala Lumpur, playing the cha-cha-cha!

The pattern of hearing was the same everywhere. It was no different in Kapit, the heartland of the Iban people. The future of Sarawak hung on the decision of the people of the Rejang. Without the Iban support, the Malaysia Concept could not be successfully actualised. The British knew this. We knew it. The Ibans knew it, the Chinese knew it and so did the CCO. My old friend Jarrow had brought all the chiefs of his forty one longhouses.

Temenggong Jugah was the centre-piece. His words would echo across the land and the Iban people would do as he would bid them to do. Jugah submitted his Kapit resolutions. Then to the surprise and shock of his men he added his own words. Jugah wanted a cessation clause. I asked him for his reason. Jugah replied that he was comfortable with the Tunku but other people who would succeed the Tunku would change things and therefore he wanted the right to withdraw from the Federation. I pointed out the danger of such an enabling clause. It would encourage nasty people to seek or invent reasons to "withdraw" and that would have very serious implications. Even within the tenure of office of the Tunku or his successor who might not at all be disagreeable, there was still the possibility of the clause being invoked. I noticed some murmurings among his chiefs notably the *tuai rumah* (household head) whom Bennet Jarrow had brought with him. For a moment Jugah looked uncomfortable then gave a hearty laugh, a sure sign among the Malay race when one does to cover an embarrassment, and said that it was only a matter for thought, a try-on!

Jugah in his frequent discussions with me privately before the arrival of the Commission had said that he was very much in favour of Malaysia but quite often confused by the British officials who gave him conflicting ideas. On one hand people like Peter Ratcliff of Radio Sarawak would encourage him to support Malaysia whole-heartedly but other officials would give frightening pictures of Malay discrimination and Islamisation. He was very impressed with the Tunku, Razak and me. He therefore thought that if we three were no longer on the scene and if things turned very bad for the Ibans, he would like to take Sarawak out of Malaysia. Apai was a man who felt very responsible for the welfare of his people. He had been pushed around first by the Brookes, then the Japanes, next came the colonial administration and now he had to decide regarding Malaysia. Somehow he told me that Malaysia was inevitable but that was his gut feeling and he had been right mostly. But he felt a sense of foreboding with regard to the communists. He had a great deal of respect for Ong Kee Hui, the President of SUPP but he treated the Party as predominantly Chinese and highly influenced by the CCO. He declined to join SUPP. He thought that the fate and future of the Iban people were inter-twined with those of other natives particularly the Malays. That was the reason why he supported Abang Mustapha and his Party Negara. But Mustapha had been too dictatorial and would not discuss with his friends before making a decision. He told me that Abdul Rahman Yaacob and Tuanku Bujang had been talking to him about forming another party.

As far as I could gather, Jugah favoured Malaysia because he wanted *pemansang* or development particularly education for his young people. He did not want the Malays of Malaysia to subjugate the Iban. I spent some time explaining to him that the idea of secession was bad and that the concept of Malaysia was very much like a longhouse.

Everyone would have a *bilik* (room) with a common *ruai* and everyone in the house would have a say in the common well-being of the community. The concept was not subjugation or colonialism.

I understood his anxiety because of the dependency syndrome and it was difficult for him to accept that he could depend on the Constitution and the Rule of Law. He wanted something more tangible like the person of the Tunku. He wanted an Iban to be the Governor and I assured him that such an appointment was possible but that the power of running Sarawak would be in the hands of the Chief Minister. It took sometime for me to explain the different roles and it took him some time to comprehend that a Governor in Malaysia was purely constitutional. But I did assure him that I could envision his important role in Sarawak in Malaysia because he was a natural leader of men.

By the time he met the Cobbold Commission, he had already been explained regarding the Sarawak paper on Malaysia and had himself played an important role in the Kapit Conference which passed a number of resolutions for the attention of the Commission.

That afternoon was spent in visiting a longhouse about twenty minutes away from Kapit by an outboard motorboat. It was the house of a Pengarah. As soon as we arrived there, Cobbold was given the honour of sticking a spear into a live pig. Then the blessing of the seven plates of *bertih* or rice popcorn, seven lumps of *pulut* or sticky rice, seven eggs, seven pieces of cake and *sirih* or betel leaves. After that, the singing of welcome began led by a young beauty in all her native splendour, the grand-daughter of the Pengarah. In essence the *pantun* (four-lined quatrain) or improvised lyric of the song referred to the hope of the Iban people that Malaysia which had promised peace and security should be ushered in as quickly as possible.

The young girl was rather heavily made up with rouge and bright red lips. Her teeth were unattractively golden as the fashion then among the Iban men and women. A glass of *tuak* was pushed to each of us and we had to drink it bottoms up. Then another song and again another round of *tuak*, then another and another until we were filled with that rice wine which tasted rather like the fermented rice or *tapai* which the Malays of the Peninsula consume with relish.

The Pengarah gave me an Iban jacket and the Tuai Rumah an Iban hat with the hornbill feathers which I wore rather proudly that night at the house of the District Officer. He gave us a marvellous dinner of fresh water fish which I enjoyed thoroughly. It reminded me of *Jelawat* a specie of fish that was found in the Jelai or Lipis river in the district of Pahang where I came from.

The Pengarah had asked me to invite the Tunku to visit Kapit which I did later. He had a son-in-law, a corporal who was serving in the Malayan Armed Forces in Kota Tinggi, Johor. The Pengarah was genuinely one of those who wanted Malaysia.

At the District Officer's dinner, I was commanded by Jugah to perform the Iban dance. I was already clad in an Iban jacket and the headgear; but kept my trousers on! I borrowed a *parang* and a shield and started the slow rhythm swaying and waving the *parang* as if I was on my way out head-hunting. I overheard Jugah exclaiming, "*Jahanam Sarawak, Melayu ini sudah jadi Iban!*" (Sarawak is damned. This Malay had become an Iban.) I did not know how to take it but the *Sarawak Times* reported that I stole the show.

That night after dinner, I had a little chat with Jugah. He expressed worry because there was a report that in Julau, a small town on the tributary of the river Rejang by that name, the SUPP members had come to blows with members of Party Negara. I quickly checked with the local police officer who assured me that the incident was not serious. However, Jugah's concern was understandable since he was the overall chief covering Julau. In all likelihood, members of SUPP would have been Chinese while Party Negara would have been natives. Jugah impressed me of being a person who was always wanting to do the right thing but was never certain until he was assured. He would get persuaded easily depending on who was the last person to speak to him.

The following day found us in Kanowit where the reaction of the Iban was positive. It was here that I found the Iban expressing interest in the name of the new country but they could not suggest any. When I asked one of the chiefs of the area his reply was that the name should be given a serious consideration but they in Kanowit would not suggest any because people from other territories might wish to suggest other names. He was clearly a wise man.

There were a couple of Englishmen who were serving in the land development schemes. They sought an interview with us but turned out to be pathetically ignorant as to what Malaysia Concept was all about.

That night we had dinner on board *Zahora* where we had been staying during the Rejang trip. At dinner, I heard for the first time something which never occurred to me before when Lord Cobbold said that Malaysia might not be acceptable because MPs in London also might have the impression that Malaysia meant Malay domination. Wong Pow Nee, I noticed, shook his head as he sought my eyes. There was no response from me but it made me somewhat conscious that more work would have to be done in London even if I did not believe that the MPs would vote against Malaysia for the reason given by Cobbold.

After that we stopped in Sibul, the home of Tuanku Haji Bujang. I went to his house for dinner to collect the latest gossip about the area. Also I met Aini Dobi and separately the Melanau leader of Sibul, Abang Louis Barieng and his wife Pauline.

March 22, 1962 was a memorable day because it was on that day that I turned forty. There was a small celebration during lunch between Sibul and Binatang on *Zahora*. Watherston gave me a small torchlight for use, as he said, in my declining years. Abel gave me a paper weight and Cobbold, a pair of cuff-

links. I was very touched by their thoughtfulness and thanked them with a toast to the success of the Cobbold Commission.

The lunch was not altogether without something which stuck in the throat. I did not know what inspired it. Other than what Jugah said in Kapit, Lord Cobbold came out with the astounding statement that Sarawak should be allowed to secede if Malaysia should leave the Commonwealth while agreeing that a secession clause would be bad. It was something ridiculous, I thought, when Cobbold gave the reason that the Dayaks had expressed to the Commission their sentiment of loyalty to the Queen. The Dayaks always had the loyalty expression in the preambles of their speeches and *pantun*. I was beginning to feel more and more cautious that in writing the report many of Cobbold's own untutored observations might creep into the recommendations. And for so long as Sarawak was a colony, the Iban undivided loyalty would always be to the Queen. That was the way of it.

At Binatang, the division between the wishes of the natives and the Chinese was the most distinct. The natives irrespective of community, favoured Malaysia as soon as possible whereas the Chinese were divided into two. One delegation said that if Sarawak was forced to join Malaysia then there should be a referendum. I asked them if they understood what they had said. I explained that if Sarawak was forced to join Malaysia only the British could force it and the Tunku had already said that there would be no Malaysia if the people of the Borneo territories had not wished it. In any case how could there be a referendum when Sarawak had been forced to join Malaysia. Eventually they admitted they did not understand the implications of their statement to the Commission. But they made it clear they did not want Malaysia.

The other group first wanted self-government for Sarawak, then a Federation with North Borneo and Brunei and only then they would consider forming Malaysia. It was obvious that the two groups belonged to SUPP and very much under the CCO influence. They were coached to say them without really knowing what they were talking about. The area was well-known for the activities of the CCO. The linkage with the Singapore Barisan Sosialis was apparent.

I knew a young native customs officer whom I met when I accompanied the Tunku before. He had been working very hard to influence the natives into supporting the Malaysia Concept. Before I left Binatang he gave me for my birthday a *parang* and a hat belonging to the Kayan Community.

At the next port of call, Sarikei, I found for the first time a group of Chinese who had the guts to openly contradict the SUPP and by implication the CCO although the town was very much a target for subversive activities. The open opponents of SUPP told the Commission that if the Chinese had not been cowed by the CCO through intimidation and subversion, more than 60% would admit that Malaysia was best for the Chinese. One of their leaders told the Commission that it was for the reason that only Malaysia could resolve the

communist problem and bring stability and security to the area that the Chinese of Sarikei wanted Malaysia. I thought he had brought some sense and a breath of fresh air. Cobbold was very impressed.

The journey up the Saribas was the same. It was an Iban country with other communities on the coast while the Chinese were in their plantations, mainly pepper. Again the Chinese was subjected to CCO intimidation but the Ibans belonged to the Sarawak National Party of Stephen Kalong Ningkan although some had other affiliations. For the first time, the Commission heard the presentation that they did not like the name Malaysia and it came from SNP. It was a clear indication that SNP would support Malaysia with some changes and modifications.

The Commission went to Betong by outboard motorboat, from a place called Tanjung Asam. Wong Pow Nee and I were given an outboard motorboat named Malaysia. It had a 12 hp engine. Cobbold and the two British members travelled in another boat with 40 hp which arrived in Betong 20 minutes earlier than Malaysia. I jocularly remarked to the District Officer that he was under instruction to arrange that Malaysia should not hurry. I also said that if more horse-power was given to Malaysia it was not discrimination but only to correct the imbalance in the power equation. There was a great deal of laughter.

Betong was uneventful but it was here that Stephen Kalong Ningkan appeared before the Commission. We heard nothing new from the natives as well as from SUPP members who appeared in different guises of associations and societies. We left Betong in the afternoon and managed to be in Simanggang before nightfall. Part of the journey was by jeep over some rather rough country road.

We were met at Simanggang by the Resident, a British colonial official. A Resident was an officer who would be overseeing the work of a number of District Officers. He would be of great influence, the representative of the Governor in a given area.

Simanggang town was somewhat dressed with buntings and slogans put up by the SUPP and SNP but it was nothing compared to what the SUPP had put up between Kuching and Bau. However, I had not scrutinised the wordings on the posters which in any case were written a great deal in Chinese characters. Obviously these posters were intended for the local Chinese to remind them as to what to tell the Commission. It looked like a well-organised elections campaign and at that stage in Sarawak only the CCO with the help of their friends in Singapore could be that well-organised.

We were guests at the Residency. We were introduced to the Resident's wife, who I noticed for a while, was somewhat hostile towards the idea of Malaysia. Having realised that I had to be extra careful in order not to get into useless arguments. I could not pin down to what her unhappiness was but it was not difficult to surmise that Malaysia would change her from what she was accustomed to. The Resident, I detected, was not very different from his

wife but was cleverer in camouflaging his personal feelings. What the Resident and his wife wanted, I supposed, was an assurance from the British Government that they would not be worse off in Malaysia.

The Simanggang interview fell into the same pattern as in the other places. There were, however, two cases which attracted my attention specially. Firstly, the statement of Datuk Abang Haji Zen, a Malay community leader who said he wanted a native to be the head of the state in Sarawak in Malaysia and that the head of Sarawak State should be eligible for election to be the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Cobbold and Abel whispered to each other that the Zen line was new. I could not understand Zen because I had not heard that line before even among the Ibans and least of all the Malays. I wondered if he did all that to amuse the Ibans who would not want to take that position themselves. The other point was made by Howell belonging to the Ningkan group. Howell had come with forty Ibans. Howell requested the Commission to consider that during the interim period of a year or two the British Governor should stay. He could not see anyone from among the natives to assume that office. My goodness, I thought to myself. It dawned on me that the two ideas were quite coordinated. I noticed Cobbold was profusely writing some notes.

Later I managed to get Howell privately. He explained to me rather callously that it was said to pacify the British. At the cocktail given by the Resident, I confronted Abang Haji Zen and I was accompanied by a Malay interpreter for the Commission. I asked Zen if he wanted an Iban to be the Head of State for Sarawak. He appeared uncomfortable and began to mumble something. When I requested him to say clearly, he was almost rude when he said he did not want nor care about the appointment of the Head of State for Sarawak or that of Malaysia. He had the impression that I was accusing him of wanting the post. All he wanted was equality of opportunity. Watherston, whom I did not notice, was also listening to what Zen was saying particularly when he said that he did not know what was the job of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

When the party was over, I saw the Resident personally accompanying Zen and his wife to their home. The next day I stayed back at the Residency. I requested Wong Pow Nee to tell me later on as to what happened at the Commission hearing. I did not think that any spectacular or new ideas would emerge and I wanted to spend some time examining my thoughts.

While sitting in my room, I noticed Zen was also in the house. He was talking with the Resident but I did not know what they were talking about nor did I know if they saw me.

That night I met Ahmad Zaidi who was then in Simanggang and he was convinced that what the natives were projecting had been cleverly coached by the Resident and some British officials.

It was in Simanggang that I crossed words with Cobbold for the first time. It would not have happened if he had taken me seriously then but I think the incident helped him to make up his mind about me. At the hearing in

Simanggang the few SUPP and their native supporters were downright rude. They had invectives reserved specially for the Tunku which I could not imagine could be used even on any lowly creature. I mentioned to Cobbold and Abel that the British officials had to do much work but Cobbold laughingly replied that I would have every chance to explain. Perhaps it was not what he said but the manner it was said which I took exception. I curtly replied that it was not my function as a member of the Commission to explain. If I were to make a public explanation that would not be in line with the role of the Commission. But if I did, the British Administration in Sarawak would itself get the blame. In any case that would not be prudent and the Commission and the idea of Malaysia, had to be folded up. Cobbold got the message.

* * *

We returned to Kuching from Simanggang by Twin Pioneer then to Singapore the same afternoon. At the Singapore airport, waiting for me was Phillip Moore. Moore told me the most depressing story. There was a terrible row between Lee Kuan Yew on one side and the Tunku, Razak, Dr. Ismail and Tan Siew Sin on the other. There were a few subjects—one of them was Lee Kuan Yew's proposal to visit China. Lee had since altered his plan.

There was the question of raising of wages for Singapore workers. The other was Lee Kuan Yew's grievance on the old issue of the Tunku's visit to Singapore UMNO Headquarters and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce when the Tunku did not invite Lee Kuan Yew to accompany him. In terms of Singapore politics, this was a question of credibility. Lim Yew Hock was sticking to the Tunku like a leech. This had been a running sore and Lee Kuan Yew's political opponents who knew this as his raw nerve would all the more use the Lim Yew Hock factor to irritate Lee Kuan Yew. In most cases the Tunku was quite oblivious of the game people like Lim Yew Hock were playing.

Moore wanted me to intervene. He could not see any other person who could be the honest broker in this Lee Kuan Yew-Tunku misunderstanding. It was unfortunate that I had been away on the Cobbold Commission work. In previous cases if Lee Kuan Yew or the Tunku wanted to do something which might have implications they would mention it to me. It had been understood that I should manage the issue so that it would not become a problem. I had become a kind of interpreter. If I had been around, Lee Kuan Yew would have thought aloud and if it desired checking with the Tunku I would do so. The reverse would also be true. More often than not, the two sides required an interpreter. It was not always easy for Lee Kuan Yew to understand the Tunku's body language say of a nod, whether it meant agreement or understanding or simply "I heard you".

In the case of the Peking visit, I would have first tried to find out from the Tunku what he thought of it. If it was negative, I would have advised Lee not to go. As it so happened, Lee Kuan Yew in a surprise move had told the Tunku

that he was going to visit Peking. Of course, ordinarily why should the Tunku take exception to it. After all Lee Kuan Yew had never been under the thumb of the Tunku; but the Tunku had a special feeling for Lee Kuan Yew whom he wanted eventually to be the leader of the Chinese in Malaysia. He had even hinted this to Lee Kuan Yew. At that point in time, the Tunku would not wish to tarnish in any way the image of Lee Kuan Yew who could be accused by the UMNO of being either a chauvinist or a communist or both. Lee Kuan Yew, on the other hand, thought if he could go to China and bring a few Singaporean with him as witnesses he could then tell the Singaporean and Malaysians of Chinese origin that there was nothing wonderful about China and that our democracy with all its faults and shortcomings was still superior to the Chinese democracy. Lee Kuan Yew, not understanding Tunku's inner feelings could never understand why the Tunku should object. Of course, there was another element which could interfere with the Tunku's thinking. It was the MCA factor; hence Tan Siew Sin was on the side of the Tunku to lambast Lee Kuan Yew. I assured Moore that I would speak to both sides and repair those ruffled plumes.

As soon as I got back to Kuala Lumpur, I went to see my friend Sheridan, the Attorney-General, to find out from him certain points of law with regard to the Malayan Constitution. Then I briefed Razak on what had happened so far as well as my impressions about Cobbold who became more and more sensitive but in some instances thoughtless as we progressed. Razak said if Cobbold and the British side was going to be difficult I should not hesitate to write a minority report and tell the British to keep the Borneo territories. I also told Razak what Moore told me regarding the Tunku-Lee Kuan Yew episode. Razak knew about them and advised me to let the matter rest. I followed his advice.

I had been toying with the idea of Malaya setting up a regiment comprising people from North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak as a part of the Malayan Security Force. We discussed it at length and if the British could recruit gurbahs into Her Majesty's service, there was no reason why Malaya could not have one composed of all the Borneo native communities. Razak, as the Minister of Defence, seemed attracted to the idea but it must have been shot down by his colleagues and the idea never came to anything.

After three days rest in Kuala Lumpur and updating my normal office work, I went back to Sarawak to join the rest of the members of the Commission. During my stay in Kuala Lumpur, Stephen Kalong Ningkan brought his SNP leaders. Kalong Ningkan came to my house and I had a very happy conversation with him during which I began to understand the man and his ideals better. It was also confirmed in my mind that Kalong Ningkan was rather weak and this could be exploited for good or evil. I was afraid that maverick British officials would manipulate him for their own purposes.

* * *

The segment of the work of the Commission in the Baram to me was one of the most interesting parts. When the Commission reached Marudi we were met by Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau and the District Officer. A Twin Pioneer took us with the Temenggong and the District Officer to a landing strip rather a short one hanging at the edge of the forest. The pilot had to stall the aircraft for the short landing with an uncomfortable bump. Otherwise all was well and the weather was fine.

As soon as the last man stepped out of the Twin Pioneer, out of the edge of the precipice emerged hundreds of school-children and started singing a song of welcome. Then adults appeared in their fine costumes. We were now in the Kayan and Kenyah country of the Orang Ulu.

Oyong Lawai Jau introduced us to everyone of them who were Chiefs under his jurisdiction. It was all very confusing because they came to shake our hands first before I could try to gather the name of the last person. In the end, I could not remember any of their names.

One of the persons to greet us was a police inspector by the name of Majid, who hailed from Muar, Johor. I had been informed earlier by one of my contacts that Majid had gone up in advance from Marudi with a few policemen. It was therefore a case of, "Inspector Majid, I presume!" Majid led us to a few outboard motorboats which conveyed us upstream to the Fort where the formal welcome was held.

Oyong Lawai Jau made his speech which he prefaced as I expected by expressing his loyalty to the British Queen. I noticed Cobbold was so impressed with the expression of loyalty as he once was in Kapit that he at once drafted a telegram to the Queen conveying the loyal message. I thought Cobbold was overly sentimental and detected a feeling of pride to be so acknowledged in this age of vestigial colonialism.

After Oyong Lawai Jau made his speech, I was signalled to say a few words. I could not speak on behalf of Lord Cobbold or the British Government but I conveyed the greetings of the Tunku and renewed the invitation to Oyong Lawai Jau to visit Kuala Lumpur and the Tunku was looking forward to a discussion with the Temenggong. I said the Tunku would like to share his views with the Temenggong regarding the proposed new longhouse called Malaysia. Abel in his speech said Her Majesty's Government had been most anxious to find sincere friends for them. The Chief of the Kayan, Penghulu Jok Ngau supported the Temenggong in welcoming us.

After that, the padre at the mission invited us to visit the mission which was run by a Dutch missionary. They had a school with about 500 pupils, a hostel and village church.

The Commissioners were invited to Oyong Lawai Jau's house which was to be our lodging. It was a new longhouse and the Temenggong had extended his compartment giving a bit more privacy for him. It was quite an extraordinary longhouse having a water closet with a chain to pull!

There was no usual longhouse welcome ceremony for us because the day had coincided with the funeral of one of their members. The deceased was only six months old but they were in mourning and we respected that.

A meal was served and there was nothing else but dishes with pork. There was one Brunei Malay living in Long Akah and he had kindly prepared some halal chicken curry for me.

The local people, despite their mourning, could not restrain their demonstration of hospitality. Out came the *tuak* and *borak*; I hated them both but gallantry dictated that I should suffer in silence. *Inai* meaning mother whom I fondly addressed the wife of Oyong Lawai Jau, sang to me a song of welcome, making apologies for her shortcomings and saying how delighted she was to have in her house people of such high position from England and Malaya and all the flattery that went with such improvised songs. I knew what was coming immediately after the song ended; she thrust a glass of *borak* to my mouth which I guzzled down with great apparent pleasure. The custom was that if she sang again, then I would be forced to swallow another glass of the local brew. However, if I sang then I had the privilege of offering my host a drink which she could not refuse. In order to escape having to be forced to drink was to be in a position to force the host to drink by reciprocation of her song. And if she felt that she had to match drink for drink and a song for a song she would certainly decide to stop. So I decided to sing to her. The lyrics in Malay were simple and sung in the same monotonous tone which I had begun to be familiar with.

The song rambled with the great feeling of elation that I then experienced for having the privilege to have a mother in the Kenyah country of a great Kayan lady. It had been my serious shortcoming that I had not visited her at her home before then to pay respect and homage to a lady of vision and fame. The song went on to say how great was the longing of the people of Malaya to be reunited into a single family and to once again live in one longhouse in peace with plenty of *borak* to drink. My chief, meaning the Tunku, also had dreams of visiting this beautiful place and before many moons would fly here in a better and bigger "balloon" meaning an aircraft, than the one which carried me. I thought I had gone long enough and as I thrust the glass to her mouth and drained it dry there was a big chorus of cheers and clappings. I should have mentioned that this whole proceeding took place in the kitchen which as a result was thrown into confusion. "Inai" thought that was enough and to my pleasure and relief I returned to join the men in the *ruai* or the space which served as a sitting room, a verandah and a footpath all at once.

It was time to go. We shook hands and I thought Lord Cobbold enjoyed himself thoroughly. We were about to experience a Kenyah farewell. A swarm of women, young, old, fat and slim suddenly came out of the longhouse shrieking and laughing, each carrying a bucket or a basket and rushed toward us. The one that came to me was a hefty looking one with her hand stretched which I thought was something she wanted to give me. As I faced her I felt a

sudden splash on my face - Eeks! it was slimy and smelly which must have come from the animal farm. And everyone shrieked with laughter and clapping of hands. The men were grinning showing their gold teeth, no doubt enjoying the misery that we had to go through. More mud and dirt in the face and head and my shirt was completely ruined. Nobody had warned me that we were going to be splashed with water and indeed ducked into the river. I saw the police inspector being ducked too. The motor of the boats had been started and as I waded towards my boat, a swarm of women poured more dirt on my head. I must have looked a real mess. The philosophy behind this quaint custom was that a goodbye should not be forever and there should be no sadness but an occasion and a place to remember and someday to return to.

What a wonderful farewell. Even in my misery being battered in muck and mud with my shirt and trousers ruined, I could not help feeling sad to leave behind such a wonderful people particularly my plumpish, matronly Inai with her beaded jacket and long ear lobes ornamented by a hundred rings reaching her shoulders. As I scrambled on board the motorboat roared and left with such speed that it was as if in a flash we were hidden from the village and the waving friendly hands by a bend of the river. I managed to get some dry clothes and was happy to be able to wash in the river and change before going up to the airstrip. I had sworn that I would return.

We scrambled into the twin pioneer and did not talk a great deal to each other in a knowing silence that we had been well received by the people. Each one of us must have some secret thoughts which we were not ready to share.

The Twin Pioneer started the engines and began to roll towards the end of the strip which was facing the river. The idea was to taxi and as we neared the edge of the hill with a sheer drop of a few hundred feet without any trees but the river, the plane would rotate and gain height. But as the plane turned to take off position, I felt a sudden jerk and the plane was stuck without moving an inch. The pilot switched off the engines and we got down to find out what the problem was. The plane had not fully turned as yet to take its position but the right undercarriage had sunk into the dirt about half a wheel. The ground was really soggy at that part after a heavy rain the previous night. There was a group of people who came to see us off and when they saw that we were literally stuck, they rushed towards the plane. Before we knew it, they were pulling and pushing, rocking the heavy flying machine which they called "balloon". I tried to stop them and I saw the pilot throwing up his arms in despair. Instead of stopping they became even more vigorous and soon the other undercarriage sank into the mud and the plane was almost resting on its belly. The whole situation was hopeless. The police inspector and the District Officer frantically worked on their hand cranking wireless apparatus to get in touch with Marudi. The only option left was to stay back until we could get enough boats to take us down river through the rapids. My prayer had been answered much too quickly that I would return, I thought, as we chugged back by motorboats up-river to the longhouse of Oyong Lawai Jau.

We continued talking with the people at the longhouse until dark. Clearly, they wanted development but there must be religious freedom. After dinner, which for me was canned mackerel and rice, we were invited to the open space where we were to witness and later to participate in the dancing and singing.

After a few dances performed by the village youths and maidens, they began to call on the guests to perform. Cobbold and Abell had gone to bed perhaps after some doses of *tuak* or *borak*. A few damsels caught me by my arms and pulled me to a corner where they dressed me up in an animal skin over my shirt and a feathered hat. I looked towards Oyong Lawai Jau, seeking his help to spare me from this ordeal. His chubby face just broke into a grin with *Inai* on his side waving her hands to encourage the girls to lead me by the hand to the centre of the hall. There was clapping and loud shrieks from the young men showing their appreciation when I stood alone feeling extremely silly. The music started with different sounds of gong accompanied by two look-alike stringed instruments emitting rather sweet but repetitive sounds. It could be monotonous if one was not with it.

I had decided not to let the side down; others had done worse for their kings and countries. I had already begun to be accustomed to the tempo and I felt I could shuffle a few steps remembering what some young men had done before me. It was a slow movement of a waddle to begin with and after a few movements, outstretched my arms like a bird in flight and then folded my elbows as if I was a cockerel doing a courting gesture. As I moved round and round to the accompaniment of the music with a great deal of nodding and head lifting, I gave a shriek and jumped which I thought was symbolic of bird movements. I must have looked ridiculous but the applause sounded genuine and in the midst of the noises I heard a voice saying, "Pandai tandak Kayan" roughly translated that I knew the Kayan dance. I was in a Kenyah longhouse.

That voice devastated me because I had never seen a "Kayan" dance before. I turned to the area from where I heard the voice and spoke in Malay which was well-understood that I was doing it in honour of my *Inai*, a Kayan lady! Oyong Lawai Jau's wife smiled and there was a loud applause.

After my rather misrepresented performance, there was community dancing when everyone took part. I was exhausted and went to a corner and sat down on the floor leaning my head against the wall ready to fall asleep when four pairs of hands pulled me to participate in a guessing game. It was played by a dozen or more people sitting round the floor in a circle. There was a long string joined in a loop and everyone participating held it in a circle. The string held a little shell through a ring. The idea of the game was to grasp the shell and pass it to the next person without anyone being able to know as to who really held the shell. Lots were drawn as to who should be in the centre of the ring. The gongs and the music would start and very quickly the shell was passed from hand to hand while at the same time those without the shell were also feigning that they were passing the object. It was exactly like musical chair. When the music stopped the miserable fellow in the centre would have

to guess as to the hand which held the shell. If he was correct then the detected man had to take his place in the centre. If he failed to guess then he would have to do something as a penalty. I was caught with the shell once and when I failed to correctly guess as to where the shell was, it fell on me to do something "of my own choice". I decided to teach them the chorus of a popular community song "Rasa Sayang" and I improvised one or two verses. I must confess that I enjoyed my punishment.

I had begun to suspect that they were not on a level with me because after a while I began to notice that they signalled to each other as to whom the shell was to be passed to. The whole purpose of the game was to catch me. After the first penalty I had begun to catch their cue and I was never caught again after that. This went on until two in the morning when they agreed to disperse.

However, the young men stayed on and wanted to know more about the Malaysia Concept and about Malaya. Many of them after the questions and answers expressed their wish to visit Malaya which I promised to arrange.

One of them asked if the Kenyah people would be allowed to join the armed forces. I said in Malaysia they would be welcomed to jointly defend the country. One of them with a great deal of support given by the rest complained that the British colonial government only took the Ibans to join as trackers in the British army. The Kayans and Kenyah were not acceptable. I said things would be different in Malaysia.

These intelligent young men complained that no one had come to them to explain fully about the concept though they knew a little about it from listening to radio but that was a one-way kind of communication. They liked what they heard and hoped that Malaysia would come quickly.

I asked them what they thought of their chief, Oyong Lawai Jau. One of them said with others nodding or making approving noises that the Temenggong was very much under the influence of the mission. They revealed to me that a few days before our arrival, the Temenggong had called a meeting of chiefs with the padre present. At that meeting the padre said that if Malaysia came, he might have to leave. That frightened the Temenggong and the chiefs because the mission had provided them with a school, hostel and a church. According to them, the Temenggong was always seeking the advice of the padre. I said that might be a good thing because everyone needed advice and other views but eventually everyone had to make up his own mind. As for them, they should always be close to the Temenggong who was a grand old chap and his leadership was most important. It took me awhile to realise that there was not only a generation gap between the Temenggong and those young Kenyah but also a cultural gap. Oyong Lawai Jau could not take for granted that the young men under his care would always listen to him.

It was nearly four in the morning that I managed to lie down in the corner allotted to me. I had an inflated rubber mattress which was extremely uncomfortable perhaps because I was unfamiliar with it. Just as I was about to

doze off, a cat fight took place and raised such a din that I really sat up cursing. It might have been mating meows. Then the pigs under the house began to snort while a mangy dog sniffed at my foot. The sandflies were not only numerous but were full of music in my ears; the smell of pig droppings from under the house was particularly strong that I had to cover my face with a handkerchief to reduce the odour. Before I could begin to properly sleep, the cockerels had begun to crow and it was already five o'clock. The whole longhouse had begun to rise and with it the noises of clanging of tins and water pots added to the cries of infants for their morning feed.

There was nothing else I could do but to get up since everyone seemed to be walking around. I went for wash and used the Temenggong's W.C. I was delighted when I pulled the chain, it worked. By 6 a.m. we were ready to leave this time by boat all the way. There was no ducking when we waved goodbye to Oyong Lawai Jau and *Inai*.

We left the Twin Pioneer behind and travelled by boats. Certain parts of the Baram was rough and even treacherous with rapids. No wonder the District Officer and the police officer were reluctant to let us return to Marudi. It was chilly and the water splashed across the bows of the slender outboard motorboat soaking my shirt. I had to take off my shirt and changed to a fresh one and had a *sarong* wrapped around me to keep warm. The journey was monotonous. But I saw what was described to me as funeral structures in a couple of places rather artistically designed and stood out among the jungle green.

At about midday, we reached Long Lama and stopped at a house of a gentleman known as Tuan Sapu. He was a caucasian with a wife and two lovely adopted children, one a Kelabit girl and the other a Kayan boy. They spoke English like English kids did and even their mannerisms were much the same as English children. Tuan Sapu was once a Methodist missionary but had taken the job of being the principal of a community development school teaching the young natives all sorts of village trade and craftsmanship. He was a strict teetotaller and those who did not drink among the natives were branded as "masuk ugama Tuan Sapu" (converted to the religious order of Tuan Sapu).

Tuan Sapu and his charming wife fed us with corned beef and cheese which I consumed with relish since my last meal was a can of mackerel which the people there referred to as sardines. A wireless contact had been made with Marudi and a speed boat came to fetch us.

We arrived at Marudi in the afternoon and after a bath at the District Officer's house, we met another leader of the Kenyah people, a Penghulu Gau. He was extremely supportive of the Malaysia Concept without much comment except he very much wanted to visit Malaya with his men and some Iban people of the area. The District Officer was to make the arrangements. I detected in his private talk with me that there was rivalry for leadership of the Kenyah people between him and Oyong Lawai Jau.

We flew to Miri in an oil company "Shell" helicopter. I was able to play nine holes of golf as soon as we got there.

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We had planned to visit Brunei because Lord Cobbold wanted to see the place and also wanted to speak to the British High Commissioner Dennis White. Watherston and Wong Pow Nee did not join us in our trip to Baram as they were charged to cover some other places which we as full team were unable to go. Cobbold, Abell and I visited the Baram. We were to rendezvous in Jesselton.

The helicopter took us to Miri and we left Miri for Brunei by commercial flight. Ong Kee Hui the SUPP leader was on this same flight. I was able to sit next to him. In the course of the flight he kept on denying the fact that he had been in trouble with his party over the MSCC endorsement of the special position of the natives. That endorsement, I had gathered, was causing an internal tension in the Party. Ong Kee Hui admitted he feared that many members of his Party had taken a final stand and would not budge. As for himself, Ong Kee Hui said, he had been agreeable to the Malaysia Concept with certain reserve powers for Sarawak. However, many of his Party members would not listen to him. He was going to ask for a special meeting of the Party where the question of Malaysia would be put. He thought that a majority would support him if the meeting and its decision could be made confidential. He could see that the outcome of the meeting would be the chopping off a few heads depending on the decision one way or another. As for him, if the answer was in the negative he would reconsider his position and membership of the Party. Since the impression he had that Britain was supportive of the idea it would be futile to oppose Malaysia. All that needed to be done was to negotiate for the best deal for Sarawak.

While One Kee Hui was talking I pictured him sitting on a tiger's back looking for a space to jump off and finding one, he was wringing his hands calling for help. I told him not to worry unduly and that the middle-of-the-road Chinese would want his leadership in or outside Malaysia. I assured him that I understood his predicament and valued his friendship. Without making it sound patronising or prophetic, I told him that with his leadership of SUPP, he might be able to bring in the Party into coalition with the Alliance and be both involved in Sarawak as well as in the Central Government. That brightened him up somewhat.

When the team made a stop in Brunei, I quickly went into a closed meeting with two very senior Malayan officials seconded to the Brunei Government. They were at the airport to meet me having heard that the Commission was stopping in Brunei. One was Raja Azam of the Malayan Civil Service who was officiating as the State Secretary of Brunei, while the other was Abdul Aziz of the Malayan Legal Service, appointed as the Legal Adviser to the Brunei Government.

Azam and Aziz informed me that His Highness, the Sultan, had formed a Malaysia Committee composed of two *wazirs* (ministers), some elders and councillors, the *Mentri Besar* (Chief Minister), Deputy State Secretary, Privy Councillors making in all seventeen members. The Malaysia Committee had decided to reject any public hearing, as proposed by the Menteri Besar, but accepted to study the views of the MSCC and all its official documents. The Committee also had recommended that His Highness should start forthwith taking steps towards negotiating with Kuala Lumpur.

Azam and Aziz had the impression that His Highness was happy with the progress so far achieved; His Highness was even thinking of making an announcement about Brunei's positive intention regarding Malaysia. The two Malayan officials asked for my thought on the matter of the negotiation and announcement. I said, as a preliminary thought, His Highness should be in the country when making the announcement particularly when it contained certain reserves contrary to the desire of the people. If he was outside, the Azahari group would find it easy to create trouble in the form of a public order situation. I asked them to keep their ears close to the ground; these gentlemen were in a position to advise His Highness. Of course, it would be up to His Highness to decide on the matter. On the question of negotiations with Malaya, I requested Azam and Aziz to prevail upon His Highness and advisers that it should begin only after my return from the fact-finding mission under Cobbold. I would have a better idea of the two British territories and it would be easier to relate Brunei to the rest of the situation.

On the subject of Azahari and his Party Rakyat, the two officials reported that Azahari felt extremely desperate because he had not received sufficient support from the people of Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak and that a few of his people had begun to desert him. It appeared he was extremely keen to be invited to KL with the idea of seeing the Tunku with whom he said he wanted to make peace. Azahari claimed that everything he did was to support the Tunku. This I took to mean that the consolidation of support of the people of Brunei for him would be offered to the Tunku which I had noticed was the common mistake of many politicians who wanted to deal with the Tunku. No way would the Tunku wish to make a deal with anyone who had such an idea. It would be tantamount to a political blackmail or a price for favour which the Tunku would abhor. To him, he would prefer support and friendship without consideration and he would know how to reward them.

On the internal bickering, the Mentri Besar of late had acted rather peculiarly news of which I thought would affect the smooth course of Brunei joining Malaysia. He had become extremely averse to Pengiran Yusoff and Pengiran Ali who had been active in the MSCC even if they were only observers. There were signs of insecurity shown by the Mentri Besar because with the positive attitude for Malaysia, His Highness might show favour to them when Brunei joined Malaysia.

Lord Cobbold had been able to see Brunei town, the village on the water contrasting the splendid mosque on shore. We met White, the British High Commissioner and Cobbold asked for his views on many matters. White was not very forthcoming because he said his position was rather difficult in that he could not influence His Highness a great deal. He went at length to explain his limited role since the administration was entirely in the hands of His Highness. He even mentioned that the two most important civil service jobs were held by Malaysians seconded as also in some other areas including forestry. However, White did not give any indication that he had any reservation regarding Brunei in Malaysia since he thought the Ruler was quite capable of looking after himself and the interest of Brunei. With regard to the announcement of the intention of His Highness to bring Brunei into Malaysia, White thought that it should be done after His Highness had returned from Haj. For some reason, White and I had the same thought, that the announcement might trigger a public order situation.

After the day visit, we left for Jesselton. It was the April 2, 1962. At Jesselton, Lord Cobbold said that the Tunku should not have the impression that Malaysia would have an easy passage. He was going to tell London about his thoughts as to what London might tell the Tunku. I told Lord Cobbold that if he wished to do that he should not write in the name of the Commission and certainly not on behalf of the Malayan members. I also said that we had only just covered Sarawak and both Wong Pow Nee and I would not want to make a premature observation even on Sarawak. I said native politeness expressing loyalty to the Queen was part of the native culture and in the circumstances should be read as preambulatory compliments and not as a desire to be subject people for ever. Cobbold said he would write to London in his own name only.

After that, Cobbold revealed his concern for Brunei. From what he gathered from White privately, the announcement by the Sultan might be for or against. Laughingly I asked if Brunei was contemplating a third option. I did not think Cobbold was amused by that remark but he was a thorough gentleman and ignored such a trivial remark. I felt quite ashamed and apologised because I wanted to hear more what he had in mind. I told him that I had never dismissed from my mind that Brunei could be independent on its own unlike Sarawak or North Borneo. Geopolitically, Brunei would be well-protected.

Cobbold continued that if the announcement was in the positive there might be a public order situation organised by Azahari who had affiliations with Indonesia which was much under the influence of PKI and China. In that situation, the other territories might not want to join. If the announcement was against, it might also affect the decision of the two, meaning that they might opt for staying out of Malaysia. He kindly invited me to express my thought on the matter. He agreed that I should advise him in all condour.

It would seem to me that the information which White had about the reaction of the people were identical to mine. But I could not agree with Cobbold's conclusion. My guess would be that a public order situation in Brunei would be known by the natives of North Borneo and Sarawak and that such a situation could only be inspired or devised by the Indonesian communist-influenced groups. It would have the effect of making the people of the two territories even more determined than ever to want Malaysia quickly. However, there was a small group of Chinese in Sarawak who would take advantage of the situation by persuading their community to oppose Malaysia because it would be opposed by Indonesia against whom Malaysia would be no match. The rest of the Chinese were fence sitters and would join the natives who were the majority. In any case many of them were merchants and tycoons who had some influence over their communities. These groups of Chinese would fear Sukarno and the communist elements intruding into Sarawak if the British had to go. However, from the Chinese community, particularly in North Borneo, the emphasis would be for the British to stay while in Sarawak where the SUPP would be divided, the CCO elements would want independence under communism while the anti-communists like Ong Kee Hui would want the British administration to clean up the communists first.

Immediately after my conversation, I wrote to the Tunku telling him the gist of what took place between Cobbold and me.

* * *

Datu Mustapha came to my room that night on our arrival at Jesselton and told me that the group of young men who went for training at the UMNO Headquarters were very upset by the way they were treated by the UMNO party bureaucrats. I assured him that I would look into it. I had to find out more from Zainal Abidin Sulong who told me that when the delegation arrived, they were found to be young and rather indisciplined. They even broke their promise of not seeking publicity and this upset the UMNO officials. Perhaps also, the delegation expected too much in terms of attention by those people living in Kuala Lumpur who had developed a rather selfish culture of the urban life. When these young men and one woman were left to themselves to look for their own amusement, as strangers it became rather expensive and they were at a loss as to what to do. The clash of culture was something which could not be ruled out and that would have to be corrected at Kuala Lumpur end. I did not share my thoughts with Mustapha other than to mention to him that it would not happen again.

It was already late well past ten-thirty at night but Mustapha insisted that we should give Donald Stephens a surprise visit. Although such a suggestion with regard to time would only be agreed to against my better judgement, I could not refuse Mustapha and I was also anxious to see both working together to lead North Borneo into Malaysia. If there were vestiges of mistrust and suspicion between them, they had to be eradicated.

When we arrived at Stephen's house he was already in bed. We had to knock at his door rather noisily until we were ushered in. His wife was so gracious and hospitable to such late intruders. We were served with some very fine coffee and biscuits. It might appear strange in the west to visit late at night but over here where people are close enough, midnight calls are not regarded as offensive. It must be Mustapha's intention to demonstrate to me how close his relationship was with Stephens who called him *Abang* while Mustapha addressed him simply as "Doonal" which was Stephens' Christian name. Stephens did not lose the opportunity to give the signal that all was well.

Nothing specific was raised with the conversation rambling and personal, each telling the other his own exploits and activities, even relating to the Japanese occupation. While Stephens told me of the gruesome experience he had when the Japanese arrested him, Mustapha had tales of fighting the Japanese in southern Philippines and in the islands off the shore of North Borneo in the Sulu Sea. The only point which might have some relevance to the Cobbold Commission or the Malaysia Concept was when Mustapha opened up telling me that many of the expatriate officials were negative towards the Malaysia Concept. I was satisfied that both Mustapha and Stephens could then work together for the well-being of North Borneo.

During our visit in North Borneo, whether on the coast or in the interior, we did not encounter any difficult situation. However, it may be of interest to mention my experience in Sandakan. I had visited Sandakan before and had found the expatriate colonial officials, the expatriate officials of British companies and the rich Chinese merchants and loggers were very thick with each other to the extent, I thought, they did not know that other people existed. They were so complacent with their wealth and power that they were a class by themselves. When we were scheduled to interview the people there, I felt a shudder down my spine when I read that the British Resident would be the first to meet the Commission. I had known the Resident as rabidly anti-Malaysia. He was a kind of Colonel Blimp who spread his disease among the British businessmen. The Chinese tycoons, who feared Malaysia for their own reasons, found in the Resident a great comfort to do their dirty job of opposing Malaysia. Yet these tycoons would talk to people like Stephens or Mustapha in the most positive way about Malaysia. They were even prepared to fund political parties of these two leaders as they had also funded groups opposed to Malaysia. As a group, these Chinese merchants and loggers were masters at hedging and insurance.

I had to prepare myself to meet those people whose sarcasm might not be as biting as the invectives of the communist elements in SUPP, yet they would be cutting enough to raise a few degrees of heat and temper. I was determined to be patient and never to react in any way.

The Resident, having seated himself across the table in front of us, looked somewhat discomfited without the normal confidence and air of arrogance.

That I thought was a good sign. He began very politely by saying that the was expressing his personal view and agreed that Malaysia was a desirable aim. However, he expressed doubt as to the manner that the plan was to be implemented judging from the newspaper statements and reports of the MSCC meetings.

After a while, he became a little more specific and said that the Malayan Constitution would not be acceptable as a basis for the new Malaysian Constitution. His argument was that neither before nor after independence did any of the States in Malaya enjoy the kind of autonomy which North Borneo then enjoyed. He thought it would be incomprehensible that the people of North Borneo would surrender legislative powers. The Resident would agree to authority vested in the centre as in the case of foreign affairs, defence and internal security which should be concerned with subversion only. He regarded it as a retrograde step if North Borneo were to be intergrated with Malaya.

The Resident then boasted about the economic growth and increases in exports and imports. He did not think that the development in Malaya was first class compared to the development in North Borneo and that the people of North Borneo were capable of looking after themselves. As North Borneo, was not a Muslim country, it would be best to leave the contentious question of religion alone. Malay should not be made the national language of North Borneo since Malay was not her language and the question of national language should be left to the decision of the people of North Borneo at some future date. His statements were clear and well-mannered and did not reveal any negative demeanor. That to me was a great help.

Turning to the population of Sandakan, the Resident said that 25% to 30% of the people were Chinese while between 40% to 50% of the rest were Muslims. These Chinese generally were of the second generation. Indonesia's threat was not felt and the communists, although found in Sandakan, were not in any organised form. He admitted that the Sandakan Chinese had always had a feeling of affinity with Hong Kong.

After the other members of the Commission had asked him questions, I sought the Chairman's permission to seek clarification. I asked if the Resident knew the history of Malaya and the British connection by treaties confirming through cases in British courts, of the sovereignty of the Rulers that, in fact, the protected states had more than automony and certainly not, a colonial territory, which by definition, would have no autonomy. He simply answered that he knew the history of Malaya. On the question of development, he admitted that he had never been to Malaya since independence but knew the existence of the Red Book system but he did not know how it worked. I then told him that we, in the Commission, would not argue with held views but we had to seek clarification as to the basis of such views. Of the rest of his statements, it was obvious to the rest of us that he was quite unaware as to what Malaysia was all about. Perhaps, he was under a great strain to control

the scorn he had for Malaya and therefore got lost in the mist of his own prejudices.

An example of current thinking among expatriate British businessmen was expressed by a person who appeared before the Commission. This particular person had a local lady for his wife but I did not know if that had anything to do with influencing his views. He was reputed to be an influential man among the business circle. His line was not dissimilar to what the Resident previously had said but his approach was that North Borneo would accept the concept of Malaysia, not as a matter of sentiment, but of convenience; and that North Borneo should first achieve self-government before she could make any decision. He said that currency should be controlled by the centre but finance by the state. At that stage, the Chairman remarked that if one of the States in the Federation of Malaysia became insolvent, the position would be awkward. The man did not argue with the Chairman whose remark was let to pass.

Official languages, according to this man should be English and Malay. At this stage, I asked him if he understood the difference between national language and official language. He admitted that he had no knowledge of their differences and meanings. He continued that Malaysia should be secular without any state religion. After all there would be only 40% Muslims in the whole of the Federation and any attempt to impose Islam would be resented.

Because his line was similar to the Resident on the issues of development and independence of states in making its own programmes, I sought clarification if he really understood what he was talking about. Eventually he confessed that he was absolutely ignorant of Malaya other than what he had read in the papers which were in any case scanty. On the question of why he regarded Malaya as not being secular, he said because Malaya had Islam as her state religion. In that case I asked him why he did not object to England having the Church of England as the religion of state. I noticed he had become somewhat fidgety and I repeated the question if he thought that England was not a secular state. Rather pathetically and perhaps feeling very intimidated after having exposed his ignorance, he surprisingly replied that England was not secular. I did not have the heart to seek further clarification without giving the impression that the poor chap was being hassled.

The United Party, generally known as the Richmen's Party, composed of wealthy Chinese and those who had their education abroad, having absorbed western values and lifestyles. They presented their memorandum, the gist of which did not differ very much from the points presented by the Resident and the British businessman. I did not bother to seek any clarification except on one point made by a friend of mine, a lawyer, that North Borneo would not like to be controlled by a government that was a thousand miles away. I did not make the obvious point that Whitehall was more than a thousand miles. Kuala Lumpur would not be a metropolitan power but a government which would belong to all states and I asked him would the people of North Borneo be

happy if the Federal capital and Parliament House were moved to the foot of Mount Kinabalu! The gentleman looked uncomfortable because as a lawyer he knew what he should say; yet his reply was that such a proposition would be objected to by the people of Malaya. I told him that was not my question but capitals could be moved like New Delhi, Canberra or Brazilia. When I pressed on, he simply said that North Borneo wanted self-government first. Others of the United Party repeated the gentleman's last words, self-government first.

There were a number of native organisations and they all wanted Malaysia quickly. Chinese dominated organisations presented their views similar to the other Chinese parties. They included taxi drivers associations and *tongkang* (junks) associations.

A group of Chinese who were in the process of forming a political party to be known as the Liberal Party of North Borneo completely refused to have Malaysia preferring a federation of Borneo states.

The Democratic Party claiming 1000 members in Sandakan, submitted a memorandum which was a carbon copy of their party's submission in Jesselton which we had already received. The leader in Sandakan wanted English to be the official language. I asked him if the local Chinese would not object to that. His reply was in the negative. Then one of the members of the group whom I thought expressed himself rather aggressively shouted that he wanted English. He referred to a case of the son of a Menteri Besar of Brunei who had married a Chinese girl in Singapore and he was living in London. The man said he was sure that the love letters sent from London by the boy to his wife would be written in English. He directed a question at me to refute his assertion that English should be the official language. With the permission of the Chairman, I replied that for those in love language would not be a problem.

Such were the thoughts, rather devoid of factual basis, among the expatriates and the rich of Sandakan.

After the Commission returned to Jesselton, the Chairman, Lord Cobbold, shared his views with the rest of the Commission. We had not as yet completed our work but Cobbold had expressed that if the situation was not properly handled it would blow up. Whatever might be the recommendation of the Commission, Cobbold believed that the administration must continue to be strong and that law and order be maintained. His impression was that the people were generally ignorant and there was intense difficulty in getting views other than the party lines. It would appear to Lord Cobbold that the native chiefs had been encouraged to say things which they never understood. Therefore a transitional period would be necessary. He could not see everything being done all at once though the first stage must be done quickly. Decisions must be taken and implemented rapidly with no undue delay, otherwise the position could become untenable.

As far as he was concerned, the Commission should try and work for something which the country could support. He asked for my views.

As Lord Cobbold was talking, I thought he was trying very hard to condition my mind to his view point which had become transparent although at that stage I would say it would be premature to arrive at any conclusion. I wondered if Cobbold's conclusion was the result of what he saw or heard or whether what he saw and heard merely confirmed his preconceived notion. I debated in my mind as to how I should respond.

Anyway, I said that as far as I was concerned, since I had not as yet discussed with Wong Pow Nee, I was not ready to say one thing or another. What I saw and heard had to be referred to the backdrop or the circumstances when and where the statements were made.

My preliminary thoughts were that I agreed there should be no long lapses between the publication of the Report and the implementation of any decision. On what I saw in the third, second and first divisions of Sarawak regarding the communist activities with their placards and loud slogans, I was not going to be influenced by them. The situation would be tricky if we tried to please one side or the other. It was obvious to me that whatever might be recommended, some people would be dissatisfied. However, on balance, it would be more problematic if the natives were disappointed. For the moment, they needed more information and not coercion. The question of safeguards would be foremost in my mind but the differences with the rest of the states should not be over-extended because that would create anomalies which might not be manageable.

With regard to the CCO, they had to be dealt with firmly beginning from now by the British. With regard to some of the British colonial officials in North Borneo. I informed Cobbold that I was far from being satisfied with their commitment and leadership. Their commitment was no more than that Malaysia was a desirable aim, a phrase found in the Tunku-MacMillan joint statement. Lord Cobbold thought that these officials would have their own views. Quite true I said, but in a colonial set-up, their private views could become edicts and commands to the colonised. They could never separate their private selves from their official capacity. The colonised people would identify the private views as official even if the official views became coloured by the private views.

In Sandakan I had the information that the Resident, a British businessman and the Richman's Party officials, had sat down together to draft a common line memorandum led by the Resident. Surely that could be distorted or made to appear as the official view in the eyes of the public.

I proposed Lord Cobbold should meet with the Tunku and test his views.

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I kept the Tunku in the picture as to the personal views of the Chairman of the Commission. The Tunku agreed that there should be as little difference as possible between the new members and the old states of Malaya. On this point, the Tunku had told Lord Cobbold when the latter came to Kuala Lumpur

during a brief break in the work of the Commission. His meeting with the Tunku was very private and only Razak was present. I was told later by the Tunku that he had made it clear to Cobbold that if the Malayan Government could not accept the report, then Britain should keep Singapore and the Borneo territories.

Cobbold, besides seeing the Tunku and Razak, also visited the National Economic Development Operations Room and studied the Red Book system. He was also shown the operations room of the internal security system where he was fully briefed on how Malaya was managing the problems of communist insurgency and public order situation. After that, Cobbold had a better idea as to the reasons why the natives of the Borneo states wanted Malaysia to be formed quickly when they gave "development" and "security" as their reasons. Cobbold also understood that while there were communal parties based on races, the governing party in Parliament was an alliance of racial parties therefore making the Alliance Government non-racial in character. The Alliance Government was not a coalition in the usual sense which would be formed after elections in order to form an effective government but a "togetherness" before elections using the same party manifesto and a single symbol. Voters elected an Alliance candidate and not a candidate of one of its components. Hence, an Alliance Member of Parliament was a member for his or her constituency and not his communal party.

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I had been bothered a great deal by the word "native" as used in British North Borneo and Sarawak which their own respective laws had provided its definition. If the idea of Malaysia was to extend the special position of the Malays in the existing Federal Constitution, then the problem of the interpretation had to be resolved before I could make any recommendations. In one of my meetings with the Tunku and Razak, I was able to pose this problem and made my own suggestions. I said I was inclined to interpret indigenous people to include those first generation products of inter-marriage with a native male or female if the couple were ordinarily resident in either Sarawak or North Borneo and that the non-native spouse was a British subject. Or the easiest thing would be to regard all "natives" as defined by their respective laws and the new Malaysia Constitution would simply interpret that these natives or indigenous peoples would be regarded as Malays, for example, in the application of section 15 of the Constitution. The Tunku said that my ideas sounded reasonable but the matter had to be given the fullest consideration. I mentioned to the Tunku and Razak that arising from this there might be implications nearer home. I then referred to them the question of the descendants of Portuguese in Malacca who, except for their religion, were Malays. It would be highly unjust if no attention was given to their status which at the moment was neither fish nor fowl nor red herring. Razak was supportive of the idea and the Tunku said that there had been

precedents in Kedah, his own state, where a number of Thai-speaking non-Muslim subjects of the Ruler had been in existence for many generations. He said an early consideration should be given to the matter.

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In both Sarawak and North Borneo, the Commission encountered a small number of people who wanted that the formation of Malaysia should not be done by the entry of new states in the existing Federation but that a new federation should be created through negotiations. The negotiations of course would require time and obviously the difficulty in such a proposal was the time factor. The CCO in Sarawak was gathering momentum with the help of China through the PKI who provided training for the militant units of the CCO which had infiltrated the SUPP, Chinese schools, labour and student associations.

The more difficult problem was that historically the Federation of Malaya was formed as a result of a treaty arrangement between the British sovereign and each sovereign Malay ruler. The British entry into Malaya was by treaty arrangements. If the Federation agreement was abrogated in order to negotiate afresh together with the two British territories to form Malaysia, then the Federation would have to break loose. It either required the return of Britain by treaty arrangement with the nine states and taking control once again over Penang and Malacca or without the nine treaty arrangements it would be tantamount to reverting the sovereignty of each state to the Ruler and thereby Federal Parliament would disappear. One could at once see the enormity of the problem of once again trying to create a Federation. The Ruler, having got their full sovereign position reverted to them, might not wish to part with it and Brunei would become a model. Then no one could be sure if elections would take place; without a Central Government there would not be a democratic Malaya or Malaysia.

The advocates of such an arrangement did not understand the concept of a Federation or the history of the Federation of Malaya. Because some colonial officials wished to perpetuate colonialism the Central Government was made to appear as if it was a foreign government. Yet, in the context of a Federation the Central Government should belong to all the states in the Federation since all enfranchised citizens from all the states would be represented in the central Parliament. It was the fear of an apparently foreign power because the Parliament and the seat of the Federal Government was in Kuala Lumpur the impression could be created as if it was hegemony from Kuala Lumpur. Hence, during the Cobbold interview, I had an occasion to ask a person who held the view of KL domination that should the capital of the Federation and its Houses of Parliament be moved to one of the states, say North Borneo, he would change his mind regarding the KL domination.

To show that the point was not well understood, the gentleman's answer to my question was that such a move would be resisted by the people of Malaya! I had expected him to say that it was inconceivable to see Whitehall and the

Houses of Parliament were moved to one of its colonies thus depriving England as the metropolitan power!

I think this impression would persist a long time until and unless there were plenty of movements between people of the Peninsula and the Borneo territories. I felt quite strongly against the control of immigration by the two states because that would delimit or at least discourage movements but I would defer to the wishes of the Borneo people while no such restriction should be placed by the rest of the states against entry of people from North Borneo and Sarawak.

* * *

The Commission completed its task of finding out the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak by the end of April 1962. Together with Wong Pow Nee, accompanied by my wife, I left for London on May 4, 1962.

The Cobbold Commission had decided that the writing of the report should be done in London. Both Wong Pow Nee and I had made extensive notes and from time to time we had consulted one another to clarify our thoughts. We were in total agreement on the conclusion.

While the Commission had a secretary, I felt somehow I would need a separate assistant because the views would be diverging as we had noticed along the way. Therefore, I had invited one of our diplomatic officers to be attached to me and I could also commandeer the services of the High Commission in London for typing, etc. I was certain in my mind that the task would be formidable.

To assist me and Wong Pow Nee, I had selected Zain Azraai, an extremely able diplomatic officer. Temporarily he could work with me. I had found him agreeable in discussions and a good testing ground for new ideas. Zain was on his way to New York on a transfer to the office of the Malayan Permanent Delegation to the UN but he agreed to be involved in the work of the Commission for which I was grateful.

Wong Pow Nee had stopped in Rome on his way to London. He was a devout Catholic and had gone to the Vatican to fulfil his lifelong dream. He had an audience with the Pope.

To be precise, London was not the venue for the discussion of how the first draft should be made. Since the work had to be gone through in a number of stages the Chairman decided the first stage would deal with finding out each other's views on what had been heard and put them down in a coherent form, the conclusions for such views should be tackled first. After the conclusions had been arrived at, the Commission would proceed with the recommendations.

Lord and Lady Cobbold had invited the Commission to do the early stages of the work in Knebworth House which was their stately country home.

My wife and I arrived at Knebworth at about tea-time. Zain was put up at a hotel in Stevenage. Wong Pow Nee arrived rather late that night from Rome, full of excitement about his sojourn at the Vatican.

I am not at all familiar with architecture but I found Knebworth House pleasant, homely and interesting with its quaint construction. The Cobbolds were, as they should be, very proud of their stately home. The house had a fine collection of books. Since there was no resident ghost, I had suggested to Lady Cobbold that one should be invented.

Hermoine, that was Lady Cobbold's name, if my memory served me well, was kind enough to show us the grounds and pointed out the farms and the rest of the estate. It was a perfect ambience for rest and recreation but I was not sure if the atmosphere would be conducive for me to work. For one thing, the house was cold since the heating was not very efficient and I had to put on thick clothing indoors even when it was in the month of May.

The first meeting took place soon after breakfast at ten o'clock on May 6, 1962. Watherston had placed on the table his draft, all cyclostyled, no doubt done in advance with the help of the colonial office. We started discussing on the programme and possible timetable. We then dispersed to study the papers and asked that the afternoon be kept free.

The rest of the morning, afternoon and night was spent reading what Watherston and the others had produced. Wong Pow Nee and I were horrified that the papers not only looked as if it was the whole final report but it was so loaded that it should not be allowed to rear its ugliness. The draft, among other conclusions based on faulty premises claimed that it was the announcement about the formation of Malaysia by the Tunku which started racial conflicts and problems in an otherwise peaceful North Borneo or Sarawak. The draft also gave a glowing picture of the marvellous colonial administration of both territories and the unshaken loyalty to the Queen, reflecting the Rejang and Baram flatteries. All in all, I was quite disgusted because I felt that my intelligence and that of Wong Pow Nee's were being thoroughly insulted. Wong Pow Nee decided that we should reject the draft *in toto* and we should present them with a counter draft which I undertook to write.

When we assembled again the next morning, I started by expressing my unhappiness regarding the draft. There should be more time to make assessment of the views before a finding could be worked out. The present draft was beyond amendment and needed a new one which I undertook to present, that would reflect the wishes of the people and recommendations in a structured form. There was a stunned look on the faces of the British side. Lord Cobbold said that he had promised the Prime Ministers to produce a report before the end of the month and therefore could not waste much time.

In response to the Chairman, I said that this matter could not be treated casually and lightly since it would involve the future life and well-being of millions of people, not only of those in the British territories but also others in

the purview of the Malaysia Concept. The draft, as Wong Pow Nee and I found, did not reflect what was expressed by the people interviewed. The structure of the report should first contain all the views of the people. Our report should give a true reflection. Malaysia, I emphasised, should not be formed if the bulk of the people rejected it nor should it be dressed with all sorts of reserves that would be regarded as violently anomalous in respect of a Federal structure. I said that as a member I was resolved to be helpful and offered to make a fresh draft that would bear all the points with proper emphasis after which, even if we could not get an agreed recommendation, at least we could understand the viewpoints of each other to make conclusions.

After a heated argument, the decision was in my favour and I requested for a short adjournment to start writing.

That afternoon, Wong Pow Nee, Tijah, Zain and I left for London where we could get help in typing and copying from the Malayan High Commission. I had warned the Deputy High Commissioner, Tunku Jaafar, that I would be needing a great deal of help including telephone and telex facilities. K.T. Ratnam, the First Secretary, was tasked to see that all requirements were satisfied. The High Commissioner, Tunku Yaacob, had given a meeting room to work in, which was extremely agreeable. It was well-heated though London was not as cold as the countryside in Knebworth.

The typist, David, was a fine getlemen who was extremely patient and between Zain and David, they produced something only to be redone again and again remembering that there was no word processor at the High Commission then. We worked until about midnight and then drove back to Knebworth House. Wong Pow Nee, Zain and I were certainly very exhausted. Zain had to drive on the misty country road often wondering which road to take at junctions where the road signs were not clearly visible.

While waiting for my draft which David was typing in London, we began discussions in Knebworth on non-controversial matters and decided to write to the two Prime Ministers that they should make an early decision once the Report was submitted to them. We discussed development which the natives had asked in every presentation. In this regard, the British side and the Chairman wanted Development Boards to be set up with British Government representatives sitting together with the representation of the Central Government and each state government. For a moment I was dumbfounded since I could not see the logic of the presence of the British Government officials. After some discussions, I managed to persuade them that in this very important subject which would benefit the natives, I should produce a paper for them to consider.

There was no meeting for the rest of the week and that was an opportunity for me to concentrate on refining my draft. Wong Pow Nee and I decided that we should go to London and find our lodgings there.

Tunku Jaafar, the Deputy High Commissioner, was kind enough to accommodate my wife and me in his home. I had asked Ratnam to look for a

flat and we found one in Lancaster Gate. Wong Pow Nee and I knew that this was going to be a long drawn-out affair and we were preparing ourselves to dig in. I did not cherish the idea of staying in a hotel; besides the discomfort it would have been beyond our means to stay for too long.

Zain and I worked furiously while Wong Pow Nee vetted what we did. He was a great help and being a seasoned politician he was able to smell what would be the right or wrong thing to say. David was untiring and stayed with us typing and retyping. I still marvel, to this day, how we managed to produce such quality work despite the odds against time and poor facilities.

By Sunday the thirteenth of May, I was able to send to Knebworth House, a part of the draft. Cobbold had prepared another draft and we went through both and were able to integrate them to the satisfaction of both. There was some positive progress and I was delighted.

* * *

It should have been mentioned that Lee Kuan Yew, during that time, was also in London to discuss with the British Government the future of Singapore. While in London, I was invited to lunch by Maudling, the Colonial Secretary, in honour of Lee Kuan Yew. It was during this lunch that Lee Kuan Yew wanted to speak with me and we met in his London hotel. I was informed by Lee Kuan Yew that the Referendum Bill which was to be tabled would be based on the question of whether the merger should be on the basis of the White Paper or on the basis of the Borneo territories although no one as yet knew what the future of the Borneo territories would be.

On the subject of citizenship, Lee Kuan Yew was toying with the idea that only those born in the Borneo territories or who were British subjects domiciled in those territories should automatically become citizens of Malaysia. With regard to Singapore, he said that since 340,000 out of 624,000 were not born in Singapore the proposal he had thought for Borneo was sure to be rejected by the people of Singapore. According to him, the proposal to have a separate Singapore citizenship was the only point attacked by the communists as being anti-Chinese. The communists should be allowed to pursue this line right up to the Referendum. He thought the present voters would still vote for the separate citizenship of Singapore because they would not wish to lose their present citizenship and franchise.

Clearly Lee Kuan Yew did not calculate on the same basis as Malaya did in the case of Penang and Malacca - not only would there be citizenship by operation of law but also by application. I told him that even if the resident qualification was made to twelve years the bulk of these 340,000 would qualify like the early days of Malaya when the language test was relaxed for a certain period. I thought the Singapore voters would vote for what Lee Kuan Yew said as the Borneo proposal since they would be fully aware that although they would be disenfranchised temporarily they would easily regain citizenship by application since they would have had all the necessary qualifications.

Lee Kuan Yew was working on the assumption that once the Referendum was announced the Federation Government and the Singapore Government would conclude an agreement that in Malaysia all Singapore citizens would automatically become Federal citizens but that voting rights of all Malaysian citizens would be exercised in Malaya, Singapore and the respective Borneo territories according to their residential qualifications. In other words, there would be a single citizenship but voting rights would be compartmentalised in three regions with rigid immobility. I quietly advised Lee Kuan Yew that it would be better if he did not press on with these ideas and far better if the issue of the Singapore citizenship were kept separate. After all, I was not yet in a position to reveal our thoughts on the question of citizenship for the Borneo territories and any conjecture would be premature.

I despatched a confidential message to the Tunku relating my conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. The Tunku sent back immediately a message to the effect that Lee Kuan Yew should not depart from the agreement reached with him. He said that any new idea would be prejudicial to the interest of the Federation and would not be entertained.

* * *

In the meantime, I was deeply immersed with the drafting of our version of the Report. The British too had been busy giving us their version which looked very much like a colonial office report. I kept on offering to redraft the various versions and I was sure that the British side must have been fed up to the teeth with what they might have regarded as stupidity or obduracy on my part.

Lord Cobbold's comments, which he had asked to be included as part of the recommendations, was horrifying. Supported by the two British members, the suggestion was that they wanted a British governor with executive powers in each of the two British colonial territories. The picture was a fantasy.

At my request, the meetings moved to London. The British Government had provided an apartment not far from Marble Arch where we could meet in comfort and secrecy. It looked like a safe house no doubt, with all the snooping gadgets maintained by an intelligence organisation. I did not care to do a sweeping exercise since nothing discussed would really be secret to the British. In any case, it was more agreeable to be in London because I could get better assistance and if there had been no work to be done, I would have preferred the stay in the country.

Lee Kuan Yew was in touch with Lord Cobbold. Lee Kuan Yew had warned me that Cobbold would be insisting that the British Governorship and partial British responsibility should continue in the British territories for approximately five years after the establishment of Malaysia.

As I learnt from the Cobbold proposal which was given for our consideration, he had arrived at that conclusion because there existed no sound leadership in those territories and the appointment of a local Governor and Chief Minister could trigger off a racial strife. Cobbold thought that his

proposal was the only way to retain the British officers whose presence was vital to keep the territories going in Malaysia.

When the subject was raised, I must admit that I had to resist since the proposal and the reasoning in my view were extremely absurd and jaundiced although made in good faith. All I could say in dismissing the proposals was that it was preposterous to have the presence of the British with executive powers as Governors in Malaysia. I said neither Wong Pow Nee nor I believe the Malayan Government would agree to perpetuate colonialism in any form particularly when it would make Kuala Lumpur a metropolitan power replacing London.

I was not only angry but became very sad to find myself having to deal with people who had not at all appreciated what MacMillan had said on "the winds of change". They could not have been stupid nor dishonourable but they were brought up in the age when the culture spelt respectability in colonisation and the quest for empire. I shared my thoughts with the Tunku through confidential messages and he was so kind as to give me encouragement and comfort. The Tunku said he agreed with me and that I should remain firm in that the Central Government would never accept the position of a British proxy managing British interests in Borneo. An agreement to such a proposal would be allowing colonialism to continue with Malaya as a British stooge. I detected a sense of anger when the Tunku, in his message, said that if the British insisted on having a British powered Governor for the Borneo territories the proposal would never be accepted even for a day.

Referring to a message that I sent him to the effect that Gaitskell, the leader of the opposition in the House of Commons, had assured Lee Kuan Yew who met him that the Labour Party would give priority to and support in the Malaysia debate in Parliament, the Tunku included in his message to me that it was extremely encouraging to get the Labour Party to support the Malaysia Plan in Parliament.

* * *

Cobbold must have repeated to the British ministers about my feeling with regard to his proposal. I was invited by Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth Secretary, to meet with him at his office. I went there without Wong Pow Nee but I had guessed what he would say. Sure enough, he was trying to persuade me to accept the Cobbold proposal.

In my meeting with Duncan Sandys, he had assured me that the British did not intend to cling on to the territories for even a day longer than necessary. He took great pains to explain that the British Government had an obligation to the people of the Borneo territories and that if there was no smooth transfer there would be trouble. Sandys maintained that a smooth transfer of power in the Borneo territories necessitated the presence of British officials because only they could effect a change. However, if there was an immediate transfer of sovereignty the British Government would not legally be able to force the

officials to stay. On the other hand, if certain powers were transferred to Kuala Lumpur, the others would be retained by the British Government which would thus be in a position to control these officers. Elaborating on the question of transfer of sovereignty and the alternatives to an immediate transfer, it was Sandys' view that it could take place in stages. I was now even more confused on the question of what the British really wanted.

It seemed to me then that Sandys was thinking more of a condominium than an independent sovereign nation as Malaysia. His arguments were tantamount to admitting that sovereignty was divisible. In 1962, the concept of sovereignty among newly independent countries was indivisible. Sandys was advocating a joint colonial control over the Borneo territories between Britain and Malaya each having separate powers.

However, Sandys denied that he had "condominium" in mind. He said by agreement Her Majesty's Government should retain certain powers which relate to state powers. He wondered why I was so opposed to such a proposition.

It dawned on me, as he was speaking, that he had been persuaded by certain quarters that ways should be found to keep British officials in Borneo at least during the early stages. In response, I admitted to Sandys that the expatriates in the Borneo territories had a vital role to play and that the local people too had expressed their wish that the British administrators should stay. But nowhere did I hear that they wanted the British Government to have a part in ruling over them in Malaysia. Such a recommendation would not have an even chance of being accepted. I knew that neither the Tunku nor the people of Malaya would accept the kind of proposal which Sandys had just made. In any case, I could not come round to convince myself that it was the right idea, although I wholeheartedly agreed that it would be helpful if some means could be devised to retain the services of British expatriates as happened in Malaya. I stated categorically that I would not be a party to muck up the Malayan Constitution which would be the basis for the Malaysian Constitution, not only by such violent changes to make it unrecognisable but the sovereignty of the nation would be compromised.

I then offered some thoughts I had regarding the Malaysia Constitution. North Borneo and Sarawak would enter Malaysia as Malacca did but with certain reservations like immigration to be under the control of the state. When we talked of a governor, he was responsible either to the people or the metropolitan power. As proposed by the British, the Governor would be responsible to Kuala Lumpur as an executive. Sandys asked if I thought the Tunku would be agreeable to a British Governor within the transitional period. As I knew the Tunku and his principles and also the temper of the people of Malaya, I thought Malaya could have no part in anything which smacks of colonialism and its vestiges even for a day.

Sandys requested me not to make the Malayan recommendations too rigid. I was somewhat taken aback by this request and in turn requested Sandys to

inform the Chairman and the British members that they should not produce a non-starter. Whatever he meant he said that let us see what they could do about it.

With Sandys it was easy to speak on such matters because as a Commonwealth Secretary he had been accustomed to dealing with independent countries. He knew how outmoded was the idea of colonialism and agreed quickly that nothing must be done to show that Malaysia was "neo-colonialism".

But Sandys had a job to do and I respected his position though not his request that I should succumb to the Cobbold proposal of making Malaya a trustee for British colonial territories, though it was not said in so many words. It was a rough afternoon for me but I thought in the end I had left with him the sincerity and earnestness of my thoughts and endeavours.

I was reminded by Sandys, that in the discussion, the Malayan members had agreed to emphasise on the need for the British officers to stay. This I did not deny because the natives and the pro-Malaysia Chinese had expressed their desire to see the continuance of British officers in the service of the two territories. However, I countered the Cobbold proposal that while it was true, none ever asked that British hegemony or British power should be retained.

The British members of the Commission had said that the only way to keep the British officers there was to retain British authority; otherwise these officers would have to be paid compensation or inducement and even then there would be no guarantee that they would stay. Wong Pow Nee and I said almost in the same words at the same time that the ways and means of how to persuade British officers to stay on in Borneo was a matter best discussed between the two governments. It did not fall within the purview of the Commission which should confine itself to expressing the wishes of the people.

On the morning of May 31, 1962, Wong Pow Nee and I received another shock when we received a message from Lord Cobbold that certain parts of the assessment of the Commission which had been agreed to should be altered in such a manner as to alter the whole colour of the draft which I had written. It may be mentioned that at that stage there would be two recommendations based on the same assessment. The British side must have discovered that my draft based on the common assessment had been brought to its logical recommendations and that theirs would not match the assessment. Unless the assessment was amended to suit their recommendations, theirs would appear to be illogical, even nonsensical. Indeed the British side was in a dilemma. I thought the Chairman's request for such changes was rather unusual and indeed absurd and I told them that we would not budge an inch. I felt convinced that the Chairman and the two British members were colonialists at heart even if Maudling gave them no instructions. At least I thought they were flying a kite for the colonial office and both Wong Pow Nee and I were not prepared to be drawn into such a ludicrous situation, devoid of any common-sense and self-respect.

Both the Tunku and Razak had been kept informed of the progress of the drafting of the report which was becoming more like a negotiation exercise. The Tunku and Razak sounded quite upset when they suggested that there could be no merger if the British wanted to retain power in Borneo for even a day.

On the assessment of the views of the people, the Commission unanimously agreed that about one-third of the population in each territory strongly favoured early realisation of Malaysia without too much concern about the terms and conditions and that another third, favourable to Malaysia, asked with varying degrees of emphasis for safeguards, varying in nature and extent and that the remaining third was divided between those who insisted on independence before Malaysia was considered and those who strongly preferred to see British rule continue for some years to come. After various qualifications, the hardcore of the opposition to Malaysia was estimated at near 20% in Sarawak and somewhat less in North Borneo.

The recommendations chapter of the Commission's report was divided into four sections necessitated by the fact that the British members had different views from the Malayan members and the Chairman himself had his own views. There was a joint recommendation on general matters and the Malayan members were satisfied with the following:

- (i) the need for an early decision on Malaysia;
- (ii) the constitutional basis for Malaysia;
- (iii) the agreement for the appointment of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong;
- (iv) the name "Malaysia";
- (v) the question of immigration;
- (vi) that there would be no right of secession;
- (vii) that the public services should be harmonised as quickly as possible;
- (viii) that British officers should be encouraged to remain in service until their places could be taken over by Borneo people;
- (ix) the question of citizenship.

While Wong Pow Nee and I, as the Malayan members of the Commission, concurred on the above, we expressed certain reserved views on the following:

- (i) The question of religion where Lord Cobbold and the British members recommended that there should be a specific provision in the State Constitution regarding freedom of religion and that the present provision regarding Islam as the religion of the nation and the incurrence of certain public expenditure for Islamic purposes should not apply to the Borneo territories. We stood firm on our recommendation that Islam should be the religion of Malaysia with all the safeguards for the freedom of worship as in the Constitution of Malaya.

- (ii) The British members objected to Malay as the national language to be applied to those territories. Cobbold and the Malayan members accepted Malay to be applied as the national language but the Chairman and the British members recommended that both Malay and English should be the official languages without any limit of time. However, the Malayan members could support that to the extent that the use of English as an official language should extend for ten years after Malaysia, unless the State Government decided to do away with English during that period and, if there was no such decision, English would continue as the official language thereafter until such time as the Central Government, in consultation with the respective governments, would provide otherwise.

The British side, in the course of the deliberations in preparing the Report, had indicated their grounds to substantiate the recommendations. They insisted that there was a considerable lack of political experience in the two Borneo states and therefore, an immediate rather than a paced-out transfer would cause confusion and bewilderment. The British Government was therefore obliged to develop political institutions fully. There was no paradigm or time frame proposed but the British members believed that there was a distinct possibility of inter-racial discord if authority at Kuching and Jesselton was suddenly weakened. Therefore, it was important to maintain official administration and law and order in the territories concerned meaning that only the British official administration would be able to do that. The Chairman and the two British members did not hide their feeling that they were referring to the British role in setting up political institutions with political education. If Malaysia had to come anyway then there should be a transitional period of not less than three years but not more than seven during which the British authority should subsist in the two territories. I thought I heard Lord Cobbold murmur something like "five years at least". The Central Government of Malaysia, on behalf of the two territories, would be responsible for external affairs and the anti-subversive aspect of internal security a resonance once made by a colonial official in British Borneo.

The new arrangement in Malaysia, according to the British members of the Commission, would provide representation in Parliament by members elected from unofficial members of and by the state legislatures. The Governor logically would continue to exercise his executive powers and would be a British officer and he would introduce gradually a ministerial and electoral system. There should be a joint working committee composed of representations of the Central Government and the respective Borneo territories to make recommendations on timing and measure of integration of the two territories into the Federal system of courts and practices and of these departments which should be made a federal responsibility. Of course the terms and conditions of employment of expatriate British colonial officials would remain

unchanged during the period as an inducement for them to stay since it was premised that only the natives of the United Kingdom would successfully administer the two territories. During the transitional period, the British Governor would be jointly appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the Queen - a vestigial colonialism indeed.

It would seem to me then that what I had been trying to impress on them and even Duncan Sandys had been ineffectual. Wong Pow Nee and I were unconvinced that the quality of the Borneo leadership was in no way mediocre. We had been very impressed with the quality of leadership in those territories including those groups which opposed the Malaysia Concept. Malaysia, to those who supported the Concept, was progress and development and there was no suggestion of protracting the process or applying such a cumbersome arrangement and certainly no request was ever made for a British Governor in each territory. The idea of British authority in parts of Malaysia was simply preposterous.

Wong Pow Nee agreed with me that the Malayan side should recommend the establishment of a joint working party for each of the territories composed of equal number of representatives from the territory and the Malayan Government and a Chairman to examine and make recommendations on the measure and timing of the integration into the Federal system of the law and practices relating to subjects in the Federal List.

Similar working parties or the same working party should also consider finance and economic matters and such other subjects as education, legal and judicial services. The Malayan members were aware of the danger of administrative collapse if the Federal functions were precipitously transferred. We agreed to the necessity to keep the British officials in the Borneo territories and we had taken very careful notes of their willingness to stay irrespective of constitutional arrangements provided there were adequate encouragement and inducements. We therefore decided to write a separate recommendation based on the jointly agreed assessment.

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While discussions with the British side were going on, Wong Pow Nee and I had kept the Malayan High Commissioner in London informed. We shared our thoughts and misgivings with him. He was a highly intelligent man, a former Director of Agriculture and holding a ministerial rank during the British colonial administration in Malaya. The greatest asset was his influence on the Tunku, being an elder brother, and this I had noticed since I was also the head of the foreign service. Therefore, it was a stratagem on our part to keep him in the picture in case we would need his assistance which indeed became necessary later. However, those matters which he heard from us, he would inform by telephone to the Tunku. Therefore, it was with trepidation that I received a telex from Razak that Wong Pow Nee and I should not sign the Report until we received instructions from the Tunku. A bigger bombshell

came when the Tunku sent a message that I was to inform the British Government that we would be unwilling to sign until I had consulted him because, in our view, the views expressed by the British members and supported by the Chairman were at variance both in spirit and principle with the Malaysia plan. The Tunku even requested me to return for consultation.

I must admit that the terse tone of the message with its come back order caused me a great deal of discomfort. I did not at all cherish the idea of returning for consultation since this was not a negotiating exercise and I did not accept the appointment of serving as a member with an instruction or a specific mandate. I had been told by the Tunku as I accepted the appointment that on the basis of the assessment, I could truly publish my conclusions and recommendations subject only to my endeavours to get Wong Pow Nee to agree at least to be in close consultation with him.

In my briefing the Malayan High Commissioner or the communication with the Tunku, my intention was only to keep them informed even if I had used some unrestrained language when faced with such suggestions as the appointment of British Governors with executive powers in Malaysia. Of course my intelligence had been insulted by some outrageous suggestions but I was prepared to face them and argue against them on the basis of the agreed assessment. I was prepared to let them write their recommendations so long as I was also allowed to put in my recommendations even if they were at variance with the recommendations of Wong Pow Nee so long as the recommendations were based on the agreed assessment. After all, the assessment would have to be based on facts even if opinion or recommendations would differ.

It was then an unhappy moment for me. I was upset because the Tunku's message embarrassed me. I felt as if I did not have the authority to speak my mind and I was resolved to clarify the point with the Tunku. Certainly, I could not accept a situation where I could be ordered to return home without first expressing my candid opinion in the Report.

After some discussions with Wong Pow Nee, we decided that we should speak to the Tunku by telephone and explain to him that we could not treat the work of the Commission as a diplomatic negotiation. That would be a matter between him and MacMillan but as far as we were concerned, we should write what we felt. We had already overcome the most difficult part which was the assessment on the basis of the enquiry. In this regard, we had a common agreement. I told Wong Pow Nee that I would be drafting the recommendations and he would be free to agree or disagree with me. If he disagreed with the British side and mine, then he should feel free to make his own observations and recommendation. Wong Pow Nee said that he had felt the same about the whole thing and would agree with me on all counts.

And so we telephoned the Tunku and I spoke. I told him that I had received his telex but that we were now left only with the part of writing the recommendations. If the British insisted on their viewpoints, they were entitled to them but I would stick to mine which might violently be opposed to

their recommendations. As a Commission's report, it would not be unusual to have a minority opinion but in this case, it was a minority in respect of the recommendations only. The chances were that we still could convince them that their recommendations would not be consistent with what should follow the assesment. I reminded the Tunku that we were dealing with hard core die-hard colonialists who were living in the past. They had a special feeling for the natives as we had had a few of them in Malaya who thought that it was the white man's burden to take care of the noble savages who should remain so for them to patronise and gloat.

The Tunku was quite composed and urged me to get them to change their mind because he wanted a report that would not be controversial. If the future of the two states in my view would be chaotic with a public order situation, then I should say so and it would be undesirable to have a Malaysia bloodied by internal discontent. Let the British keep their colonies if they still wanted to hang on to them, said the Tunku. Wong Pow Nee also spoke to the Tunku giving the assurance that he and I would be extremely careful not to compromise any of our principles for which we had firmly stood.

Wong Pow Nee who was a close friend of the Tunku's knew the Tunku's mood and temper. He agreed with me that we should go ahead trying to get the British to have a single report or we should write our own recommendations.

We had another meeting after that telephone conversation with the Tunku. I had been debating in my mind as the next line of action. It seemed to me that the Malayan side could use the Tunku's message to advantage to show that despite the Tunku's instruction, we were prepared to walk the last mile and not abandon the whole project midstream. In that case, I had to reveal to them the Tunku's message. If the matter was not properly handled, the Malayan side could be exposed as tutored and would have defeated the purpose of the Commission.

Wong Pow Nee agreed that we should use the message and, if necessary, even show it to them. Wong Pow Nee thought that might convince the British side of our desire to find a solution but if they agreed that Malaysia was a desirable aim then they should be grateful that we had revealed to them the distance we could go.

When we met again, I requested Wong Pow Nee to speak and he rose to the occasion. He quoted the state of Penang as an example of which he was once a Chief Minister to demonstrate the point that the British fears were groundless. He then revealed the Tunku's message and, so far as the vestiges of colonialism was concerned, they should realise that the Malayan side could not go along with the British proposals not because of the Tunku's message but the reality that the Malayan people would never accept such proposals. Already the communists in Malaya, in Singapore, in Indonesia, China and the Soviet Union had condemned the Malaysia Concept as neo-colonialism; to agree to the British proposal proposal would be to confirm it.

This vital meeting was hard-hitting but both sides maintained the spirit of

goodwill and cordiality which had characterised the Commission from day one. The most important issue to me was the appointment of a British Governor as proposed by the British members in their draft. After a great deal of discussions, I noticed the Chairman was softening; either he thought I was just a brick wall or that our side had made sense that an executive British Governor in Malaysia even for a day would make nonsense of Malaysia. This, I knew, would be a thorn in the throat, if the Chairman supported the British members' idea.

I thought we had succeeded in convincing the Chairman that the first Governor of each of the two Borneo territories for a limited period should be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The nomination should be jointly made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the British Queen. That was all that we needed to agree together. If the British members had wanted to maintain their stand on the two phase Malaysia with the two territories being administered by a British appointed Governor during the first phase, Wong Pow Nee and I told them that they were at liberty to do so. It was gratifying that even at the discussion stage, the British side saw the anomaly of seeking for a British Governor although as colonialists they did not see the anomaly of the two states in Malaysia being administered by British Governors. I was quite certain in my mind that MacMillan and his advisers in the Foreign and Commonwealth offices would understand the Malayan objection to the two phase exercise and the role of the Governors, worse still, if they were British appointed by the Queen.

Having achieved thus far the disagreement in transitional arrangement was reduced to the question whether the first Governors should be armed with executive powers and the issue became merely constitutional. The Malayan side proposed that the Governor should be a constitutional one, like in Penang as demonstrated by Wong Pow Nee and he should appoint a Chief Minister in whom the current state legislature had confidence. The state government would have all the powers in accordance with the State List with a few reservations for the period of adjustment that the Central Government would delegate certain functions, not powers, to prevent any sudden jolt brought about in the changes in administration.

The whole picture of the discussions could be summarised as follows: While the Malayan members who had confidence in local leadership wanted the Borneo states to enjoy self-government, the British members were clinging to the belief that the people there were not politically ready. However, in the course of the discussion, I began to notice that the British side, in putting forward their proposals, did not do so with the take it or leave it attitude. They were then put rather nicely as matters for consideration. At once I knew that our side had prevailed upon them, that the issues were such that the two Prime Ministers could now make a choice. I suggested that each side should submit its own view. By that time I thought I did not notice any great desire on the part of the Chairman for a two phase transitional period when the Governor at

the first phase would have executive powers.

It was then agreed that each side could put up its own recommendations on those issues where there were divergences of opinion. The Chairman was free to make his comments or to lend his support to any side; I knew somehow that he would not support the British side on the issue of the two phases, the first phase being an administration by an executive Governor.

We went through the draft on the agreed sections and each side and the Chairman would simply submit their respective recommendations and comments as three separate sections.

* * *

In the meantime, my association with the Malayan High Commissioner paid high dividend. He had taken upon himself to contact the Tunku relating to the problems in the work of the Commission as he saw it. He persuaded the Tunku not to insist on my return for consultation but rather to complete and sign the report which would not restrict room for manoeuvre in negotiations with MacMillan. It was useful to keep an appearance of impartiality and independence on the part of Wong Pow Nee and myself. I did not know at that time he had thus communicated with the Tunku.

It would appear that the Tunku wanted a unanimous recommendation on external affairs, defence and internal security. The Tunku had sent a touching message to the effect that if my conscience was clear, I might sign the Report.

* * *

Having had some idea as to what the British members and the Chairman were inclined to recommend, I quickly got down to work with Zain and David the typist. Wong Pow Nee endorsed the recommendations and we sent it to Lord Cobbold for him to include his comments and recommendations, having taken into account the views of both sides. I shot off a telegram telling the Tunku of the latest development and that in the circumstances, we would sign the Report for submission to the two governments.

I wrote to the Tunku on June 15, 1962 after I had put down my pen for the last time in the drafting of the recommendations. Whatever posterity may wish to judge the work of the Commission, I was satisfied that despite the divergence of views on a few things there was agreement on the fundamentals which would make negotiations by the Tunku with MacMillan somewhat less hazardous with a prospect for success.

I wrote:

My Dear Tunku,

I am sorry that we bothered you so much. Abel-Watherston team is quite formidable but I can assure you we hammered them really

hard. Now of course we reach a point where they cannot move an inch further. In view of their personal background their stand is understandable. The way is now clear for a negotiation on a few purely constitutional issues. I doubt if MacMillan had a great deal to argue about.

There are one or two points we have to work on but I think we can sign the Report and respective recommendations on Thursday the 21st June. I hope to return on Friday the 22nd and report to you immediately on arrival.

My only regret is that I have not been able to get a unanimous Report. This, I am truly sorry.

The Tunku replied that he should receive the Report as early as possible so that the Cabinet could study it before he would decide to proceed to London.

The Report of the Cobbold Commission was signed on June 21, 1962 at Knebworth House, Hertfordshire, the home of Lord and Lady Cobbold.

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As soon as I reached Kuala Lumpur, I called on the Tunku and handed him a copy of the Report. It was at once brought to Cabinet and on the twenty-seventh the Tunku announced that a Cabinet Committee which had been formed to study it composed of himself, Razak, Dr. Ismail, Tan Siew Sin and Sambanthan. The Committee would study the Report and work out a basis for discussion with which if there was no British agreement, the Tunku would not proceed to London. Provided everything was in order, the Tunku intended to leave for London in the middle of July.

The Cabinet Committee and I held our deliberations at Frazer's Hill in one of the Federal Government bungalows. It was cold and wet, which made staying indoors easy.

Every member of the Cabinet Committee threw up his hands after reading the recommendations made by the British members. After some very serious scrutiny with me clarifying the British viewpoints as I understood them, the Committee unanimously concluded that they were unacceptable.

Arising out of the meeting, the Tunku sent a message to MacMillan that he could not agree to the recommendations made by the British members. The Cabinet Committee had identified three contentious points as I expected. They related to the transfer of powers on matters of external affairs, defence and the anti-subversive aspects of internal security to the Central Government, the situation whereby the British Governors were not only retained but would continue to exercise full authority over other domestic matters and a situation whereby all expatriate officers would be retained until they were replaced by Borneo officers to the exclusion of officers from Malaya but were to be replaced by other expatriate officers should they leave before the Borneo

officers were ready to take their place. The Tunku correctly read the Report and emphasised that there appeared to be no intention to have any merger of the Borneo territories with the Federation. The provision in the Report for an immediate transfer of sovereignty notwithstanding, a situation would be created where power would continue to rest with Britain and British officials during the transitional period.

As if the British Government would support the British members' views of the Commission, the Tunku said it would be impossible for him to accept such a situation without losing face with his own people. He would accordingly suggest that during the transitional period as recorded by the British members, Britain should retain her sovereignty over the territories and implement the British members' recommendations. And when the British Government had decided that those territories were ready for merger he would be happy to discuss the creation of Malaysia with the British Government.

The Tunku's message was devastating since a reluctance on the part of Malaya to proceed with Malaysia, Britain would be saddled with a serious situation in Singapore. MacMillan personally handled the matter and in his reply to the Tunku said that it was all a misunderstanding. He pointed out that he and the Tunku had agreed to the creating of an independent commission to ascertain the views of the Borneo territories and make recommendations. However, the danger lurked in these independent commissions because they had been independent. As far as he was concerned, both the Tunku and he were anxious to establish Malaysia and both had agreed to the transfer of sovereignty to the Federal authority. MacMillan conceded that every Federation experienced problems regarding respective rights and duties of the Central Government and the powers of state and local governments. These matters should be settled between the two Prime Ministers. MacMillan reiterated that the British Government had not the slightest desire to maintain its authority during the transitional period over the Borneo territories. This assurance was anticipated as I had the impression that the Commonwealth and the Foreign Office would understand better the negative implications of the British members' recommendations in the Cobbold Report. Thus MacMillan helped to clear the cobwebs of colonialism.

Once again the Malayan High Commissioner in London came to the fore when he met Duncan Sandys who said that the British Government had an open mind and would be prepared to discuss all aspects of the Report with the Tunku. This helped to remove any unease felt in Kuala Lumpur brought about by the Cobbold Report.

On July 14, 1962, the Malayan delegation left for London led by Razak and Tan Siew Sin. I also was in the team. The Tunku would travel separately.

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As soon as the Malayan Ministerial delegation arrived in London they had a series of meetings with the British Government. I served as the Secretary to

the Malayan delegation and quite often as its consultant. I was also a draftsman of aide memoires and statements which made me a one-man secretariat but I had the assistance of the Malayan High Commission and the services of the typing staff, headed by the untiring David, who had helped me in the preparation of the Cobbold Report.

At the meeting with the British, the Malayan side was requested to give its views first. The Malayan formula was that at the conclusion of the current discussions between the two governments, a joint statement would be issued that Malaysia would be established on August 31, 1963. This of course would include the states in the present Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei and the two British territories of North Borneo and Sarawak.

As for the transitional period, the Malayan side proposed a two phase process. In view of the deteriorating internal security situation in Singapore and the tension which could arise in the Borneo territories, the first phase would have to be short and any undue delay might bring undesirable consequences. In the circumstances, that first phase should not exceed six months and should, as a target date, terminate on 8 February 1963. During this period, constitutional and other arrangements with all the relevant instruments should be prepared and agreed to in order to effect the establishment of Malaysia.

The Malayan delegation required special attentions during this transitional period. In respect of Singapore, the relevant authorities should take urgent action to neutralise communist activities and influence. This would be part of the preparation process for Singapore merger in Malaysia. The Malayan delegation also reminded the British side that it would continue to hold the stand that it would not be politically possible for a Singapore merger before the transfer of sovereignty of Sarawak and North Borneo.

With regard to the two British colonial territories in Borneo, the British administration would initiate and implement as far as possible local constitutional and administrative changes in preparation to ushering in of the second phase. As soon as the first phase ended, the British Governors would relinquish their offices. Also, during the transition phase, the British authorities would undertake to take all necessary action against communist activities.

The Malayan delegation also made the proposal that at the end of phase one, which would be on February 8, 1963, sovereignty would pass to the Government of Malaysia. The completion of the transitional process would be undertaken by the Malaysian authorities until August 31, 1963 when the transition period would end and Malaysia formally declared.

The British and the Malayan Governments would provide the necessary facilities for Brunei to be accepted into the Federation on, before or even after February 8, 1963 if it was the wish of His Highness, the Sultan.

The Malayan proposals were not at all received with favour. However, the British side countered the proposal by offering two alternatives.

Alternative (a). There would be an announcement that the transfer of sovereignty of Singapore and the Borneo territories would take place not later than 31 December 1963. No date of the merger of each territory would be made; rather the merger would take place at an opportune moment if it was found to be desirable to do so on that date. According to the British viewpoint, such an announcement would give the impression that a package deal had been arrived at even if there was no announcement of actual date or dates.

With regard to the two British colonial territories, the British side gave an undertaking that under the alternative arrangement, constitutional changes would be made. This would prepare them for their entry into Malaysia which would take place by December 31, 1963 when British sovereignty would lapse.

As far as Brunei was concerned, the first British alternative provided no objection to Brunei joining the Federation even before Singapore merger.

The British alternative (b) almost followed the same pattern as in (a) except that with the entry of Singapore, the Borneo territories would also join Malaysia and the transfer of sovereignty in respect of the Borneo colonial territories would take place on the date when Singapore joined the Federation.

In alternative (b) the British made it very obvious that British Governors would continue to hold office until December 31, 1963 even if they had joined the Federation. The only difference was that the executive governors would be responsible to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. In other words the Malaysian Government would be a colonial power using British officials to do its job for a period.

The Malayan side declared that under no circumstances would they agree that the Malaysian Government to be a colonial power or the possible entry of Singapore after the other territories. I was amazed at the tenacity of the British officials to project the line that I thought I had dealt with Duncan Sandys. I could not surmise otherwise than that both Watherston and Abel had their instructions or advice in inverted commas from the officials of the colonial office. Such an attitude would be in character and I shared my thoughts with the other members of the Malayan delegation that those were mere tries on and that MacMillan would have a different view.

The Tunku then made me prepare an aide memoire to be presented to the British side so that there could be no misunderstanding. This I did after picking the brain of the Tunku, Razak and Tan Siew Sin. I put their thoughts together with some of mine and it became a document presented to the British side on July 27, 1962. In that aide memoire it was suggested that the transfer of sovereignty of the Borneo colonial territories and Singapore should take place simultaneously on February 8, 1963 and that Brunei could come in earlier. In any event, formal declaration of Malaysia should occur on August 31, 1963.

The Malayan side was prepared to give one concession as regards the continuance of the British Governors who might stay on even after the transfer of sovereignty but would have to leave by August 30, 1963. During

their stay in office, they would have to make all necessary transitional arrangements.

It was a very serious discussion. Being a constitutionalist and a strong nationalist, I had my reservation with regard to the concession made by the Malayan side. The Tunku simply dismissed my arguments and told me not to worry unduly. I gave way to his wisdom.

At the end of the deliberations, the British agreed that Malaysia would be formed earlier if the Singapore situation was such that warranted it. In such an event, the two governments would agree that the British Governors would remain at their posts as "Constitutional" Governors by appointment of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. I must admit that I felt so relieved after that. It was now a situation where the Governors would be British but without executive powers and appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. At least they would not be British Executive Governors in Malaysia.

I think it was Duncan Sandys who was leading the British side that prevailed on the colonialist die-hard to remove the thorn in the throat which was the Executive Governor. Sandys however made a request for those specie of Governors to remain until December 31, 1963. The Tunku showed his magnanimity and graciousness by replying that the date could be flexible.

The Tunku kept Dr. Ismail, who was holding the fort in Kuala Lumpur, informed by phone and telex and on this occasion he sent a message to Dr. Ismail describing the meeting as "weather unsettled, less stormy, outlook fair". There was a clear evidence that the leadership was closely knit almost a troika plus Tun Tan Siew Sin and Sambanthan.

I think, because of the way the Tunku had conducted the Malayan side in the discussions with Duncan Sandys, remembering that the Tunku was both a Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs and Sandys was the Commonwealth Secretary, MacMillan must have been keeping a keen watchful eye on the proceedings. MacMillan had a very high regard and fondness for the Tunku. I knew this to be the case.

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On July 28, 1962 MacMillan sent to the Tunku a note which was entitled "Suggested Plan for Malaysia". It came like a breath of fresh air and after a quick glance through it, I knew that MacMillan was sensitive to the feeling of the Tunku; and Malaysia which they both wanted would soon be a reality. It was a far cry from the earlier demands and proposals of the British side indeed had endorsed a great deal of the contents of the aide memoire which the Malayan side had passed to them.

The gist of MacMillan's suggested plan was that the two Prime Ministers would declare their intention to conclude a formal agreement which should provide for the transfer of sovereignty on August 31, 1963 and for the safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak. With regard to defence arrangements the lines had already been agreed to.

The two Prime Ministers also agreed but not for public knowledge that if Singapore Government fell to the communist elements or that its collapse to the communists was imminent, then Malaysia should be formed as quickly as possible. In the circumstances, the British Governor of North Borneo and Sarawak, while ceasing to be responsible to the British Government, would continue as an interim measure to exercise their executive powers until the appointment of new Governors by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. This satisfied the Tunku since the understanding would not be published. The Tunku said to me confidentially and confidently that he would do everything in his power to assist Lee Kuan Yew in order to obviate a situation which might trigger all kinds of undesirable eventualities.

The two sides laboriously worked on the joint statement. It was issued on July 31, 1962 which declared that an agreement had been reached between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya that Malaysia would be brought into being by August 31, 1963. In order to give effect to the agreement, the two Governments would conclude within the next six months an agreement providing for the transfer of sovereignty of North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore on August 31, 1963, and provisions governing the relationship between Singapore and the new Federation of Malaysia as agreed between the Governments of Singapore and Malaya, the defence arrangements as set out in the joint UK-Malaya Statement of November 22, 1961. The agreement would also provide for detailed constitutional arrangements including safeguards for the special interest of North Borneo and Sarawak to be drawn up after consultations with the legislature of the two territories. In order to bring about a smooth switchover to the Federal system, the transfer of sovereignty would be followed by a transition period during which a number of Federal powers and functions would be delegated to the two Governments.

The joint statement stated that an Inter-Governmental Committee would be established as soon as possible in which the British, Malayan, Sarawak and North Borneo Governments would be represented. The task of the Committee, which was better known later as IGC, would be to work out the future constitutional arrangements and form of the necessary safe-guards. It was also declared by the joint statement that Lord Landsdowne who was then Minister of State for the Colonies would be the Chairman of the Committee. Its deputy chairman would be Razak. Landsdowne and Razak would proceed shortly to North Borneo and Sarawak to conduct discussions. Landsdowne would discuss with the respective Governments and staff associations as to how the services of the expatriate officers could be retained in the Borneo colonial territories.

The Tunku and MacMillan in this joint statement also stated that they had informed the Sultan of Brunei of what had been agreed to and had made it clear that Brunei was welcome to join Malaysia.

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Some of the happenings behind the scene could be of interest. They led to the Tunku-MacMillan statement of July 31, 1962 which formally declared that a decision had been made to conclude within the next six months a formal statement providing for the transfer of sovereignty of the British colonial territories of North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore by August 31, 1963 and that Brunei would be welcomed to join the proposed Malaysian Federation.

The Malayan delegation composed of the Tunku, Razak, Tan Siew Sin and I, before leaving Kuala Lumpur, decided that the Tunku should travel separately. Kadir Shamsuddin who was to service the Tunku would travel with him. The main reason for the arrangement was that MacMillan was reshuffling his Cabinet and we had heard that the Tunku would be dealing with Duncan Sandys since Maudling would cease to be the Colonial Secretary who had been handling the subject of Malaysia. The tricky matter which was causing concern was whether the British would be prepared to discuss the question of the internal security of Singapore and whether they would take action against the communists and subversive elements. To us at that time, Sandys was an unknown character although I had met with him before we would not want to expose the Tunku to someone who might simply upset the apple cart. If our assessment of Duncan Sandys was negative we would advise the Tunku not to come to London and we would try to hammer out the various problems until all was clear.

The Razak team left on Friday the July 13 from Singapore. On that very day, the Singapore Legislative Assembly was debating a motion regarding the communists in Singapore. Before our departure, Lim Yew Hock boasted to me that he had put in an amendment to say that the Assembly had no confidence in the PAP Government because it had not taken any action against the communists. By this amendment, he had the Barisan Socialis cornered. Lee Kuan Yew did not regard the amendment as one of non-confidence but merely of a comment. He would take action if the people of Singapore wanted it.

I thought the polemics and the rhetorics were very interesting but an exercise in futility. The British colonial authority was responsible for internal security and Malaya, one of the members of the Singapore Internal Security Council, was on her way to get the British to address the problem.

Things between ourselves and Indonesia too was not going on well and I had recommended that we should send the Malayan High Commissioner in Pakistan to Jakarta. He was Datuk Kamaruddin, a former *Menteri Besar* of Trengganu and I knew for sure that the Indonesian leaders would be comfortable with him. He had already received his transfer orders and I was able to catch him in Karachi; he was on his way to Jakarta and I to London. I spent some time briefing him on the state of our relationship. Our plane to London was delayed for four hours and we used the time available to our advantage.

When we reached London there was a big crowd of students and other Malaysians greeting us on arrival. I remember noticing in the crowd Yoke Ming, a girl who lost her arms in an accident and very courageously was going through her studies with admirable progress.

Straight away I went into a meeting with Tory, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, who had returned to London in view of the Tunku-MacMillan meeting. Tory assured me that everything would go in the right direction which remark I did not fully understand until he clarified that there would be an agreement. But what about the pet subject of the colonial office to leave behind problems on decolonisation and in this case the insistence on keeping the British Executive Governors in Malaysia. Tory said that the British side would certainly toss the question but they would forget it as soon as we resisted it. I could not say whether Tory knew what he was talking about but it did make sense to me and therefore quite comforting even if he was expressing a conjecture.

On the question of internal security of Singapore, he said he had been hammering the Malayan line but to no avail. Lord Selkirk, the Commissioner-General, had advised against the Malayan proposal because any drastic action would produce undesirable consequences and might even cause riots and conflicts. Then I produced my bluff which I wanted Tory to convey to the British side. If the British would not do what we had suggested then I would signal to the Tunku not to come to London. If he had already left Kuala Lumpur, efforts would be made to get him to stop in Karachi or Beirut and return to Kuala Lumpur. I was not sure as to the actual date of the Tunku's departure but if the Tunku arrived the next evening in London we would abort the meeting on some ground. We could easily say that in view of the Cabinet reshuffle, the meeting had to be postponed.

Tory was doing his best, short of being accused of being a Malayan ambassador, and I could see his difficulties also because of the change from Maudling to Sandys. However, I knew that he would convey what I said to Sandys and that it was not a vain threat. In the meantime, I had arranged that Claude Fenner, the Malayan Inspector-General of Police, who was British should brief the officials in the colonial office regarding the Malayan and Singapore communist activities. Fenner had come to see me that night telling me that the security side of the British had been fully briefed and they appeared to accept the Malayan idea of security management in Singapore before Malaysia.

In the meantime, I also had a description of Duncan Sandys from my British friends in London, which confirmed my belief that the Tunku and Sandys would hit it well. This made me even less worrisome to expose the Tunku to him who, as Foreign Minister, would be Sandys' counterpart. I recommended to Razak and Tan Siew Sin that the Tunku should come and they agreed.

Razak and Tan Siew Sin called on Sandys on July 12, 1962 in the morning and the Tunku arrived that afternoon after a delay, like ours, of four hours due to severe fog in Cairo. The plane was diverted to Beirut. I thought it was quite a co-incidence because Beirut was mentioned to Tory as a diversion route!

I went to the airport to meet the Tunku. There I saw Lord Selkirk. After a great deal of prodding while waiting for the plane to arrive, Selkirk said that the internal security of Singapore was very tricky. According to Selkirk, if action was taken now the effect might be bad for Malaya. In any case, no one had ever said to him the action was not against political parties. If it was absolutely against communists he would not mind. He was really a stick in the mud, I thought. I told him that we had made it very clear that it had never been envisaged that the action was against political parties but against communists who of course might be members of a political party. But the action would not be against the party. Just then, Claude Fenner joined us and I told the good Lord that Fenner had all the answers and left them both in a huddle. Fenner later told me that he had told Selkirk as previously to the colonial officials that there was a solid case for the arrest and detention of Lim Chin Siong and his close comrades.

As soon as the Tunku was cleared of customs and immigration through the VIP room, he asked me to ride back with him to town and I was able to bring him up to date with the development including our assessment of Duncan Sandys with whom he had to deal. The Tunku was quite tired and complained that the sojourn in Beirut would have been welcomed if he had an opportunity to see what was then reputed to be the number one playground for the rich and famous of the Middle East.

The Tunku called on MacMillan at 11 a.m. on Tuesday July 17, 1962 at 10 Downing Street. It was a meeting between the two only. Razak, Tan Siew Sin and Kadir Shamsuddin were invited to join them after the two had one hour of being closetted together as old friends. Later Kadir told me that the two Prime Ministers wanted the Cobbold Report, accompanied by an agreed statement on Malaysia, published as quickly as possible.

MacMillan gave us lunch and Lord Cobbold and I were included. MacMillan was always kind to me since we met when Malaya attended the Prime Ministers' Commonwealth Conference at Number Ten particularly when we had to deal with South Africa and her detestable apartheid laws and policies. He looked extremely well despite the ordeals of reshuffling of cabinet. And Lord Cobbold, next to whom I sat at lunch, was as ever genial.

The first ministerial meeting was held that afternoon. It seemed all went well but I was somewhat taken aback that the British side had planted a paper containing their recommendations that on the creation of Malaysia, Sarawak and North Borneo would be admitted. In practice it would make no difference if it was differently worded. The process as agreed was that it was their inclusion into the Federation with constitutional amendments when Malaysia would come into being.

The British side had suggested and we agreed that there should be a steering committee to assist the ministers. The two British Governors were also in the committee. I was part of the Malayan side in the committee with Lord Lansdowne as the Chairman and the first meeting was held on the nineteenth of July. The two Governors kept making statements which were extremely discouraging but Lansdowne was quite firm.

The morning meeting with Lansdowne was rather pleasant. Lansdowne took Razak, Tan Siew Sin and I to lunch at a well-known Indian restaurant in Piccadilly. Just as lunch was about to be served, an Englishman greeted us in Malay and introduced himself as a police officer from Sarawak. We introduced him to Lansdowne and he volunteered to tell Lansdowne that 75% of the expatriates in Sarawak and North Borneo would stay irrespective whether the Governors were expatriate meaning British or not. He said that the expatriates in those territories knew the conditions in Malaya and read the same newspapers. The police particularly was pleased that Malaya had not found it necessary to replace Fenner as the national police chief.

I thought I saw Lansdowne listening to the man very intently and must have impressed him a great deal since it was certainly unsolicited. But it would be a disaster if Lansdowne had suspected that the whole exercise was my design! It could not be since Lansdowne invited us to lunch just before adjourning the morning session.

The afternoon meeting appeared strange to me. Lansdowne was not in the chair. A very senior official came to say that the meeting could not proceed any further to discuss the arrangement for the civil service since nothing could be decided until the question of authority had been finalised and also the question of how to keep expatriate officers without compensation. It looked to me as if they were hedging for time. The British side was hinting as if these decisions had to come from the British Government. It cast a gloom all over our side.

As soon as we had dispersed, I managed to catch hold of Tory and asked him what it was all about. He just shook his head and asked me to be patient. Tory rang me up later at the hotel saying that the British bureaucrats were still working on the basis of the Persian market. There would be haggling but eventually one side would give in. Not the Malayan side, I quipped.

I told Tory that during the MacMillan lunch, Sandys had talked to the Tunku regarding the idea of the British Executive Governor to which the Tunku told Sandys that the British should keep the two territories until they were ready to relinquish authority and everything else.

It appeared to me that the talks would be futile if the British side was going on a haggling spree as in a Persian market. I told Tory that the Tunku once had been toying with the idea of getting Singapore placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations. I had vehemently argued against the Tunku that such an arrangement would lead us into the clutches of the USSR which might force a referendum. The Tunku had since given up the idea but if he

concluded that the British side was not taking him seriously he might think of such a solution for Singapore even if it was preposterous.

When the ministers met again, the issue was whether a joint action should take place to rid Singapore of communists. The British side was against it because of two reasons: (i) the odium they would get in the UK and overseas; (ii) such an action might develop in such a way that the uncommitted Chinese would react negatively creating riots and chaos and Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP might just collapse which would put a brake on the formation of Malaysia. The Malayan side agreed that the situation if allowed to deteriorate would be so dangerous that it was worth all the odium for the British! The Malayan side did not believe that the uncommitted Chinese would be offended. They might even swing to the side of the Government if it showed firmness. This point was accepted by the British side. What the British side was uncertain about was whether after the action, Lee Kuan Yew would continue to get the support of the PAP.

The British side revealed something which might have weakened their stand when they said that their information was that Toh Chin Chye did not know half of what Lee Kuan Yew was doing and that the PAP had for some time no meetings or contacts with the PAP leaders and rank and file. I did not believe the situation in the PAP was as bleak as all that. The PAP leadership I thought was in control otherwise they would not have rallied, as I heard, more than 10,000 people at the airport to send the Tunku off. On the other hand, I told the meeting that any action taken after the formation of Malaysia would be construed and interpreted as anti-Chinese.

However, my mind was searching for the real British attitude. All those what I thought to be silly questions were just red-herrings. They certainly had something big up their sleeves.

The bang came when the British side said that all parties concerned should be prepared for all eventualities in case the PAP government led by Lee Kuan Yew should collapse. There should be a crash programme for Singapore whereby Singapore would merge with the Federation and a firm date would be given for the two colonial territories to join, say in 18 months.

It was quite a shock for me because obviously the idea was not spontaneous. Was this another version of the vestigial colonialism since if there could be a crash programme for Singapore, I wondered why not also for the two territories.

The British proposal was unacceptable and I said so at our own meeting. I warned Razak that if the crash programme was accepted, then the UMNO and the people would have to be convinced, since all along the Malaysia Concept, as understood, was that Singapore would only come in simultaneously but not before. It had to be a package deal or nothing. Supposing, I argued, during the period before the target date of the entry of the two territories something should happen to cause the abrogation of the agreement then Malaya would become Malaysia only with Singapore without the two territories. I concluded

that the British proposal, which was fraught with dangers and bristling with difficulties, should be rejected. Razak agreed with me but for some reason the Tunku was at first prepared to give in to the British proposal contrary to all his previous statements and commitments.

The Malayan side decided that Lee Kuan Yew should be invited to come to London for consultations. When this was informed to the British, they said that Lee Kuan Yew in any case was most anxious to come to discuss about citizenship. The Tunku objected and said that Lee Kuan Yew should limit himself only to the subject of internal security since everything else should be discussed not with the British but strictly between the Alliance Government and the PAP Government. I whole-heartedly supported the Tunku and recalled that when the Singapore White Paper was discussed, the British was not a party to it. It was at that discussion that I found some of the comments of the British officials and Tan Siew Sin were rather jaundiced against Lee Kuan Yew which made me quite unhappy.

At a meeting between the Tunku and Duncan Sandys, Tan Siew Sin said that the cleansing action in Singapore before the merger could be defended morally. Sandys told Tan Siew Sin that the moral aspect should be discarded. But a while later when the Tunku said that action should be taken jointly, Sandys asked if that meant that Malaya was expecting British moral support. Very quickly the Tunku replied that the moral aspect, as Sandys had told Tan Siew Sin, did not come into the issue at all. Duncan Sandys blushed.

It was a gloomy day for me when the Tunku asked me to prepare a memorandum regarding the crash programme for Singapore and Malaysia to be brought in two distinct phases. The Tunku had brushed aside all my arguments and said it was possible for us to accept the proposal of a crash programme.

I knew the Tunku well enough that he must have a fall-back position. He had already told me that the best thing was not to allow the contingency to arise by giving full support to Lee Kuan Yew. And so I sat down to write out the formula according to what the Tunku favoured. In short, until 8 February 1963 the British Government would be responsible for implementing the provisions to prepare for the entry of North Borneo and Sarawak. On February 8, 1963 the sovereignty and governments of the two territories would come within the Malaysia arrangement and the British Governors would be retained for a period as constitutional heads. Malaysia would be declared on 31 August 1963 by which time the British constitutional Governors would have disappeared. With these firm dates and agreement, the entry of Singapore before 8 February 1963 could be defended. Nevertheless, the internal security action in Singapore should be carried out before the merger.

The Tunku accepted the suggestion and put the paper in his pocket. It was on the July 23, at 4 p.m. He went in first to meet with Sandys, just the two of

them. I did not know what transpired but we were called in to the meeting room about forty-five minutes later.

The Tunku and Sandys were there and I thought Sandys was full of smiles while the Tunku was rather glum. However, the meeting was confined to the report of the steering committee which was not much. The meeting agreed with the principle that as little change as possible should be made of the Malayan Constitution which would be the new Malaysian Constitution containing the various safeguards for the new members of the Federation. Sandys suggested that on immigration, if possible, it should be arranged by administrative means. We could not go beyond the minutes of the steering committee which had looked at the Cobbold Report. Razak appeared a bit impatient when Sandys remarked that the territorial arrangement was now the vital question as if there had never been any understanding about it. Razak then suggested that there should be a discussion on the subject so that the form of words could be worked out satisfactorily. It was this ministerial meeting which brought about the agreement for the formation of a high powered committee under the chairmanship of Lord Lansdowne known as the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC).

The ministerial meeting continued on the afternoon of 24 July. As always, there would be first a short four eyed meeting between Sandys and the Tunku. Both the British and Malayan delegates joined them later. This time Sandys spoke in a very firm and clear manner that Britain was not interested in retaining authority for a day longer than necessary. However, the responsibility of the British Government was not only to Parliament in the United Kingdom but Her Majesty's Government also felt responsible for negative consequences arising from any overly rapid changes among the backward people of the colonies. In this instance, the British Government also recognised the Malayan need of taking over Singapore together with the Borneo territories.

Sandys then laid out the British proposals which were as follows: An announcement would forthwith be made that there would be transfer of sovereignty of Singapore and the Borneo territories not later than 30 December 1963. This declaration of firm intention to transfer sovereignty would give the impression of a package deal. No date of the actual merger of each territory should be made but as each opportune moment arrived the territories would merge if found desirable. Sandys said that the British Government would not object to Brunei joining the Federation even before Singapore. However, with regard to North Borneo and Sarawak they would have to go through the full course of making constitutional changes in preparation for their entry into the Federation. The process had to be completed by December 31, 1963.

The Tunku started by saying that it would be impossible for Malaya to be saddled with Singapore and British Governors with executive authority in the Borneo territories. I had passed a note to him to the effect that without the

Borneo territories it would be impossible to get Singapore legislators in Parliament. At first he allowed me to speak on the matter and then brushed me aside by saying that my point was not very important because at that time they had enough seats in Parliament and he envisaged that the PAP would include Singapore Alliance members to be sent to Parliament. He had assumed that PAP would retain the majority. I could not see the Tunku's logic but I did not contradict him in public as I had always observed such a decorous practice. But his argument was fallacious since the exercise of a crash programme for Singapore merger was premised on the collapse of the PAP Government. When I had a chance to talk to him, just the two of us, the Tunku jeeringly laughed and said my mind was too tidy. He said such a way of looking at things would not work in politics which made me think of politics as the art of the impossible! Only the Tunku could do that because he was determined not to allow the collapse of PAP and any statement he made was purely to achieve progress. I gave up.

Coming back to the exchanges between Sandys and the Tunku, the British Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary received a shock when the Tunku asked why not federate the Borneo territories with Singapore. Sandys quickly dismissed the proposal. Sandys told the Tunku that he understood the problem of the Singapore representations in Parliament in the context of the crash programme. He then suggested that Singapore representatives in Parliament could follow the Berlin arrangement whereby there would be seats but no voting until everything were completed by 31 December 1963. This remark was rather revealing in that the various contingencies and options had not really been worked out. It was an ad hoc statement and I intervened by simply saying that the situation would not allow for such an arrangement after sovereignty had been transferred. The communists and world opinion would have a field day.

The Tunku said he was not very happy with the slow progress of the talks. I was certain Sandys was joking when he said the Tunku shouldn't be unhappy when Malaya was getting a bigger territory. However, it made Razak's face turn red. Perhaps to prevent Razak from hitting at Sandys, the Tunku retorted that there was no reason for him to be happy when everyone else was giving up his empire. After some jocular remarks, the subject was cooled off and Sandys asked the Tunku if 8 February was the date for the transfer of all territories, whether the Tunku would agree to retain the British Governors until the thirty first of December. This would keep the confidence of the people intact. The Tunku replied that whether it was one year or ten years, the problem was the same. He was sure that, according to the British, the people there would always be regarded as unready. The Tunku reminded Sandys that in the Malaya independence negotiation the words, "if possible" was used yet by the first of July, well before August 31, 1957 Malaya was ready for independence.

The meeting ended with no conclusions and we rushed to the Malayan High Commission at Portland Place for the High Commissioner's reception.

There I gathered that Sandys would eventually agree to hang on to Singapore until August 31, 1963.

There was no meeting the next day because Sandys had to be in Brussels the day after. The Malayan team continued with their discussions. The Malaysians concluded that Sandys must have thought that the ball was at their feet. I told the Tunku that our side had already compromised on the question of the Governor, the time factor of their tenure had become unimportant if there was a firm date agreed and announced. Razak unhappily agreed with that line and the Tunku instructed me to convey the point to the British side.

On July 27, 1962, a message from Sandys came that since he was not going back to Brussels he would prefer to have the meeting at 4 p.m. When we met, there was no progress with regard to the role of the Governors. Razak was quite annoyed with Goode who insisted that without the British Executive Governors the people might refuse Malaysia. Razak curtly interjected by saying in that case the British could keep the two territories. The meeting broke up with a deadlock and a sense of gloom prevailed.

On the following day which was a Sunday, the Tunku was invited to Chequers for lunch with MacMillan. When he came back, he went straight to meet Malayan students at Malaya Hall and addressed them. At that stage, I had not been able to learn anything which might have come out of the lunch.

That night a letter came from MacMillan to the Tunku. It was the "Suggested Plan for Malaysia" which broke the deadlock. To many, it was a surprise but somehow I knew that MacMillan's fond regard for the Tunku would incline him to see the Tunku's viewpoint. All the tussles with Sandys who wanted Malaysia by December 31, 1963 had been no more than probing and prodding exercises.

Lee Kuan Yew had come to Tunku's hotel with the citizenship draft to be presented to the Tunku. Nobody took any notice of it because we were all busy with studying and analysing the MacMillan's Plan. I prepared a memorandum containing commentaries on the Plan for the Tunku.

The Ministerial Meeting convened again on Monday the July 13 and it was a very long one from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m., then from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. But every one was in fine humour. Lansdowne, I observed, was quite firm with the Governors; once I heard him requesting Goode to be reasonable but I did not know what it was all about.

Lansdowne reminded me very much of Cobbold. I had begun to suspect that this idea of the Lansdowne Committee was to get Malaya to another level for haggling after we all had agreed on the principles. My only consideration was that Razak should be a member of the Committee and I was certain he could deal with whatever kind of problem which Lansdowne might present.

I was right in thinking that he was another Cobbold. At that meeting he showed very little political sense and even put up a fight about dates. Duncan Sandys who joined the meeting later taking over the chair had to control

Lansdowne. Sandys handled the meeting very well and every time he became convinced regarding a subject he would just roll it through.

This particular session was a marathon. Most of the time was taken at looking for the form of words in an agreement which would be published as agreed. I was truly tired and thirsty. There was a great deal of whisky and brandy but there was not a drop of water, not even soda water. It was Sandys who came to my rescue when he asked someone to get some water for his thirsty friend as he called me. We had coffee, tea, biscuits and water after that. It was 2 a.m. and we staggered back either very tired or sloshed or both.

Before we adjourned, we had agreed that the draft agreement would be sent to our hotel by the secretariat which was manned by the Commonwealth and Colonial Office. We were also informed that the meeting next day would commence at 10 a.m.

The following morning, we went to the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) but nobody was there on the British side. We were told that the secretariat was still working on the text of the draft. We waited in the meeting hall until 4 p.m. then a few pieces of paper were distributed.

We carefully studied the papers which we received. The Tunku remarked that there was too much emphasis on the subject of immigration which caused the paper to be somewhat stilted.

The British team asked that the working committee be assembled to work on the draft agreement and the joint statement. It started at 5 p.m. and went on until 6.30 p.m. Then the Ministerial Meeting started with the Tunku and Sandys.

The Ministerial Meeting mostly dealt with the question whether the British authorities would take internal security action in Singapore before the merger. Sandys refused to budge an inch and requested the Tunku not to push too hard. He however conceded that if the situation demanded it, UK would act. The Tunku said Selkirk might not go along with that to which he replied that he would deal with the situation in his own way. Turning to me Sandys said that I should not record his words but that we should take his words in good faith. The Tunku acknowledged the assurance given.

When discussing the Governors and their continuation as British executives in Malaysia, the Tunku said that Malaysia meant that we had to live with it for the rest of our lives. To overcome that, the matter should be left to the Malaysians to form a judgement as to when this situation should receive attention. On the other hand, if in the judgement of the British Government that Malaysians had no real commitment or that they could not be trusted to make a sound judgement, of course the British Government was at liberty to carry on with their obligations in North Borneo and Sarawak which simply said, "keep them!" If the British side should feel that Malaysia was a desirable aim then they should have faith that we would give our best endeavours to make Malaysia a success and any half-hearted measure would end in failure. The British colonial officials must throw their lot with us. We certainly would

be more keen than anybody else to make all the Borneo people happy, said the Tunku.

At quarter to eight in the evening, we moved to Admiralty House. There I saw MacMillan waiting at the door to greet the Tunku. As soon as we were seated, MacMillan addressed us. It was a very fine speech which emphasised on the importance of doing things right and quickly before a situation turned sour. He assured the Tunku that Her Majesty's Government was just as anxious to see Malaysia succeed.

On the British side, only MacMillan, Duncan Sandys and a secretary were present; while on our side besides the Tunku and Razak, Tan Siew Sin and I, Tunku Jaafar, the Minister at the Malayan High Commission and Lee Kuan Yew were also present. The Prime Ministers and the four other ministers signed the joint statement and an agreement which was not intended to be published containing inter alia the clauses to the effect that for any reason if it appeared desirable, the new Federation of Malaysia could by agreement between the two governments be brought into being earlier than August 31, 1963. In that event, the British Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak would be confirmed in their position by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Until the appointment of new Governors on August 31, 1963 in accordance with the Constitution of Malaysia as an interim measure, they would exercise all their existing powers by the authority of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

It was for me a great privilege to have witnessed on July 31, 1962 such a historic and momentous occasion and be a party actively contributing in the preparations, deliberations and negotiations which gave birth to a new and a proud independent nation. All of us returned to our hotel where there was a little celebration toasting the Tunku, Razak and Tan Siew Sin for their brilliant success in the negotiations. The Tunku gave me a little pat on the back and I went to bed extremely happy and in delightful anticipation for the day when Malaysia would become a reality.

My task was far from over. Copies of the signed joint statement and the confidential letter of understanding were distributed to us. We found a few minor verbal changes with which we could live with but the printed copies were made from the draft which contained a paragraph on immigration which we had amended before the signing. These errors were inadvertent and soon corrected before releasing the statement to the press.

* * *

The business with the British was over. Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee were both in London, I mentioned earlier that Lee Kuan Yew had sent a letter to the Tunku but no attention was given to it because everyone was so busy attending to the MacMillan-Tunku documents. It was Sheridan who alone had a look at it. I had not seen the document which Lee Kuan Yew had sent, and I had no idea as to what Lee Kuan Yew wanted the Tunku to agree to. But I knew that Cecil Sheridan, the Attorney-General who was then also in London

alone had been working on a draft reply for the Tunku. I obtained the draft reply and I was aghast to see what was written. It proposed to confirm what Lee Kuan Yew wanted as in his letter that they would agree on the change of the nomenclature and that all Singapore citizens would be federal citizens.

The Tunku was then out and I managed to get Razak and Tan Siew Sin. I told them and Sheridan that my guess was that the Tunku would not agree to the suggestion made by Lee Kuan Yew. At first they could not see why I had said so, but after my explanation, they saw my point. I reminded them that the Singapore White Paper had sought to differentiate between Singapore citizens and Federal citizens and both citizens would enjoy equal status and treatment as Malaysian nationals. This would require the creation of a law which would spell out the rights and obligations of nationals as distinct from citizens. The White Paper was agreed to between the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew because of this distinction. If the understanding was changed then many other matters had to be changed consequentially.

We all then went to see the Tunku as soon as he returned to his hotel room and I explained the implications of Lee Kuan Yew's latest letter. I thought the Tunku at first did not fully grasp its effects and implications in the context of the Singapore White Paper with which he had agreed. He appeared to have forgotten about the content of the White Paper. I reminded the Tunku and the rest of our team that if we had agreed to the notion of the common citizenship nothing could be done if Kuala Lumpur, for some reason later, would want to discriminate against Singaporeans. As I understood it, what was agreed in Kuala Lumpur was that those born in Singapore should not enjoy the same citizenship rights as those born in the Federation; any change in the citizenship law of Singapore would have to receive the concurrence of the Central Government. The Tunku admitted that he had forgotten the fine points and instructed Cecil Sheridan that he should redraft a reply having taken note of what was said in the discussions.

* * *

The Tunku and I took a few days holiday and played golf at Highgate Golf Club of which I am still a member. Razak and Tan Siew Sin left for home on August 2, 1962. The Tunku complained of his haemorrhoids which was causing him loss of sleep and therefore looked tired. The British Government had left us alone and we were in a restful mood. It was during these few days that I learnt that the Tunku was having some difficulty with his Minister of Agriculture, Aziz Ishak, about whom he confided in me a great deal. It turned out that Aziz did not favour the formation of Malaysia.

The Tunku and I, with his private secretary Nik Hassan, left London for home on August 6, 1962. Lee Kuan Yew was also in the same plane. When we arrived in Singapore, there was a mammoth crowd waiting for the arrival of the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew. Lee Kuan Yew spoke in Malay, English and Mandarin. At the end of his speech he shouted Merdeka Malaysia! When the

Tunku's turn came to speak he shouted *Hidup Malaysia!* A boy was heard to say loudly that it sounded like Dato Onn. On hearing the remark, the Tunku said "*Merdeka Malaysia*" but in such a soft tone that he himself giggled. I thought that was Tunku in his mischievous mood. His speech, however, was quite the usual stuff, purely thanking the people for such a grand welcome home and expressed his delight at the successful outcome of the Malaysia negotiation in London.

* * *

As soon as I got back to office, having cleared the backlog, I had a long chat with Razak. I had become rather concerned with the United Nations which could be used by Sukarno and the Soviet Union as well as other members who were in the camp of the so called "new emerging forces" to create difficulties for us and that we needed some friends in the UN and a team should go round to explain the Malaysia Concept to those countries in Africa. Hence it was decided that we should take every opportunity to attend governmental or non-governmental conferences and seminars in Africa and elsewhere in order to seize opportunities to explain the concept. Zainal Abidin Sulong had started to organise the visits and diplomatic offensive.

It had become our concern in Kuala Lumpur, due to the various statements from Sukarno, that the formation of Malaysia might be construed as the emergence of a new entity and her admission would be vetoed in the Security Council. There would be demands by the Decolonisation Committee of UN that it should first examine the issue and be satisfied. I was then toying with the idea of getting approval of Parliament to have the name of the Federation of Malaya changed to Malaysia well in advance. Later, by invoking Article 2 of the Constitution, Parliament might just admit other states to the Federation. I was then advised by Razak that we should keep the idea but in the meantime to work for international acceptance.

* * *

As a result of discussions between the Tunku, Razak and I, it was decided that Razak should visit Brunei to call on the Sultan whom he knew well when they were studying at the Malay College, Kuala Kangsar. It would be polite to brief the ruler on what took place in London between the Tunku and MacMillan. Of course, the British, through their High Commissioner, White, would have kept the Sultan informed but we thought that any discrepancies in the versions which inadvertently or otherwise might get distorted or stilted on the way could be corrected by Razak. Razak wanted me to accompany him and we left for Brunei on August 16, 1962.

The flight was by a Dakota, a rather reliable plane, but very noisy which spared us from talking to each other. It would be shouting if we had tried. I had informed the Sarawak Government that Razak would be passing through

Kuching but without stopping on our way to Brunei. On arrival in Kuching, two senior British officers from the colonial administration, Shaw and Ratcliffe whom I knew well were at the airport and brought us to the VIP room. While Razak and Shaw had their conversation, Ratcliffe and I were able to exchange some thoughts. I told him generally what happened in London and clarified the point that there was an unpublished understanding about the possibility of an earlier transfer of sovereignty. This particular issue was not really understood as yet in the colonies but that to me was not surprising since the agreement was not going to be published. However, I told Ratcliffe, which I was certain he would pass to the Governor and everyone else, that Kuala Lumpur would be doing its level best to obviate such a situation and that we would favour that Malaysia would come into being on August 31, 1963. The Tunku would seek to avoid any possible contingency of Malaysia emerging earlier than August 31, 1963. Although the Tunku had agreed with MacMillan as to the interim measure of the role of British Governors, it would just make life miserable for Malaysia, which could easily be accused of wearing the mantle of colonialism.

Ratcliffe described to me the general situation in Sarawak and assured me that it would be plain sailing. Opposition particularly among the natives and the fence-sitter Chinese had melted except the hard core CCO and their front organisations. In fact after the Tunku-MacMillan statement, these groups had hardened their opposition even more. Of the British expatriates, nearly everyone would go along and many would want to stay. He said a few would leave in a huff on Malaysia day and he mentioned particularly a name which I noted. I had no intention of doing anything about it.

Shaw had shown to Razak the reception programme for Lord Lansdowne complete with a guard of honour that would be a befitting welcome.

We arrived in Brunei at about 1 p.m. and were met at the airport by the Mentri Besar Marsal and the British High Commissioner White. The MB whisked us away to a seaside restaurant for lunch after which he brought us to an audience with Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin at the Istana.

The Sultan looked genuinely happy to receive Razak, his schoolmate in whom he had a great trust as an old friend. His Highness, after the pleasantries, opened up by saying that with regard to the Malaysia plan the Brunei Legislative Council, had resolved to agree in principle. The State Government had set up a committee of about twenty people and had been made to work out the details as to the requirements and terms of merger. Once that was done, the two governments could begin discussions.

Razak responded in a very correct and suitable court language first conveying the greetings of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the Tunku, then went on to explain the purpose of his visit which was to convey to the Sultan regarding the latest development in London. Razak spent a bit of time to relate to the Ruler but did not reveal the unpublished understanding about the reserved crash programme. But he did emphasise that Brunei could enter the

Federation at any time and Razak indeed urged the Sultan that Brunei should join first as early as possible since there was already a willingness to be part of Malaysia. According to Razak, who had been briefed about the local political situation, that any delay would provide an opportunity for disruptive elements to create havoc.

Then came questions only from the Mentri Besar addressed to Razak. Firstly, he asked about the status of Brunei in Malaysia. It would seem to me at first that the Mentri Besar was more concerned with form than substance. But the form was in respect of the Sultan and the question of sovereignty arose. That was substance. Razak explained that there would be a transfer of sovereignty in respect of North Borneo and Sarawak since sovereignty in the colonial territories rested with the United Kingdom. In the case of Brunei, sovereignty transfer did not arise since it rested with the Sultan. Razak turned to me as if asking for confirmation but I kept a straight face.

Then the Menteri Besar started talking about Parliament and elections for which Brunei might not as yet feel ready and quibbled about irrelevancies like the term merger which was not a legal word but used by the layman. He was speaking like a school teacher who got lost in the details of his subject waffling all the way through. It might not make sense to an outsider but, as a Mentri Besar of a Sultanate which was run like an estate or a private property, it occurred to me then that he made a lot of sense. What I thought originally was form to him was also substance in view of the situation pertaining. Razak offered to provide further clarification if needed but he thought the committee which was mentioned by the Sultan could resolve many of the issues raised by the Mentri Besar. The Sultan sat smiling all the way through and alternately looking at the Mentri Besar and Razak as each one spoke. I suspected he was enjoying the intercourse and must have been pleased with his Mentri Besar who gave at least a hint of what would be regarded as priority to Brunei.

The Sultan was extremely gracious and his hospitality was overwhelming. He gave a dinner in honour of Razak complete with a *zapin* party, a dance particularly popular among the Pahang people. I think the origin of the dance must have been from West Asia or Turkey. As a boy, I remembered even partaking in the steps and the dancers were all men. It had rather simple steps of shoving forward and backward and twirling round which I thought must have been practised by Sufis or religious leaders to encourage the idea of unison. Now the dance has become folksy and we see them performed together by males and females which would certainly not receive the approbation of the Sufis of the old days.

After dinner, Aziz the Malayan legal officer seconded to the Brunei Government as its Legal Advisor, came to see me and discussed the situation in Brunei. He confirmed what had already been generally known to our side that Party Rakyat was greatly influenced by the Singapore Barisan Sosialis and Azahari was often seen in Singapore in the company of Lee Siew Choh and

Bani who also made frequent visits to Brunei. For the moment, it would appear that Party Rakyat would be used by Barisan Sosialis to frustrate the formation of Malaysia and if that failed with Brunei in Malaysia the Barisan Sosialis would bring Party Rakyat in an alliance to be the opposition in the new Malaysia. Even at that time, Party Rakyat posters and pamphlets were printed in Singapore with the assistance of Barisan Sosialis.

I informed Aziz that the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) also was busy infiltrating and subverting Party Rakyat. Three Indonesians had been employed in a printing press owned by Azahari. Quite a common method of establishing a position by elements which were indulging in political action or espionage, and we knew for certain that they were close with Azahari - the Party Rakyat leader. What appeared to me to be highly dangerous and more so than in Sarawak or in the states of Malaya was that because in Brunei the communists were aiming to have a native base. Native based communism might make it easier for communists to infiltrate the natives of future Malaysia.

The Special Branch in Brunei I discovered was very lax. I had once brought to the attention of the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur that the PKI elements were training some Party Rakyat members in armed combat and warfare in a place in Kalimantan. The British laughed it off saying it must be Indonesian boy scouts. Such a response could only come from a sloppy intelligence network in Brunei. The only explanation for this laxity was that the British officials who were responsible for the security of Brunei had become disinterested because of the Malaysia plan or perhaps the local staff or agents, being relatives of members of Party Rakyat, no real intelligence could be collected. There was the possibility of a deliberate non-action on the part of the British officials to allow for the development of a situation which would abort the Sultan's decision to join Malaysia. They and the communists might be using Party Rakyat to achieve the same objective but for different reasons. These of course were in the realm of speculation but future events showed that even without the Malaysia plan the internal security of Brunei was in dire need of greater attention.

I requested Aziz that he should be in touch with the top British Special Branch officers and to encourage them to be more vigilant. If they proved obdurate then I could take the matter up with the British Government who in the circumstances could not ignore the development in Brunei.

Aziz and I agreed that I should brief Razak about the political and security situation in Brunei. We went to see Razak as he was about to go to bed. By the time I had completed my briefing he was more awake than I was. He agreed to see Azahari to listen to what he had to say. In the meantime we had to take care not to offend both the Sultan and the Tunku who had grown to dislike Azahari's politics and would not want to have anything to do with him.

I went to Seria to play golf and on the way I noticed hundreds of posters bearing the buffalo head, Party Rakyat symbol with various slogans. There

were a few posters of independent parties and no doubt judging from the campaign alone, Party Rakyat would have the support of the people of Brunei. The Party was well organised and looked as if it had a great deal of funds for the local elections.

At Seria, Pengiran Yusuf, one of the strong supporters for Brunei's entry into Malaysia was there and with another Malayan I played nine holes of golf then returned to Brunei town to have lunch with Razak and the Mentri Besar.

Once again, the Mentri Besar asked Razak who was the guest of honour at the lunch, a number of questions regarding Malaysia. This time he was accompanied by his advisers. The Mentri Besar sought clarifications which were easily answered but he kept coming back on the matter of the constitutional position of his Sultan.

Towards the end of the clarification session, I asked the Mentri Besar that since His Highness and the Legislative Council had expressed favourably regarding the Malaysia plan, what steps had been taken to inform the people about Malaysia and if any assistance was required from Malaya in that regard. The Mentri Besar replied that the people had not been informed because the committee had not as yet worked out the details.

I said surely the people would not know nor care for details at this juncture but they would be extremely keen to know what the general concept was. The Party Rakyat was having a great time condemning the concept without even a squeak from the Government side defending what the Sultan and the Legislative Council had agreed to in principle. I impressed on the Mentri Besar the importance of information among the people.

If not for the nagging question relating to the constitutional position of the Sultans in Malaysia, I could be truly amazed at the inertia of the government machinery considering that the Ruler and the Legislative Council had expressed support for the Malaysia plan even if it was in principle. I had been told they did not have copies of the Cobbold Commission Report which would have given them some idea of things to come. However, until His Highness was certain of his own position, I doubted if Malaya and Brunei could have a really meaningful dialogue.

While I was golfing in Seria in the morning, Razak had a quiet meeting with Azahari, the leader of Party Rakyat. Razak related to me that Azahari would like a meeting of all political parties in the three Borneo territories. He made no conditions and no demands but simply asked that he be recognised as the spokesman for his people so that he could control them. He also asked that his colleagues should also have the opportunity of meeting with Razak. It was agreed that a meeting would take place at 7.15 p.m. that evening.

I was with Razak when Azahari, the Party Vice President Hafiz Laxamana and Tengah the Treasurer of the Party arrived. The conversation began rather light heartedly and could have ended as a mere courtesy call. However, the atmosphere began to be serious when I dropped a remark why the Brunei Malays found it difficult to cooperate to actualise Malaysia. Azahari quickly

responded that Brunei Malays were always ready to cooperate with the peninsular Malays. Then I said why did we not get on with it. There was a sort of embarrassed laughter. How much of the Malaysia plan did they know; not much was the reply. Azahari said I was wrong in the Cobbold Report to say that 80% favoured Malaysia in the two territories. Razak replied that the conclusion was not mine alone but it was unanimous. Azahari then suggested that I should stay for two weeks in Brunei so that there could be a leisurely discussion in order to obtain a better understanding. I said I would love to be in Brunei even longer than two weeks but the responsibility of explaining the Malaysia Concept rested with the Brunei authorities. I could be accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Brunei if I did that.

After a little more polite conversation and their expression of confidence in winning the coming local elections, they asked to be excused. As I walked with Azahari down the steps, he said he would like very much if I could go to his house that night. Since I had accepted an early dinner invitation by the High Commissioner I could only meet with him after 9.45 p.m. He said he would send a car for me.

The dinner given by White, in honour of Razak, was rather unspectacular. However, I had a little more time to speak to Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf who were also at the dinner about the need for information. White said that he had talked to the Mentri Besar about information; hopefully, I thought, something would be done in that regard.

Pengiran Ali said Azahari had informed him by telephone that he had met Razak who had invited him to a meeting. I said the truth was that Azahari had asked through Aziz, if he could see Razak and we managed to persuade Razak to agree to see him. I told Pengiran Ali that he had invited me to his house after that dinner. However, I told Pengiran Ali it did not matter who initiated the meeting. The important thing was that Razak met Azahari and I was going to meet him also. Such meetings might be helpful.

Before dinner I had told Razak that I was visiting Azahari after dinner. He agreed and joked about it that if my body was found floating down the river he would know who to suspect! What a gruesome thought.

After the High Commissioner's dinner was over, Razak showed the film of the Tunku's return from London. While this was going on, I left the party quietly. Aziz, our legal officer in Brunei, drove me back to his house and soon, Tengah and another person arrived and they took me away to Azahari's home. Until today, I could not remember where the house was.

Azahari was in a congenial mood when he received me. I saw Hafiz Laxamana and a few others there which meant I would be talking to the top brass of Party Rakyat. I was quite pleased with the opportunity of meeting with them.

After some polite conversation and light-hearted remarks about anything and everything, Azahari suddenly made a remark which jolted me somewhat. He said he had heard from other sources that I was a Malay chauvinist. I told

him that if in my work I had been constantly protecting the interest of the Malays which made it appear that I was a chauvinist, I could not help that. Few people like me who came from the ulu and had suffered during our young struggling days the hardships and rigours of the underprivileged, we could not help but feel strongly for the poor in the *kampung*. They happened to be Malays. I admitted to him that I was brought up in a family of Malay nationalists and some members of our family had suffered detention at the hands of the British. My uncle, my mother's brother who brought me up, was released from Outram Road Prison in Singapore by the Japanese after they had captured Singapore. This upbringing and nationalist spirit made me extremely concerned to see that the well-being of the Malays would be improved. I said the Brunei Malays had only to reckon with the feudal élitist class. We, in Malaya, had in addition to deal with the Chinese who were better off economically than the Malays. On independence, we were left with a very uneven playing field. That had to be corrected. However, at no stage did I feel resentment against other races and indeed some of my best friends were among non-Malays and even some English people too.

I did not know if I had talked a bit too much about myself but intuitively I had to impress on Azahari that my nationalism and concern for the well-being of the people need not make me a chauvinist or that I should not consort with foreigners.

That triggered the serious question about the Malaysia Concept. Azahari said that the Sultan had not done anything so far to make a clear declaration of support for Malaysia. His statement had been very guarded and it almost sounded as if he was not sure what he was talking about. The Sultan did not categorically say that Malaysia would bring advantages to Brunei. Instead he gave the impression that he was going to find out as to what would be the *faedah* or benefits. This kind of presentation confused the people.

Azahari asked if the Sultan had made specific proposals to us. I told him candidly that all the Sultan and the Mentri Besar did was to seek clarification regarding the Malaysia plan and about the latest Tunku-MacMillan statement. I offered the thought that the Sultan would make proposals or demands only after he had crystallized his thoughts as advised by the committee that had been set up to examine the concept. Azahari said that the advisers of the Sultan were politically illiterate. He ventured to suggest that the Sultan's demands might not be acceptable to the *rakyat* and Malaya. Azahari said he would then take advantage of the unreasonable demands to abort the formation of Malaysia. If the Sultan seriously wanted to join Malaysia and if Malaya wanted Brunei, then both the Sultan and Malaya should realise that the Sultan should invite him and his party for discussion of the points before presentation. The Party had to be identified with the demands and conditions for Brunei's entry. If there would be agreement of terms and conditions then Brunei entry would be a smooth sailing since he envisaged his Party would control the legislative body.

At that stage, I began to see that he was manoeuvring for a position of being able to hold the trump card. I did not think he would even want Malaysia because he was too committed to the anti-Malaysia groups both in Singapore and Indonesia. If he held the trump card, he would be able to do what he liked which would not be in the interest of the formation of Malaysia.

Azahari asked me to explain in some detail the Malaysia Concept using my knowledge of what had been agreed to between the Tunku and MacMillan and between the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew. I took the risk of telling him those things because I wanted him to know that as far as Malaya, the United Kingdom and Singapore were concerned, they were very serious about Malaysia. I gave a signal that whatever the anti-Malaysia groups wanted to do Malaysia would be inevitable.

Strangely, he said he was happy to hear the position of religion and language in Malaysia. Then in earnest, he asked what kind of representation was envisaged for Brunei in Parliament. He thought Brunei would get no more than two seats. I replied that it might be more because weightage would be considered for Brunei. He seemed pleased with my remark perhaps he had presumed that the weightage would be based on democratic electoral arrangement.

While on the subject of Parliament he said that some of the Pengirans had already been thinking about being a minister in the Federal Government. I said the usual thing to happen would be for the Prime Minister to choose someone from a party who supported the Alliance Party and who had the support of his own party. This was a hint to him that if Party Rakyat supported the Alliance Party then he, if he should become an MP, or one of his boys who was elected to Parliament, would stand in good stead. But I thought he himself would prefer to be the Mentri Besar in Brunei.

Then, for some reason he started to be very defensive about Party Rakyat. He said whatever people said about Party Rakyat it was not a left-wing party; in fact there was very little difference between his party policy and that of the Alliance. He claimed that the elections manifesto was quite similar to what the Alliance stood for. How could Party Rakyat be a left-wing party or socialist or influenced by communism when Hafiz Laxamana the Vice President was the richest man in Brunei. I jocularly remarked that Hafiz supported the Party to prevent it from going left. In any case, he was not the richest man in Brunei. Everyone laughed understandingly. Azahari went on and on to explain that Party Rakyat had all sorts of people as members and officials including highly religious-minded people and therefore it could not be communist. By this time, I had begun to realise that Azahari had accepted my remark on the same assumption as I had entertained that there would be democratisation of Brunei in Malaysia.

I told Azahari that I got the message but I asked him not to be concerned with what other people think of Party Rakyat. If as he said was all true then there would be no difficulty in cooperating with the Alliance Party and later

in Malaysia be a component. However, he said, there was a big problem of his relationship with the Tunku. Azahari claimed that at first he and the Tunku were friends; but of late he felt that the Tunku no longer liked him. I said he should not find it too difficult to see the Tunku and be friends again if it was true as he claimed. He and his men should visit Kuala Lumpur and not just Singapore and I winked. Everyone laughed.

Azahari said the visit to Kuala Lumpur would have to take place after elections. When I asked him if he would have any objection to UMNO members visiting Brunei he said he would welcome them as the guests of Party Rakyat with open arms. He murmured something which I gathered that he was annoyed at not having been informed regarding Razak's visit.

The subject of Malaysia returned as the centre piece of our conversation. One of them asked what would happen to the Constitution of Brunei. I said it would be incorporated in the Malaysia Constitution as a Constitution for Brunei. That, according to Azahari, would not be acceptable unless certain changes were made. Of course that was the idea I said. Azahari said of what use Malaysia was to Brunei if the Constitution of Brunei did not have a fully elected legislative council. I said in Malaya there was an arrangement known as the Essential Provisions to democratise a member state. In fact it would be rather awkward if Brunei alone, among the fourteen states of Malaysia, did not have elections. But that was a question which he should do battle with the Sultan. Malaysia would not be a good idea for Brunei if the state could not hold elections. In the depth of my heart, I agreed wholeheartedly but I did not reveal to him what I thought on this very important issue. However, it stuck in my mind that while Azahari and I were poles apart, on this issue we were *ad idem*.

I elaborated a little more as to why he had to work closely with the Sultan regarding what demands Brunei should make before joining Malaysia. This was related to the question of the independence of the member states. For instance, the Central Government's economic plans could be implemented only with a great deal of difficulty and diplomacy in the state of Kelantan which was governed by Party Islam (PAS) which was not a member of the Alliance. He agreed that that would be a negative point and could not serve the people well. He then told his friends how very progressive the development plan in Malaya was. He had gathered this from one of his relatives currently working in Johore.

Azahari was full of praise for the Tunku and no doubt was intended to be conveyed to the Tunku. He said the Tunku was a very sincere man and he began to mention other political leaders whom he had met. He regarded Nehru was not the same as the Tunku although Nehru was just as sincere. Sukarno's personality was different from that of the Tunku. Azahari thought when he met Nasser in Egypt he had a feeling that the Tunku and Nasser were rather alike. I did not know if the Tunku would consider that a compliment. Azahari sounded so sincere when he said he had a high regard and respect for the

Tunku. It was wonderful he said, when the Tunku gave a touching speech at the state funeral of a political opponent, Dato Onn.

On citizenship, he agreed with what I thought would go into the Constitution of Malaysia. However, Azahari objected to states in a Federation having control on matters of immigration. He advocated free movement of people within the same country otherwise the trend for separation would develop. I could not agree more with him but the people of Sarawak and North Borneo were afraid of being flooded by people from other parts of Malaysia. Azahari said those fears were unfounded and they could be overcome by a careful explanation. I told him I had gone to North Borneo and Sarawak several times including the visit made as a member of the Cobbold Commission. I found there was this fear which might be unfounded but the existence of fear was real enough and had to be reckoned with. There was no doubt in my mind that Azahari's thoughts were greatly influenced by the Indonesian principle of a unitary state. But he said he admired the Malays who were less than 50% in population but were able to place Islam as the religion of state whereas Indonesia with 80% Muslims could not do it.

Then I gave him the question that I thought I should ask him anyway. If, as he said, he had a great deal to admire the leadership, the Government and the concept of the Federation of Malaysia, why could he not change his mind and support the Malaysia plan. His reply was that at that stage, nobody knew enough about Malaysia. What he would prefer, as he had suggested to Razak in the morning, was a meeting of all political parties in the Borneo territories with the view of forming an alliance. And if that alliance could support the Malayan Alliance Party, that would be the strongest combination.

He then suggested to me that I should persuade Donald Stephens and Datu Mustapha to take the initiative of calling a meeting of all political parties including those who opposed the Malaysia Concept. Then he revealed his leanings when he said that SUPP in Sarawak would follow his lead. Azahari was manoeuvring to get into a position where he had to be reckoned with and if he had to hold hands with the Federation Alliance Party, it would be on the strength of his Borneo alliance. This would be a great mistake since the Tunku's mind did not work that way but on trust and faith in wanting to collaborate for a common ideal. The Tunku could not accept someone in his fold who would continuously pose demands or political points simply because he thought he had the leverage. The Tunku would accept friendship not because of strength but of sincerity and like-mindedness.

On the whole, I was quite satisfied with my meeting and this might yet hopefully be the turning point in the Brunei political development. But Azahari was tricky and politically cunning. I thought the Tunku and Razak would have a rough time if Azahari was in Malaysia as a political ally or worse as a foe.

On August 18, 1962, we called at the Palace to seek permission to return to Kuala Lumpur and once again Razak impressed on the Sultan as to the

importance of joining Malaysia early and also about informing the people. At the airport, the Mentri Besar who was sending us off asked me what I did last night. I requested him to ask Aziz who had been briefed to tell those who wanted to know that my meeting with Azahari was to explain about Malaysia and to invite him and his boys to Kuala Lumpur. The Mentri Besar was suspicious that we might have a secret deal with Azahari and he seemed to know that I had met Azahari the previous night. His spies must have reported that I left Azahari's house well after 1.00 a.m.

When we got back to Kuala Lumpur I gave my candid assessment of Brunei. I told both Razak and the Tunku that Brunei would be the most problematic in Borneo. Azahari and Party Rakyat would support the Alliance if they had enough strength of their own and not simply because they were invited to do so. The political situation might turn out to be unmanageable and there might be instability which could hinder our development programme. On the other side of the coin was the Sultan who would never agree to democratisation taking place in Brunei. I would find it very difficult to explain particularly that Malaysia was democratic when a state within the federation existed without democracy, it would stick out like a sore thumb.

Added to these two, the people of Brunei being Malays, had a kind of complex which manifested itself against the Malayan seconded officers. The "Congo" syndrome would get worse and not better when the police and armed forces came to be under the control of the centre in Malaysia. They, starting from the Sultan and the ruling élite, could not or refused to understand the concept of a democratic federation. As for me, I declared to the Tunku and Razak that I could never come round to thinking that Brunei should be in Malaysia. After all, the state was rich and homogenously Malay. The natives did not have the same problems as in North Borneo or Sarawak. As far as I was concerned, I could not be enthusiastically working for her entry into Malaysia.

I revealed to the Tunku and Razak that this nagging question of the position of the Sultan was related to his status as absolute monarch with which he was not prepared to compromise by being a constitutional ruler. The Tunku, supported by Razak, contradicted my surmise. They thought that the Sultan was anxious to know if his precedence among the Malay rulers would be determined by the date of his ascension to the Brunei throne or Malaysia Day. If it was the former, he would be the next Yang di-Pertuan Agong. I did not argue any further although my mind was convinced that the Sultan cared very much not to be herded into the crowd of constitutional rulers even if it meant to be the next King. I thought he knew his priority. I simply told the Tunku and Razak that I would prefer not to have Brunei in Malaysia until the ruler was prepared to have elections and to be a constitutional monarch.

I suggested to the Tunku and Razak that Brunei was encouraging the formation of Malaysia simply to frustrate the British plan of creating a Borneo federation which would also threaten the constitutional position of the ruler. I

did not think the Sultan would be very serious about Brunei's membership in the Malaysia Federation if the position of the Sultan would be likened to the other Sultans in Malaysia. Very candidly, I submitted to the Tunku and Razak that Brunei in Malaysia without democratisation would be like a drop of indigo in a pail of milk. In any case, once North Borneo and Sarawak achieve independence through Malaysia, Brunei too would not remain long as a British protectorate, and then we would have one more independent Malay country represented at all international forum. All we need to do was to assist the state to play its role as an independent member of the family of nations.

* * *

Azahari on two occasions, once with Razak and the second time with me, had proposed that all political parties irrespective of their inclinations towards Malaysia should meet together to discuss the Malaysia plan. In fact his political party, the Party Rakyat, was one of five members which formed on June 26, 1962 the Council of Joint Action to wreck the plan and to oppose the Singapore merger.

The Singapore Referendum was to be held on September 3, 1962 and the Council of Joint Action had urged the people of Singapore to cast blank votes. Barisan Sosialis was at the forefront.

When the Referendum result was announced, the Barisan Sosialis and the Council of Joint Action managed to get over 144,030 blank ballot papers out of nearly 692,800 electorates of Singapore. The people of Singapore came out to vote although it was not mandatory and the majority voted for Singapore joining Malaysia while retaining local autonomy in labour and education. There was no riot, no public order situations and everything ran smoothly and orderly. There were no cries of foul play or rigging even if the questions in the Referendum were loaded and the choice limited.

Azahari, in talking to Razak and I in August, which meant after the formation of the Council of Joint Action in June 1962, could have calculated that the Council of Joint Action would not be able to outwit Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku and that Singapore would find a way for merger. He therefore thought that if all the political parties in North Borneo and Sarawak could be gathered together there would be a fair chance for him to persuade them that the best thing for the Borneo states was to make haste slowly like climbing the "nibong" tree, according to the Ibans. Any procrastination would enable Azahari to control Brunei and as everyone by that time had already known that there would be no Malaysia if only it was a Singapore merger. Azahari would have another weapon with him to wreck the Malaysia plan if he was able to organise a rebellion in Brunei by which event the other two states would get cold feet.

Azahari, when meeting Razak and later with me, was extremely confident that Party Rakyat would win the first district council elections on an anti-Malaysia platform. This he did on August 30, 1962 by winning sixteen elective

seats. The Council membership was thirty-three and Azahari could count on some votes from the appointed and official members. It may be recalled Azahari, true to form, submitted a motion calling for a North Borneo Federation, which the British had at first promoted but rejected by the Sultan, and would not be part of the Malaysia plan. He and his Indonesian Partai Komunis Indonesia and Barisan Sosialis friends had thought this out carefully as a sure spanner in the wheel. The Sultan who was keen to keep his option open about Malaysia, postponed several times the meetings of the Council with the view of disallowing the motion.

* * *

On December 7, 1962, Azahari after consulting his friends in Singapore, went to Manila and from there pressed the button for a rebellion which was crushed in a matter of days. Azahari had declared himself the Prime Minister of the new state of Kalimantan Utara which, by Indonesian definition, would include North Borneo and Sarawak and not just the Sultanate of Brunei. This was a source of embarrassment to the leaders of North Borneo and Sarawak, except for the SUPP and the communists. It had been intended as a supportive exercise for the anti-Malaysia elements in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore.

Azahari later sought refuge in Indonesia. He and his communist cohorts in Singapore and Indonesia were encouraged by some Philippine leaders who had designs over North Borneo had failed to wreck the Malaysia plan. However, it provided a factor which would loom large in the mind of the Sultan.

Nevertheless, Malaysia was formed. And I believe to this day that the absence of Brunei in Malaysia was welcomed by the Sultan who had not favoured the practice of democratic elections whereas Malaysia would be doomed if a part of its territory was not subject to democratic elections and a government of one of its states was an autarchy and feudalistic. However, the journey to the fateful destination would not be without its ups and downs and not without meandering and a great deal of waste in time, resources and manpower.

As mentioned earlier, I had been as candid as possible in my reporting to the Tunku about Razak's visit to Brunei and my own impression and indeed my lack of enthusiasm in attending to matters pertaining to that state. The Tunku at first chided me for this attitude of mine since Razak had given him a picture of optimism that Brunei in Malaysia would change and that the same effort must be given to Brunei to persuade her to join Malaysia, as Zainal Abidin Sulong had been doing in the other two territories. The Tunku later sympathised with my feelings since he knew now better what CONGO was all about and that the Azahari propaganda, on using the Barisan Sosialis and PKI line that Malaysia would be colonising Brunei, had been effective among the populace.

The Tunku, nevertheless, valued Razak's unflagging optimism and enthusiasm for Brunei's entry and that I should give all my support to

Razak. I promised him to do so but I could not resist telling the Tunku that Party Rakyat was capable of being more than a nuisance with Sukarno's support and I would shudder to think of treating Party Rakyat as we had been treating the communists. Once in Malaysia, I believed Party Rakyat would be a Trojan Horse for the communists, and for the ambitious Sukarno. The Tunku assured me not to be overly anxious and said that Brunei was smaller than Perlis!

After the failure of Barisan Sosialis and the Council of Joint Action to frustrate merger in the Referendum exercise in Singapore on the third of September, the emergence of Malaysia became imminent. The negative elements prevailed on Azahari to play his last card which was the shortlived rebellion of December 7, 1962. Azahari had hoped that with the success of the Brunei rebellion he would be in a position to influence the other two states to stand against the Malaysia Concept, thus satisfying his anti-Malaysia friends in Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. When the attempted coup failed, he was immobile and later found a home in Indonesia. With the demise of the active role of the Barisan Sosialis in Singapore his link with them ceased to be of any consequence.

However, the activities of Party Rakyat had some impact on the Sultan. He could no longer take his people for granted including those in the security forces. He had the choice of going alone if he had wanted to bring Brunei in Malaysia or alternatively to continue to obtain the British protection during which period a system would be devised for the defence of the throne in the form of loyal mercenaries in the event of the British deciding to leave the Sultanate. The throne would be well protected from any internal conspiracies. He had no real fear of any external threat since Brunei borders were well guarded by the British before Malaysia and by Malaysia thereafter.

The Sultan appeared at first to be inclined to take the first alternative since he might have been persuaded by the Tunku, but he would need to examine the constitutional position of Brunei and the throne in Malaysia.

* * *

By September 1962, the Sultan decided to send his negotiating team to Kuala Lumpur. Raja Azam, a Malayan civil service officer serving as the Brunei State Secretary had suggested to both the Brunei and the Malayan Governments that the time was then propitious to begin discussions on the Malaysia plan.

When the views of the Brunei Government were made known to Kuala Lumpur, Razak quickly instructed that a Malayan committee be formed composed of Dato Abdul Aziz bin Majid, the Chief Secretary to Government; Nik Daud, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Interior and Internal Security and Aziz Yeop. They were to discuss questions of details initially among Malaysians only. It was decided that four working parties be established to work out the subjects relating to the legal and constitutional implications

of Brunei in Malaysia, the service establishments, finance and her structure and Education in Malaysia. The Malayan officials had a preliminary meeting with Razak in the chair and it was decided that because of the difficulties with two subjects, namely the administrative and civil services and education, the Principal Establishment Officer and the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Education should also be included. Razak also considered that I should also be available for consultation because I was the project officer for Malaysia and had taken part in the discussions in London before and after the Cobbold Commission. But Razak knew I had little enthusiasm for an absolute Sultan in Malaysia.

Raja Azam, the Brunei State Secretary, had sent a message on behalf of the Brunei Government to Kuala Lumpur giving the composition of the Brunei team. It was as follows:

- (i) Mentri Besar, Dato Setia Marsal bin Mann - Leader
- (ii) Timbalan Mentri Besar, Dato Setia Pengiran Haji Ali - Deputy Leader
- (iii) Pengiran Kerma Indra Dato Paduka Haji Mohammad bin Pengiran Piut
- (iv) Timbalan Setiausaha Kerajaan, Dato Setia Pengiran Haji Mohd. Yusof
- (v) Haji Jamil - Secretary to delegation
- (vi) Salleh bin Haji Masri
- (vii) Neil Lawson Q.C. - Adviser
- (viii) Attorney-General, Dato' Abdul Zain - Adviser
- (ix) Mohammad Taib bin Munap - Adviser
- (x) Radin Mas Ismail bin Awang - Stenographer

The delegation was to examine the various facets of the Malaysia plan and the position of Brunei therein and to make recommendations to the Sultan who had expressed positively that the Malaysia plan was a sound and an attractive proposal. He wanted to know what were the essential terms of entry that would ensure the safety and safeguard the interest of Brunei.

The Brunei delegation, although led by the Mentri Besar, was represented by Neil Lawson Q.C. on the first day. The Sultan was also in Kuala Lumpur, close at hand for consultation.

Lawson made the initial move by explaining the sovereign position and the status of the subjects of the Sultan. He was empowered to seek clarification with regard to the Malaysia plan while admitting that the Sultan had already accepted in principle that Brunei should join Malaysia as declared in the Brunei Legislative Council. It was therefore important that the Sultan should be satisfied with the measures safeguarding the interests of the people of Brunei which were political as well as economic.

The Brunei delegation went at length to explain the position of Brunei which should be regarded as different from the other territories to be included. The essential differences could be broken up as follows:

In relation to North Borneo and Sarawak, Brunei had been fully self-governing since 1953 and that there was a strong nationalistic feeling in

Brunei. Brunei was favourably placed in financial, economic and other aspects compared to other territories which had been proposed as component units in Malaysia.

It was pointed out that Brunei defied comparison with the Malay states in Malaysia since she had no experience of being a member of a federation and that a state in the Federation of Malaya had a fairly advanced degree of political development and naturally looked towards the federal form of government rather than towards the development of a state government.

Unless the Sultan was thoroughly satisfied with the safeguards in respect of the prosperity and welfare of the people of Brunei, His Highness would look upon the participation of Brunei in Malaysia as a retrograde step.

The presentation made no indication as to the constitutional position of an absolute monarch in a federation but the reference to "the prosperity and welfare of the people of Brunei" sounded somewhat familiar. The "people" and the "Sultan" were synonymous.

As an opening remark in reply to Lawson, Razak reminded the Brunei delegation that the views of the Malayan Government on Malaysia had already been made known. The ultimate success of Malaysia hinged on the point that all participating units were equal partners with the sincere desire to form one single nation. While assuring the Brunei delegation that it was never the intention of Kuala Lumpur to supplant Whitehall, Razak denied categorically that there could be no other question but that Brunei should be in Malaysia as an equal partner in a federation. He reiterated that if Brunei delegation insisted on maintaining the characteristics of Brunei as explained by Lawson, then it was better that Brunei should not come in at all. That pleased me extremely.

Lawson said that Razak should appreciate the special position of Brunei and asked whether nationhood could be forced upon a people. Razak countered that it was inescapable that in the context of the Malaysia Concept that all should belong to one nation. It had become obvious to me, listening to the exchanges, that Lawson was making a try-on and Razak was replying in kind as a preliminary dance in a *silat* performance.

The conditions which Lawson set out as necessary were that the new Federation should be responsible for external affairs, defense against external aggression and guarantee the position of the Sultan and also the state Constitution. This point in relation to the guarantee of the status quo confirmed my view that the Brunei delegation did not want to be in Malaysia as a member of a Federation but would want Kuala Lumpur to replace Whitehall as a protector power.

Lawson continued as Razak did not appear to take much notice of the last point. While the Brunei government accepted the concept of common citizenship, the control of immigration in relation to the Borneo territories should remain with the Brunei Government. Lawson suggested that the Central Government should establish a consultative machinery on matters of

common interest such as finance when assisting Brunei in its development problems. Brunei would not insist on representation in the Federal Parliament but would welcome a degree of representation as observers in Federal organs of Governments such as the National Finance Committee and the National Land Council. The delegation hoped that Brunei would have some kind of representation in the *Dewan Negara*.

Lawson admitted that Brunei was simply seeking to obtain full internal self-government. Razak was getting somewhat crimson in the face and replied almost curtly that it would be difficult to accept the Brunei stand on Malaysia and would not be in the interest of Malaysia to accept such terms. Such an arrangement would not be acceptable in which case Brunei should not participate in Malaysia at all, said Razak in a tone which I thought was firm.

The meeting on the following day, September 26, 1962, started by the Mentri Besar appealing to Razak not to slam the door on Brunei. He requested that the Malayan side should give more details of the plan. Razak replied to the Mentri Besar by saying that as far as he could gauge from the proposals made by Lawson the previous day, it was clear that Brunei accepted in principle the Malaysia plan but the approach appeared to be different.

Razak continued that the proposed Federation of Malaysia was to be on the same line as the existing Federation of Malaya. A Federation would need a strong Central Government and if such an arrangement was opposed by Brunei then the Malayan delegation would not be able to accept the Brunei proposals. In the Malaysia Concept, Brunei would *mutatis mutandis* have to make certain sacrifices for the common good.

At this juncture, Lawson intervened by saying that the sticky point seemed to be Brunei's insistence on having full internal self-government. Therefore, it was important to know what the major subjects were which would be transferred if Brunei entered Malaysia. Razak simply replied that the subjects concerned would be generally on the basis of the present Federal Constitution.

The Mentri Besar rather softly and in a very conciliatory tone said that the Brunei delegation had decided to participate in this talk to ascertain the views of the Federation of Malaya with regard to Brunei's entry into Malaysia. In the view of his delegation, the Mentri Besar pointed out, there were three reasons behind the proposals to form Malaysia: first, a quick independence; second, the ability to withstand communist threat and subversion; and third, assistance to under-developed states. The Mentri Besar said that his delegation had no mandate from either the Sultan or the Legislative Council to change their position as presented by Lawson the day before. Brunei was not prepared to lose her existing constitutional authority and the powers of the Sultan.

The Brunei stand was a great disappointment, Razak said. Brunei, he reminded the meeting, while claiming to enjoy power, was still under British protection. The purpose of Malaysia was to establish a Central Government

and Brunei would be a part of that government which would be responsible for foreign affairs, defence, internal security and other matters as well. If Brunei claimed to have full powers, the Central Government could not have jurisdiction over those subjects.

At that point, Razak looked at me as a signal to intervene. I thought he had said all that needed to be said. Since my last visit to Brunei, I had felt that Brunei to be in Malaysia would have to be treated very differently but such a treatment would pose problems in the other constitutional Sultanates of Malaysia. Already a very broad hint had been given that they were not interested in the representations in Parliament which meant they were not prepared to have elections. I would rather leave Brunei alone and I had already told the Tunku and Razak about my attitude towards Brunei. Now this delegation had confirmed my worst fears.

In response to the signal from Razak, I thought it would be a waste of time for me to say much except to draw Lawson's attention to the fact that Brunei was not the only place where a strong feeling of nationalism existed. Nationalistic sentiments were also strongly felt by the people in the various states of Malaya and in Sarawak and North Borneo. It was that sentiment in Malaya which brought Merdeka. And it was this same sentiment which brought forth the Malaysia proposal with a constitution in which this nationalism could be harnessed to forge a strong and viable nation. Brunei nationalism would have an important role in this process if she shared her sentiment with those of others who were all placed on equal footing. If my meaning of nationalism had equated that of Party Rakyat, I must have put the fear of the devil among the Brunei delegation.

The Menteri Besar then stated that it was abundantly clear to his side that the Federation of Malaya would not accept Brunei's proposals and conditions for entry into Malaysia. Since the delegation had no mandate to change their stand, he would have to report back to the Sultan. The first meeting with Brunei thus came to a close with an assurance from Razak that Malaya was prepared for further talks at any time.

The two day meeting served to emphasise the degree of differences that prevailed between the two sides. Razak had left the door open. Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur told me that the Sultan was greatly surprised at the way the Malayan delegation had reacted to the proposals made by Brunei.

I briefed Tory on what had taken place and words used. I informed Tory that my impression was that Brunei had in mind replacing London with Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia was eventually to give independence to Brunei. This of course was a non-starter. The Sultan had no grounds to claim that he did not know what Malaysia was all about.

The Sultan and his advisers had read the recommendations of the MSCC in which Brunei actively participated even if she was an observer. The Cobbold Commission Report was not a strange document to Brunei so also was the

decision taken by both the Tunku and MacMillan after the Report was submitted to them. Furthermore, Razak and I had been in Brunei and had discussed all facets of the Malaysia plan with the Sultan who could not feign ignorance. I ventured to suggest to Tory that in reporting to the Sultan, the Mentri Besar for reasons best known to himself must have exaggerated the way Razak had responded to the Brunei proposals hence his surprise to learn of the Malayan reaction.

On December 27, 1962, Tory wrote a letter to the Tunku conveying a message that on their own accord Brunei had wanted to resume discussions on Malaysia and Brunei's entry. The British High Commission in Brunei had reported to London that Brunei's "Malaysia Committee" had decided to open negotiations again this time without the conditions previously required on the side of Brunei. Azahari's abortive coup in December must have made the Sultan feel the urgent need to seek further clarifications. Brunei took advantage of the door that had been left ajar by Razak who promptly and positively responded. The new approach, as recommended by the Brunei-Malaysia committee, would deserve the highest consideration.

I had my own suspicion. The Sultan was a very astute ruler and extremely intelligent. He must have concluded that no way could Brunei join Malaysia other than on the same status for the Sultan with the other rulers. The existing Brunei Constitution would have to be drastically changed and that, understandably, the Sultan would not be willing to do. Neither could he, without loss of dignity and face at this moment in time, reject the Malaysia plan on the ground of the absolutism of the monarchy. Other reasons would have to be found and with some trepidation, I went to the meeting.

The Azahari attempted coup in December also had an impact on the Malayan side. The Tunku had promptly instructed the security forces to be ready to whatever might be needed to keep Brunei from falling into communist hands or those of their proxies. I was to take charge of the security of the two sons of the Sultan who were then schooling in Kuala Lumpur. This I did most unobtrusively until they were in the safety of the Brunei Palace. At that time there were a number of elements who were in sympathy with Azahari and his Party Rakyat in Malaya. Manila, PKI of Jakarta, Singapore Barisan Sosialis and the Iron Curtain countries were supportive of Azahari, which made the Tunku anxious about the security of the two loveable princes, the elder of whom would someday succeed the throne. Had the insurrection achieved success, it would be regarded as an anti-colonial war and the intervention of the United Nations on behalf of the rebels would have been secured.

The Sultan was filled with anguish that his own people had revolted against his person. In his public statement he said that he had given the most searching consideration for many months regarding his views on the future of Brunei. He would delay no longer in reaching a decision. He therefore had decided that a formal discussion be started with the Government of Malaya on

the possibility of Brunei joining Malaysia. He came to Kuala Lumpur and met with the Tunku towards the end of January 1963 and announced on the third of February that the inter-governmental discussions would resume immediately.

The Brunei delegation arrived on February 4, 1963, this time headed by Dato Setia Pengiran Ali, the Deputy Mentri Besar. Other members were Pengiran Yusof, Dato Paduka Haji Mohamed, Haji Jamil bin Omar, Idris Talog Davies (Attorney-General) and Dato Neil Lawson Q.C.

The Malayan side was headed by Razak and assisted by Tan Siew Sin. Ten senior officials were made members of the delegation. I was also requested to partake in the discussions. I recalled the opening meeting was held on the seventh of February at the Operations Room in Razak's Ministry of Rural Development. It was an unimpressive place, rather bare and untidy with maps and graphs on the walls and documents lying all over the place. There was a big frame with sliding boards; on each was shown the progress of development on a given subject. The table was utterly unattractive and chairs hard, the kind supplied by the Public Works Department. It was nothing like the upholstered halls in the other conference rooms.

However, it was a place where the most serious work was being done for the development of the rural communities in Malaya which had gained a world reputation for efficacy and sound results.

Razak welcomed the Brunei delegation and expressed his genuine pleasure that the talks were being resumed. There was plenty of pleasantries and the Brunei leader replied with equal grace and politeness that only royal court officials could perform. It was a delight for me to watch the proceedings and the tension which emerged at the end of the previous meeting was no more.

Then Neil Lawson spoke in well-measured tone but being a non-Malay, unaccustomed to the Malay form as expected was devoid of that genteelism of a Malay gentry. He plunged headlong into business by saying that the Brunei Government had accepted, as a basis for discussion, the broad structure and framework set out in the Federation Constitution. He added that he would prefer to deal with the whole subject generally under a series of heads:

- (a) the Sultan should have the precedence laid down in Article 70 of the Constitution and guarantee as laid down in Article 71.
- (b) the Sultan should be a member of the Conference of Rulers in the same position as the Rulers of the other Malay states. As for Schedule Three, the Sultan's position should be as from the date of his accession to the throne; i.e. he should not be entered in the list on the date Brunei joined Malaysia.
- (c) the Sultan and his dynasty should be in line for appointment to the position of Head of State which preserved the monarchy and the present lineage would be in perpetuity.

Razak interjected that (a) and (c) would be easy enough to look into but for (b) the Malayan Government would have to reserve its position since this was

a matter for the Conference of Rulers to decide. Lawson or anyone from the Brunei side did not throw in any points for discussion but I saw everyone profusely making notes.

The matter of the state religion was then raised by Lawson. Brunei would accept the application of Article 3(1) and 3(2) and of Article 12(2) and 38(2) of the Federation Constitution all of which laid down that the Conference of Rulers would decide on the extension of any religious acts, ceremonies, etc. in Malaya. Of these, Article 3(1) might give rise to some discussion. In the Brunei Constitution Islam was the state religion but other religions could be practised lawfully. Article 12(1) of the Federal Constitution referred to the provision of funds for educational institutions. The practice in Brunei was that mission schools were in fact discriminated against in comparison to other schools. Lawson said that so long as the mission schools complied with the requirements of the law and educational standard, Brunei would be prepared to accept that those mission schools would not be discriminated against.

Lawson then referred to the question of citizenship which Brunei could accept but would wish to be clarified as to the status of those people in Brunei on Malaysia Day which belonged to the following three categories. First, subjects of the Sultan. He answered the question himself by saying that they should automatically acquire citizenship by Operation of Law. Second, British subjects ordinarily resident in Brunei having been born in any of the British territories. Again Lawson thought that this category on Malaysia Day would acquire citizenship by Operation of Law. Then there was the third category of some 14,000 people with the status of British Protected Persons, born in Brunei with permanent resident status without any nationality. Lawson wanted to know what would happen to them on Malaysia Day. Sheridan, the Malayan Attorney-General, replied that those British Protected Persons would be eligible for citizenship by way of registration.

Razak, in response to the questions made by Lawson and expecting more, at once suggested that the best way to deal with such problems would be to organise the inquiry exercise into two committees, one dealing with constitutional matters and the other financial matters with three or four members from each side. There was a great deal of head-nodding but without voices. Lawson continued with his presentation and referred to the subject of immigration control. The Brunei Government's view was that Brunei should have effective control over immigration into that territory. Lawson gave the impression that the control was in respect of Federal citizens only. Brunei would not agree to placing immigration in the Federal List unless by legislation enabling the power to be delegated to Brunei. Razak simply commented that the Central Government should have the sole right to determine who might or might not enter any part of Malaysia including Brunei in Malaysia. Anyway, Razak wanted this point to be disposed of by a committee. There was then no discussion.

The next point raised by Lawson was the judiciary. Brunei would support the idea of having three High Courts and a Supreme Court. However, the position of the subordinate courts should be preserved.

Then as if *en passant*, Lawson referred to the subject that I personally felt was of utmost importance to the concept of Malaysia and it was the democratic character of the nation and its processes. All he mentioned was that Brunei would want, like other states, two Senate seats. As for the Dewan Rakyat, Brunei anticipated that by Malaysia Day there would be a Legislative Council in Brunei again and Members of Dewan Rakyat should be chosen from amongst the Brunei Legislative Council. No indication was made with regard to a democratic process which would render to the people living in Brunei a direct representation in Parliament.

An impression had been given that democracy was not an important issue to Brunei. The issue foremost in the mind of the delegation was finance because it had been drummed into the ears of the Brunei people from the top of the social ladder to the water dwellers that Malaya was covetous of the riches of Brunei and it was for that reason only and no other that Malaya was keen to include Brunei in Malaysia. The seconded Malayan officers in Brunei had been subjected to humiliation and jeering with such words as to imply that it was poverty in Malaya which forced them to work in Brunei. The idea that Malaysia was a ploy to plunder Brunei of its wealth was started by anti-Malaysia elements whose appeal had seeped through to all levels of the society.

Lawson was only reflecting what was in the mind of the Sultan. I thought he did so not in an offensive way but rather mildly patronising in a voice he was accustomed to as an advocate in England; he wanted to make it perfectly clear as if there was a lot of fog and cobwebs in the Malayan mind, that Brunei had an annual revenue of about B\$110 million and of that figure some B\$40 million accrued from interests on accumulated investments and B\$60 million from petroleum. The remainder B\$3.5 million from customs and B\$2 million from currency profits and about B\$4.5 million from other sources. Lawson then presumed that the Central Government would not want to touch on incomes from investment capital or the investment itself.

Lawson had plunged into the question of revenue from petroleum which he said would be depleted in ten years' time yet he revealed that Brunei Government had just completed negotiation for a new and favourable agreement with the Shell Oil Company which would pay one part in royalty and the other part in tax.

The Brunei delegation, continued Lawson, appreciated that they would have to pay for the overall expenses being a member state of Malaysia but the crux of the matter was that Brunei was quite differently placed from any other state coming into the Federation. In an emphasis which some of my colleagues thought was rather offending, Lawson said Brunei was not interested in road grants or emergency grants. Brunei did not want any money from "you" and

Brunei would pay "you" and "we" would pay "you" a lot of money. But "we" would keep the oil. There was this "we" and "you" as if Brunei in Malaysia would remain as it was, a power independent of the new federation system.

I saw Tan Siew Sin, the Malayan Minister of Finance getting quite agitated as if he was about to burst. I knew Tan Siew Sin well. He was brought up in the best traditions of the *baba* who had much of the genteel nature of the Malays and also their pride. And Tan Siew Sin had been known to be highly sensitive. He could hold himself no longer when he heard the "we's" and the "you's" and the "yours" and interjected that he could not be a party to an agreement which in his view would bankrupt the Federation of Malaysia composed of all the states including Brunei.

Razak came to the rescue by suggesting a recess and that those matters raised would be considered by the two committees or working parties as proposed.

The Working Party on Constitutional and General Matters would use, as a basis for discussion, the structure and framework set out in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. The Malayan side was led by the Cabinet Secretary Abdul Aziz bin Majid, assisted by some senior officials from various ministries. On the Brunei side, the leader was Neil Lawson assisted by Talog Davies with four Bruneians. The Working Party on Finance was on the Malayan side led by Mohd. Shariff bin Abdul Samad, the Permanent Secretary of Finance, assisted by three officials while the Brunei side was again led by Neil Lawson with the assistance of Dato Setia Pengiran Yusuf, Talog Davies, John Lai and Isa bin Ibrahim. I was to assist the Malayan sides of both working parties.

The Working Party on Constitutional and General Matters met on three occasions while the Finance Working Party met five times. Since the Brunei delegation had regarded the matter of finance as somewhat more important than anything else the Working Party on Finance failed to reach agreement on two major points namely the minimum period to which the financial arrangements set out should apply and the level of Brunei's contribution. Although the Working Party had agreed on the principle of Brunei's annual contribution which Brunei would insist on referring it as "voluntary annual donation" should be written into the Constitution, there was no agreement as to the actual level of such contribution or donation.

The Malayan side had proposed that the minimum period should be the period during which the federal revenue from Brunei did not fall below B\$70 million per annum. The Brunei team had proposed that the annual "voluntary donation" which should be written into the Constitution would be a sum equivalent to a charge of \$350 per barrel of Seria Crude. This "donation" would be in addition to the other amounts receivable by Malaysia.

The Working Party on the Constitution and other matters could not reach a decision on the number of seats for Brunei in the Dewan Rakyat and the other matter was the position and precedence of the Sultan. It had become evident that the Working Party could never resolve these two problems which

were fundamentally political. The outstanding matters which the two Working Parties could not agree on were referred to the Tunku and the Sultan of Brunei. The Tunku and the Sultan met only with Razak present on March 1, 1963. I was not present and therefore unable to give an insight into what transpired. However, Razak had shown me a piece of paper written by Neil Lawson after the Tunku-Sultan meeting.

The note was to be treated as secret but I was not at all sure of its security status since I did not notice any date though duly signed by what was believed to be Lawson. However, it did indicate that after the Tunku-Sultan meeting, the Sultan and his delegation had a meeting and they had arrived at certain conclusions perhaps after listening to the reports from the Brunei delegation represented in the two Working Parties. The Sultan had revealed to the public that on the whole the main issues had been settled; and one of the unsettled issue was the financial question. The Sultan was careful to avoid the issue of his position in Malaysia and that of the representation in Parliament.

In the Lawson note, the Brunei side expected the Federation to agree to provide four seats in Dewan Rakyat. On the Malayan suggestion that Brunei should be prepared to volunteer additional financial assistance to Malaysia to meet emergency commitments, the Sultan was prepared to give a personal assurance that he regarded that as a moral obligation and it was unnecessary that it should be recorded. He was also prepared that when the Heads of Agreement between the two governments were initialled, a letter would be handed over to the Federal Government on behalf of Brunei to the effect that at any time during the period of 10 years beginning January 1, 1964, Brunei would be prepared, at the request of the Government of the Federation, to review this amount of Brunei's annual contribution to the Federation with the view to making such adjustments as would be appropriate to the financial position of Brunei and commitments of the Federation. It was becoming clearer to me that the Sultan was thinking of Brunei in Malaysia as a completely different state from the other states of Malaysia.

I expressed to Razak that first we should establish the *bona fide* of Lawson's note in particular the time when the Sultan was alleged to have made those proposals through Lawson. Razak requested me not to be unduly concerned since the contents could be tested through further discussions and that the Tunku himself would be dealing with the matter. Razak said the same note had been copied to himself, Tan Siew Sin (Minister of Finance) and to Sheridan (the Attorney-General).

The one aspect in the Lawson note which strangely did not emerge was the issue of the position of the Sultan in Malaysia. This subject had been presented with vehemence by the Brunei delegation who were mandated to indicate *inter alia* in the context of the ruler's position that Brunei would wish the Sultan to take precedence among the other Rulers according to the date of accession to the Brunei throne. The argument put forth by the Brunei side was that the Federation of Malaysia would be a new nation and not a continuing

Federation, hence all rulers including the Brunei Sultan should take their places in the order of precedence according to the dates when they ascended the thrones of their respective states. In their presentations, the Brunei delegation reminded the Malayan side that the Brunei Sultan had always been closely interested in the affairs of the Federation and forging close links and had always looked to the Federation of Malaya rather than elsewhere for assistance. The Brunei delegation reminded the meeting that Razak at a previous meeting had assured them that the precedence and position of the Sultan would be looked into.

It may be recalled that Razak did say in his intervention at the resumed meeting of February 7, 1963 that points (a) and (c) as raised by Lawson would be easy but the Malayan delegation would have to reserve its position on (b) which was the sole prerogative of the Conference of Rulers. There might be a genuine misunderstanding here. Razak, in trying to accommodate the Sultan, had made it appear that the question of precedence could be looked into but, as for Schedule Three relating to the election of Yang di-Pertuan Agong, it would be presumptuous on his part to dabble in what strictly belonged to the Conference of Rulers. The Brunei delegation did not make it clear that they were prepared to leave the matter to the Conference of Rulers after they had heard Razak, who could say no more than that. On the other hand, the Brunei delegation wanted a firm commitment from the Malayan Government on a matter with which they regarded as of utmost importance.

The Conference of Rulers had decided in March that the precedence and the position of the Sultan of Brunei should be related to the date of Brunei's accession to Malaysia which in Schedule Three, his name would be the last in the election list. I must confess that when I heard about it I was somewhat stunned because it emerged at a critical time which would have a strong bearing on future progress of the negotiations. My only hope then was that if there was a mutual desire to have Brunei in Malaysia, some way would have to be found to accommodate the wishes of the Sultan in respect of his position. I was certain in my mind that he would not mind at all if he was bypassed in the elections for the office of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong but that the Sultan would wish to retain his seniority among his brother rulers and of course maintain his constitutional right as an absolute ruler. I could not see him agreeing to a reform for democracy.

Returning to Lawson's note, the Tunku told me that he took it very seriously. He informed his Cabinet colleagues and, consequently, there was a sense of gloom and disappointment in the Cabinet and official circles. The Tunku sent a message to the Sultan referring to the matters raised in the Lawson note expressing the deep disappointment of Razak and Tan Siew Sin in respect of Brunei's annual contribution towards the Federation which was limited to not more than \$40 million. Disappointed though they were, the Tunku said he was able to persuade them to accept the Brunei proposal so that the issue could be settled early.

With regard to the point that Brunei was not prepared to enter into any agreement enabling the Federal Government to obtain some benefit from any substantial further discovery of oil in Brunei, the Tunku stated that such a decision was contrary to the Malayan Government policy and that decision would only lead to misunderstanding. The Tunku most humbly begged His Highness the Sultan to reconsider the matter.

The Sultan replied to the Tunku's message. In his reply he confirmed the intention of the Brunei Government to make a "voluntary donation" of \$40 million per annum for a period of ten years after which time the figure would be revised depending on the general financial position of Brunei. He, however, insisted that all revenues from oil should belong to the Brunei Government. Also, Brunei would not agree to enable the Central Government to obtain some benefit from oil assets. This was the response to the Tunku's humble request for reconsideration.

On the question of defence, the Sultan wrote that Brunei would make an outright contribution of \$5 million.

The tone of the Sultan's letter, the language used by Lawson during the discussions with Razak in February, that Malaysia was "your" idea and had nothing to do with "us" were clear indications that the Brunei élitist ruling group were labouring under the impression that Malaya was bent on including Brunei in Malaysia because of her money hence the hauteur in words and demeanour.

The Tunku once again sent a message to the Sultan on April 8, 1963 pointing out that the Central Government would not increase Federal taxation in the initial ten years which I thought was a generous concession. In the calculation of the Malayan side the Federal expenditure in respect of Brunei by way of administration and foreign affairs costs, defence and internal security costs would far exceed the \$40 million per annum as proposed by the Sultan. However, the Tunku wrote, the Federation Government would be prepared to accept the annual grant of \$40 million plus the \$5 million for the first year if the Sultan would agree that should Federal expenditure on account of Brunei prove to be more than the revenue received by the Federal Government, Brunei would make a further contribution to make up the difference.

The Tunku talked to me about the term used "annual voluntary donation" in respect of the \$40 million. I thought it was absolutely inappropriate. This point was included in the Tunku's message to the Sultan. According to the Tunku, the use of the term "annual voluntary donation" in respect of the \$40 million was not at all correct. This sum had to be paid in lieu of a source of revenue - income tax on profits. The Tunku would settle for such nomenclature as "annual contribution".

With regard to revenues from oil fields, the Tunku said that these would not be subject to any form of Federal tax for the initial ten years and therefore a major concession which of course could not continue *ad*

infinitum. The Tunku went into mathematics to show that the total annual Federal expenditure on account of Brunei would approximately be B\$59 million whereas the revenue accruing from the state would be B\$10 million. There would be an annual shortfall which the Central Government would have to cover.

Tan Siew Sin had been feeding the Cabinet with the financial outlook. According to the Finance Minister, after ten years when the "annual voluntary donation" would cease, Brunei would still continue to retain oil revenue. If oil revenue was excluded, the taxable capacity of Brunei would be very small indeed. Hence, again his outburst in one of the inhouse meetings, that Malaysia would be bankrupt if the Sultan's offer was accepted under any name.

Influenced by his Finance Minister, the Tunku, in the message to the Sultan, made the point that should the oil revenue of Brunei increase year to year, then it was only fair that the Central Government should share in any additional revenue which would accrue in Brunei.

Perhaps the point of the Tunku was not well appreciated because of the "blind spot" in the perception that Malaysia meant a domination by an extraneous authority in Kuala Lumpur like Whitehall. There appeared to be no understanding as how a Federation should work. The Brunei offer would simply mean that one component member would continue to enjoy surpluses while the centre would have to provide increasingly greater subsidies to bridge the gap between revenue and expenditure. In essence, other component states would have to indirectly contribute to make up for the deficit. That would be an intolerable situation.

Surely no respectable arrangement for a Federation would make a provision that any deficit should be made up by an appeal to one of the component states. It compromises the principle of a Federation to control the national, fiscal and financial policy and the apportionment of funds between the Federal and state governments. What was offered by Brunei was, in my view, as I told both Razak and the Tunku, a sure recipe for a Malaysia crumble.

For some strange reason best known to Brunei, it was Lawson from London who wrote to Razak expressing his deep disappointment at the stalled talk between Malaya and Brunei. I had a sight of the letter dated April 11, 1963 which I thought should have come from the Mentri Besar and not someone designated an adviser, living in a faraway place as London.

Lawson told Razak that he had been informed of a number of difficulties. He referred to the decision made by the Conference of Rulers alluding to the position of the Sultan in the order of precedence placing him last in the election list for the election to the office of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The second problem was that Brunei had asked for the exclusion from Federal powers of mines and minerals on a similar basis to the agreed exclusion of oil. The third problem was what the Tunku had written to the Sultan regarding

donation and finance, in particular the Malayan proposal that at the end of the 10 year period, the full Federal tax arrangements should apply to Brunei.

Lawson pointed out that the Conference of Rulers had erred because what was involved was the position of the Rulers within an entirely new Federation of which Brunei would form an integral part. He appealed to Razak to urge the Conference of Rulers to reconsider their stand. The lack of understanding persisted with regard to the Malaysia Concept which envisaged the admission of new territories into the Federation under Article 2 of the Constitution. In the discussions with the British Government that point was made clear. The name of the country might be changed; terms and conditions of admission may be provided for; but it was not to unravel the existing Constitution because to do so would require fresh negotiations between the existing rulers and between them and the people to form a Federation and in that situation no one could predict the time taken and the shape of things to come. If the Brunei advisers had done their homework, they would have sent an emissary to the Conference of Rulers to ensure the position of the Sultan. No Malayan ministers, not even the Prime Minister, would be in a position to represent Brunei in any discussion with the Conference of Rulers. If Lawson thought, as he wrote to Razak, that the decision of the Conference of Rulers was an insult to the Sultan, it was contributed in no small measure by the lack of insight on the part of Brunei as to the concept of Malaysia and the way how this problem could be resolved. There was an inertness due to attitudinal problem.

Lawson in his letter conveyed to Razak said that he had advised the Sultan to drop the insistence on the exclusion from Federal powers of mines and minerals on a similar basis as oil since Brunei's ownership of any minerals that might be newly discovered would not be affected anyway. Referring to the "annual voluntary contribution" he was surprised that Malaya was twiddling the Sultan's thumb too much. Brunei had always maintained the fundamental part that it should preserve its oil revenues and would want to keep that arrangement in perpetuity.

The Sultan did reply to the Tunku in a letter dated April 8, 1963. It was rather argumentative as if the letter had been written by one bureaucrat to another. However, the political Sultan never missed to remind the Tunku that the revenues derived from the soil of Brunei should belong to the state. He did not forget to use the term "annual voluntary donation" when referring to the \$40 million.

In response to the Tunku's mathematical presentation of additional costs in respect of defence and internal security, the Sultan argued that it would be almost impossible at best only speculative, to determine in monetary terms the cost of maintaining the stability of Brunei with the centre. The Sultan said that the Tunku's suggestions were quite unrealistic compared to what was claimed to have been already agreed to in the schedule to the proposed Heads of Agreement. The Sultan was generous enough to offer a handout of \$4 million to meet the immediate problems that the creation of Malaysia might entail.

Tan Siew Sin, in commenting on the Sultan's response, wryly said that those were the kind of terms usually meted out by a conqueror to the vanquished. I saw already that there would be a great deal of difficulty to bring about a meeting of mind over the issue of the financial arrangement which, in any case, in my view, was a red herring.

Razak and Tan Siew Sin went to London and met with Neil Lawson. It was an informal meeting and appeared to reach agreement on some points. I really admired the tenacity of Razak and Tan Siew Sin to pursue the matter to such length even after I had told them that the two sides did not have a common reference point.

Anyway, Razak reported that he and Lawson agreed that during the period of ten years beginning January 1, 1964 the "annual voluntary donation" might be reviewed. The second point on which they reached agreement was that if Brunei desired to retain all benefits deriving from oil and oil fields after the agreement period, then Brunei would have to pay an annual sum to the Central Government equal to the amount which the Centre would receive annually if taxation were imposed upon profits accruing from the oil industry. There were a few remarks made by Razak to me which I cannot now recall but Razak and Tan Siew Sin thought that what had been agreed to between Razak and Lawson could be the basis of a fresh discussion to break the deadlock. I was not as sanguine as Razak on the outcome of a new negotiation particularly after I had heard Tan Siew Sin talking to his officials referring to taxation on the products from oil. Furthermore there was no agreed formula with regard to the future oil discoveries. We were already deep in the quagmires of the mind-set of both the Sultan and the Malayan Minister of Finance.

The outcome of the meeting between Razak and Lawson provided another opportunity to the Sultan to make the move to reopen talks. He communicated his wish in a cable on June 3, 1963 to Razak that talks for the third time should be held in Kuala Lumpur. The Sultan indicated that the Mentri Besar would lead the team assisted by Lawson and eleven other officials.

This third meeting was held at Dewan Tunku Abdul Rahman on June 10, 1963. The Malayan side was led by Dr. Ismail and assisted by Tan Siew Sin, Sheridan, Aziz Yeop, Abdullah Ayub and ten other officials.

I was kept a running commentary as to what happened in the meeting. It was reported that after the usual pleasantries and preliminaries, the Mentri Besar of Brunei had stated that there were two matters on which decisions were still outstanding namely the question of the position of the Sultan and the financial arrangements. He suggested that the question of the position of the Sultan could be discussed later and this was agreed to.

It was conveyed to me that Lawson took over the discussion on finance and reminded the meeting that the Tunku's letter to the Sultan on April 8, 1963 had in fact been the subject of agreement during the February discussions. At the private meeting between the Sultan, the Tunku, Razak and Tan Siew Sin

on March 1, 1963 at Rumah Alang Anak Betatar, the Brunei Government palace at Ampang Road, Kuala Lumpur, all financial arrangements had been agreed to, according to Neil Lawson, subject to the three points namely that the Brunei Government should increase its annual payment to \$45 million instead of \$40 million, that Brunei should reconsider its stand on the question of allocating additional revenue accrued from new oil fields to the new Malaysian Government and the terms covering Malaysia's right to ask for a review of the amount of the annual payment during the first ten years.

Lawson said that on the March 2, he had circulated a letter dealing with these three points. On the fourth of March the Tunku, referring to Lawson's letter of the second of March, wrote to the Sultan suggesting that Brunei should reconsider its stand with regard to Malaysia's share in the increased revenues from further oil fields discoveries and the Sultan had given a negative reply.

The Federation Government therefore according to Lawson had gone back on its words on points already agreed. If the Brunei delegation could be convinced that the Tunku's four points were in conformity with the principles governing the establishment of Malaysia safeguarding the interests and status of the Sultan and his subjects, then Lawson said that he would undertake to advise the Sultan to consider favourably any new suggestions the Malayan side might raise.

Dr. Ismail, I was told, had been very patient, which, to those who had known him would regard that as out of character. He did not say much except that the Tunku as Prime Minister had consulted the Conference of Rulers with regard to the precedence of the Sultan of Brunei and in so doing, the Tunku had adhered to the Constitution. With regard to the first of March meeting at Jalan Ampang and other previous meetings, Dr. Ismail maintained that they could not be otherwise than provisional because it would require the decision of the Cabinet. The Cabinet had considered these matters and had approved except the four points as raised by the Tunku with the Sultan which required further consideration.

Tan Siew Sin categorically rejected the statement that the Federation Government had gone back on its words. The points made by the Tunku to the Sultan were in fact matters which were not resolved at the Brunei-Malaya talks at the end of February 1963. With regard to the so-called speculative and unrealistic figure submitted by the Tunku, the costs over defence and internal security had in fact been carefully worked out by officials of the Security Departments who had assured the Treasury and the Minister of Finance that they were, in the view of the Malayan Government, a realistic assessment.

The Brunei delegation had tried to give the impression that the Tunku's letter to the Sultan on March 8, 1963 was a binding document. However, the letter was clear enough that what the Tunku had tried to do was to set out the areas of disagreement in clearer terms. Tan Siew Sin reminded the meeting

that there could be some form of agreement if the modification reached between Lawson and Razak were to be examined in greater detail.

Dr. Ismail at that stage intervened by saying that the points made by the Tunku had as yet to be thrashed out and that the terms of Brunei's entry into Malaysia had to be considered in relation to the other states particularly the Borneo territories.

Tan Siew Sin returned to his London meeting between Razak and Lawson which had produced a satisfactory formula provided Brunei could give a firm and binding commitment to enable the new Federation to receive a share in the additional revenue derived from new oil discoveries.

They met once again on June 13, 1963 with the Malayan side taking the initiative to produce a piece of paper for consideration on the terms of the financial arrangement relating to the duration and review of the proposed agreement which, if there was a failure to reach agreement, the subsisting financial arrangement should continue.

The Malayan side also tabled a new draft to the effect that in the event of any new source of revenue, including that from new oil fields, whether or not of the same nature as existing sources of revenue at any time becoming available to Brunei, arrangement would be made to ensure that the Central Government should be paid by the state annually not less than the amount of revenue which would have accrued to the Central Government from such source, if the financial provision of the Federal Constitution had been applicable to Brunei as applied from time to time to the states of the Federation. The Malayan side insisted that upon acceptance of the principle of the annual payment of new source of income that the "failure to reach agreement" clause would be accepted.

All the Brunei delegation could say was that it would guarantee after ten years to make good any shortfall between Federal revenue and Federal expenditure. On the entitlement to any revenue arising from new sources including new oil discoveries of the first ten year period, the matter would have to be referred to the Sultan.

Just as the discussions were concluding, Lawson received a telegraphic message from the Sultan. The meeting was then adjourned. In the morning of the following day, the thirteenth of June at 9.30 a.m., the Tunku received Lawson who had requested for a meeting. Immediately after Lawson's departure, I was informed that the Tunku had sent a telegram to the Sultan inviting His Highness to meet with him in Kuala Lumpur. I had no idea of the content of the message the Sultan sent to Lawson but Lawson might have shown it to the Tunku. The Tunku's telegraphic message was in the Malay court language saying that a visit to Kuala Lumpur would provide the opportunity for clarifying certain points in the mind of the Sultan.

Now the situation was truly serious. Only the intervention of the Tunku and the Sultan could have saved the day though I doubted it. The gap was too

wide and principles were irreconcilable. The financial red herrings were strewn all over the place.

In response to the Tunku's message, the Sultan was gracious enough to come to Kuala Lumpur with an entourage composed of the Mentri Besar, Lawson and six other officials.

On the June 17, 1963, the meeting between the Sultan and the Tunku took place in the resplendent cabinet room in the Parliament building. By this time the Malayan side had begun to recognise that the Brunei side had regarded the Malayan team capable of committing the Government of Malaya whilst in their case they had to refer to the Sultan as the authority. The Malayan side thought that the Brunei negotiating team was under the impression that the Heads of Agreement agreed to by Razak was automatically agreed to by the Government since he was someone with authority in the Government. The Malayan negotiators now had just begun to understand that the Brunei team had no experience of democracy and the working of a cabinet system.

Because of that, since the Sultan, the final authority in Brunei had come himself and could commit Brunei on the spot, the Tunku brought his team comprising Razak, Dr. Ismail and Tan Siew Sin so that he too could make a decision without referring to the Cabinet if he could get the support of these three very senior ministers. I was roped into the group of advisers together with Sheridan, the Attorney-General and three other senior officials.

The Tunku, after warmly welcoming the Sultan and his delegation said that it was absolutely necessary to resolve all the outstanding issues between Malaya and Brunei at that talk before the final negotiations with Britain for the establishment of Malaysia.

It was Lawson who said that there were several outstanding matters on the financial questions. My mind was agog seeing a scene that here was a negotiation between two Malay teams using the English language to facilitate a better communication with advisers. While Lawson was on the side of Brunei, the Malayan side had Sheridan as its legal adviser, also an Englishman whose knowledge of Malay was suspect. As far as I could remember, the Sultan never used English although he understood every word spoken. He also had a very soft voice speaking in whispers and he would hardly have been audible unless the meeting had provided microphones and loud speakers. The Tunku had forbidden microphones lest it might inhibit people from speaking candidly. It was therefore natural that a Q.C. should be the Brunei spokesman since the Mentri Besar himself was not proficient in the English language. Whereas, on the Malayan side, all the Ministers were at home in both languages though the Tunku might find some difficulty of being understood if he had burst into the Kedah dialect as the Sultan had once told me during dinner in a Malayan navy boat anchored in Brunei harbour.

Lawson listed the four thorny problems: one, the question of new oil discoveries during the ten years period; two, the nomenclature annual

“contribution” and annual “donation”; three, the question of mines and minerals; and four, the question of what was to become of the arrangements after the ten year period. Lawson said that the Sultan was very unhappy that Malaya was seeking to retract from the position reached previously. He himself also shared the same view and he had been authorised by the Sultan to express the royal unhappy sentiment. Nevertheless, in spite of all that the Sultan, according to Lawson, would wish to proceed with the negotiations so as to consider possible solutions to outstanding issues.

Referring to the question of precedence of the Sultan, Lawson took great pains to point out that His Highness himself had never indicated that he should benefit personally but what concerned him was the legal position of Brunei. As I listened carefully, I thought the shroud of “precedence” to cover the “status” of the Sultan in the new Federation was masterly.

As that stage, the Tunku suggested that the Sultan could meet the other rulers informally but Sir Omar shied away murmuring that it would be embarrassing for him to raise the question of his own position. The Tunku made it clear that he or the Government had no *locus standi* and in this regard could not interfere in the deliberations of the Conference of Rulers.

Lawson contended that there was no need for the matter to go before the Conference of Rulers in the first place. I had no doubt that he was going to project the argument that Malaysia was a new arrangement and not the admission of state under Article 2 which, as Sheridan correctly pointed out, that non-compliance with Article 38(4) would infringe on the status of the present and future rulers.

Here was an example of two Englishmen, who in their own way, brilliantly produced an argument which was circular and devoid of a common reference. If the Malaysia Concept was the unravelling of the Constitution of Malaya letting loose all states each independent since the abrogation of the protection treaties with the British in 1957 and a fresh negotiation was to be organised with Brunei as one of the parties, then Lawson was correct. But the egg could no longer be unscrambled. If Article 2 of the Constitution was applied to Brunei then Sheridan was correct. Sheridan did not point out that Article 38(4) was applicable if it had followed Article 2. And if Article 2 could not be accepted by Brunei then there was no further argument but that the unwilling element could not be absorbed into the body politic.

It was the Sultan at that stage who suggested that the matter should be left alone for the moment and the meeting should proceed with, according to him, more important issues. He understood the problem well and would not want to break the negotiations on that score.

Tan Siew Sin who I thought until the end never understood the ball game made the move back on the financial arrangements which were still unresolved. The Sultan said that the Malayan side had put forward the formulae, one dealing with the position after the ten year period and that the terms of that arrangement should be subject to review. If the two Governments

failed to reach agreement then they were to revert to the *status quo ante*. Tan Siew Sin believed that that would be favourable to Brunei. The second formula which of necessity hinged closely with the first was that there should be a legally binding obligation on the part of Brunei to regard any new sources of revenue including new oil discoveries as subject to the provisions of the Federal Constitution. Now everyone was back chasing the red herring.

Lawson said that he had explained the Malayan proposal to the Sultan whose response was that there was an assumption in the proposal that the Governments in 10 years' time would consist of reasonable parties and men working together for the same ends because unless the Governments in the territories of the new Malaysia were in that frame of mind, the Federation had not much chance of success.

As I listened to Lawson with His Highness nodding his head with a smile, I could not help thinking that here was a game being played with each side using its own rules. The Malayan side was using the paradigm of a democratic system that things work out according to the democratic Constitution even if men and political parties came and went. But Brunei was working on an ossified system where no change was expected and change would be resisted as dangerous and threatening to the system. My mind's eyes panned to the Selangor Club *padang* where a surrealist crowd was cheering in a "football" match on a pitch with one side using the "rugger rules" while the other "soccer rules". Both sides were indeed playing a game of "football" and there was no referee to suggest whether it was soccer or rugger even if it was known as "football".

Lawson continued with his presentation and suggested that there should be a thorough review of the financial arrangements and the terms should be spelt out to indicate the financial position of Brunei at the end of the ten years and the Federal position in relation to Brunei. This position is the amount of Federal revenue from Brunei and Federal expenditure in respect of Brunei including expenditure for transfer subjects and also contribution to overall expenditure. At this juncture, Dr. Ismail interjected that it was essential for Brunei to contribute to the development towards a strong Malaysia which also meant a strong Brunei.

Speaking of the review of the financial arrangements at the end of the ten year period, Lawson suggested that such a review should be undertaken by the two Governments concerned. If the Governments could not reach an amicable settlement, then an independent assessor from within Malaysia should determine the question. The independent assessor could be nominated by the Lord President of the Federal Court.

Then, Tan Siew Sin came out with something which I thought the Brunei side never had expected. He said any reference to the financial position of the Federation would include the reserves of Brunei. Tan Siew Sin explained that if Malaysia were to approach the international money market for loans, the latter would examine Malaysia's reserves as specified in the financial

publications of the International Monetary Fund before sanctioning any loans. Then it would be read that while Malaysia possessed a strong external reserve, yet she still wanted loans. Tan Siew Sin also said that the annual contribution of \$40 million would not be sufficient. Any new agreement should not lead the Federation into a loss as a result of total exemption from taxation.

Lawson said that Brunei would not agree to her financial position in relation to her accumulated resources being considered in any review and he rejected Dr. Ismail's suggestion that he should persuade the Sultan to change his mind.

Dr. Ismail having heard the stand of Brunei, as explained by Lawson, said that any review must take into cognisance both the Federation and states, in this case Brunei's reserve. If, as suggested by Lawson, only the Federation's financial standing was subjected to scrutiny, then a completely distorted picture would emerge.

Lawson said that the fundamental point was that the accumulated wealth of Brunei was something that was held in trust for the people of Brunei. I wondered what an English Q.C. meant by that. He categorically said that the Brunei delegation would not consider any suggestion that sought to subvert this fundamental point. The Sultan's view was that the review of the financial arrangements at the end of the ten year period should be based on the financial position of Brunei at that time and the new Malaysian Government's revenues from an expenditure in respect of Brunei at that time.

Lawson said that if the Sultan's views were accepted by the Malayan side then some form of written agreement should be drawn up. I wondered why Lawson a Q.C. would resort to a separate agreement. It might have been closer to the mark if he insisted on the clause to that effect in the Malaysian Constitution. With regard to the question of future oil discoveries, the Sultan, according to Lawson, was not in any way prepared to accept terms that imposed an obligation on Brunei to pay a share of revenue for future oil discoveries. Lawson claimed that when the question of oil revenue was previously discussed, an assurance was given by the Malayan delegation that Brunei's oil revenue would be protected.

The Tunku then brought up the subject of the nomenclature for the transfer of \$40 million per annum from the Brunei Government to the Central Government. It would be acceptable if it was going to be known as "annual contribution". He could not agree to the term "annual voluntary donation". The implication of such a term on the whole Federation of Malaysia would be very serious. The basic principles underlying the Federation of Malaysia was the duties, rights and responsibilities of the states as units of the Federation. If there was going to be any special exception, exemption and qualifications the Tunku said that it was going to make Malaysia a very strange Federation indeed.

Some discussions took place and it was finally agreed that there should be

an interpretation clause to explain the meanings in English and Malay the term "annual contribution".

Tan Siew Sin raised the question of mines and minerals because it would be possible that new minerals might be discovered in Brunei. Tan Siew Sin also spoke of export duty and quoted rubber as an example; a source of revenue would come from export duty. If the state governments were to maintain that such an export duty was state revenue then the Federation would simply wither away because there would be no revenue. For these reasons, the Central Government should have the powers of taxation on mines and minerals in Brunei. In order to allay the fears of Brunei, the Central Government would be prepared to give an assurance that the powers of taxation would not be used in such a manner as to prevent the economic exploitation of new mineral revenues. This was accepted. With that, the meeting adjourned.

On June 19, 1963 the Tunku briefed the Cabinet on the outcome of the various discussions with the Brunei delegation culminating in the final meeting between himself and the Sultan on the seventeenth of June. He then sought advice of his colleagues regarding Brunei's entry as a state in Malaysia. After a lengthy deliberation, it was decided that the Federal Government should have the power of taxation as set out in the Federal Constitution over new oil finds five years after the old fields were found; or alternatively the Brunei Government should pay in lieu thereof a contribution equivalent to the expected revenue. The Government further decided that the Malay term *derma sukarela* could not be accepted to convey the same meaning as "annual contribution" as suggested by the Sultan. It was also decided that there should be a provision of the Federal Constitution which should apply to new sources of revenue, including new oil discoveries, mines and minerals or alternatively the Brunei Government should pay in lieu an amount equivalent to the tax yield had such provision been applicable. As a compromise, however, the Government agreed that the Federal Constitution would not apply to new oil discoveries for the first five years of Malaysia.

The Tunku had revealed to the press that in view of his intending visit to London in a few day's time to finalise and sign the Malaysia Agreement with the British Government in respect of North Borneo and Sarawak, he would expect a reply from Brunei to the final offer of her admission into Malaysia. Razak had written a letter on June 21, 1963 and handed to the Sultan who was still in Kuala Lumpur, conveying the final decision of the Cabinet. The Sultan left on the same day for home, seen off at the airport by Razak who told the press that he thought Brunei would join Malaysia by the thirty-first of August, because the difficulties were not too great. But a Brunei source told the press that Brunei was anxious to join Malaysia but would do so on her own terms. The Tunku fired a salvo that Malaysia would come into being on August 31, 1963 with or without Singapore or Brunei.

On June 29, 1963, the Sultan replied to the correspondence of the twenty-first in Malay expressing regret that he was unable to accept the offer contained therein even as a basis for further discussion. The Sultan added that, as he had said earlier on if the terms were in accordance with the objectives which he had offered and the assurances which had been given to him regarding the special position of Brunei, His Highness would be happy to consider them.

The Tunku's salvo was not one of welcome but farewell to Brunei. That was how I perceived it. The Sultan indeed had played his card well. It was the question of money that failed and Kuala Lumpur was seen as a grabbing octopus. Yet all these matters of state and federal lists would be consequential if the fundamental question of status of the Sultan in Malaysia was resolved. Perhaps, the Tunku himself being a prince understood how to save the *air muka* (embarrassment) of another prince even at his own expense.

By the time we got to London to finalise the Malaysia Agreement, the Tunku and Razak were quite clear in their minds that the Sultan had rejected Malaysia and there was no way that he would agree to be a signatory. As I had mentioned earlier, I had lost enthusiasm over Brunei since my visit with Razak in 1962. And as the discussion went on and on, the picture became clearer that there was a monumental attitude problem on both sides. But that did not worry me too much because with better contacts and communications, the problem of relationship would not arise. However, what worried me about Brunei was the lack of contact between the élitist governing group and the people, so much so that it was possible for Azahari to manipulate the masses. The British officials for whatever reasons were not giving their best and the seconded Malayan officials were not allowed to. Therefore, Brunei, to me had two intertwined problems, namely the question of democracy and the role of Party Rakyat.

I had, for some time, been made aware that Azahari using his party was working towards the creation of a North Borneo Federation with himself as the Prime Minister and the Sultan as the constitutional head. This was similar to what the British had in mind. I had suspected that the Sultan knew of Azahari's thinking and no way would he wish to be a constitutional head. Hence, his way of frustrating Azahari's hope was not to agree to democratisation. When rather limited elections took place at the behest of the British Government, Azahari showed his fangs and claws too early in the day after the Party Rakyat success at the August 30, 1962 elections. I was horrified in Kuala Lumpur to hear that Azahari had called for a North Borneo Federation. Twice before the idea had been mooted by the British and twice spurned by the Sultan. This time the Sultan simply ignored it until the unexpected happened. His subjects revolted. It is now a matter for speculation as to what would have been the picture in Borneo if Party Rakyat called for a Federation of North Borneo or the revolt had succeeded. Azahari had, previous to that, made contacts with his cohorts in Sarawak, the SUPP and the

Barisan Sosialis in Singapore and Donald Stephens of North Borneo. Already the SUPP of Sarawak, Barisan Sosialis of Singapore and Party Rakyat of Brunei had formed the anti-Malaysia front.

These left leaning parties including those led by Boestamam and Nazar Nong in Malaya were already in touch with Azahari on the platform of *Melayu Raya* a residue of the Malay nationalist days in the interwar years. Likewise the PKI in Jakarta was using Azahari for their own ends but would as a matter of tactic allow the *Melayu Raya* concept to be the motivating force. After all Philippines were also Malays. Was not Rizal a great Malay hero? In Manila, the Sabah claimants had their own agenda and Azahari would have been a useful tool. Hence he was given a special treatment during the Brunei revolt which was ordered from Manila.

Brunei therefore appeared to me something which would bring with it some formidable problems in Malaysia if it became a component state. With undemocratic Brunei in, Malaysia could never claim to be based on parliamentary democracy and that would be a target of attacks. One of the states in Malaysia would have an anomalous position including financial arrangements as to create envy and jealousies among the others. Malaysia would be a strange kind of Federation indeed as the Tunku said and would not stand the test of time.

Discussions on the formation of Malaysia, official or private, had taken place on a number of occasions within a golf club or the golf course itself or before or after a game of golf. Golf was never very far in the minds of those who were concerned with the formation of Malaysia, except perhaps Tan Siew Sin who had a great aversion for the game. This was caused by his failure to take a swing at the ball on the tee but hit the ground, a foot before it. He remarked that the game was too silly since he was not allowed to make a choice between hitting the small ball and the big ball on which the small ball rested!

The golf syndrome was an important factor in the formation of Malaysia. The Federation would be like a golf club. A golf club would have its own club rules. At the same time it would have for members the rules and regulations of the game of golf whose system would facilitate every player to partake without feeling disadvantaged or otherwise. That is the handicap system. If a member did not wish to recognise the handicap system then that member should not play golf. He need not have to join the club even. The Malaysia Concept provided for members a system which would level the position of its components. The one main difference was that there would be no article in the constitution of the Malaysia club to allow for resignation or to provide a full member with exemptions about voting rights.

The negotiations for the state and federal lists could be likened to be negotiations for the handicap system. This handicap system could be compromised by accommodation as often happened when players who were keen to play together knew that one of them was for some reason not up to the mark. To enable everyone to enjoy the game the handicap of the player

concerned could be revised. And the handicap system was always subject to revision or even private arrangement between friendly players. However, the main issue is that being a member of the club one should be willing to abide by all the rules of the Club (not of the golf game) without exception. Now if a person knowing all the rules of the club but would not wish to abide by one of them the negotiation for the handicap system among friendly players would be a futile exercise unless it is intended to show that a failure in not agreeing to the rules of the game would be a public *raison d'être* for not joining the club.

It appeared to me that Brunei did not like the club rule namely, the decision of the Conference of Rulers on the position of the Sultan but, more importantly, the democratisation of Brunei which would make the Ruler a constitutional head of Brunei. But the negotiations were about financial arrangements likened to the rules of the game rather than the rules of the club. The Malayan side was led to negotiate on the handicap system, in this case, the Federal and state powers. It seemed to me that the Federal Constitution would have to make important exception to the rule namely the democratic process and elections. Even if the constitutional rule about elections was compromised it was still powerless to compromise on the constitutional position of the Ruler. The Conference of Rulers would just not budge. The whole rigmarole could have been avoided if both sides had first placed on the table their respective bottom line position which was the position of the Ruler and if there was no agreement, time and efforts could have been saved. The impression which is embedded in people's mind was the handicap system (the question of state and Federal powers on finance) which caused the breakdown. And the world was so led to believe that.

The Sultan invited Razak to meet with him at his hotel in London when we were there to sign the Malaysia Agreement with the British and representatives of the Rulers. It was on July 5, 1963, a day before signing the Malaysia Agreement. Razak was elated and truly sanguine that the Sultan had come to London with the idea of making his best endeavours to bring Brunei into the club. Razak thought the Sultan did not want to be left out. I told Razak that I agreed with him regarding the sincerity of the Sultan wanting to bring Brunei into Malaysia. Having argued with him once more that Brunei would be a pain in the neck if she joined because she would not compromise on the process of democratisation, I supported Razak that at least we should hear him out.

And so we went to Park Lane where his hotel was. The Sultan greeted Razak very warmly since they were school friends at Malay College, Kuala Kangsar, the élite school for the children of Sultans and the Malay ruling class of Malaya. Also present with him was the Menteri Besar, Marsal. Very much like the Malay *silat* game it was played with the beautiful preliminary steps and dance. It was all very pleasant and nobody at all talked of the deadlocked negotiations. It was definitely a masterly evasion. Tea and cookies were served. Then almost at the last minute of the tea tete-a-tete, the Sultan in

his normal soft voice almost shyly asked Razak with regard to the position of the Brunei Sultan in the Constitution as if giving the impression that the question of state power did not matter that much, particularly the vulgar question of money. I was seated opposite the Sultan and Razak to his right and the Mentri Besar to his left. The Mentri Besar raised himself a little leaning forward to catch Razak's reply and Razak looked somewhat embarrassed. I expected Razak to take the official line and I knew that nothing would satisfy the Sultan other than the continuance of his absolute rule in perpetuity. And if Razak could give him an assurance that would meet with his wishes I was certain he would request for resumption of the financial talks which again might or might not baulk.

The financial factors would certainly be used again as red herrings to frustrate the process towards joining Malaysia even if there was a hint that elections would be mandatory by a certain date unless that date should be determined by Brunei which would be an anomaly if it referred to Federal elections.

It was with relief that I heard Razak in the most polite language, almost apologetic, reiterated the point that the matter could only be decided by the Conference of Rulers. The Sultan suddenly changed from the perpetual smile into a frown and that I knew was the time when in his mind he had finally decided not to join the club. Nothing more was said on that subject nor any other subject relating to Malaysia. After some further pleasantries including some comments on the unpleasant London weather which was not at all original, we took leave and the *silat* dance was concluded in the most graceful way.

In the car on our way back to the hotel, I told Razak that Brunei would not join Malaysia, certainly not during the Sultan's lifetime. Razak on the other hand, still believed that there was a good chance since the Sultan did not refer to the financial issues and therefore must have regarded them with flexibility. Razak said his main concern was his status and order of precedence. Then he asked me what I thought of the meeting. I said the Sultan was indeed very keen to bring Brunei into Malaysia but His Highness had never been very clear on how the Federation would work. I reminded Razak on the Sultan's statement about changes in leadership. Therefore he could have lived with any terms and conditions so long as he was convinced that he had a few friends or at least one powerful friend who could be his champion in the maze of Kuala Lumpur politics. He had been looking for that in the Tunku and Razak. It must have been to the Sultan's greatest disappointment that the Tunku had asked him to fight his case among the brother rulers and that Razak had no other reply but to refer the issue of the Sultan's position as beyond him. Then Razak almost in an annoyed voice said that he had no legal or constitutional way of assuring the Sultan regarding the status and precedence. I said, of course, the Sultan knew that but he and the Sultan had been longtime friends and Razak was expected to say in the most polite court language that he would carry on his

head the wishes of the Sultan and would present them to the Conference of Rulers for reconsideration of their previous decision. That would have been a demonstration of friendship and loyalty on which the Sultan could depend and for other issue as well like the elections.

I said the Sultan would have been very generous with the financial issues if he knew he had a faithful and loyal friend to represent his views vital to him which he could not expect Neil Lawson to speak on his behalf with success. Razak asked what would happen if he failed to convince the Conference of Rulers. I said it did not matter but for his purpose at that afternoon tea it was enough for him to know that Razak was on his side and would strenuously do his best on behalf of his friend, the Sultan. The Sultan must have believed that if Razak and the Tunku, the two whom Malayan royalties respected very much, would stand by the Sultan and cogently speak for him, he would get what he wanted. I said I was sure the Sultan was sensitive to the fact that the moment Brunei became a state in Malaysia he would some day though not immediately lose his present power in Brunei. His dependency syndrome had dictated that he had to have protectors. Following the discussions in the Brunei-Malaya negotiations, if Kuala Lumpur had a plan to replace the British, it might have been easier to manage the relationship which would be familiar to Brunei, but of course such a thought was highly obnoxious to the Malayan side.

Razak fell into a grim silence and we spoke no more on the subject.

The Tunku and his press secretary must have been briefed by Razak on the meeting with the Sultan and quite naturally the issue of the Sultan's position emerged as the only topic in reference to Malaysia given the impression that nothing else was important. Razak might also have used my surmise and an impression had been gained that the Sultan had appeared to be flexible on the financial arrangement. Perhaps Razak did not make it clear that it was a mere conjecture that the Sultan would have agreed to the financial issues if he was satisfied with the answer Razak might have given him. As a result, a press statement was made by the Tunku that the Sultan had second thoughts on the negotiations and had made the question of the royal status as a major issue. The Tunku on July 9, 1963 told the press, that it was unfortunate that the Sultan had brought the matter up at that late stage when it could have been dealt with earlier. He mentioned the suggestion he had made that the Sultan should bring the matter up with the Conference of Rulers but the Sultan at that time relegated the issue as less important than the financial arrangement which, if an agreement was reached, would have resolved the status issue.

The Malayan press spokesman made a similar statement saying that all issues with Brunei had been resolved except the new issue of the position of the Ruler. Of course, it was not a new issue nor would it be resolved consequential upon the financial issues. It would have been the other way round. At once, it looked like a distortion and a propaganda war and the Sultan promptly said that it was the Malayan Government who found itself in

a position where it was unable to give effect to terms previously agreed or to assurances given. Thereafter, the Tunku refused to say publicly that the Malaysia door was still ajar for Brunei to enter.

There was no substance in what I thought was a jocular remark after the Tunku's first visit to Brunei and his dinner with the Sultan on board the Malayan naval vessel that there was a lack of communication between the Tunku and the Sultan, one speaking in Kedah dialect which was hardly understood by others and the other with the help of dints made by an old ship, hardly audible! The reality was that the Royal House of Kedah and that of Brunei by some kind of symbol or communication knew exactly that the most fundamental issue was the constitutional position of the Ruler with its consequential democratisation. The Tunku was a true democrat and a people's prince. The House of Brunei was not as yet ready to change and the Tunku knew that and allowed Tan Siew Sin to chase the red herrings of finance but the *sepak raga* game was concluded with such grace and decorum that no side felt it was the loser.

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The joint Tunku-MacMillan statement issued on July 31, 1962 promised that an Inter-Government Committee (IGC) would be established in which the British, Malayan, Sarawak and North Borneo Governments would be represented. The Cobbold Commission had strongly suggested that the constitutional basis for Malaysia should be worked out with reference to the membership of Sarawak and North Borneo in the Federation. The task of the IGC was to work out the future constitutional arrangements and form of necessary safeguards for the two Borneo territories.

It was agreed in London that the Chairman of the IGC should be nominated by the British Government and that the Minister of State for Colonies, Lord Lansdowne would be Chairman with Razak as the Deputy. As an initial step, Lansdowne suggested that since the IGC would have a great many detailed matters to go into, there should be a number of sub-committees established. The work was to commence early in September. Lansdowne had prepared a tentative terms of reference and a suggested outline of its work programme.

Lansdowne suggested that the IGC would have to consider a wide variety of subjects which would include the following:

- (i) the State Constitutions for Sarawak and North Borneo;
- (ii) the delegation of certain Federal powers to the States;
- (iii) Variations made where necessary in the existing federal, state and concurrent lists as the Malayan Constitution would form the basis of the Malaysian Constitution.
- (iv) the judiciary;
- (v) citizenship;
- (vi) religion;

- (vii) immigration;
- (viii) education;
- (ix) detailed arrangements for gradual alignment of tariffs;
- (x) the position of the natives;
- (xi) shipping and navigation;
- (xii) fisheries;
- (xiii) regionalisation of such federal services as may be agreed;
- (xiv) languages;
- (xv) representation in the Federal Parliament.

The IGC would have to prepare the draft of the legal agreements and constitutional instruments for the establishment of Malaysia. Despite the enormity of the task, Lansdowne had expressed the hope that all deliberations would be completed by Christmas 1962. Quite naturally most of the work would have to be done in the Borneo territories to provide the opportunity for the Borneo people to see the IGC at work. On August 30, 1962, exactly a month after the announcement of its formation, the preparatory meeting of the IGC was held in Jesselton, North Borneo.

The British delegation, led by Lansdowne, comprised five members while Razak brought with him three senior government officials. The Sarawak Government was led by Jakeway, the officer administering the government (OAG) assisted by the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary. The local people were represented by Dato Bandar Haji Abang Mustapha, Temenggong Jugah, Pengarah Montegrai, Chia Chin Shin, Ling Beng Siew and Ong Kee Hui. North Borneo was headed by the Governor Sir William Goode, assisted by the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Financial Secretary and the Secretary for Local Government. The unofficial members were Mohd. Yassin bin Haji Hashim, Datu Mustapha bin Harun, Donald Stephens, Khoo Siak Chiew, Pang Tet Tshung and Sundang.

In his opening address, Lansdowne said that Malaysia must be established on conditions acceptable to all. There should be safeguards not only for the groups and interests coming together to form the new nation but also for the new nation, Malaysia, itself. If the IGC worked on the basis of those underlying principles, the success of Malaysia would be assured.

The task of the IGC had been spelt out in the Tunku-MacMillan London statement. To deal with the constitutional arrangements and forms of necessary safeguards various sub-committees would have to be established:

- (i) the Constitutional Sub-committee: This sub-committee would consist of administrative and legal representatives. It would consider and report all necessary amendments to the existing Federal Constitution or on any Federal legislations to enable Malaysia to be established. These amendments would include provisions towards the safeguards or special treatment to North Borneo and Sarawak vis-a-vis citizenship,

immigration, special position of the natives or indigenous peoples. The sub-committee would have to consider in detail on the extent of the Federal powers and functions in order that there would be a smooth transition. The federal lists, state lists and concurrent lists would be carefully studied and recommendations made. This sub-committee would also have to draft the state constitutions of North Borneo and Sarawak as states in the Federation of Malaysia. It would also have to pay due regard to the question of integrating existing state laws on matters which would, after the establishment of Malaysia, fall under the jurisdiction of the Central Government. This sub-committee would have to give constitutional effect to any recommendations made by other sub-committees where necessary. As such, its work would only be completed when all the other sub-committees had completed their tasks;

- (ii) the Financial Sub-committee: This sub-committee would consider the alignment of tariffs and other matters relating to finance and development in the Borneo territories;
- (iii) the Judicial Sub-committee: It would work out provisions relating to the courts;
- (iv) the Public Services Sub-committee: Its task would be to consider the position of the public services and the Borneo territories including the functions of and relations between State and Federal Public Services Commissions, the regionalisation of certain Federal services if deemed desirable and the question of the quota system arising from the special position of the indigenous people.

The Chairman said that the first Plenary Session of the IGC would be held in mid-October, another in November and a final one in December by which time it was hoped that the work would be completed. During that period the sub-committees would continuously meet.

Razak made a few remarks supporting what Lansdowne had said and emphasising the fact that the IGC had a heavy task ahead. The problems faced by each component state and Malaysia as well must be looked into. In Malaysia, the Central Government should have sufficient powers to enable it to function as a Government of a sovereign state. Razak said he appreciated the concerns of the people of Sarawak and North Borneo and their fears should be allayed.

Following a general discussion, it was agreed that the membership of the IGC and its sub-committees should be left to the Government concerned to decide. It was also agreed that Brunei would be allowed, if she so wished, to attend the IGC as observers.

The first Plenary Session of the IGC was held on October 22, 1962 in Jesselton which had been agreed to as the headquarters of the IGC. Lansdowne and Razak brought their respective teams. Sarawak and North Borneo

delegations were led by their respective Chief Secretaries. Brunei attending as observers was represented by Dato Setia Pengiran Haji Mohd. Yusof and Tuan Haji Jamil.

Since the first preparatory meeting of August 30, the respective legislative councils of North Borneo and Sarawak had passed resolutions welcoming, in principle, the establishment of Malaysia by the August 31, 1963 provided there would be terms safeguarding their special interests.

Lansdowne in his opening remarks at the first plenary session alluded to the decisions of the two legislative councils and reminded that all concerned would have to pay a price for joining and, in a manner of speaking, the IGC would determine the nature of that price. Lansdowne urged members to bear in mind his target of January 1963 as the date for completion of the work in order to facilitate the necessary legislative processes to be completed by August 31, 1963. Razak, in endorsing the remarks made by Lansdowne, emphasised that the IGC should not be a bargaining body but all should endeavour to work out a system of a Central and State Governments which would be strong and stable and that should be the theme of the IGC.

The Constitutional Sub-Committee had started its work for two days from the eighth of October and had submitted their preliminary report. The IGC selected certain items for discussions. On the issue of "language" since Donald Stephens pointed out that North Borneo had only provisionally agreed to Malay being the national language to Malaysia, it was agreed that Malay as the national language would be conditional on satisfactory arrangements being agreed over the future position of English.

On the next subject of Borneonisation, Lansdowne preferred the Public Service Sub-Committee to deal with it quickly as that would present a clear picture to the British officers as to their position in the new Malaysia. When it came to Defence and Security, there was not much discussion except that Razak offered licensing powers of shotguns and ammunition to be delegated to the governments of North Borneo and Sarawak, provided the executive functions of licensing was carried out in consultation with the police. Then the question of holidays, other than state holidays, came up for discussion. The North Borneo delegation requested for executive dispensation where these were related to religious occasions that had no significance in North Borneo. Perhaps the delegation had in mind some Hindu festivals which was not celebrated in North Borneo since there were almost no Hindus. No one was sure as to whether things would remain the same after Malaysia but the North Borneo point was well taken.

The Fiscal Sub-Committee had met once on the nineteenth of October in Jesselton a few days before the plenary meeting. For the Fiscal Sub-Committee, the Sarawak Government had submitted a number of working papers. The IGC agreed to refer them to the Sub-Committee with the recommendation that Sarawak would receive not less than the amount of tax now imposed by the state on mineral wealth, which was 10% ad valorem.

The Malayan delegation gave an undertaking that it would work out a flexible formula to ensure that state revenues would be sufficient to meet the annual cost of expenditure on state services taking into account the need to provide for the elements of growth.

On the subject of "Development" the Fiscal Sub-Committee had, in response to a demand, that the British Government should be committed to a territorial grant recommended that the level of British contribution to a proposed fund could not as yet be determined, thus inferring an acceptance of the proposal of a Development Fund in principle. The British delegation pointed out that such a British commitment was out of the question and that the British would accept no commitment at that stage. In response, Jakeway of Sarawak requested in the circumstances that the Malayan side should give an assurance of a specific minimum figure for the Sarawak Development Fund and threatened that until such assurance was given, it would not be possible for Sarawak to sign any agreement on Malaysia. Ling Beng Siew, also of Sarawak, said that public opinion in Sarawak would be reassured if a definite figure could be given for the proposed Development Fund and he believed that this in itself would accelerate the formation of Malaysia. Razak in his reply, on behalf of the Malayan delegation, appreciated the views expressed by the Sarawak delegation but he could not give an assurance of any definite figure at that juncture.

Lord Lansdowne expressed satisfaction with the Malayan assurance that the impending visit of a mission from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) would be given the opportunity to study the Borneo territories which would be consulted in determining the terms of reference for the assessment by IBRD.

Education was a matter of great importance to all sides. It was clear that this was one subject which the colonial administration, whether by design or in a fit of absent-mindedness, had neglected. There were very few schools which catered for anything above the primary level. One of the so-called schools not far from Sibu which the Tunku and I visited had only one teacher and nothing beyond primary two. Even then, the quality and the qualification of the young teacher were suspect; yet the school children there, in welcoming the Tunku, sang a song of praise of the colonial government for providing that school. There was a time in Malaya when the policy of colonial education was condemned as atrocious because its objective was to teach Malay boys to be better farmers than their fathers. The Iban boy never had even that chance. He probably would have been worse off than his father who at least had his father to teach him the ways of the community.

The IGC meticulously studied the papers on education submitted by the governments of Sarawak and North Borneo. As a member of the Cobbold Commission, I had supported the recommendation that education should be in the Federal List. I could not see the state doing a great deal towards improvement and upgrading. However, in the initial stages, I recognised any

violent change would be counter-productive and that the integration with the federal system of education should take place gradually. The Sarawak delegation appeared to have accepted that but explained that since over the years a Sarawak National Education Policy had been evolved, Sarawak would prefer retaining a considerable degree of state control on Borneo territorial basis. The North Borneo delegation, while agreeing to the views expressed in the Cobbold Report which would lead to an eventual integration, argued that complete integration would lead to a number of difficulties on matters such as the language policy and syllabus. The delegation wished the subject of education to remain a state responsibility.

Razak in his remark said that certain policies on education were basic and could not be very different from one place to another and therefore the formulation of an integrated education policy would not be too problematic. Razak, as he was once a Minister of Education which promoted the idea of education as an integrative force in nation building, preferred a national education policy and system for Malaysia but he conceded that a certain measure of local administrative control should be the responsibility of each of the Borneo territories.

The North Borneo leader, Donald Stephens, enquired as he understood it, if it was true that Singapore in Malaysia would retain education in the state list. After all with the rampant activities of communism in the island, surely there would be greater danger of subversion than in North Borneo. Razak had already discussed the subject with the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew as the PAP leader was formulating his policy on merger and there were sensitive elements which could not be discussed at random unless the matter was germane only to the question of Singapore merger. Razak's reply was rather vague and perhaps evasive when he said that the question of education for Singapore was a complicated matter and undertook to speak to Donald Stephens privately.

Stephens found himself unable to depart from the mandate given under the 20 points and suggested that he would arrange for Razak to meet the local political leaders and explain to them the federal education policy.

Razak agreed and met the North Borneo political leaders and its outcome was an agreement to the form of words which formed the recommendation of the IGC. In essence, education for North Borneo and Sarawak was to be a federal matter but there should be a number of safeguards which would include the continuance of the current practices including the non-use of the national language, the deployment of education officers and the role of local education committees until they were otherwise agreed to by each of the states. The IGC recommendation made it absolutely clear that there should be no application to the two territories of any federal requirements regarding religious education. This was to allay the fears of those who had been influenced by the bogey that Kuala Lumpur would impose Islam on the non-Muslims of North Borneo and Sarawak.

Razak accepted Stephens' suggestion that the requirements of North Borneo and Sarawak should be given special consideration in respect of higher education. It was in this regard that I, as Chairman of Institut Teknologi MARA, later established the branches of the Institute in the two Borneo territories as a prelude to the actual establishment of a university.

It must be admitted that Lansdowne in his wisdom encouraged the meeting between Razak and the political leaders of North Borneo and also the meetings of Directors of Education of Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak to consider the various technical aspects. It was this approach of the British Chairman, who was highly conscious of the British colonial responsibility towards the peoples of the two territories, which made it possible for the IGC to produce a positive recommendation.

The next item addressed by the IGC was the representation of the people of the Borneo territories in the Federal Parliament. As the discussions developed, I had a creeping suspicion that the issue was one of representing the state governments rather than the people based on constituencies. This is understandable since neither territory had a real taste of democracy and the bogey of KL colonial domination as perpetuated by the anti-Malaysia elements was still hovering.

Razak patiently explained that this issue should be governed by the extent to which the constitutional powers remained in the state list. Therefore, until the Constitutional Sub-Committee had made its recommendations, Razak suggested that it would be premature to determine the actual number of seats. He gave a categorical assurance that it was the view of the Malayan Government that the people of these two territories should be adequately represented. Razak revealed to the meeting that the Malayan Government had envisaged the first general elections throughout Malaysia would be held in 1969 and, during the intervening period, he envisaged that there would be agreement and constitutional provision for North Borneo and Sarawak to be represented by nominations from their respective Legislative Assemblies.

The point I had drummed into Razak's mind again and again was that if Malaysia had to be represented as a democratic nation this must at all events be transparent. I also needed this to be endorsed by the IGC in view of Brunei. As far as I was concerned, that was the furthest I could go with regard to the process of democratisation. The Elections Commission would have to work out the delineation of constituencies. In other words, if Malaysia was to survive, clear constitutional provisions must be made for the three Borneo territories that Malaysia for them meant independence and democracy.

Lansdowne and other members of the IGC listened to Razak intently. The Chairman then concluded by saying that the Constitutional Sub-Committee should be tasked to thrash out the specific details and instructions to the Elections Commission in delineating electoral constituencies.

The Sarawak delegation had accepted the principles governing the assessment of representation in the Federal Parliament as provided for in

the Federation of Malaya Constitution. North Borneo in its twenty point presentation simply said that account should be taken not only on population but also the size and potentialities and in any case the number of seats should not be less than that of Singapore.

After further discussions, the Committee agreed to the proposition that the number of seats allotted to the two Borneo territories in relation to the total number of seats in the *Dewan Rakyat* should not be reduced, except by reason of granting of seats to a new state, for a period of seven years after Malaysia Day without the agreement of the state government concerned. Thereafter, the matter would be governed by the Federation Constitution. It was not clear to me as to why on this issue only the state government decision was sufficient and not the state legislative assemblies. It would seem that the wisdom of that time was not to be a stickler on such a point. There was more concern on other issues like language and finance.

Talking of language, both the North Borneo and Sarawak delegations presented their respective papers. North Borneo had asked for Malay to be the national language of the Federation while English should continue to be used for a period of ten years after Malaysia Day. On the question of official language, English should serve for that purpose in the state as well as with the centre. Sarawak made no mention of Malay as the national language or that it should be an official language together with English.

Donald Stephens did not find any difficulty with regard to Malay as the national language. His concern was for the English language. His delegation would need an assurance on the continuing use of the English language after Malaysia Day although he had expressed before that the agreement to Malay being the national language was conditional upon the assurance of the use of English. Razak very quickly replied that the Malayan delegation would be prepared to concede that only in Sarawak and North Borneo, but not in Peninsular Malaya, English could continue to be used for a period of ten years after Malaysia Day. After a few exchanges, the Committee agreed to the recommendation that English would be the official language in Sarawak and North Borneo for state and federal purposes for ten years after Malaysia Day until the state legislature concerned decided otherwise. This of course presupposed that the bureaucrats in Kuala Lumpur still could by that time communicate in English or they would have to devise some means of communication using the English language.

The decision on the use of English meant that during the period of ten years or thereafter, as so decided, English could be used in the legislative assemblies and for all other official purposes in dealing within the state or with the centre including communication with Federal ministries and departments. This included proceedings in the subordinate courts and the High Court of the Borneo states and the Supreme Court relating to cases arising in the Borneo territories. Except for the use of English language for ten years in Parliament for Borneo members, the power to change English as

an official language rested with the respective state legislatures. In the case of the use of English by Borneo members in both Houses of Parliament after ten years, Parliament itself would provide otherwise.

Clearly Donald Stephens had demonstrated flexibility. There was silence on the request made by Datu Mustapha, also of North Borneo, reflecting the wishes of his party (United Sabah National Organisation) that Malay should be the official language together with English. This was no slight on Mustapha or USNO although at that time his political opponents would like to think so. Malay having been accepted as the national language, automatically was an official language and the question no longer arose. What worried the others was the status of English. However, what irritated the Malayan delegation was the original stance of the North Borneo delegation that unless there was satisfaction regarding the use of English, the position of Malay as the national language would have to be reconsidered. There was no real concession given by Razak except to follow more or less the precedent in the Federation Constitution of 1957 relating to the use of English.

Because of the constant reference to Malaysia Day, the Committee took the opportunity to recommend the amendment of Merdeka Day in the Federal Constitution to read Malaysia Day.

After the amicable resolution of a very thorny subject, Lansdowne requested the IGC to turn its attention to the subject of the Judiciary. At that stage Malaya still had an expatriate Chief Justice, James Thomson and he was invited to participate in the discussion. From the side of the Borneo territories, Chief Justice Sir John Ainley was present as the counterpart to Thomson. One of the major issues was whether there should be one court for Malaysia consisting of a Supreme Court and three High Courts or whether there should be separate High Courts in the strict sense of the term.

James Thomson gave a short history of the Judiciary in Malaya from the time when there were separate and individual Courts to the time when these Courts merged into one unitary Supreme Court after the Second World War. This was, it will be observed, a development which followed the constitutional development of Malaya from the Federated and Unfederated states years, to the Malayan Union (1946) and to the Federation of Malaya of 1948 to an independent Malaya of 1957.

James Thomson expressed the view that the Supreme Court had operated to the satisfaction of all levels of the public and had aroused no criticism either in its jurisdiction or administration. The Court had been careful in respecting the pride of the Malay states and the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers. When the proposal for the establishment of Malaysia was first considered, there was a suggestion that Singapore with the Borneo states should come within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Malaya. However, the Malayan Government had recognised that conditions in the Borneo territories were different from those in the Malay states.

The written presentation to the IGC had taken into account the sensitivities of the Borneo territories and as Thomson put it had gone out of its way to make concessions. The Malayan proposal would place the Chief Justice of Borneo at par with the Chief Justice of Malaya and Chief Justice of Singapore and these three would enjoy the same status, privileges and responsibilities and so would their Courts.

There was much to be said for an entirely separate Supreme Court of Malaysia but Thomson pointed out certain disadvantages. He said it would greatly increase public expenditure on the Courts in the future Malaysia. It would also impose a heavy strain on the search among competent professional lawyers for the appointment of three judges on Malaysia Day. Furthermore, there was a need for central direction on financial and administrative matters such as seeking for finance from Parliament.

Sir John Ainley said that in most Federations it was usual for each of the component states to have its own separate High Court. Under the Malayan proposal, the division of the Supreme Court would mean that the Borneo High Court would be placed under the administration of a supreme authority and if situated in Kuala Lumpur it would be a long distance away. Ainley maintained that whoever administered the Borneo High Court would need a thorough knowledge of the Borneo peoples and this requirement was not envisaged in the Malayan proposal. Ainley was fighting for the status of the Chief Justice of Borneo who, he contended, should not be a deputy of the Federal Chief Justice nor the Borneo High Court, a functionary of the Supreme Court.

The Attorney-General of Sarawak, Mr. Pike, remarked that the proposal made by the Malayan delegation involved very real concessions to the Borneo territories and a degree of decentralisation.

Lansdowne directed that the Legal and Judicial Sub-Committee should consider the proposal that the High Courts of the Federation should be separate courts subject to the undertaking that the introduction of such a system would need to be deferred until practicable. Eventually, the IGC came out with a comprehensive recommendation on this highly sensitive and technically difficult subject. However, only the Malaysians were concerned. The unofficial members of the Borneo delegation did not show as much concern. Neither the North Borneo in their "twenty points" nor Sarawak in their "eighteen points" made reference to the subject. But the expatriate officers did, and together with the Malaysians they wanted to ensure that the system of justice would continue to maintain a high standard of credibility without which a nation would flounder.

The next subject was taken up by the meeting with a great deal of zeal and interest. It concerned religion which was high on the agenda of both the Sarawak and North Borneo unofficial members of the delegations. Both the Sarawak and North Borneo delegations had submitted papers. Razak thought that it would be best to have a full discussion deferred to a later date.

However, Razak declared that it was the policy of the Malayan Government to maintain freedom of worship and he was particularly concerned that it should be maintained in the Borneo territories as well. For political reasons, the Malayan Government would be unable to alter the existing provision of the Constitution enabling state legislatures to restrict the propagation of other religions among Muslims. The relevant provision in the Constitution was formulated not to impose limits on the practice of other religions but in order to restrict any deviant teaching of misinterpretation of Islam. The Malayan Constitution would need the same enabling clause but there would be no reason why the Constitution of a new state should not provide that no law restricting the propagation of any religious belief could be passed without a two-thirds majority in the State Assembly.

This suggestion was acceptable to the two delegations. Lansdowne noted the point and Razak added that Sarawak and North Borneo should be put in the same position as Malacca and Penang in being excluded from the provision of the Constitution and also that the Constitution would not confer on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong the position of Head of the Muslim religion in Sarawak and North Borneo.

Jakeway of Sarawak drew the attention of the meeting that the Federal Constitution enabled the Government of Malaya to provide \$5 million ringgit annually on religious education. That provision of the Constitution which enabled a Federal or state law to provide for special financial aid for the establishment and maintenance of Muslim institutions in the instruction in the Muslim religion of persons professing that religion in the view of the Sarawak delegation would be unacceptable.

Following Jakeway's intervention, a member of the British delegation and one expatriate official of the North Borneo Government drew the attention of the meeting to the provision of the Education Act of Malaya enabling the Central Government to acquire state monies for Federal purpose including religious instructions. Then another expatriate official from the North Borneo delegation came out with the proposal that these difficulties might be obviated if amounts equivalent to Federal expenditure on religious instructions in Malay were paid over to Sarawak and North Borneo for general welfare purposes. Razak expressed agreement to consider the suggestion in the context of the provision of the Constitution referred to by Jakeway. With that the meeting was adjourned.

Razak returned to Kuala Lumpur and a number of meetings with Malayan officials were held to review what had been discussed and what points were taken. In the meantime the various sub-committees met.

The next session of the IGC was held from the twenty-third to the twenty-six of November 1962 in Jesselton. The financial and fiscal arrangement was one of the trickiest subjects dealt with by the IGC. The North Borneo unofficial group in their delegation had brought up as one of the twenty points the proposal that North Borneo should retain control of its own finance,

development and tariff, and should have the right to work out its own taxation and to raise loans on its own credit. This was referred to as point eleven. The Sarawak delegation had only asked for assurances in Development Fund, an adequate arrangement for the revenue to the state and the gradual increase of taxation to the level as practised in the Peninsula.

The Malayan delegation was warned in advance that to the unofficials of the North Borneo delegation, this subject was regarded as extremely important and if no satisfactory solution could be achieved there was every possibility that North Borneo might opt out of the Malaysia plan. It should be recalled that at the time when the IGC was meeting, the economy of North Borneo was booming.

Datuk Mustapha told me that North Borneo was about to find oil and even brought something to show me as a sample in a jar of what might be the black gold. Since I was quite ignorant of any knowledge about mineral or oil I was not able to confirm one way or another as to the potential oil riches of North Borneo.

However, I recognised that whatever might be the financial potential in the North Borneo, the people there believed very deeply that they were rich at least in timber and they could not reconcile to the idea that anyone else should have a bite of that wealth. Donald Stephens had spoken to me that the Malayan side should remember that the Tunku's proposal was for a cooperation between North Borneo and Malaya as if they were of equal units, rather than North Borneo as a unit in Malaysia despite what had been discussed and clarified in the MSCC. Donald Stephens was the most influential unofficial leader trusted by political parties as well as the colonial officials. Financial autonomy was the battle cry although I knew for certain that Donald Stephens was convinced that the future of North Borneo was in Malaysia. His only point was how to make it acceptable and workable. Therefore it was Stephens who should be influenced to lead the opinion of the budding politicians of North Borneo. To do so would require a logical and convincing argument on the part of the Malayan delegation with the help of expatriate officials if necessary since I knew that Stephens respected their views.

At the IGC level, the North Borneo delegation had presented a paper which contained three options one of which was regarded by them as acceptable. The paper was well structured and well argued. The proposal outlined that on the financial and fiscal matters the Federal Government should be concerned only with currency, banking and monetary policy, foreign exchange and capital issues as well as borrowing from outside sources. The paper proposed that within ten years there should be established a Malaysian customs union.

It was envisaged in the North Borneo presentation that the financial autonomy would subsist until such time as there was an agreement by North Borneo to cease enjoying the status. Of course, the exact form of autonomy would be subject to negotiation in order to finalise the agreed federal and state

lists and for some reason Stephens kept on telling me that North Borneo should be equated to the status of Singapore in Malaysia.

In his private discussion with me, Stephens strenuously argued out that North Borneo was a long way from Kuala Lumpur and the people there had a different way of thinking. Stephens conceded that in the future after a habit of being together had been well established, there might develop a desire on the part of the people to surrender that autonomy. Stephens said in the early stages of Malaysia it was best to work on the basis of decentralisation in particular where the economy of the state was such that it could be self-financing.

Then came the scorpion sting when Stephens reminded me that the *raison d'etre* for Malaysia was not economic but political with a heavy security overtone. North Borneo could not see any economic advantages for her; in fact she would be at an economic disadvantage, according to Stephens. Perhaps it would be cheaper for North Borneo to contribute towards Defence, Security and External Affairs. Stephens conceded that if Malaysia was to be respected internationally, then the Central Government needed to be strong and viable but this must not be done at the expense of North Borneo.

When I mentioned this attitude of the North Borneo delegation to the officials of the Malayan delegation in the IGC, I had no idea that they had been mulling over a memorandum sent by the North Borneo delegation which in essence was not very different from what Donald Stephens had told me. Officials particularly from the Treasury were fuming since the inference contained in the memorandum made them feel that North Borneo had regarded the exercise as a means of replacing the British colonial authority by Kuala Lumpur. This, the officials regarded, as highly insulting and had drafted a response which I thought had some sharp edges. I advised them to couch their words in more conciliatory terms.

The Malayan reply to the North Borneo proposal was a rejection since a complete autonomy in financial matters and at the same time retain most of the government functions directly affecting the public could hardly be expected to provide any incentive for the development of a desire for closer association. The Malayan Federation had gained a high esteem internationally and had already started developing an advanced money market which the whole of future Malaysia would benefit. If North Borneo wished to remain remote, she would remain as such, surrounded by neighbours of dubious stability, she could not be expected to attract investments, a sure presumption for decline in development. The North Borneo proposal according to the Malayan delegation would cut across the prime object of the Malaysia plan which was the creation of a strong and prosperous new federal community with a common loyalty and sense of genuine nationhood while preserving its cherished local characteristics. Malaya would never agree to give North Borneo the status of a dependency of the Federation whereas the Malaysia

plan envisaged every state within the Federation a full partner in the management of the Federation of Malaysia.

The response from North Borneo revealed the difference in perception. North Borneo was not prepared to be analogous to the status of the other states in the Federation of Malaysia. And the Malayan delegation was reminded of the fact that the inclusion of North Borneo and Sarawak in the Malaysia plan was needed as political make-weight.

The Malayan side then sent to the IGC Fiscal Sub-Committee the final offer which was a mixture of point eleven and the status of one of the states in the Federation of Malaya.

I was watching these exchanges helplessly. I rushed to Jesselton and met with Stephens. I pleaded with him to persuade his side not to think of North Borneo as Singapore; I knew that the Malayan side could be persuaded to be flexible by offering something more than what a Malayan state enjoyed. Stephens promised to talk to his team including the British colonial officials. Datu Mustapha was easy. He would agree to the Malayan proposal for so long as the IGC would recommend something that would make North Borneo somewhat different from the other states. Of course the difference should be to the advantage of North Borneo. Despite all these difficulties in negotiations, it was heartening to see these two local leaders giving each other full cooperation which would augur well for the future of North Borneo and Malaysia. Datu Mustapha, I knew, had a great deal of influence and was well respected by Stephens and others in North Borneo as well as Sarawak. Stephens always addressed him as *abang* (elder brother) and this was not just polite address but there was a real feeling of brotherhood.

What, I thought, influenced both Stephens and Mustapha, Sundang, Peter Lo and Khoo Siak Choo was the persuasive powers of the colonial British administrative officials. They were, as I gathered, quite concerned that something had to be done to make progress. It was the Financial Secretary of North Borneo, an expatriate officer who was to provide comment and advice to Donald Stephens and through him to the North Borneo Alliance. The advice given by the Financial Secretary of North Borneo to Stephens and others was carefully worded giving the impression that it was his personal views. He praised the Malayan memorandum as having a great deal of common sense and sound economics. Then he drew the attention of the North Borneo leaders that the misunderstanding arose from different perception which I had suspected all along. The Financial Secretary suggested that the North Borneo delegation had viewed the exercise as the formation of a true federation with some appreciable amount of powers to North Borneo. However, the reality of the situation as seen by the Malaysians was that for all intent and purpose, the Federation was a unitary state demanding a strong central government and that the Malaysia plan was merely to admit new members to that Federation. Therefore the question of relative economic advantages did not arise. It was basically a political problem.

Having said that the expatriate officer expressed doubt if point eleven could even be acceptable to the Malaysians. However, with some modifications it might be made workable and suggested in essence that the Federal Government should have the last say in matters relating to levels of tariffs giving allowance for a transitional period which by mutual agreement could later be shortened, and that the Federal Government would have the overall control of borrowing outside North Borneo.

After that most momentous advice, Donald Stephens, the leader of United National Kadazan Organisation, and the most influential person in the North Borneo Alliance, took the bold step of making an appeal that the North Borneo delegation should modify its demands and that the failure of fiscal talks should not be the cause of North Borneo staying out of Malaysia. His quality of leadership was superb when he boldly appealed that tempers and threats would not serve the best interest of North Borneo on whom there must be no appearance of Malaysia being forced on her.

Stephens vouched for the sincerity of Malayan leaders. By that time Razak had indicated that there would be a Central Government allocation for the development fund. Stephens assured the North Borneo Alliance that the North Borneo delegation had informed the Malayan and British Government that agreement reached there would be subject to the final report of the IGC.

Stephens was eloquent. The final paper submitted to the IGC Sub-Committee was conciliatory and became the basis for the final IGC report to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

In the case of Sarawak, the delegation had proposed a development fund for each of the Borneo territories. The British delegation at that stage refused to quote any financial commitment to the fund. Jakeway leading the Sarawak delegation once again said since the British side could not make any commitment then Kuala Lumpur should make the commitment of a minimum figure for the development fund of the state. Then he made a threat that if no such assurance was forthcoming, it would not be possible for Sarawak to sign any agreement on Malaysia. Ling Beng Siew interrupted since he saw the threat was completely unnecessary. Lim Beng Siew said that a definite figure would be helpful to accelerate the formation of Malaysia. I gathered later that the unofficials in the delegation were taken by surprise by Jakeway's threat but they asked me to make sure that the final picture would be to their satisfaction. Razak at that stage could not commit himself to any definite figure.

He assured them that the coming visit of a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) would be given the opportunity to make the assessment on the requirement of the two territories. Although he had said all these once before, Razak also undertook that there would be consultations with the Governments of the two territories in respect of the Bank's terms of reference. Lansdowne expressed satisfaction that Razak had given such a positive assurance.

It would have been absurd for Razak to make any specific commitment on quantum. There was no way then to make even a guess. Also, Razak wanted the British Government to make this gesture. After all, the neglect in development was during the colonial administration which should also be made responsible for making up in funds for the development.

I had briefed Razak of my conversations with Stephens, Mustapha and some of the officials in the delegations of North Borneo and Sarawak, in addition to the unofficial members of Sarawak. Razak eventually was persuaded to commit a figure allotted for development to be included in the report but it was contingent upon the British Government also making a specific commitment.

As it turned out, the IGC made a recommendation including the specific offer of the Federal Government and the British Government with regard to the development funds of both territories. The Fiscal Sub-Committee of IGC had made some very specific recommendations on the taxes and grants to the Governments of Sarawak and North Borneo. It was very comprehensive and a study of the IGC report 1962 would reveal the wide ranging matters connected to the financial and fiscal arrangements in the Malaysia plan which was well received by all parties concerned. It was a job well done of Lansdowne and Razak and in no small measure the agreement was reached through the wisdom and leadership of the unofficial members of the respective delegations. All relevant references to the Constitution was dealt with, including the temporary delegation of powers from the Auditor-General to the Directors of Audit whose reports would be submitted to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

Having resolved the more difficult issues in the IGC, Razak had occasion to address Lansdowne on the subjects which continued to plague his thoughts. On the question of immigration, Razak told Lansdowne that at that time he was unable to find a suitable form of words to allay the fears of the delegations from the Borneo territories in respect of persons to be admitted for employment in trade, commerce and industry. Razak wanted that the Central Government should be unfettered in carrying out its responsibilities under the law and therefore should be free to admit persons for the discharge of these responsibilities. He was, however, prepared to concede as far as the employment of private business in industry was concerned that the governments of the two territories should be given the right of veto.

On the question of town and country planning which had been suggested by the two Borneo delegations to be on the state list, Razak found it unable to agree which it was feared would enable state governments by legislation to impose town or country plans to exclude Federal Government projects from being sited in places which might be required as bases for security purposes including that of the navy, army, air-force and the police.

Having attended to the main areas of disagreement, a draft of the IGC report was submitted to the Tunku for the consideration of the Malayan Cabinet. A similar draft was submitted to the British Government.

The Tunku having studied the report with his colleagues on February 12, 1963, wrote to the British Government through Duncan Sandys saying that, although he regretted it very much, he found it necessary to forward certain modifications if Malaysia was to survive.

According to the Tunku, recent events in Borneo did not rule out the possibility that an emergency might arise which would necessitate the Central Government to assume special powers for the duration of such an emergency. So as to ensure that the Central Government would have adequate powers during the emergency, the constitutional arrangements with the new states should be capable of modification during the emergency without the requirement of two-thirds majority in Parliament or the consent of the state government concerned.

On the question of immigration into the Borneo territories from outside Malaysia, the Tunku wrote that the Central Government had a serious responsibility. Recalling the meeting in July 1962 in London, the Tunku said both the British and the Malayan Governments had agreed that immigration into the Borneo territories from outside Malaysia should in effect require the approval of the State Government except when admission was necessary in the interests of external affairs and security. What the Tunku read from the IGC draft was that it had gone further than what was understood in London and had recommended that the State Governments should have power to admit any person from outside Malaysia whose entry the State Government considered necessary for state purposes unless the Central Government objected on security grounds. This, according to the Tunku, would undermine the overall control of the Central Government over immigration and it could open a potential avenue for subversive and undesirable elements. The Central Government should have the last word on the admission of persons from outside into any part of Malaysia.

It would be contrary to internationally accepted democratic standards for a state in a Federation to be given unqualified right to exclude citizens of the Federation from the state. Therefore the Tunku proposed that no citizens of Malaysia should be excluded from any part of Malaysia.

Lord Lansdowne consulted Razak on all the points made by the Tunku. He certainly gave the views of the Tunku the highest consideration. After some slight changes here and there the IGC published its report on February 27, 1963 and it was submitted to the four governments concerned. The Report concluded with the nicety that the agreement of the Malayan Government to the recommendations was subject to the consent of the Conference of Rulers being obtained before the conclusion of a formal agreement embodying detailed constitutional arrangements including safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak. It was necessary that a Bill be introduced in the Malayan Parliament to amend the Malayan Constitution accordingly including the name of the Federation of Malaya to Malaysia. On

the subject of the Draft State Constitution, they would be submitted to Her Majesty in Council.

It would be noted that the Report was signed by Lansdowne, the Chairman and Razak, the Deputy Chairman as well as members of their respective delegations. In the case of North Borneo, the delegation had a joint leadership of two, namely the Chief Secretary of North Borneo and Donald Stephens, the leader of the unofficial members of the delegation. For Sarawak, F.D. Jakeway (the officer administering the government) signed the report together with other members of the delegation. Ong Kee Hui an original member of the delegation and of the SUPP opted not to sign.

The main recommendations of the Report were as below:

i. State Constitutions

The IGC recommended that the first Head of Sarawak and North Borneo should be nominated before Malaysia Day by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Queen Elizabeth. He should be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for a period of 2 years. In Sarawak, the Head of State should be known as the Governor and in North Borneo as the Yang di-Pertua Negara.

The IGC pointed out that the question of whether a state constitution contained provisions inconsistent with "essential provisions" of a state constitution as set out in the Federation Constitution should ultimately be determined by the views of the Houses of Parliament.

ii. Legislative Powers

The legislative powers given to the federal and state legislatures were obtained in an appendix to the Report. With certain modifications, these lists were based on the distribution of legislative powers under the Federation Constitution. The IGC resolved that certain legislative powers should be concurrent.

In the initial stages after the establishment of Malaysia, no major changes should be undertaken in the administrative arrangements in the Borneo territories; and also, during the initial stages certain federal powers should be delegated to the state governments.

Subject to the above reservations, the IGC recommended that the principal items in the Federal Legislative List should be external affairs, defence, internal security, civil and criminal law and procedure and administration of justice (except Muslim and native law), Federal citizenship and naturalization, machinery of government, finance (except State sales tax), trade, commerce and industry, shipping and navigation, communication and transport (excluding the North Borneo Railway), federal works and power, survey, education (subject to the reservation above), medicine (except that in North Borneo this subject should be concurrent until 1970), labour and social

security, welfare of aborigines (though Federal, this should not apply in Sarawak and North Borneo), professional occupations, holidays (other than State holidays), unincorporated societies, control of pests, newspapers and publishing, censorship, places of amusement, federal housing and improvement trusts and cooperative societies.

In so far as the State Legislative List was concerned, the IGC recommended that the following should be included: Muslim law and native law (including personal law relating to marriage, divorce, maintenance, succession.) and services of a local character (such as fire brigades, hotels, burial grounds.), State works and water machinery of the State Government subject to the Federal List, State holidays, creation of offences in respect of matters included in the State List, inquiries for State purposes, indemnity in respect of matters in the State list and riverine fishing.

iii. Financial Provisions

The IGC recommended that with certain exceptions, taxation should be a Federal subject. The Committee pointed out that in order that the cost of State services should be met and provision for expansion made, it would be necessary to provide adequate revenues for the State Governments.

Therefore, it would be necessary to assign to Sarawak and North Borneo certain revenue additional to those assigned to the States in the existing Federation of Malaya - such as, certain taxes on petroleum products, timber and minerals, revenue from State sales taxes and port dues. In North Borneo, so long as the State retained responsibility for medicine and health, 30% of all other customs revenue should be assigned to it. Among several other grants including an annual balancing grant for each State to be made from Federal sources to the Borneo States, was a special grant to Sarawak to provide for continued expansion of State services, and another to North Borneo equal to 40% of any increase of Federal revenues derived from the State and not already assigned.

The Committee revealed that the Central Government would assist Sarawak to spend M\$300 million during the first five years after Malaysia Day on capital expenditure on development. Malaya had also noted an estimated development expenditure in North Borneo of M\$200 million for the same period, and recognized that funds from outside Malaysia would be required. The British Government had promised a grant of £1.5 million (pounds) per year for five years for the development of North Borneo and Sarawak.

iv. Elections

The IGC recommended that members of the Federal Legislature from Sarawak and North Borneo should initially be elected by the State Legislative Assemblies. Direct elections to the Federal Parliament - and to the State

Legislature - should be held for the first general elections after the fifth anniversary of Malaysia Day or earlier if the State Government agreed. Elections would be the responsibility of the Federal Elections Commission which should be increased by one additional member from the Borneo States.

v. The Judiciary

In addition to the Supreme Court of Malaysia there should be three High Courts, for the States of Malaya, for Singapore and for the Borneo States. The Supreme Court should have jurisdiction to determine appeals from the various High Courts, as well as disputes between the States or a State and the Centre, and certain constitutional questions. This qualification apart, the IGC recommended that the High Courts should have unlimited jurisdiction to determine appeals from lower courts within the States. Native law, customs and native courts should continue as a State subject. The Supreme Court would be known as the Federal Court.

vi. Public Service

The IGC declared that separate Public Services Commissions should be established in each State. The Federal Public Services Commission should establish, for at least five years, branches in Sarawak and North Borneo and members of the State Public Services Commissions should serve on the Federal Public Services Commissions State branches.

The IGC declared that existing officers, including expatriate officers should be eligible for promotion, secondment or transfer in the Federal Service but such officers should not be required to serve outside Borneo unless they agreed to do so. Further, it was agreed that people from the Borneo territories would be given preference in any recruitment affecting Borneo states.

vii. Citizenship

The IGC recommended that any citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies who was born, naturalized or registered in North Borneo and Sarawak and ordinarily resident there when Malaysia came into being, should become a Malaysian citizen by operation of law. Any other person over seventeen (17) years of age and ordinarily resident in the Borneo territories should be entitled to apply for Malaysian citizenship by registration, within eight years of Malaysia Day subject to certain qualifications including residence for seven out of the ten previous years.

viii. Immigration

Immigration into Malaysia should remain in the Federal List but legislation should be enacted by the Federal Parliament to ensure that, with certain

exceptions, entry into the Borneo States would require the approval of the State concerned. This legislation should not be amended or repealed without the prior agreement of the State concerned.

ix. Religion

The IGC agreed that Islam should be the national religion of Malaysia but there should be no state religion in Sarawak and North Borneo. There should be constitutional guarantees for religious freedom. Where Federal law provided for the granting of financial aid to Muslim institutions or for Muslim religious education, proportionate amounts should in the Borneo States be made available for purposes of social welfare.

x. Education

The IGC recommended that Education should be a federal subject. However, the existing policy and system of education administration in Sarawak and North Borneo should not be disturbed and should remain under the control of the State Governments until the latter otherwise agreed.

xi. National Language

While affirming that Malay should be the national language, the IGC concurred that for a period of ten years after Malaysia Day, thereafter until the State Legislatures otherwise provided, English should remain an official language. Members from the Borneo States in the Federal Parliament should be permitted to use English in the Federal Parliament for ten years and thereafter until Parliament otherwise decides.

xii. Existing Laws

Laws on federal matters in force in a Borneo State immediately before Malaysia Day should remain in force notwithstanding inconsistency with any provisions of the Constitution until of course, it is repeated, amended or modified by Parliament.

xiii. Indigenous Races

The IGC agreed that the provisions relating to Malays in the Federal Constitution should apply to the natives of the Borneo territories as defined by their respective laws as if they were Malays.

xiv. Transitional Arrangements

The IGC were of the view that certain constitutional powers should be delegated to State Governments during the transitional period.

Clearly, the completion and publication of the Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee on North Borneo and Sarawak marked an important milestone in the formation of Malaysia. All along the Borneo leaders had campaigned for adequate conditions and safeguards for the special interests of their territories. They had argued for political and explicit constitutional guarantees before North Borneo and Sarawak entered the proposed Federation of Malaysia.

Details set out in the IGC Report prove that these constitutional demands and guarantees met the ready understanding of the Malayan leaders. And since the IGC Report favoured the Borneo territories generously there was all round satisfaction among Bornean leaders.

Political leaders had little ground, if any, to grouse. Their demand in respect of religious freedom was fully met; they could use Malay as well as English as media of instruction; and their wish to control unwanted immigration into North Borneo was also met. The IGC agreed to other demands from North Borneo leaders e.g. federal representation, special position, indigenous races and finance.

Indeed, in so far as North Borneo was concerned, their demands for safeguards as embodied in their "Twenty Points" had been agreed to by the Committee.

Political leaders in Sarawak were highly appreciative of the IGC Report. The Secretary-General of the Sarawak Alliance, Stephen Kalong Ningkan said that his party "fully endorsed the Report". The Sarawak Government itself considered that the Report contained "generous terms of safeguards for Sarawak". It was thus clear that Sarawak was satisfied with IGC recommendations. A relatively new political party, the *Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak*, was of the view that there "should be plenty of rural projects and we want more help to be given to the rural people". Mr. Leong Ho Yuen, the Vice-Chairman of the SUPP said: "All in all, the Report is quite satisfactory. Though we cannot get all we asked for, at least we have been given a high percentage".

The Sarawak Council Negeri voted unanimously to adopt the IGC recommendations on March 8, 1963. The resolution was moved by the Attorney-General and he stated that the new nation, formed on the basis of the IGC Report, would forge ahead with confidence. He added:

"... so long as there exists in this world a struggle between rival ideologies those matters will be troubled. Better that we sail in convoy with the good ship Malaysia than alone in the small ship Sarawak."

Thoroughly satisfied with the IGC Report, the North Borneo Legislative Council unanimously adopted the Report on March 13, 1963. Two unofficial members of the Council respectively proposed and seconded the motion. They

were Donald Stephens and Datu Mustapha. Mr. Stephens, who was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the North Borneo Alliance said, "The whole of North Borneo will now welcome with joy the creation of Malaysia".

Thus, it had taken twenty-one months for the Borneo leaders to make up their minds on Malaysia. The willingness to explore the possibilities of a union with Malaya began with the attendance of Borneo leaders in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference in July 1961; their continued interest in Malaysia meant four meetings of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee from August 1961 to January 1962; from February to April 1962 the Cobbold Commission gave official sanction to North Borneo and Sarawak joining Malaysia; and now, twenty-one months later with the adoption of the IGC Report, the way was clear for Malaysia.

PART FOUR Neighbours



After the adoption of the IGC Report it would seem that the way for Malaysia would be unhindered. However, there were external complications brought by Malaya's two neighbours. It certainly became a very bitter controversy affecting relations with those two neighbours namely the Philippines and Indonesia. I had not anticipated the intensity of the controversy and was at first more concerned with Malaysia being accepted in the United Nations.

With the agreement of the Tunku, I had been in close consultation with the Canadian Government through its High Commission in Kuala Lumpur to which I had given a clear picture of the decolonisation objective of Malaysia. The Canadian Government had made a draft resolution for the General Assembly on the question of the Universal Application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The High Commission showed the draft to me and I made a slight amendment which I thought would appeal to the Afro-Asian countries. The original Canadian draft had included in the Resolution the issues of Soviet imperialism in the Baltic States, Ukraine, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Far East; this would certainly be opposed by USSR and her friends. I told the High Commission that for the current purpose we should focus our attention to the older kind of colonialism although the USSR's type of imperialism was more sinister and should be dealt with separately.

It may be recalled that on May 24, 1962 London handed to the Philippines Ambassador an aide memoire reaffirming the British Government's conviction that the British Crown was entitled to and enjoyed sovereignty over North Borneo and that no valid claim to such sovereignty could arise from any quarter including by inheritance of the rights of the Sultan of Sulu except the only right of the heirs to receive their shares of money as agreed. Her Majesty's Government would resist any claim whether advanced by the Government or a private person in the interest of the people of North Borneo. The aide memoire added that the Malayan and the British Governments had welcomed in principle the formation of Malaysia and any public dispute over North Borneo would have serious repercussions in Malaya and North Borneo.

This last point was rejected by Salvador Lopez the acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs and declared that the dispute existed between the Sultanate of Sulu and the Philippines Governments on one hand and the British Government on the other. Manila confirmed that it was entering into a dispute with the British Government over ownership and sovereignty of North

Borneo. Lopez also told our Ambassador in Manila that there was no truth in the allegation that the Manila claim was aimed at frustrating the formation of Malaysia which Manila supported in principle. The claim was a long outstanding matter which the previous governments of Manila had neglected and had been ignored by the British. It was a matter of regret that Macapagal came in at the time when the Malaysia plan was being proposed and expressed the hope that the dispute would be resolved by the time Malaysia was formed. He revealed that the President would soon be making a proposal of the confederation consisting of Malaya, Singapore, the Borneo territories and the Philippines.

Two days later, Macapagal made the statement that the Philippine claim would continue to be pursued by peaceful means and expressed confidence that the British Government would agree to a discussion. Like Lopez, Macapagal also reiterated that the claim was not a deliberate effort to hamper the formation of Malaysia which would be a bulwark against communism. Then he made his proposal of a greater Malayan Confederation, to begin with Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. It was significant to note that Indonesia was not included perhaps, in a fit of absentmindedness or was it Freudian. However, the message was implicit that the Confederation would render Malaysia as unnecessary.

About a week later, our Ambassador, Zaiton Ibrahim was called to the Philippines Foreign Ministry and handed over an aide memoire by Pelaez. The aide memoire referred to the Tunku-MacMillan agreement for the establishment of Malaysia and expressed satisfaction of the Manila Government over Malaysia and so far as it had represented a step forward in the direction of increased cooperation and unity. Pelaez believed that the step would ultimately lead to a broader integration of the Malay peoples in the cultural and economic fields.

The aide memoire pointed out the existence of the dispute between Manila and London which Manila hoped would be settled amicably. The Malayan side was reminded of the conversation between the Tunku and Pelaez when the Tunku had said that North Borneo would join Malaysia on a clean slate and this should not be ignored. Nothing should happen which would adversely affect the fraternal relations between Malaya and the Philippines and the strong support given to ASA.

The Philippine Press was attacking the Tunku violently and even personally which made the Tunku extremely unhappy. He was accused of standing in the way of the claim by the Malaysia Plan which was described as pre-planned to deprive Manila of its just rights. The Tunku being concurrently Malaya's Foreign Minister besides being the Prime Minister thought that he should not visit Manila to attend the Foreign Ministers meeting in November 1962. There was no doubt that the Press campaign and speeches on the claim were having a telling effect on the Manila - Kuala Lumpur relations.

At the United Nations General Assembly in September 1962, Pelaez told the Assembly that Manila would firmly press the claim, which according to Pelaez, was valid and legal and based on historical grounds. The British leader placed on record of the General Assembly that the United Kingdom had no doubt whatsoever as to its sovereignty over the territory of North Borneo. These exchanges focussed world attention to the existence of a problem between the Philippines and the United Kingdom.

I was then instructed to find a way which would render the Tunku's "clean slate" point as inconsequential. I called the Philippines Ambassador and handed to him an aide memoire telling Manila that Malaya was going ahead with the establishment of Malaysia in accordance with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people in the British territories in North Borneo and Sarawak. The aide memoire said that at that time North Borneo was under the effective and direct rule of the British Government and to the British Government the question of sovereignty over North Borneo had at no time been in doubt. The Government of the Federation of Malaya had accepted this situation as sufficient to satisfy the terms stated by the Tunku as "clean slate". If the Philippines Government had any reason to disagree with the claim that the British Government was entitled to and actually enjoyed sovereignty over North Borneo, such a dispute would be a matter strictly between the two governments. The aide memoire pointed out that at no time before the announcement in London in July 1962 of the establishment of Malaysia was there a reference made to the claim by the Philippines Government that the British Government was not entitled to ownership or sovereignty over North Borneo or to transfer it to any other entity. It was only during the conversation between Pelaez and Zaiton Ibrahim the Malayan Ambassador on August 2, 1962 in Manila that Malaya became officially aware that Manila was making a formal claim to North Borneo.

Manila was not helpful then in trying to improve relations. In fact, we had information in Kuala Lumpur that Azahari the President of Party Rakyat of Brunei, had visited Manila where during his stay, Azahari was reported to have met various political leaders including Pelaez and leading newsmen seeking support for his proposal to oppose the Malaysia Plan.

Azahari left Manila November 29, 1962 for Singapore where he met his friends among the Barisan Sosialis and Party Rakyat Melayu. Azahari signalled the outbreak of revolt in Brunei with no other reason than to create a security situation in the hope of dampening the spirit and determination of the protagonists of the Malaysia plan. None in Kuala Lumpur expected the Brunei coup to succeed but the repercussions would reverberate among the Borneo peoples particularly among the Chinese whose main interest was an atmosphere of stability in order that they would prosper in trade. Azahari returned to Manila where he was given protection and it was in Manila that Azahari proclaimed the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara consisting of Brunei, Sarawak and British North Borneo and that he was the

Prime Minister while the Sultan of Brunei was the Head of State. It would seem to the Malayan Government then that both Azahari and his Manila supporters who had claimed to have formed a liaison with Malacanang were quite naive.

Little did anyone in Kuala Lumpur expect the Philippines Government to show their hands when Manila was expected to show neutrality. Perhaps many of the supporters of the President saw that Azahari's State of Kalimantan Utara would serve as a face saving device regarding the cartographic claim. Azahari's supporters in Manila must have reckoned that Azahari was not a man who would surrender North Borneo but Azahari could have created a new situation in which the claim on North Borneo would be rendered unnecessary particularly if the illegal action of Azahari was supported by the Philippine Government. The bizarre attitude of the Manila Government when Azahari was in Manila being allowed to make such political statements as to injure Philippine-Malaya relations could not be explained and best left to conjecture. Azahari was crafty enough to mislead some of those blinded by the claim that the revolt was against the British although everyone outside Manila knew that Azahari meant to dislodge the Sultanate or at least to reduce it to be a constitutional office. Most of the Manila press worked overtime to provide comments and news that had been in favour of Azahari.

Official comments came to the Malayan Foreign Ministry from Manila to the effect that Azahari had approached Manila for formal recognition of his State only after the coup had been a total failure. Azahari's request for him and his "government" to stay in Manila would be agreed to by the Philippine Government only on condition that they possessed valid travel documents. I asked Zaiton Ibrahim, our Ambassador, if Azahari was given a political asylum with conditions usually attached to such an asylum. I was told by our Ambassador that there was no such arrangement. Although I had been informed by the British that Azahari's passport had been invalidated, Zaiton told me that Azahari and his merry men were still treated in Manila as if they had valid travel documents. It was quite possible that the British did not inform Manila of the status of Azahari's passport after the failed coup.

I must confess I found it then very difficult to reconcile the attitude of Manila with the professed friendship with Malaya. It could not be treated as a friendly gesture when someone enjoying the protection of the so-called friendly government was fomenting a rebellion and claiming to be a "Prime Minister" of a government having jurisdiction over territories which were parts of the Malaysia plan. Championing the cause of the subject peoples of Borneo by organising a coup in Brunei when the Philippines had been assured that the plan had the support of the vast majority of people could hardly be a matter for support unless that support was part of a mischief. The attempted coup by Azahari's men was a bad dream. And it soon became an embarrassment to Azahari's supporters in Manila and he was eventually

persuaded to leave for Indonesia. In Kuala Lumpur, the attitude of Manila became a subject of intense scrutiny. I was one of those who would not believe that the Philippine Government was veering towards the opposition to the formation of Malaysia. Friendly signals appeared less and less and I was left alone to grasp at some evidence of goodwill. My efforts were in vain.

An old friend of mine whom I had met in India when I lived there with Malcolm MacDonald had now become the leader of the Philippine Delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1962. He was Ramos, then an ambassador in New Delhi. I had spent many pleasurable hours talking with him about our region of a single race being divided by Western colonial powers. Rizal, the greatest Malay patriot, was an object of my admiration and a subject of study.

If I had not known the ways of diplomacy and international politics, I would have taken Ramos' statement in the General Assembly as a personal affront. Ambassador Ramos, on behalf of the Philippines Government, said that the Malaysia proposal was being forced on the people of the Borneo territories against their will. Security as the main worry of Manila came to the fore. The Manila presentation at the General Assembly was that from the viewpoint of national security, the Philippines had a vital stake in the future of North Borneo.

Then came a theory which took me a long time to discern until I began to understand that Malaya could no longer be treated as friendly – a line espoused by Sukarno and Subandrio, persuaded by their PKI cohorts. In the Malayan Foreign Ministry we named it as the “cock-eyed” theory. According to Manila, the territory of North Borneo was like a “cork” that closes the Sulu Sea and therefore of great strategic importance for the Philippines. This really worried me and I had no way of asking Manila's friend, the US except through their Ambassador, if they shared that view.

I did not think that the American Strategy for Peace in Southeast Asia included the “cock-eyed” theory and I had been a number of times assured by the US Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur that the US would favour Malaysia. All they needed was the use of the British base in Singapore for SEATO purposes. They were more concerned with Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and even Thailand. In fact the idea of Malaysia was endorsed as a viable strategic concept against the growth of communism in Southeast Asia. Malaya had a very good record in the management of communist insurrection. And as far as I could gather there was no schism in the Anglo-American attitude on the overall strategy of Southeast Asia at least between “the young cocky Irishman” and the aging Prime Minister of the British Empire. It was MacMillan who referred to Kennedy as “the young cocky Irishman”.

Malaya had no business to show anxiety over the “cock-eyed” theory even if I was painfully concerned. The British delegation in the General Assembly commented on the claim as a new invention since the Philippine Constitution of 1946 and the 1961 Resolution of the Philippine Congress on territorial

waters defined the boundaries of the Philippines to the exclusion of North Borneo. Furthermore, there was strong opposition to the Manila Claim from the people of North Borneo.

An open letter had been sent by the five leading political organisations in North Borneo to Macapagal expressing cogently that the parties and people of North Borneo did not believe that the Philippines had any claim over any land whatsoever either by virtue of the former Sultan of Sulu or otherwise. No matter what anyone might say about this so-called claim, not one of the people of North Borneo had any wish to become part of the Philippines nor would any of them consent to it.

The "cock-eyed" theory was inconsistent with what was said by Pelaez, who on August 2, had said that Malaysia would represent a step forward in the field of cooperation and unity among Southeast Asian people. The relation just deteriorated and the slide was enhanced by Macapagal's State of the Nation message in the last week of January 1963. He said that Malaya had no valid claim or right to take over North Borneo as if the exercise was an annexation. Macapagal perhaps was not aware that the exercise was a decolonisation process and could be actualised only with the will and wish of the people to be members of a federation. He went on to say that the project to place North Borneo together with Brunei and Sarawak under Malaya, (a very strange way of putting it to say the least), had already provoked a revolt in Brunei. There was no doubt in the view of Macapagal that the Borneo territories would be, as he put it, a continuation of colonialism based only on an expedience of false security. All these placed me in a very awkward position because I had openly always held Manila in high esteem. There were a number of occasions when I had to face 'I told you so' kind of remarks made by Malayan politicians and officials.

There were enough people who thought that the Azahari coup attempt and the "cock-eyed" theory as having nothing to do with the claim.

The British Government in May 1962 had informed the Philippine Government on its stand over the question of sovereignty over North Borneo. I had flown to London on the September 14, 1962 to inquire a little more from the British about the Manila claim on North Borneo. I had with me Zain Azraai and we met Sir Arthur Snelling of the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO). Together with him were some officials from the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and his staff from the CRO.

Snelling referred to the Cessation Grant of 1878, to the Confirmation Grant and the Letter of Commission which he handed over copies to us. He said that Her Majesty's Government had no doubt, from a reading of those documents, that all rights and powers had been transferred. However, Manila and London had exchanged notes on this subject. It would appear that the claim had gone beyond financial considerations and was no longer restricted to the original territory of the Sultan of Sulu. It was now bound with the internal policies of the Philippines. At that juncture, the British view was that

Manila had not as yet established a case for discussion, and as such there was no reason for a general discussion. Snelling asked what the attitude of the Malayan Government was. For the moment, I replied, Kuala Lumpur was not overly excited but the matter might be raised when the Tunku would visit Manila for the ASA Meeting in November 1962.

Snelling thought that the visit to Manila by the Tunku would provide a good, and perhaps the only opportunity to persuade Manila not to pursue with the claim and only the Tunku could do it. There was a Philippine proposal for a confederation and this, according to Snelling, was a smoke-screen behind which Manila could graciously and honourably retire from their present position in respect of the claim.

There was a reference to Lansdowne's discussion with the Tunku. It was revealed to us that Lansdowne had casually mentioned that Malaysia might come about by giving the Borneo territories independence for a nominal period, say 24 hours, and then subsequently join Malaysia.

This method might help to meet the problem of the claim. I told Snelling that this idea had been bandied around particularly among the rich Western educated Chinese circles in Borneo but on consideration it had little advantage. In any case, it was confirmed by one of the British officials that Lansdowne himself did not favour the idea and the matter had been dropped.

Snelling asked if I had any information that the Philippines would bring up the matter to the United Nations to which I replied that I had no definite information but we in Kuala Lumpur knew that Manila had been lobbying Cairo and Jakarta. I asked the British side as to their position if the claim was brought up to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ). The British officer from the Foreign Office said that the UK would be prepared to defend her position. I pointed out to the official that Britain was subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court only on matters or issues arising out of documents signed after 1930. In any case, Snelling observed, he could not see Manila bringing up the case to the ICJ since this was a time consuming process.

We then discussed on the point as to whether on the formation of Malaysia there would need to be a fresh application and seat in the UN assured. Snelling said the British view was that there need not be any fresh application. They were not then as yet prepared to make any open declaration on the matter since that might create difficulties in the Borneo territories. I reminded the meeting that in the case of the United Arab Republic the application had to be referred to the Security Council. Although in that case there was no discussion in the Security Council, in the case of Malaysia the USSR might raise objections knowing well that the communist countries and their friends were opposed to the formation. This of course was not an exact analogy since Syria had already been a member of UN. Two other examples were quoted, one, India after the entry of Goa and the other, the United States after the inclusion of Hawaii.

An official from the CRO said that the British legal view was that Malaya had not changed its international personality on becoming Malaysia. I revealed to the British side that I had my worries because of the USSR veto and to overcome that I had proposed to the Tunku and Razak that the Malayan Government should change the name of the Federation to Malaysia even before the entries of the new states. After all in the various discussions everyone from the Borneo territories and Singapore had agreed that the name should be Malaysia and they had objected to the "Persekutuan Tanah Melayu". The Malayan Government did not see any difficulty in that but no decision had as yet been made. Snelling requested that the British Government should be kept informed but expressed the view that the British Government was not too concerned with this question as it felt that the creation of Malaysia necessitated no fresh application.

We then moved on to the subject of drafting the Agreement to form Malaysia which should be in the form of an Agreement with amendments to the present Constitution of Malaya and annexures to contain the State Constitutions of Sarawak, North Borneo and Singapore. It was not noticed by any at the meeting that I had deliberately excluded Brunei. Snelling suggested that the Malayan Government should produce the first draft with amendments to the Constitution of Malaya while the British would produce the drafts of the Constitutions of the new states. I agreed with the suggestion. Snelling also said that the Colonial Office legal advisor would soon be going to the Borneo territories and I welcomed the suggestion that he should also visit Kuala Lumpur so that there would be a direct contact with the draftsmen in Kuala Lumpur.

I took the opportunity to discuss the question of security of Singapore since at the Tunku-MacMillan meeting the security action should be taken in November after the debate in the British Parliament and now I had heard that Parliament would only meet on the issue in February. The Internal Security Council of Singapore in which Malaya was represented would prefer an earlier date. I revealed to the British side that in my conversation with Razak he preferred action to be taken quickly. The Referendum showed that Lee Kuan Yew appeared to be strong but the Referendum might only be an indication not of Lee Kuan Yew's strength but the strong desire on the part of the people of Singapore to merge with Malaya on a favourable term. In the coming by-election in Singapore I suggested to the British side that if Lim Chin Siong was nominated he would be almost certain to win. It was therefore important that security action be taken before the nominations day. The Police Departments on both sides of the Causeway had been preparing the case for security action. I told them that the laws in the two territories were identical and would pose no problem. It was Sir Arthur Snelling who said that their position, though not final, was to take action after the debate in Parliament which might take place in February the following year. But the British side would closely monitor the deliberations and decisions taken at the next Singapore Security Council

meeting to be held on the sixteenth of November. He was extremely anxious to avoid any political repercussions in the British Parliament for any British action in Singapore.

A few days after my return from London, I invited the Philippines Ambassador, Mr. Yusup Abu Bakar to have a chat with me at my office. I wanted to express to him my concern that there were too many hostile statements from Manila seemingly from government sources. Our Ambassador Zaiton Ibrahim had been having discussions with Pelaez. I was therefore somewhat puzzled as to what Manila wanted since the British Government had told me that Manila had not supplied any basis for the claim. I asked if it was the money due to the heirs of the Sultan that Manila was interested in or the acquisition of the territory. In any case, North Borneo was now bigger than what the Sulu Sultan had surrendered in the Cessation Grant.

Ambassador Yusup informed me that the matter would not have arisen if the British Government had not ignored the demand of the heirs to a settlement by a lump sum for a waiver of any future claims. Now that the heirs had assigned their rights to the Philippines Government, Manila had become interested in purely the question of legality as to the ownership of the territory. Once the ownership had been established, Manila was quite prepared to let the matter be decided by a referendum among the people there as to which way they might wish to go.

At that stage I was not at all versed with the subject of the claim. However, looking at the Agreement superficially I thought that the whole exercise would be purely academic and indeed futile. The Agreement between the Sultan and Overbeck had very clearly stipulated, whatever might be the merits of the word *pajak* that the Sultan and his heirs and successors had in perpetuity assigned all rights and powers to Overbeck and to his heirs and successors. If there was going to be a transfer that transfer should be approved by Her Majesty the Queen which confirmed even more that the rights of transfer rested with the British Government. There appeared no ground for making the claim on Malaya or the future Malaysia when elections would confirm the wishes of the North Borneo people.

The Ambassador repeated the point that Manila was anxious only to establish ownership. I made a preliminary remark that such a right transferred in the Agreement could not be challenged unless there was a breach of any of the conditions of the Agreement. Of course if the two sides agreed to re-open negotiations on terms and conditions of the Agreement including its life that would be entirely a different matter.

According to that day's news from London it would appear that the British Government was considering a discussion on this matter and I suggested that we should wait and see. Yusup said he wished the British would really discuss the matter instead of ignoring the claim.

With regard to the Tunku's visit to Manila to attend the ASA conference, I requested the Ambassador to impress on his government that there would be

no linking of ASA with the Manila claim. The Malaysia Concept was personally identified with the Tunku and he would find it advisable not to attend the meeting if his presence in Manila as a result of the excitement aroused might cause embarrassment all round. The Tunku might prefer to send another minister to represent him. Yusup assured me that the excitement was the invention of the Press and there was no excitement among the people. He suggested that if he could return to Manila a fortnight before the meeting he might be able to meet the members of the Press and talk to them. He claimed he knew most of them and felt that he could persuade them not to draw any attention to the claim or the Malaysia plan during the period of the Tunku's presence in Manila.

The Tunku, as early as the middle of June, had requested me to make a study of the people of the southern islands of the Philippines and to find out the strength of their feeling. His instruction was short but to the point.

I had a friend by the name of Des Alwi. By nationality he was an Indonesian but had become one of those opposed to Sukarno. He was the adopted son of the first Prime Minister of Indonesia, Sutan Sharir who during his exile in Banda Niera had adopted Des and his sister Mimi. Both these kids were sent to London in 1948 to study and the few Malays in London at that time including the Tunku, Razak and myself took care of them. Mimi died after her return to Indonesia and Des on his return to Indonesia had worked for the Indonesian Government in the Overseas Information Service. When the PRRI and Permesta rebellions against Sukarno took place, Des who had been serving in the Philippines had chosen to side with the rebels and he fled to Kuala Lumpur where he was given sanctuary. Since he knew the Philippines well, the Tunku thought that he could re-visit the country in particular in the Muslim areas of the South with me and make an assessment. However, during the process of planning, we concluded that he and I should not make any appearance there. Instead, a special team was sent to make the assessment.

When we were talking of the claim we were well-aware as to the strength or lack of it. Some claimants to be heirs to the Sultan were the only people who showed interest and that was at first for the money including timber concessions which they had hoped to get in North Borneo. I had been working on a certain formula to be proposed in order to satisfy the group by creating a lump sum or a Trust Fund for the heirs. The difficulty was that the group of the so-called heirs itself could not sort out the true beneficiaries. For some reason the claim had been assigned to the Manila Government which changed the colour of the claim making a resolution even more difficult. The assignment had caused the emergence of a new question as to whether the Manila Government had legally succeeded to the right to pursue the claim arising from a document signed by a group whose legal identity as rightful heirs and capable of making such assignment had not been made clear.

Tory, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, called on the Tunku on November 28, 1962. It was a Cabinet day but luckily it ended early

and the Tunku was able to receive him from 12.20 p.m. to 1.00 p.m. The Tunku had asked me to be in attendance. Tory said that it might be possible to help Macapagal to get off the hook in the matter of the claim by having a tripartite talk between the Philippines, the British and the Malayan Governments on the subject of mutual concern relating to the stability of the area.

The British Government was encouraged to think in these terms because Macapagal had taken a new line that Malaysia, with the inclusion of North Borneo, would pose a grave danger to the security of the Philippines and the stability of the area. This conclusion, it would appear, was the result of Macapagal's consideration that once the British control over North Borneo was withdrawn, the effectiveness of SEATO in the Sulu Sea would cease and Manila would be exposed to dangers. The British Government therefore thought that the best way would be to satisfy the Philippine Government that Malaysia was intended for the creating of the stability of the area and would therefore be in the interest of the Philippines.

Tory also said that the British had the impression that Macapagal had been most anxious to bring in the Americans in any talk on the matter because Manila had had the view that the British was not on the level in this matter and he had no faith in the British determination to defend this area. I had the impression that the British Government would not like the US to be concerned in the proposed tripartite meeting if it should take place.

There was the possibility of ASA meeting being held on the December 10 and the British thought that the Tunku might wish to broach Manila regarding the tripartite meeting. I reminded Tory that ASA had been postponed till the twelve of January. Tory said the British Government nevertheless would be proceeding to make the proposal through the British Ambassador in Manila. After the proposed talk it was hoped that the Philippines would agree to a Joint-Communique in which everyone would express satisfaction that the formation of Malaysia would not in any way prejudice the security and stability of the area. As a matter of fact it would strengthen it. By this means, according to Tory, Manila should then go back to their people and suggest that there should be no further worries since their fears regarding Malaysia were unfounded. Macapagal would then be in a position to withdraw from the present posture regarding the claim. Tory's line of conversation was clear to me that the common factor between London, Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Washington was SEATO which required an indication that the Malaysia Concept would in no way negatively affect its role.

The Tunku asked permission to speak with me and to find out what I thought. We spoke in Malay and Tory could never follow my Pahang and Tunku's Kedah dialects but we both understood each other. The Tunku wanted my candid opinion.

I told the Tunku that there was a great deal of naivete in the proposal. The US would have to be a party. Security was the worry and this was what Selkirk was anxious about when the Tunku said that the British base in Singapore

could not be used for SEATO purposes. That was the key to the question of security and not British withdrawal from North Borneo. Except for some small installations in Labuan the British defence contribution to SEATO was Singapore. The US, I said, would like a declaration that Singapore would continue to be a SEATO base and Malaya might have to agree as a result of the tripartite talk. Selkirk and the British did not want to find themselves as a junior partner in SEATO if the British base in Singapore was not available for SEATO purposes. I reminded the Tunku that he had already found the formula that the Singapore base would be a part of the British contribution towards the defence of Southeast Asia which meant that if the balloon was up Singapore base would be available for SEATO. In peace time there would be no occasion to have a SEATO exercise using Singapore but exercise under the Anglo-Malaya Defence Agreement could still take place.

The Tunku then turned to Tory and said that Malaya should not be brought into the talk at this juncture. However, if it would appear advantageous as a result of a bilateral talk between London and Manila that Malaya should also participate he would be willing to allow Kuala Lumpur to do so. The Tunku would like to maintain the consistency that the claim was a matter strictly between London and Manila alone. However, he had no objection if the British would inform Macapagal regarding the Anglo-Malayan understanding in respect of the British participation in the defence of Malaya on the lines of the Anglo-Malaya defence arrangement as agreed recently in London.

After Tory had left during a pot-luck lunch, we discussed again the subject. The Tunku shared my feeling that Macapagal was not really interested in the question of security. It was more on the line of what Yusup Abu Bakar had said to me. Anyway we decided to wait and see the outcome of the bilateral talk, if it would take place at all.

The Tunku in a reminiscent mood recalled that the Malayan relations with the Philippines had been close since Merdeka day of 1957. It was Manila which was one of the first governments which recognised the newly independent Federation of Malaya. The Tunku visited Manila as one of the first capitals in January 1959 with the view of cementing the bond of friendship between the two peoples. At the end of that extremely successful visit the communiqué stressed the need for close cooperation between Manila and Kuala Lumpur. The President was Garcia and the Tunku said that he had hit it well with him. They agreed that there would be an association for the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia. That was the laying of the foundation for ASA.

After that a Malayan legation was set up in Manila and soon it was raised to the status of an embassy with a resident Ambassador.

Garcia paid a return visit to Kuala Lumpur during which a further exploratory talk took place regarding ASA. As a direct consequence of this talk

ASA was launched in Bangkok on July 31, 1961 during a meeting of Foreign Ministers of Thailand, the Philippines and Malaya.

I reminded the Tunku of my reservation regarding ASA because the other two were members of SEATO and Malaya had a defence arrangement with Britain who was also a member of SEATO. I could not see in the context of the Cold War how Indonesia would agree to join. The Tunku was then optimistic that in due course Indonesia might find it possible to join an existing and flourishing organisation.

The Tunku recalled that when he broached the idea of Malaysia to foreign journalists in Singapore in May 1961 there was no immediate reaction from Manila. This silence might be explained by the fact that the Philippines were preoccupied with their Presidential elections which resulted in Macapagal assuming the office of the President on December 13, 1961.

The Tunku remembered my brief regarding Macapagal that it was Macapagal in 1948 who had successfully agitated for the return of the Turtle Islands from Britain. While a member of Congress Macapagal had initiated the introduction of a resolution calling on the President then to negotiate with Britain for the restoration of ownership over North Borneo. The Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on April 29, 1950 but failed to get the approval of the Senate. And so when Macapagal became President the Tunku said it was natural that there would be an increase in the agitation for the "recovery" of British North Borneo.

During an ASA conference Manuel Pelaez, the Vice President took the opportunity to privately discuss with the Tunku the question of North Borneo being transferred by the British to form Malaysia. He reminded the Tunku that Manila had a claim to which the Tunku made clear to Pelaez that the matter should be resolved between the British and the Philippines Governments.

By that time press and political pressure was being put on Macapagal to take the necessary steps consistent with International Law for the recovery upon a certain portion of the island of Borneo and the adjacent islands.

The British Government by that time had told me through its diplomatic representative that they had agreed to hold consultations with Manila on matters of mutual interest including the claim. I was truly relieved to hear the news and had hoped they could resolve the issue. Those consultations took place in London at the end of January 1963 beginning on the same day that Macapagal made his State of the Nation message and it lasted until the first of February.

Pelaez led the Manila delegation while Lord Home the then Foreign Secretary led the British team. There were many surprises in arguments which came to the fore but there had been no valid legal arguments. More or less as I gathered from the British, Manila believed that there was a better chance of keeping North Borneo out of communist control by restoring it to the Philippines instead of becoming a part of Malaysia. Instead of depending for

her security on Malaya and Singapore which were a thousand miles away on the imperilled mainland, North Borneo would then form part of a compact, well defended archipelago whose nearest island was only eighteen miles away.

At the end of the talks, neither the British Government nor the Philippine side would want to give in even an inch. My worry mounted because if the reasons for objecting to North Borneo being part of Malaysia had been strategic and based on security considerations then the solution could not be on the diplomatic plane. It would become a long term issue. As for me, I had always believed that only Malaya and later Malaysia could manage the problem of communist expansion. Indeed, it was also for that reason that the Malaysia plan was enthusiastically promoted by Malaya and the Tunku who had vast experiences in dealing with communist insurgency. I had believed most ardently that the domino theory was bunkum and only the faint-hearted would succumb to the call of the US dependency syndrome. I had even spoken publicly of rolling back communism in Indo-China, at least its expansionist edges.

The Tunku never failed to remind all concerned that the flirting of Sukarno with the PKI spelt danger for Southeast Asia. His Baling Talk had strengthened his conviction that communism should be faced squarely and not pacified or placated by artful massage because no way would communism surrender its ambition of spreading their power and influence. In Malaya the analytical conclusion was that for every day communism failed to spread, for that day all endeavours should be concentrated to deny it from showing its ugly head. After all communism was not only an ideology; it was also a method and it was the management of the second factor which was the more difficult. As ideology it had been bankrupt from the first day of its being applied by Lenin but they had been successful by their methods of infiltration, subversion, coercion, and terrorism.

We knew for sure that the political and legal principles in the Philippines which had been based on extremely unrealistic American ideals in an ambience of gullibility, the communist methods would work. Only with American help would Philippines be safe from succumbing to the communist fire power if force was used. But communism could easily exploit nationalism and social inequity. In this regard the American power and even monetary aid would be futile. In the psychological warfare for the heart, mind and stomach, the war had to be total; Malaya was the only country which had proved her ability to thwart the communist methods.

Perhaps at that time it was difficult to judge as to the accuracy of the analysis. I felt certain then that Sukarno and Macapagal must have thought that they had the management skill to save their respective countries from communism. After all, Madiun was a communist failure in Indonesia and Magsasay was a symbol of victory over communism in the Philippines. It was their differing perceptions which led leaders in Manila to suspect that Malaysia would not be able to resist the growth of communism. Hence the

“cock-eyed” theory and the coincidence of interest with Indonesia on objecting to the Malaysia Plan.

The Claim therefore had shifted to the realm of security and little was heard about the Sulu Sultan’s legality. Malaya was now openly accused by Manila as the cause of the quarrel and division between neighbouring countries. Pelaez said in Bangkok on his way home from London that it was not an auspicious beginning for Malaysia if it was faced with the oppositions from Manila and Jakarta.

To Malayan leaders the picture was clear but they were prepared to take a last mile walk. They agreed to a proposal by Manila that there should be a round table conference of Southeast Asian leaders, as the proponents suggested, to thrash out the problem of North Borneo although it was seen from Kuala Lumpur as a means of thwarting the formation of Malaysia. When I was asked by some people including the press regarding the proposal, I made a cautious statement to the effect that the Government was not going to jump at a flip of a finger but certainly the Government would not find it unreasonable to meet with Southeast Asian leaders for the sake of peace in Southeast Asia. The Government would certainly give the proposal its highest consideration.

The Tunku, a few days after the public proposal made by Manila, told the press that he was prepared to participate in the round table conference provided the talks were initiated by a third party, a neutral power; he however did not identify which neutral power. There was some optimism among certain quarters including foreign well-wishers for Malaysia that Malaya would go to such a conference. However, the Tunku’s response was regarded by those who wished Malaysia ill that it was a rejection. The idea of a neutral power as the initiator would never be at all acceptable to Indonesia.

With regard to Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur since 31 August 1957 had enjoyed the best of relations with Jakarta until the subject of Malaysia plan emerged. When the Indonesian people were struggling for independence, hundreds of Malaysians and people from the Borneo territories had joined in the struggle and very many indeed made the supreme sacrifice. Among those who returned was Ahmad Zaidi of Sarawak. Those who survived and elected to stay back had become Indonesian citizens. A few had risen to very high ranks in the armed forces and in the civil and diplomatic services with distinction.

On the other hand, Indonesia gave unstinted moral, political and diplomatic support in Malaya’s struggle for independence. This was highly appreciated by all Malaysians from the Tunku to the humble peasant. I remember well on the eve of Merdeka a discussion took place in the house of the Tunku attended by those who later became members of his Cabinet; I was asked to attend that meeting. At the meeting I was clearly instructed that the cornerstone of Malaya’s foreign policy should be the Malaya-Indonesia relation which should constantly be nurtured to forge the closest links and had to be kept in constant repair.

When arranging for the order of precedence for the diplomatic corp in Kuala Lumpur, naturally following the Commonwealth practice, the British High Commissioner had to be the doyen in the first list. After his leaving the capital, the next in line would be the doyen and so on in accordance with the date of the presentation of credential. And so on that day of Merdeka it was arranged that the Indonesian Ambassador would be the deputy dean to the British. There were others who claimed that position because they had consulates for some time in Malaya and Singapore before independence. So the seat for the Indonesian representative for the independence celebrations was conspicuously in a privileged position.

A pre-independent Malayan Mission had been established in Jakarta and on Merdeka Day it became an embassy, certainly the only embassy established on that day; in London, India, Pakistan and Australia where similar missions had been established before independence, by then all had become High Commissions. In November 1958, a consulate was established in Medan to meet the growing need for trade and cultural relations. It was established at the same time as the official visit to Indonesia of Razak as the Deputy Prime Minister from Medan to Bali. I accompanied Razak during that visit.

At the end of the Razak visit after meeting President Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders, a joint communiqué was issued. The two Governments, had decided to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and a Cultural Agreement which would serve not only to give a formal expression to the close ties that had existed between the two peoples and of their desire to strengthen it further but also to provide the basis for cooperation and collaboration towards the growth of a common language and a common culture.

A senior officer from the Indonesian foreign ministry and I had worked alternately in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta to draft the Treaty and the Agreement with the help of officers from the respective capitals who were concerned with trade, commerce and cultural affairs. The Treaty of Friendship and the Cultural Agreement were concluded in April 1959 with Djuanda signing on behalf of Indonesia and the Tunku for Malaya during Djuanda's visit to Kuala Lumpur.

The conclusion of those two documents brought closer the relationship through people to people contact and cultural exchanges. Joint bodies to look into the cultural aspects were formed and began to work in their respective spheres with tremendous success. Groups of civic workers from Malaya visited Medan and Jakarta not only to familiarise themselves with local developments but also to increase knowledge about each other. In December 1959, a delegation led by the Director of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Language and Literary Agency) went to Jakarta and had a discussion with the Indonesian Language Implementation Committee. One of the early outcomes of the meeting was an agreement between Dewan Bahasa and the Committee that a new spelling system would be worked out and introduced in both countries.

The Tunku encouraged by the good relationship among the newly independent countries of Southeast Asia began to think of ensuring and preserving stability to increase development opportunity and thereby growth. It was this element of growth which silenced the communist sirens and denied the bogies of cold warriors.

Ethnic Malays when facing a potential danger would prefer to be clustered among themselves. Perhaps I should discuss and explain my thoughts on the cultural attitudes of the Malays as expressed through their words and actions.

Kampung today has come to mean a village which is the other word for *desa* which also denotes a collection of dwelling houses in the interior. The Malays were originally a sea-faring people who by circumstances over the years had become riverine people. No matter how remote the *desa* is there is always a river or a stream. Water is always a part of life. The word *desa* through usage has been equated with *kampung* and thus translated as village which a *desa* is. Often the root word *kampung* has been used in derogatory terms as *balik kampunglah!* or *kampungan* to express class differences between town dwellers and the people in the *desa* who are often regarded as uncouth yokels or village simpletons. However, the spirit of a *desa* is *berkampung* that is to be gathered together.

One should not translate *kita berkumpul di rumah Pak Ali*, as that we should villagise or turn Pak Ali's house into a *desa* or village. What it means is that we assemble at the house of Pak Ali. The root word *kampung* had the original meaning of getting together of people not mere houses. Now this cultural habit of togetherness came out of a word *rumpun* which the nearest in English would be a clump or a cluster. *Rumpun* is the word to express the cluster of bamboos and the Malay sages of yore had decided only Malays should be *berumpun*. No other peoples have been referred to by them as belonging to a *rumpun* or cluster. Hence *rumpun Melayu* would denote the cluster of ethnic Malays in the Malay Archipelago. Even Macapagal and Pelaez saw the "togetherness" of the Malay peoples as the way of the future.

Therefore, the Malay community which postulates its society and security in "togetherness" would have to find someone from among that togetherness to be the *ketua* or the elder who would be referred to as an authority in all matters which through age and usage had kept the sense of that "togetherness". Since a cluster of houses which forms the lowest group, best exemplified by a longhouse, the elder of that grouping would be chosen because of his age and experience and he is called a *tuai rumah* or *ketua*. The root word is *tua* denoting age therefore experience. The one to be the leader among the elders would be the one with age, experience and intellectual capacity and he would be called a *penghulu*. The word *hulu* means head which is related to cerebral capacity. The choice of a *Penghulu* or *Ketua* depends on the *adat* which means (the "customary law") and not mere "custom" as practised according to the wisdom of men before. These would still be seen among the Peninsula Malaya rural societies and the native societies of

Borneo. In the Philippines the President is a *Pangulo* which is the same word *Penghulu*.

Out of these concepts came the concept of the role of the *Ketua* and the *Penghulu* which is *kepimpinan*. The nearest translation in English would be "leadership". His role is never to do things by himself but that he should all the time hold hands with the community. This is from the word *pimpin* meaning "holding hands and walking together". It is from this figure of speech that the word *pemimpin* (leader) came. Hence the concept of leadership is somewhat different from others.

The *kepimpinan* will seek to establish a sense of direction and in that quest the demand on integrity would be high. There can be no relationship based on coercion. Nor can it be cloaked as managers depending entirely on scientific and technological solutions to problems. By the very nature of *pimpin*, perforce he will have to reckon with the dimension of human relations. The *ketua* or *tuai rumah* or *Penghulu* or *Pangulo* as the *pemimpin*, may be called, he is expected to develop close interaction through dialogue based on the principles and practice of *mushawarah* and *muafakat* (consultations leading to consensus). The moment the *Pemimpin* walks alone in front he ceases to be one although in the western eyes he is a leader. Such a leader will walk into the wilderness as Onn Jaafar did in Malaya, Sukarno in Indonesia and Marcos in the Philippines which means that in the Malay world the concept applies to all levels in the hierarchy of *kepimpinan*, from the humblest village to the biggest mansion at the *muara*. The *kepimpinan* of the Sultan in the *KeRAJAan* or sovereign government in Brunei is still accepted while in Malaya since 1957 the *kepimpinan* had shifted elsewhere although constitutionally the Government is still called *ke-RAJA-an*; the *kepimpinan* which runs the Government or *keRAJAan* acts in the name of the *Raja* or sovereign constitutionism.

Returning to the Tunku's proposal for ASA it was this Malay cultural impulse which motivated him. The same impulse before that formed the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) composed of all Malay political and friendly societies transcending sultanates and state boundaries. It was UMNO which initiated the Alliance Party which eventually succeeded to bring Merdeka for Malaya. When Malaya, as a result of racial riots in May 1969, was almost a wreck, it was the Malay *kepimpinan* which thought of the idea of the Barisan Nasional growing out of the Alliance bringing nearly all political parties in togetherness to remove the odium and develop the country into a modern state progressing from stage to stage.

And so was the idea of Federation which could provide for more *biliks* in the longhouse that was to be Malaysia in the face of dangers from communist subversion. It had been proven to be correct. The motto of the Federation is BERSATU BERTAMBAH MUTU which roughly translated is that the value of people is enhanced by their unity. ASEAN is another idea which reflects that togetherness.

After the demise of the Soviet Union in the face of possible new dangers and threats of market protectionism once again the Malaysian *kepimpinan* reflexively came out with the concept of East Asian Economic Caucus since accepted by ASEAN. Though economic in name, the basic thought was political and social in intent to ensure togetherness and the sharing of common fate and destiny.

The ASA proposal of the Tunku was resisted by Sukarno though welcomed by the Philippines. When I was asked to draft the letter to the Heads of the Governments in Southeast Asia including Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, I had warned the Tunku that the communist elements in the world would use all means to prevent it from being actualised because it would be in competition with the communist concept of internationalism in which communism should have a leading role. The Tunku's proposal was instinctively a concept of togetherness (*berkampung*) to obviate communist subversive plots and to bring about its own version of internationalism or regionalism. I anticipated, as I told the Tunku, that the most violent resistance to his idea would come from the PKI inspired by the Soviet Union and Communist China using the nationalism of Sukarno and the Indonesian people. The Tunku simply said that thing would be alright and that we should make a try anyway.

Sukarno, because of his close association with the ideology of communism of the PKI had lost the main characteristic of a *pemimpin*. He no longer *berpimpin* with his people although he paid lip service by claiming that the Indonesian democracy was characterised by *terpimpin*. Western commentators not realising the cultural nuance translated *demokrasi terpimpin* as "guided democracy".

Sukarno's reply rejecting the ASA proposal in January 1960 said that the proposal of a multi-lateral relations among Southeast Asian nations would only give reasons for speculations on the part of other peoples and they could prevent the attainment of a desired objective of closer cooperation. Instead, Sukarno preferred bilateral arrangements.

The Tunku's private remark to me was that the President was not a free agent and that we should go ahead. At that time, we were left only with the Philippines and Thailand and both were members of SEATO and Malaya was a member of the five power defence arrangement. Britain, a member of that defence arrangement, was also a member of SEATO though Malaya was not. Without Indonesia, the ASA concept would be regarded as American inspired. In terms of the Cold War, ASA might not be able to survive. However, the Tunku thought that the idea would work and not to proceed with it would be to accept defeat even before the battle was started. He was convinced that the proposal was developing in the right direction because Sukarno had objected to it.

The Tunku had a strange logic often spliced into his sense of humour when often serious subjects could be seen as trivial. Let me relate an instance which might demonstrate the Tunku's sense of humour. Before the first Kuala

Lumpur Municipal elections in 1953, I tried to persuade the UMNO leaders of Kuala Lumpur (Ibrahim Yassin, Raja Mohamad, Sheikh Yahaya and Datuk Yahaya) to form a coalition with a Chinese friendly welfare society, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) which should be turned into a political society. None dared to suggest to the Tunku, the President of UMNO, to invite MCA to be a political society and join hands with UMNO before the Municipal elections. The UMNO leaders of Kuala Lumpur had requested me to bell the cat and to persuade the Tunku into agreeing to the idea. The Tunku that weekend would come for the races from Johor Bahru where at that time the headquarters of UMNO was.

His first reaction when I spoke with him was that I was crazy to suggest that UMNO should cohabit with a Chinese association. However, after the races he had met with the same Kuala Lumpur UMNO leaders who very quickly conveyed to me that the Tunku had agreed to the idea of working with MCA. The Tunku and I later met at the Flying Club for supper when I asked him as to how he could so rapidly change his mind. He told me with a straight face that when he was at the races he had met with Thuraisingam, his old racing friend, a prominent lawyer and at that time one of the activists for democracy. Thuraisingam had always given tips at the races to the Tunku who had used them but never won. He had asked Thuraisingam about the merit of an UMNO-MCA political arrangement. When he heard that Thuraisingam was against the idea he concluded that the proposed Alliance must be a good concept hence he agreed. He said that in all seriousness and left me utterly confused. I guess it must have been the same logic that applied when he said that if Sukarno objected to ASA then it would be something worthwhile. And Malaya together with Thailand and the Philippines formed the shortlived ASA.

It may be recalled that in 1957 there were rebellions in Indonesia, in the outer island of Sumatra, Celebes and Moluccas. After Sukarno had quelled them some of the leaders had escaped to Kuala Lumpur seeking asylum and were treated as political refugees. Among them were such prominent people as Professor Sumitro and Alisjahbana who hardly could be associated with armed insurrection though they might be dissidents. In January 1960, the Treaty of Friendship was invoked. Subandrio wrote to the External Affairs Minister of Malaya seeking agreement for the conclusion of an extradition treaty between Malaya and Indonesia. It was generally known in the international world that if a Treaty of Friendship had a provision for the conclusion of an Extradition Agreement, the subject would be smooth sailing. However, in this case, when I read Subandrio's letter, I was quite taken aback to see that the request by Subandrio was somewhat unprecedented. He had made the extraordinary proposal aimed at the extradition of political refugees.

The Malayan Government drew the attention of the Indonesian Government as to the irregularity of such a treaty arrangement since extradition arrangement should only cover criminal offenders. It is now a matter for speculation as to how Malaya would have reacted if the Indonesian

Government had pressed for a kind of special consideration. It might have raised lots of eye brows at the international level if the request had been acceded to.

The Indonesian Government though fit not to respond to the Malayan reply but the Indonesian press knew about the request and its rejection. The Indonesian press was full of invectives and the attacks well orchestrated suggesting that the Malayan reply was substantiating what the Indonesian Government had all along alleged that the Malayan Government was working hand in glove with Indonesian rebels. As I look back, I cannot help feeling that the Jakarta Foreign Office was extremely artful in making that request. Subandrio needed more evidence of Malaya's unwillingness to cooperate. He manipulated the Indonesian public and the press could not understand the niceties of international practices. Malaya had to appear true to form according to the PKI line, as an enemy of the peace loving Indonesia. Perhaps, Kuala Lumpur had been too naive to reply in the way as if it was giving Indonesia a lesson in international law.

The PKI had in particular used the Malayan legal attitude as unfriendly and after that it was easy through constant showers of press accusations to turn Malaya into an ogre. The Jakarta press exploiting nationalism had a field day when a group of Indonesian diplomatic officials who had been serving in Europe had sought and were given political asylum in Malaya. They and their families had opted to defect the rebel side during the PRRI-Permesta insurrections. Of course in giving them the status they had to undertake the normal and usual condition that they would behave properly and in no way would act prejudicial to the interest of the Republic of Indonesia.

What Malaya did was in accordance with international law and practice and on humanitarian grounds but her action was distorted as something hostile and hateful. Even incidents which occurred rarely before now had become intensified. The violation of Malayan waters became almost a daily occurrence on a basis of a unilateral claim and decree which had extended the Indonesian territorial waters separating the Indonesian island. Consequently, there were many areas where they were overlapping. Traditional fishing ground for Malaysians since days immemorial had been sealed off. This was before the new International Law of the Sea.

There was rapidly growing coolness towards Malaya. On the other hand, Malaya was not deterred and continued to pursue the active policy of strengthening relations. Malaya never went to a corner to pout like a little boy who had been ignored by his elder brother. Instead without reserve or any sign of hurt and annoyance Malaya persistently had come out in full support of Indonesia against the Dutch in the General Assembly debates over West Irian. Referring to colonialism in general and Dutch colonialism of New Guinea in particular, the Malayan delegation had continuously lashed out scorching attacks condemning the Dutch occupation of West Irian or Dutch New Guinea as one of vestigial colonialism.

The Malayan Government had not simply paid lip service to the fight for freedom from colonialism. Simply to do so would not have been too difficult. In fact the United Nations had been the most celebrated place where nations to this day merely paid lip services.

In the case of the Indonesian dispute with Holland over the Dutch New Guinea the Tunku went out of his way to offer Malaya's good offices to both parties. On September 20, 1960, the Tunku wrote a letter to Sukarno, which I helped to draft, inquiring whether Malaya would be allowed to assist in bringing about a solution to the dispute. The proposal which was thought to be a good basis for negotiations leading to a settlement was that the Dutch New Guinea should be transferred to the United Nations as a trust territory with the view to an eventual transfer directly to Indonesia with a time frame to be stipulated. Dr. Djuanda, who was the acting President, replied to the Tunku agreeing in principle to the proposal specifying that the period of trusteeship should not exceed one year.

In November 1960 the Tunku went on an official visit to Canada and the United States. I was included in his entourage. His conversations with Canadian and the United States leadership emphasised the need for finding a quick solution to the West Irian problem. The Tunku repeatedly claimed that the only beneficiary to a conflict between Indonesia and Holland would be the communist elements and in terms of the Cold War it would be to the disadvantage of the West. The Tunku also met with Dag Hammerskjold in the Secretary Generals' office in New York.

On the way back from America we stopped in London and then proceeded to the Hague. The idea of visiting Holland was to test the temperature and if the situation was favourable, we would try to broach the subject and then to make an assessment for a discussion with the Indonesian side.

The Tunku was warmly received by the Dutch Prime Minister Dr. Jan and the Foreign Minister Luns. There was also another person who was directly responsible for the affairs of West New Guinea, and if I am not mistaken, by the name of Mr. Bot. I attended the discussions which were carried out in an extremely conducive atmosphere towards achieving a solution. I did not detect any of the usual public posturing. The Dutch side was persuaded to subject the Dutch policy in respect of West New Guinea to the scrutiny and judgement of the United Nations. I was extremely conscious that this willingness by itself was far from reaching a solution but it gave the indication of a significant departure from their intransigent position up to that moment.

Considering that Indonesia had, through Dr. Djuanda, already agreed to a trusteeship for no longer than a year, the stand taken by the Dutch did appear to me to be encouraging. A communiqué was issued at the end of the visit revealing that willingness of the Dutch.

We returned to Kuala Lumpur with a view to reporting to the Indonesian Government of our assessment and any possible formula which could be built on the two factors namely "UN role" and "Dutch willingness". However, even

before we could do so, Subandrio blasted out at the Tunku rendering the whole exercise as futile. He accused the Tunku of failing to consult the Indonesian side about the matter. According to Subandrio the only solution to the West Irian dispute was a quick transfer of the territory to Indonesia. Subandrio had therefore over-ruled Dr. Djuanda without informing our side. The only United Nations role that would be agreeable to Subandrio was the supervision of the transfer of the territory from the Dutch Government to the Indonesian Government.

The Indonesian press was quick to join Subandrio and their attacks were most venomous and severe. It was a hate campaign signalled by Subandrio's torpedo. I thought the most unkind of all was an accusation by a Jakarta daily that the Tunku was an agent of the British and SEATO. It was not even a communist paper!

The Malayan Government could not let such unfair onslaught on its leader and made a demarche. Subandrio, in response, addressed a letter dated the thirtieth of November to the Tunku in which he said that the people and the Government of Indonesia deeply appreciated what the Tunku did. This letter was conveyed to the Tunku by a senior official of the Indonesian Ministry, a Mr. Suska. He was the Head of the Directorate of Asian Pacific Affairs.

He called on the Tunku on the first of December 1960. In delivering the letter he informed the Tunku that the Tunku had misunderstood the Indonesian position on the matter. It transpired that the Indonesian Government had reviewed their position on West New Guinea and would not after all agree to the United Nations taking over the territory in trust for no longer than a year and then to turn it over to Indonesia. The Tunku was quite upset but kept silent without saying a word other than thanks for the visit. It was preposterous that a change of such an important policy did not incline the Indonesian side to convey to the Tunku even if he was already en route to America or Europe. To say that the Tunku misunderstood the Indonesian position was ludicrous since Dr. Djuanda's response was quite clear.

The Tunku thought that Subandrio's letter would not help matters and it would rebound to the disadvantage of Subandrio if all the circumstances were revealed. The Tunku, after a quick consultation with me, told Suska that the contents of Subandrio's letter would not be divulged to the public. That would be a gesture of goodwill. Suska, as he was departing, said that he appreciated the Tunku's gesture and gave the assurance that no more press statements on the subject would be issued in Jakarta.

That assurance was shortlived. This was going to characterise future relationship between the two governments until the beginning of "ganyang Malaysia" or confrontation. All assurances were breached. In the case of Suska's visit on 1 December, there was the assurance that there would be no more press war yet on the fifth, a press report appeared in Jakarta to the effect that a senior Indonesian official had said that the Indonesian Government

believed the Tunku had grossly misused his rights as a mediator, a role which the Tunku never claimed.

At once, I beat up a draft note verbale and after it had been approved by the Tunku, summoned the Indonesian Ambassador to the Ministry. I handed him the note in which a request was made that the Indonesian Government should refute that statement. In delivering the note, I said that if the Indonesian Government chose to remain silent then the Malayan Government would interpret such silence as an endorsement of that statement. The Ambassador was present when Suska met the Tunku and so was I. I then reminded the Ambassador of the Tunku's gesture of goodwill. If there should be exchanges in the press and official letters published which might prove embarrassing, there would be a deterioration of relations. And in no uncertain manner I said in the circumstances the Indonesian Government alone would be held responsible.

On the December 7 the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, no doubt at the behest of a very responsible Ambassador and a true friend of Malaya, issued a statement denying that a senior Indonesian official had made that statement. Even though the news dateline was Jakarta, the Indonesian statement had the audacity to say that if such reports had been published in Malayan newspapers, then the reports had not originated from Indonesia.

Although the Indonesia desk officials of the Malayan Foreign Ministry were fuming, I had instructed them to accept the denial in order to preserve the good relations between the two countries even if they did not amount to much. When the press asked the Tunku and the Foreign Ministry, none expressed any comments. UMNO headquarters rang up the Ministry wanting certain clarification since they intended to say something but they were advised against it. So the matter rested there but for those who were directly in the know like the staff in the Foreign Office, it did leave a bad taste in the mouth.

I have narrated some of the events which did not represent Sukarno's Indonesia as a happy neighbour and as it turned out, it was to be a monumental problem culminating in the unhappy days of confrontation.

That was the background when the thought of launching the Malaysia idea was discussed between the Tunku, Razak and I. I proposed that we should find a way to communicate with Sukarno before we make public the proposal; but I could not find a device by which this could be done effectively. Razak was supportive of my idea but wanted a foolproof way of avoiding a leakage. As for me, I had been brought up in the inter-war years among Malay nationalists like Ibrahim Yaacob and Pak Sako who thought of the Malay world as a single entity as also those nationalists in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Java. Their ideological and cultural thoughts were identical. When it came to the idea of the Malaysia Concept, I had felt that there was a special duty on our part to bring the leaders in those Malay islands to share a common knowledge of what we were doing. I had long accepted that Indonesia, and the Philippines had

become separate countries as a result of colonialism with none having a native name for each country. Hence, I felt it had been highly important and desirable to keep Indonesian and Philippino leaders informed.

The Tunku thought that the Indonesians would not reciprocate my sentiment since they had never shown any respect for Malaya. According to the Tunku, the Indonesians had always been envious with a huge complex and a big brother syndrome. He was concerned that if we shared with the Indonesians our plan for Malaysia they were sure to leak it out and that would be embarrassing and counter-productive. There might be an accusation by the Borneo peoples that the whole plan was a connivance. The Tunku's decision was that it would not serve any useful purpose to inform the Indonesians before the announcement but it might be a good idea if they were immediately informed and given explanation after we had made the proposal public. He said the same treatment should be applied to the Philippines.

After the Tunku's speech in May 1961 in Singapore, I sent an instruction to the Malayan Ambassador to Jakarta to brief the Indonesian Government on the proposal. The initial reaction was encouraging which gave us in Kuala Lumpur a hope that we would be entering into an era of better relationship. This gained strength when Subandrio wrote on November 13, 1961 in the New York Times: "...as an example of our honesty and lack of expansionist intent, one fourth of the island of Kalimantan (Borneo) consisting of three crown colonies of Great Britain, is now becoming the target of the Malayan Government for a merger. Of course the people there are ethnologically and geographically very close to the others living in the Indonesian territory. Still, we do not show any objection towards this Malayan policy of merger. On the contrary, we wish the Malayan Government well if it can succeed with this plan". This statement reflected Subandrio's thinking that the natural thing for the British Borneo states was to join Indonesia.

A week later, in a statement at the General Assembly of the United Nations, Subandrio referring to the Malaysia plan said that when Malaya told him of its intention "to merge with the three British Crown colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo as one Federation we told them that we had no objection and that we wished them success with this merger so that everyone might live in peace and freedom".

After about five weeks of that speech in the General Assembly referring to the Malaysia plan as something to which Indonesia had no objection, the Central Committee of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) passed a resolution on the Malaysia Concept to the effect that it was a form of neo-colonialism and that its purpose was to suppress the democratic and patriotic movements of the people in the territories concerned and that it was a threat to peace and security in the Southeast Asian region. The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the PKI called upon the Indonesian people and government to heighten their vigilance against the imperialists, especially in the face of the

establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the formation of a new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of Indonesia.

Kuala Lumpur did not take the resolution seriously in view of what Subandrio had said. The communist jargons were well understood but a few in the Foreign Ministry, together with the Tunku, held the view that the PKI would have great influence regarding the subject among the government circles in Indonesia. The opposition made by the PKI was clear and even self-explanatory. Democratic and patriotic movements which would be suppressed by Malaysia would be those who were communists and fellow-travellers. The Malaysia plan would certainly stultify the growth of communism in the territories concerned. Kuala Lumpur would not feel too aggrieved if the communists decided to brand Malaysia as neo-colonialism. In fact, in the view of some Kuala Lumpur leaders, the opposition by the PKI proved the point that the Malaysia Concept in the context of the Cold War would be against the interest of Moscow and Peking which were represented by PKI.

Immediately after the resolution of the Third Plenum of the PKI Central Committee, its front organisations and their henchmen began to work furiously on the Government and the public of Indonesia providing a distorted insight into the Malaysia plan. The Malaysia plan soon became a plan threatening the security of Southeast Asia. International communist organisations and governments also took up the cudgel and those in Africa which had taken the communist side and their aid in the Cold War while claiming non-alignment began to spout out the communist line.

Communist China then could never forget that it was Malaya which was the first country to come out forthrightly condemning the Chinese intrusion into the Indian soil and even raised funds to assist India to repel the communist aggressors. When China annexed Tibet, Malaya was one of the principal sponsors of the resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (1959) condemning communist China's denial of fundamental rights to the people of Tibet. And Malaya made no secret of her knowledge and condemnation that the Communist Party of Malaya which was staging armed insurrections and subversion was a creation of and supported by the Communist Party of China. Therefore it was no surprise to Kuala Lumpur when Liu Shiao Chi visiting Indonesia in April 1963 had given strong support to the Indonesian Communist Party stand. He and Sukarno in a joint communiqué declared their common determination to support the Indonesian stand. The PKI had succeeded in influencing the leaders of Indonesia to view the Malaysia plan with hostility.

As late as November 1962, the official Indonesian attitude appeared to remain unchanged from Subandrio's statement to the General Assembly UN. Ruslan Abdul Gani who was then Vice-Chairman of the Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council, on his return from a private visit to Kuala Lumpur, was reported to have said that he saw positive and negative points in the Malaysia plan which was then still developing. Personally he said he would welcome

any new country around Indonesia that wanted to get rid of colonial chains.

However, I had observed a tremendous change in Indonesia's attitude since the day Azahari declared his revolt in Brunei on December 8, 1962. It did look as if that Sukarno-PKI had their own plan to form a state comprising the three British territories with Azahari as the chief executive, a puppet of Jakarta. The PKI influence was too formidable. On February 11, 1963, Subandrio officially declared Indonesian opposition to Malaysia. Liu Shiao Chi came to Jakarta in April praising Sukarno in opposing what they both called the neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia. They also declared their support of the revolutionary struggle of the people which was no other than Azahari's Party Rakyat in Brunei and the CCO in Sarawak. Through the PKI, China and Indonesia had become comrades in arms and arms were what Indonesia had wanted and obtained from China.

Subandrio's letter to the *New York Times* of November 13, 1961 and his statement at the General Assembly of UN on November 30, 1961 were now forgotten. Sukarno himself on February 13, 1963 accused Malaysia as representing forces of neo-colonialism. Sukarno let the cat out of the bag when he openly admitted support for the Brunei rebellion launched by Azahari since the rebels were fighting for independence against Malaysian neo-colonialism.

To members of the armed forces, Sukarno said that they were standing on the principle of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Malaysia was neo-colonialism and he did not agree with it.

From then on, all sorts of allegations against Malaya were made in the press. Some were indeed preposterous. These included the charges that Malaya had always been hostile to Indonesia; that Malaya had attempted to "annex" Sumatra during the PRRI rebellion; that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist plot by Malaya; that Malaya was trying to eliminate Indonesia; that Malaysia plan was against the revolution of mankind and the New Emerging Forces; that Malaysia would become a haven for economic subversion of Indonesia. These lies were rapidly built up through the press and radio and there were ample statements from organisations and parties which were pro-PKI.

It was the PKI which always set the pace. As early as December 1961, the PKI Central Committee had passed the resolution expressing hostility towards the Anglo-Malaya Defence and Mutual Assistance Treaty. When the Indonesian mass media attacked Malaya on the Treaty, the communist jargon were repeatedly used therein.

I was then a very confused person with regard to Indonesia. Time and time again the Tunku told me that for so long as Sukarno was in power and allowed himself to be manipulated by the PKI so long would there be enmity between Malaya and Indonesia. The Treaty of Friendship, the historical oneness of the Malay people were all meaningless elements in the PKI view of relations with Malaya. Only a victorious CPM and Mao's hegemony over the mass land of the

East Asia sub-continent would satisfy the PKI. The Tunku kept reminding me of the point which I told him once supported by a map which was drawn by Communist China that its line of hegemony included all the lands of East Asia, of islands only a stone throw from the shores of Borneo. That line also took a chunk out of Northern India. Hence their attack on the Indian soil and the Tunku was the first to condemn the Chinese act of aggression which caused China's ire against Malaya. That line if followed to its logical conclusion would ensure the hegemony of China in East Asia while Indonesia and the islands would be excluded.

This Sukarno had hoped would provide the opportunity for him to exercise Indonesia's hegemony over all the islands including the Philippines. Hence this attitude could be detected from Subandrio's statement in the *New York Times* in November 1961, his subsequent speech in the General Assembly of the UN hinting very strongly that the people of North Borneo and Sarawak were ethnologically and geographically very close to the others living in the Indonesian territory. He was almost saying that the natural thing to happen was that the British territories of Borneo should be with their brothers the Indonesians. All these could be understood because of Sukarno's fear of China's domination through the ethnic Chinese population in Southeast Asia. The acceptance by Sukarno of China's hegemonic line then would ensure that China would not bother him. But if a part of the archipelago in the British Borneo territories became legally and constitutionally a part of the land mass brought about by the formation of Malaysia, then China's hegemonic line would be compromised by its extension to Borneo. Both China and Sukarno had to work out a new *modus vivendi*. Therefore the visit of Liu Shiao Chi in April 1963 and their "comrades in arms" statement made sense that if the China's hegemonic line was to subsist Malaysia plan had to be frustrated.

I understood Sukarno's fears of the Chinese in terms of both China and local overseas Chinese. But I felt betrayed at his way of solving his fears. To deal with the local Chinese in Indonesia he had been hounding them out of villages and concentrating them in centres with a view to getting the China Government to accept their return. Many voluntarily left Indonesia for China or Hong Kong or elsewhere. That was one way he thought he could get rid of the Chinese, a kind of ethnic ejection. For the mass of Chinese concentrated in Medan, for instance, their fate depended on whether China would take them back and Sukarno thought if he showed friendship towards China he might be able to persuade them to accept those Indonesians of Chinese origin.

China had other ideas. All communist political societies in Southeast Asia were creatures of the CCP organised during the inter-war years or during the Japanese occupation. Peking had a special international liason department dealing with them. Funds, training, etc. had been the responsibility of this department whose staff kept close watch on the activities of all satellite communist groups. The new strategy after the split with the Soviet Union was that all communist activities in East and Southeast Asia should be controlled

from Peking. Two areas were the main targets, Vietnam and Indonesia. Vietnam was within the hegemonic line and the other Indonesia was without. For Vietnam, it must have been thought to be an easy customer but Vietnam decided not to be and chose the Soviet Union. However, that could be managed when necessary since Vietnam was only next door but Indonesia with the Soviet Union would be another matter. In Moscow, a number of Indonesian communist leaders were being taken care of by the Soviet Union which were wooing Indonesia through Sukarno who was flattered, cajoled and even blackmailed. Indonesia received military aid including naval vessels from the Soviet Union. I met a commander of one of the vessels in Surabaya who said that it was a mistake to acquire military equipment from the Soviet Union. His boat was unsuitable for this part of the world. The crew most of the time were ashore – since the air-condition plants kept breaking down and there were no spare parts and no service after delivery. The Soviet gifts were part of the Cold War to impress the rest of Southeast Asia and SEATO powers. But it also caused concern to the Chinese who were equally interested in denying the Soviet and the West in this region. For Sukarno he had three cornered suitors – the Soviet Union, China and the West. It was a strange love-hate relation with each of them. He needed the Soviet Union as a leverage to get Western aid but Sukarno hated their crude methods. China, whom he could never truly trust, was needed either to take the local Chinese back to China or to influence the local Chinese to cooperate and be intergrated with the indigenous Indonesians. And China must be kept out of the Indonesian islands or in tow. Sukarno had no confidence in the Malayan way of solving the problem of race relations when the economic power was in the hands of the Chinese with potential and actual support from Peking and above all the cultural pull of fatherland and sinicism. Sukarno was also conscious of the very closely knit networking among overseas Chinese and those people of Chinese origin who had taken foreign citizenship. Sukarno saw the Alliance Party composed of UMNO, MCA and the MIC as an unholy alliance and the Tunku and other UMNO leaders, being feudalistic would succumb to Chinese corruption. Only revolutionaries would understand and defeat the exploitative nature of the commercial class, in this case of the overseas Chinese. While Sukarno had a bad experience with communism during the Madiun incident (1948), he had to accept the role of PKI as one of the groups which fought for independence.

The role of the PKI and its front organisations had been the subject of many studies. Many people uncluding some Western leaders had pointed to the fact that Sukarno sincerely believed that the PKI was a different kind of communists. He had regarded them more as a positive contributor to national independence and therefore had a claim to be part of the national party. Some people in Indonesia had supported the PKI because it had a nationalist platform. Sukarno regarded the Tunku as ill-informed when the latter attacked the PKI. According to a source close to Sukarno, he (Sukarno) would have preferred the Tunku to attack international communism but to

leave the PKI, a special breed of communists, for him to deal with. He was quite oblivious to the fact that many a country which fell into the communist clutches had the people at first believing that their country's communists were special.

We in Kuala Lumpur saw and understood Sukarno's dilemma. He disliked the Chinese and distrusted the communists. In order to solve his own dilemma according to his perception which was that communism in East Asia was inevitable he had to use the Soviet Union and the West as counterpoise to China in terms of world power; in the management of Indonesian communism and sinicism he had to keep the Chinese Communist Party, through its leaders, on his side.

Of course Kuala Lumpur regarded Sukarno as naive and that his management theory and method were false when dealing with communism and his ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

In my desperation to put back the relationship on an even keel, I had met with an Indonesian dignitary who had friendly relations with Sukarno and Subandrio. I told him that I had wanted very much to have the relationship repaired except that I did not know how other than invoking the Friendship Treaty which did not appear to have much meaning then. It was one of the lessons which I was made to realise early in my diplomatic career that a Treaty was as good as its parties wanted it to be.

This Indonesian gentleman was quite helpless and appeared to be in the same predicament as I was since he too believed in the oneness of the Malay people. He told me that in the view of most Indonesian leaders, following the Sukarno and Subandrio line, the Tunku was a mouthpiece of the British; and the Tunku's behaviour was at the bidding of the British. When I heard this I could not help thinking how a lie persistently made had come to be believed even by men of goodwill.

Sir Leslie Fry who was the British Ambassador in Jakarta had spoken with me at a meeting in Singapore almost begging the Malayan Government not to attack Indonesia but to regard Sukarno as a friend or else Indonesia and Sukarno would continue to be tiresome. I told Fry that short of crawling on our knees we had done everything to amuse Sukarno but nothing we did would be right in Sukarno's eyes. Subandrio was full of spite and never ceased to make hostile comments about the Tunku. I also told Fry that Malaya had supported the Indonesian claim on West New Guinea and even made positive efforts after Djuanda had accepted a certain formula yet the Indonesian Government had reneged on Djuanda. We had refused to cooperate with the Dutch regarding the use of territorial waters or air space let alone port facilities when the Dutch were moving their troops and men of war to and from Dutch New Guinea. I could catalogue the number of actions taken in support of Indonesia on every issue so long as it was not too obnoxious to our conscience like treating political refugees as common criminals. When we felt offended, like Indonesian gunboats entering illegally into Malayan waters, we

did no more than register a diplomatic demarche for the record. When Fry, supported by Selkirk, said that the Tunku should make further endeavours, I replied that I could only convey such a request but even if the Tunku or the Malayan Government was to make any gesture even demeaning to the good sense of the Malayan people irrespective of race, such a gesture would not impress Sukarno and his PKI. For so long as Sukarno had to juggle maintaining his position and to play the armed forces and the communists against each other and so long as he had to depend on the PKI and China and the Soviet Union for political and economic support, so long would the relation between Malaya and Indonesia continue to sour. I reminded Fry that we had invited Sukarno to visit Kuala Lumpur even if the Tunku had never received such an invitation and in so far as our invitation was concerned, there had not even been a word of acknowledgement. When our Foreign Office reminded them all the answer we got was that the invitation was mislaid.

The British through Fry had asked that Malaya should not attack Sukarno and the PKI since they were of a special kind. Fry was one of those who together with the US Ambassador in Jakarta believed in that special brand of communism about which there had been no explanation. As far as I could trace the history of communism in Indonesia which led to the PKI did not bear any suggestion that the ideology or its basic belief was any different from other Marxist-Leninist group. Of course there were Trotskysts and armchair Fabians in Indonesia but they were not part of the core of the PKI.

I was well aware that many of the people associated with the PKI knew precious little about communism and its ideology. They had joined the various front organisations like the labour movements or the artists and cultural associations or LEKRA for economic reasons but this was not peculiar to Indonesia alone. It was the same method used everywhere when a communist society wanted to entice people to swell its members. For instance, a number of artists had been branded as communists or fellow-travellers but at that time the only place where an artist could purchase a canvas or paint was at LEKRA shops and for that one had to be a member of LEKRA and of course LEKRA was a communist front organisation. Many non-communist artists and writers were associated with communists but it did not make PKI a special brand of communists which deserved a special treatment from Malaya. Sukarno had to treat it as special even if he disliked it because he had tied himself in knots with his own brand of political philosophy which had treated at par nationalism, communism and religion (Islam and other religions), NASACOM, as elements which he claimed had positively contributed towards the independence of Indonesia.

The other point made by Subandrio was that Malaysia would be a security threat to Indonesia because it could either be a base for imperialist designs or the communists would take over the whole country. This confirmed my belief that Malaysia meant that Kuala Lumpur would have a foot in Borneo and that would frustrate the Sukarno-China understanding of hegemonic arrangement.

and money lenders exploiting farmers and fishermen. In towns the Dutch used Chinese compradores which became middlemen oppressors.

Sukarno had been able to exploit the latent fears of the Indonesian people through his propaganda machine creating an anti-Malaysia plan campaign. By some clever manipulation, Sukarno was able to influence some Malay nationalists of the Peninsula to share his paranoia. This was the internal problem which the Tunku had to face even among UMNO leaders. Indeed a couple of top leadership offered their services to Sukarno since they shared a common concern over the bogey of the spread of "Chinese" power in the region. There were some who thought that the best antidote would be the Soviet Union and yet there were others, in particular Western educated people, who thought that they needed an American umbrella forgetting that the umbrella could not protect them from subversion. Those who saw the Soviet Union as a saviour from the clutches of the Chinese since they were far off in Moscow did not see that the Soviet hegemonic attitude would make Malaya and later Malaysia a satellite and the government no more than a surrogate.

The Malayan information agencies had to go all out to debunk any misconception and to foster a national approach towards the solution of any problem including the racial overtones. Malaya had to show determination that it was going ahead with the Malaysia plan. Nevertheless in one of the meetings I had with Selkirk, I told him that Malaya was always ready to establish a reapproachment with Indonesia and also with the Philippines. Malaya would certainly take advantage of the ASA Summit to give an opportunity to the Tunku and Macapagal to sort out any misunderstanding.

With regards to the Philippines, I was quite curious as to why Macapagal made his State of the Nation address which included the Philippines North Borneo Claim and antipathy to the Malaysia plan when Pelaez was in London ostensibly to resolve the question of the claim. I had a meeting with an Englishman who was close to the British Government at that time. On being asked he told me that the British laid out a red carpet for Pelaez and his delegation in order to impress on the Philippines the importance of the visit and also the sincerity of Her Majesty's Government.

Unfortunately, the weather was extremely bad and Pelaez had a severe attack of flu. I asked whether the flu was diplomatic to coincide with Macapagal's State of the Nation address. I was assured that the flu was genuine.

Since Macapagal touched on security, I heard that Lord Home who was leading the British delegation when meeting the Philippine delegation, made a tour d'horizon of Southeast Asia as the British saw it and touched on the aspect of security and the future role of Malaysia and the participation of Britain. Pelaez, unlike his master whose emphasis was security, never mentioned anything else except the North Borneo Claim. It soon became obvious to the British delegation that Pelaez was not bothered about the

question of SEATO. The only thing that mattered was the claim which if satisfied would resolve all their problems including that of security. Pelaez expressed anxiety, almost on all fours with the Indonesian stand, that North Borneo should not be tied up with the mainland of Malaya for fear that if the Peninsula would become communist then the whole of the Borneo territories would automatically become communist and this would bring communism right next door to the Philippines. Lord Home quickly replied that any party attempting aggression into the Borneo territories would get a bloody nose. That, I was informed, had a stunning effect on the Manila side.

The Philippines side never really had an argument according to the British side. This knowledge was helpful to me when later I had to deal with the question of the claim directly with Manila.

Pelaez produced a document purported to have come from the Council of Ministers of the Sultan authorising Manila to pursue the claim. I was told that Pelaez was devastated after that meeting and privately suggested that in order to save face the matter should be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and he was quite sure that the Court would dismiss the claim. In the meantime Malaysia could come into being. I was amazed that the proposal was made at all since an injunction could be placed against the formation of Malaysia; it was very much a juggling to me. Pelaez felt that the London talk was doomed to failure from the day when Macapagal made his State of the Nation address and he volunteered to inform some of his friends who communicated to me, that the Presidential statement made while he was in London had been counterproductive. I thought that Macapagal had made the speech as a response to the way the US Government through its Ambassador had clumsily tried to push the President around.

Out of all these, it would appear that the claim came as an afterthought though Macapagal as a Congressman had earlier alluded to it without any follow-up by the Manila Government. What made the claim look so hideous was that it was too much like a conspiracy with Sukarno to frustrate the Malaysia plan. A submission by the British Government to the jurisdiction of the ICJ would certainly subject the plan to an injunction. The arguments put forward by Macapagal for reasons of security were on all fours with those that came out of Sukarno's mouthpieces. Then there was the collaboration to support the Brunei rebellion and Azahari was given cover in Manila and then Jakarta and all these could not escape the appearance of connivance and conspiracy. Both Manila and Jakarta had used the same arguments to negatively describe the Malaysia plan.

As explained elsewhere, Malaya's concern was also security which motivated her to propose the Malaysia plan. In the Philippines, the government, with the aid of the United States, could only encourage rather than thwart the growth of communism when not only the Cold War would tear the country apart but the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China made the mismanagement in the Manila politics a fertile ground for the growth of

the Maoist or the Stalinist type of communist movements. And Malaya had already begun to hear the groans of discontentment in the South amongst Muslims who felt rightly or wrongly that they were being discriminated against, particularly on the question of the ownership of land and that they were not regarded as belonging to the political mainstream. They complained that they never had a Muslim cemetery in Manila. They had to transport their dead to the South. All these were matters of great concern and root causes of instability.

For the PKI, it was important that Sukarno should be convinced of the dangers of Malaysia plan to Indonesia. The PKI had to manoeuvre Sukarno into regarding Malaya as an enemy so that Sukarno would have to agree to the formation of a Fifth Force. The Armed Forces composed of land, air, sea and the Police had their national doctrines and jurisdictions. Malaysia would be outside the administrative control of any of the commands. A Fifth Force had to be created to face the exigencies of attacking Malaya or the Borneo territories as well as to defend Indonesia. That would be the story which the PKI would tell Sukarno. Sukarno was also made to believe that the people of Sumatra and Sulewasi would support Malaya and as in 1948 would seek to secede to join Malaysia.

Because of his style of leadership which no longer was *kepimpinan*, Sukarno had never been sure of his position and it was easy for the PKI to exploit his paranoia and sense of extreme insecurity. The objective of the PKI was to have all troops sent to the islands of Sumatra and Sulewasi ostensibly to prevent them from defecting and to leave Jakarta undefended since the neo-colonialist Malaysia could never reach the Indonesian capital even with the help of Western powers. The Fifth Force composed of volunteers among communist workers and women would be trained and armed ostensibly to attack Malaya and in the defence of Jakarta. In reality, once the Fifth Force had become strong enough without the regular armed forces in place in Jakarta, Central and East Java the Fifth Force would take over power in Jakarta. The control of Jakarta would, through the voice of Sukarno, control Java and the rest of Indonesia. Since arms were a problem, the visit of Liu Shiao Chi in April 1963 who declared Indonesia and China as comrades in arms became the source for weapons of all kinds to arm the Fifth Force.

Sukarno, then using the machinery of the PKI and his own oratory, drove the nation to frenzy with his theory of neo-colonists plot of Malaysia plan to encircle Indonesia. It was an era of the new emerging forces and a new dedication towards the revolution of mankind which was the enemy of the Malaysia plan. Sukarno led his people to believe that Malaysia, when formed, would be a haven for the economic subversion of Indonesia. Distortion and lies fed upon themselves and eventually both Sukarno and Subandrio believed in their own propaganda.

While they were silent before, after the Malaysia plan was mooted, the question of the British bases and the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement suddenly became a matter for concern to Sukarno. The concern was first expressed not by Sukarno or Subandrio but in the resolution of the PKI central committee in December 1961.

Sukarno, Subandrio and their cohorts supported by PKI used practically all the turgid communist jargon. And a new argument emerged to oppose the Malaysia plan that Malaysia plan would change the status quo and any change should be a matter for mutual consultations. Memory had become short. The no objection statements of Subandrio in November 1961 were now replaced by the resolution of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of PKI of December 1961.

As the PKI role unfolded in Indonesia and anti-Malaysia plan whipped up with the support of Manila in the guise of its tenuous claim on North Borneo, the Malaysians and the people of the Borneo territories became more determined to actualise Malaysia. They saw Malaysia as the solution to problems posed by communism which were threatening Singapore and Sarawak and through Azahari and his boys, the destabilisation of Brunei. It would be a matter of time that North Borneo would be destabilised by "piracies" and subversive elements. The Malaysians were absolutely certain in their minds that Sukarno was by then surrounded by maypole dancers cleverly manipulated by the PKI over whom Sukarno had no control. Subandrio by his words and action had become the mouthpiece par excellence of the PKI and it was in that context that Malaysian leaders viewed Indonesia at that time.

It was against this background that the Philippines Vice-President Pelaez proposed the idea of a round table conference of Southeast Asian leaders. Apparently, Manila had two objectives; to use the claim to frustrate the Malaysia plan which would please Sukarno and thereby, as the second objective, to gain greater support and acceptance of the Phillipinos as a part of the Malay people in Nusantara.

Since Manila and Jakarta had gotten into the act there was every reason for me to be apprehensive that the Malaysia plan would be internationalised. Such a development would spell disaster since the cold warriors in the United Nations would certainly side with Indonesia and the radicals. After consultations with Razak and with the agreement of the Tunku, Narasimhan, the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, was invited to discuss with Malaysian leaders in general terms the subject of the Malaysia plan and the attitude of both Indonesia and the Philippines.

Narasimhan was a man of great integrity and political wisdom. He knew already what the Malaysians had in mind and so he first visited Jakarta. But there was no time for him to spend some time in Kuala Lumpur. It was then arranged that he and Razak should meet at the international airport. The meeting at which I was present took place in one of the rooms in the salon

d'honneur on February 13, 1963 for about forty minutes, the time allowed for transit.

Narasimhan had told Razak that he found the Indonesians in a good frame of mind because he had complied with everything which Indonesia had asked for regarding West New Guinea. Narasimhan had met with Sukarno, Subandrio, Djuanda and Nasution and what he was about to say were points collected after conversations with them separately and in some cases jointly.

According to Narasimhan, the Indonesians gave him a list of charges made against Malaya. The main difficulty as it seemed to him was that the Indonesians thought the Tunku had changed the terms of the New Guinea settlement agreed by them when the Tunku met the Dutch Government in the Hague in September 1960. Secondly, the Tunku had announced to the world that Indonesia had rejected ASA when the Indonesians had never been consulted about it. Thirdly, with regard to the Malaysia plan, the Malayan Government had never consulted the Indonesian Government at any stage. On the other hand, the British behaved better by sending Lord Selkirk from Singapore to speak to Subandrio.

Narasimhan asked the Indonesians as to why they were so hostile to Malaysia. After all, if that was so, Singapore would become a Cuba. While Singapore might be a little further away from Jakarta, it would be like Long Island to the United States in so far as Malaya was concerned. If, as the Indonesians feared, it had been the problem of the Chinese immigrants, Narasimhan said that the Malayan Government had been taking all precautions to make sure that immigration control would be as tight as possible and that the Chinese in Singapore would be contained in that island.

Narasimhan told Razak that the Indonesians were very annoyed with the war of words and the hostile attitude shown by Malaya to Indonesia. The Indonesians were now quite certain that the people of Brunei did not want Malaysia, hence the revolt. Furthermore, according to the Indonesians, Malaysia was the only thin end of the wedge. It was the Tunku's ambition as a next step to annexe Sumatra. The Indonesians were aware that the Tunku would favour right wing parties like the Masjumi and would like to see the fall of Sukarno. Malaya was harbouring rebels like Prof. Sumitro and Des Alwi. Malaya had also not cooperated with Indonesia regarding smuggling. (This so-called smuggling was the activities of traders who brought in goods from Malaya illegally according to Indonesian law but not committing any breach of Malayan export laws). Narasimhan said the Indonesians came out with the story that their Charge d'affairs in Kuala Lumpur had not been able to present the curriculum vitae of the new Ambassador. I took note of the point but could not recall if there was any request. I thought I should try to find out at once from the Protocol section.

The other point made by the Indonesians to Narasimhan was that the attitude of the Malayan Government to recall the Ambassador was sufficient indication of an unfriendly behaviour of the Malayan Government while the

Indonesians were most anxious to send an Ambassador in place of Dr. Razif who had been recalled.

Narasimhan told Razak that he had asked the Indonesians as to what it was they primarily sought in regard to the Malaysia plan. After all the formation of Malaysia could not be stopped. The stock reply was that Malaya should stop attacking Indonesia which meant that the Tunku should cease the verbal war. Narasimhan told the Indonesians that there must be reciprocity.

On being asked as to why Indonesian gunboats should have violated Malayan waters, the reply was that the Malaysians would not cooperate to stop smuggling into Indonesia.

Narasimhan asked Subandrio whether the UN could do something about helping to improve relations between Indonesia and Malaya, and the reply was that it would be most welcomed provided nothing would be shown to indicate that it was the Indonesian side which took the initiative to invite the UN. Subandrio emphasised that to bring about a better relationship the following should be done:

- (a) the Tunku should make an unequivocal declaration that he had no territorial design with regard to Sumatra;
- (b) political asylum given to Prof. Sumitro and other rebels should be given strictly in accordance with international rules and practice, namely that those granted political asylum should not indulge in political activities and attacks against Indonesia;
- (c) accept Djatikusumo as Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur and send Datuk Kamaruddin back to Jakarta;
- (d) start discussions on joint naval patrol.

Narasimhan thought that one of the things should be done as a matter of priority was to seek some solution to the Manila claim. He felt that Manila might bring the matter up before the UN and the International Court of Justice which would compound the problem.

In the UN, the principle of self-determination was sacred. He therefore suggested that the best thing to do would be to have a referendum in North Borneo and there would be no doubt as to its result. The British should be persuaded to agree to this line of action. With regard to Sarawak it was sufficient that the Malaysia plan should be referred to the Council Negri. Brunei posed a different problem and Narasimhan thought that perhaps a postponement of a decision until there was another election would be the best answer.

Narasimhan asked Razak if the Malayan Government was willing to accept him back in Malaya to assist in reaching some solutions to the strained relation between Malaya and Indonesia. He was coming to Bangkok in March and he could easily come to Kuala Lumpur then. Razak responded that would be an excellent idea.

Just before he was called back to the plane, Narasimhan said that the two people to work with in Jakarta was Sukarno and Nasution. However, Nasution had given him the impression that he was anti-Malaysia because he seemed to subscribe to the view that the Tunku had territorial designs on Sumatra. Furthermore Nasution thought that Malaya was being dominated by the Chinese. True that the Malay Regiment was Malay but the Air Force and the Navy, according to Nasution, were predominantly Chinese and that would be dangerous. Nasution also appeared to be sore with Malaya because Malaya had refused to cooperate in helping Indonesia to stamp out smuggling in the Straits of Malacca.

After some brief pleasantries, Narasimhan was whisked away back to his plane leaving Razak and myself quite aghast to learn of the very wide gap of understanding between Malaya and Indonesia. I expressed my surprise that Nasution should hold the view about the predominance of Chinese in the Navy and the Air Force which would make it dangerous for Malaya. Clearly there must be some genuine misconception about the way Malaya had conducted herself to manage her internal problems. Since this misconception was based on their experience with the Chinese in Indonesia, it was understandable that they could not comprehend the Malayan experience and the management of her economic, social, political, racial and religious relationships. It must be extremely intimidating to the Indonesians that with a very small percentage of people of Chinese origin, they could not control their economy and the Malayan position would be at a complete disadvantage in respect of the Malays. Malaysia with Singapore would be preponderantly Chinese and Nasution saw that as menacing.

This concern must also have been fuelled by Malay nationalists who had contacts in Indonesia and who saw the salvation for the Malays in the Peninsula was to get the Indonesians on their side. Little did they realise that Sukarno had already abandoned the Peninsula to China so long as the islands of Indonesia would not be disturbed. In fact he had disassociated himself with Malaya just before the defeat of Japan when he visited Terauchi in Saigon. He expressed this sentiment of his to Dr. Burhanuddin Helmy and Ibrahim Yaacob when they met in Taiping on his way back from Saigon to Jakarta.

I assured Razak that I would examine the various unhappy issues raised by the Indonesians with Narasimhan. Many of the allegations Razak and I knew were false and some were simply unworkable, like the issue of smuggling which in the final analysis the Indonesians wanted Malaya to do their job to stop smuggling into Indonesia along the Straits of Malacca since they did not have the wherewithal including the right manpower to effectively control smuggling.

As soon as I got back to the office, I asked to see the Charge d'affairs of Indonesia on a date agreed between us. He brought with him a letter seeking the Agreement for the appointment of Djatikusumo as Ambassador. I knew already through Narasimhan that the new Ambassador would be Djatikusumo

but I feigned surprise at this request since Djatikusumo was a minister in Sukarno's cabinet and Malaya was a small country and with some unnecessary sarcasm I referred to Malaya as a "neo-colonialist". The Charge d'affairs kept his cool but simply replied that Indonesia regarded Kuala Lumpur as an important post.

I then requested him to candidly tell me as to why Indonesia was so heated up against Malaya over the Malaysia plan. He said that Indonesia genuinely felt that Malaysia would mean a common land border with Indonesia. By some strange logic it was explained to me that the British remaining in Malaysia in the Borneo borders would be more hostile to Indonesia than when the territories were still British. It would then be inevitable for Indonesia to strengthen her defences in view of that potential hostile attitude. There was every possibility of armed border clashes which might develop into something quite dangerous. It was not clear to me if this line was official or it was his own concoction or as a sarcastic snipe shot for my earlier remark regarding neo-colonial Malaya and that the British would forever be the defence elements in the Borneo states.

The official line soon emerged when he said that Indonesia could not support the Malaysia plan because of the Brunei revolt. Even the Report of the Cobbold Commission had substantiated that there were oppositions to the plan. Indonesia supported the attitude of decolonisation but could not agree that the territories decolonised should be handed to another country. The Charge d'affairs was completely unaware of the meaning of a Federation. Indonesia had understood it to mean that the Malaysia plan was to satisfy the expansionist policy of Malaya. In the view of the Indonesian Government, the Government of Malaya was expansionist since it had the ambitions of annexing Sumatra and also had supported the 1948 rebellion. According to them, Malaya had always been hostile to Indonesia since 1957 and that Malaya had taken upon herself the responsibility of suggesting the type of Government which should govern Indonesia. After annexing North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei the Tunku would then have his eyes on Sumatra and Sulawesi.

In my response although it was quite unnecessary, I prefaced it by saying that I had gathered all his charges from the Indonesian mass media. However, what distressed the people of Malaya who valued Indonesia's friendship and never ceased to nurture it, found it inexplicable as to why Indonesia should blast Malaya through the mass media everytime Indonesia felt unhappy with any of Malaya's actions. Malaya had expected Indonesia to draw Malaya's attention for any shortcoming through the diplomatic channel. Because of the public blasting, much misunderstanding had been created.

I assured the Charge d'affairs that at no stage even presently, that Malaya was hostile towards Indonesia. As a matter of fact, Indonesia had always been a source of inspiration to Malaya. But the responses had always been negative and nothing Malaya did was ever correct in the eyes of Indonesia. There were

several instances even before the present crisis when Indonesian leaders including Sukarno regarded Malaya publicly as a colonial stooge and that we were not independent because the Chief of our Armed Forces Staff once was a British officer. On attaining independence, it was the policy of the Malayan Government in order to maintain continuity and stability to retain a number of British officials in posts like the Chief of the Armed Forces, the Police, the Court and the Attorney-General's office. In that way because of our local political situation the administration had been able to maintain public confidence and stability. Hence, the phenomenal growth in development since independence. However, these officers were subject to the political control of the Alliance Government. During the earlier period before the current crisis when Malaya was unjustly attacked only a proforma kind of demarche would have been made because we thought during the period of high instability in Indonesia those negative statements would be needed for internal political reasons.

However, these had become extremely serious affecting the internal politics of Malaya for which the Government had to respond. Many preposterous allegations had been flung at Malaya and I drew the attention of the Charge d'affairs as to the accusation that the Tunku snubbed Djuanda by refusing to meet the Indonesian leader. That was an example of the many lies perpetrated by Indonesia and its press. I took out an album of photographs which I had normally kept in the office where there was a record of the Tunku himself meeting Djuanda as Prime Minister and Djuanda's meeting in the Cabinet room with Malayan ministers. There were photographs of Djuanda visiting Penang where a red carpet was laid for him and many more photographic evidences that Djuanda was far from being snubbed.

I told the Charge d'affairs that I had personally worked very hard together with some senior Indonesian officials to draft the Indonesia-Malaya Friendship Treaty and the Cultural Agreement. This Treaty was signed in Kuala Lumpur during Djuanda's visit. I related the story that I saw Prijono, a Murba leader raising his hands for *doa* (prayer) with tears streaming down his cheeks. I was very moved because if a Murba leader could feel that strong for the bond of brotherhood then the effort made to nurture that relationship should be enhanced. But to my utter disappointment I now found that Indonesia was bent on disrupting this relationship.

Perhaps many of those things causing concern were only in the imagination of some of the Indonesian leaders. For instance, the delay in the Charge d'affairs being received to present the C. V. of Djatikusumo was reported in Jakarta as a deliberate policy of confrontation against Indonesia. I told him that in the past few days I had been preoccupied with the Brunei and Singapore delegations regarding the merger questions and I had arranged for the meeting as soon as the opportunity presented itself. The Charge d'affairs agreed that he recognised how busy I had been of late and was grateful that I had been able to receive him so promptly that day.

There was one point that I had to tell the Charge d'affairs. I rather liked him. He seemed the kind of fellow who would use his brain rather than follow blindly but that he had to know better. I thought I would take the opportunity to tell him that his side was wrong to accuse Malaya of not explaining about the Malaysia plan to him. I told him that as soon as the Tunku made his announcement in Singapore which brought about the Malaysia plan, the Malayan Ambassador in Jakarta then had briefed the Indonesian Government which Subandrio responded positively and later made the statement in the *New York Times* and also at the UN General Assembly in November that year. In Kuala Lumpur, over and over again, I had spoken to the Indonesian Ambassador regarding the Malaysia plan which he said he had reported to Jakarta. The Ambassador also had followed with interest the development regarding the Malaysia plan. He even attended the open sessions of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee when it was held in Kuala Lumpur and I had always given him papers and documents on the matter. But the Borneo territories were not something that Malaya claimed and could not be compared to Indonesian action in respect of West New Guinea. Malaysia plan could only be actualised if the people of the territories concerned agreed. There could be no force or coercion to be used. Therefore it would be wrong for Malaya to explain to Indonesia in great detail about the plan before Kuala Lumpur knew whether the territories wanted to join and if so on what terms. I thought any detailed explanation would be premature and it was therefore proper for Selkirk to explain the British intention to Indonesia since the territories concerned were still British. Even then the British could not say in what form the new Malaysian Federation would look like. Until then negotiations were still going on with the various territories regarding the details of the terms and conditions of their entry into the Federation. Once these had been agreed to it might be possible for a leader from Malaya to specially visit Jakarta to explain regarding the shape of the new Federation. It was unfortunate that Indonesia had unjustly condemned Malaya. At that stage it was thought adequate that Selkirk had talked to Subandrio and so did the Malayan Ambassador. I too had explained the Concept to the Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur. Even then the subject could only be the outline of the plan.

As I spoke I observed the Charge d'affairs had lowered his eyes and appeared to be in deep thought. I assured him that it had never been the policy of the Malayan Government that it would ever be expansionist over Indonesia or anywhere else. At the time of the 1958 rebellion Malaya never lifted a finger to help the rebels. All that happened, even then it was at the time when the rebellion was fizzling out, was that Malaya had given political asylum and had scrupulously observed the rules for political asylum. If there had been any abuse, I requested the Charge d'affairs to draw my attention to it.

Many of the refugees were former Indonesian diplomats and government servants who had defected and were stranded in Europe. They had no food and

proper clothing and nowhere else to go. It was on humanitarian grounds that the refugees were given asylum and that they were the victims of a civil war.

The Charge d'affairs at that stage, as if he was suddenly awakened up, asked whether it occurred to the Government of Malaya that the granting of political asylum was a hostile act against Indonesia. I replied that the practice of granting political asylum and the privilege of the refugees to be treated as such had been established in international law. This practice was well-known even among the best of friends and the worst of enemies in international relations. Jocularly, I said if the situation was reversed and the Charge d'affairs requested for asylum he should know that he would be treated in accordance with the international practice.

At that stage I thought I had said enough and would be just sufficient for him to report back to Indonesia. After some pleasantries he left with my assurance that the agreement for Djatikusumo would be given the highest consideration by Cabinet.

* * *

It had been mentioned that Pelaez had suggested the idea of a round table conference of Southeast Asian leaders to deal with the question of the Manila claim. While the Tunku welcomed the proposal as desirable, the official Indonesian stand was non-committal.

Perhaps as a proposal to resolve their predicament for having made the claim on North Borneo, the Philippines had been formulating her own plan designed to satisfy both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. In essence, the plan called for the organisation of a Malayan confederation. This word "Malaya" should be taken in a broader connotation to mean the people belong to the Malay race in the area known as the Malay archipelago embracing the peninsula of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. This Malay confederation loosely tied would replace what Manila claimed as the British-inspired Malaysia plan. The proposed confederation would comprise Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia and possibly Thailand. The Philippines plan envisaged the placing of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo under the United Nations Trusteeship with the Philippines, Malaya and Indonesia as joint administrators. The administration of the trust territories would end with the publication of the results of a referendum or plebiscite under UN supervision and this would determine the wishes of the people of these territories. Nothing was mentioned about Singapore.

There was no real correspondence about the plan and it was gathered from the Manila newspapers published on February 20, 1962 no doubt leaked or inspired by some authoritative body in Manila. However, it was wholly waffly but since it was not official there was no way of inquiring as to its authenticity or of seeking further clarification.

Early in March 1963, Vice-President Pelaez of the Philippines had invited Subandrio to Manila. Subandrio was reported to be pleased with this

invitation as he had wanted to enlist the Philippines support at the proposed Summit where the Indonesians would press for the postponement for the formation of Malaysia until the wishes of the people of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei could be ascertained by a referendum to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. Subandrio would only accept this method as a solution and did not believe that the Cobbold Commission had reported the real extent of opposition to the Malaysian plan.

The idea of the Summit was pursued further during the ECAFE ministerial meeting in Manila where Razak, Pelaez and Subandrio met since each of them was leading his country's respective delegation. Razak who also met Macapagal during that ECAFE meeting and had assured the President of the Philippines that Malaya would agree to a summit provided it was preceded by a meeting at the foreign ministers level which would be prepared by senior officials of the three countries. What Malaya did not want was a summit that was ill-prepared. It seemed Subandrio also met Macapagal.

Pelaez then issued an instruction to the Manila Foreign Office to start an official level talk on three principal points:

- (a) problems arising from the proposal to establish Malaysia;
- (b) preservation of fraternal and neighbourly relations between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya;
- (c) maintenance of enduring peace and stability of Southeast Asia.

Even though there had been no official explanation about the proposed confederation, the Malayan Government understood the implications of the proposal which had been regarded as a non-starter. Perhaps the confederation could be considered after Malaysia had been formed. Even then it had to be considered by the new Federation which would have included Singapore. In any case, in the view of Malayan leaders, the proposal was aimed only to thwart the formation of Malaysia.

At the meeting between Razak and Macapagal in Manila during the ECAFE conference, Razak had told Macapagal that unless Indonesia changed her belligerent attitude a summit would fail and the public would be utterly disappointed in their leaders. On the other hand the Indonesians had all along said through the press that there would be no summit unless Malaya dropped the Malaysia plan. The Malayan side therefore played along with Manila which did not impose any such condition as to drop the Malaysia plan although Malaya was convinced that it was to vitiate the plan that Manila had called for the summit. If the summit could not materialise the burden would be on Manila for failing to persuade Jakarta to drop her condition and Malaya would have been free from blame.

Malaya was determined to bring Malaysia into existence. Singapore which did not enter into the Manila and Jakarta calculations was about to have a constitutional revision. Perhaps Manila and Jakarta thought Singapore with

its SEATO base should continue to be British who would continue to take care of the security of Southeast Asia. Malaya had been following the growing influence of the communist elements in Singapore from first hand information as a member of the Singapore Security Council. The constitutional revision might easily turn Singapore into a communist island, at least that was the calculation made in Kuala Lumpur. Hence Malaysia with Singapore as a component state was imperative.

Certainly Malaya did not desire the prospect of a third party like Manila or Jakarta or both be involved with something which concerned only Britain, Malaya and the British territories including Singapore and Brunei.

It became the Malayan policy at that juncture to break the Jakarta-Manila axis. The fact that both Manila and Jakarta had different approaches to the question of summit provided the Malayan side with an opportunity to show up the differences in attitude.

While the subject of the summit was in the air and the Pelaez instructions to the Manila Foreign Office had seeped to the various foreign offices including Kuala Lumpur, a British Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the name of Peter Thomas met the Tunku. Thomas was on his way to Manila. The Tunku took the opportunity of showing his goodwill to Macapagal by informing Thomas that Malaya would be willing to deal with the Manila claim after Malaysia had been formed if Macapagal would wish to pursue the matter.

Thomas in discussion with me said that the Malayan policy as expressed by the Tunku was a good face-saving device. At least for the period until Malaysia had been formed Manila would not be such a bother. I expressed my pleasure that Thomas had reached that conclusion which as he believed, would also be shared by Manila. I found Thomas to be pleasant and decided that I would be candid with him and to engage with him in a conversation on the question of the claim although its basis was not available to London or Kuala Lumpur. However, Thomas did not reveal to me that his approbation of the Malayan policy I suspected was based on the British desire to be rid of the bother.

The question of the claim now since the State of the Nation address on February 1, 1963 had shifted to a straightforward anti-Malaysia plan stance on the ground of Manila's security. The Tunku had made his stand and the Malayan Government would not bend to any idea at the expense of thwarting the formation of Malaysia. The Malayan Government was prepared to be actively engaged with Manila on the claim after the formation of Malaysia even though it would have been extremely disappointed with the British for not facing the problem squarely. The British Government, it seemed, was indulging in masterly procrastination with the hope that the claim would fizzle out on its own or on the formation of Malaysia, as Thomas would have wished. The British could just wash their hands and let Malaysia deal with the matter.

Thomas had told the Tunku that Macapagal had expressed to the British the wish to visit North Borneo and asked the Tunku what he thought of it. The Tunku said that he could not see any objection to such a visit. The Tunku also told Thomas that he had agreed to a tripartite ministerial meeting provided the ground was prepared by senior officials who would have to reach an agreement on the scope and terms of reference for the ministers to meet.

With regard to Macapagal's visit to North Borneo and the Tunku's non-objection, I could not help telling Thomas that the visit could prove embarrassing since the people of North Borneo led by Donald Stephens and Datu Mustapha might not be able to conceal their feeling regarding the claim. This I was pretty certain since I had a previous word with Stephens and Mustapha when I heard from the grape vine that Macapagal was going to approach the British Government about his desire to visit North Borneo.

Thomas must have conveyed to Manila the gist of his conversation with the Tunku and me. He was there to attend the ECAFE ministerial conference and had met others like Subandrio, Barwick of Australia besides Pelaez and Macapagal himself. Kuala Lumpur had received reports that everyone who met with Macapagal was engaged in conversations not centred on ECAFE but on Malaysia, the tripartite summit and the future of Southeast Asia.

However, we had gathered the discussion between Macapagal and Subandrio to be rather interesting. The Tunku's message must have reached Macapagal about the willingness of the Tunku to discuss the question of the claim after the formation of Malaysia. Macapagal had stressed to Subandrio the need to ease tension. He indicated to Subandrio that he would not oppose the formation of Malaysia although Philippines harboured real fears for her security. He believed that the proposed summit would enable the Philippines to work out some suitable arrangement for regional security.

This conciliatory attitude shown by Macapagal must have placed Subandrio in an awkward position. Since there appeared no other recourse and Macapagal's stance was without warning, Subandrio had no real choice but to agree. Also it would be consistent with Jakarta's own protestations that Indonesia had harboured no hostile intention against Malaya. There would be no objection against the Malaysia proposal, if the question of Indonesian security could be placated. After all, the propaganda line against the Malaysia plan was that it would be a serious security threat to Indonesia.

As a result of the meeting between Subandrio and Macapagal, there was a marked change in the attitude of Subandrio at his farewell press conference. He was more restrained and even conciliatory in his remarks which suggested that he had heeded Macapagal's request to ease tension by reducing the war of words and had proven the Tunku's intuition as correct that Macapagal would play an important role in bringing about the summit without the Indonesian condition.

During this ECAFE meeting in Manila one could surmise that the biggest item on the private agenda of concerned ministers was the Malaysia Concept

and the Malaya-Indonesia and Malaya-Philippines relations. One such concerned minister was Barwick of Australia who went out of his way to tell Macapagal that the Australian Government was convinced that the formation of Malaysia was in the best interested for the area and Australia saw no other acceptable alternatives to it. It was at the meeting with Barwick we were informed that Macapagal categorically said that the Philippines had no intention of preventing or even hindering the formation of Malaysia but he was deeply concerned over the differences among the three Malay nations which Macapagal thought could be reconciled by having a meeting among the three leaders.

On getting this information, I could not help thinking that here was a Southeast Asian leader in search of the identity for his people. In his romantic way, he thought he could exploit the sentiments of the Indonesians and Malaysians that the unity of the Malay world should be a primary objective of these three nations of the Malay world divided by colonialism. Little did he realise that the biggest brother was deeply under the influence of PKI and communist China. Little did Sukarno realise, blinded by his belief in the domino theory, that communist China would still achieve her hegemony over the whole of Southeast Asia including the Malay archipelago by a kind of a reverse takeover or backdoor entry using the Peking oriented PKI. Macapagal would get his Malay world under Sukarno-PKI control but I did not believe Macapagal wanted that.

It would appear to me that Macapagal wanted a Malay entity in the form of a confederation of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines and the summit would find a way to resolve the political positions of the British Borneo and Singapore. I would imagine that Macapagal would prefer Manila to include North Borneo under the sovereignty of the Philippines, while Brunei and Sarawak, under Indonesia and Singapore, to be part of Malaya. As a Malay nationalist, he could envision a time when the confederation could become a Malay nation in some close political association or a federation or a unitary state, uniting Mololos with Mataram and Malacca.

Kuala Lumpur could not be convinced that Sukarno was able to prevent communist China from getting a foothold in Indonesia through PKI. Without Malaysia, there was every indication that Singapore would be controlled by communist elements also creatures of communist China and there was precious little that the British could do to prevent that from coming to pass. Likewise, Sarawak would fall into the control of the CCO which had deeply penetrated the various Chinese and native associations with the British helplessly looking on. The CCO too received its military training across the border from the pro-CCP PKI which supplied arms also to the Azahari group making Brunei another PKI-dominated entity. While at the time when Macapagal was making his confederation proposal, there were little signs of communist activities in North Borneo but for sure the people there, indigenous or otherwise, did not fancy being part of the Philippines. As

subsequent events had proved it was quite easy for the pro-PKI Indonesian armed men to enter Kalabakan near Tawau. Should North Borneo opt for independence the PKI-led Indonesia would view North Borneo as it would view Brunei and Sarawak. It was difficult to imagine a PKI-led Indonesia and communist China would tolerate a part of Kalimantan to be occupied by the Philippines, an ally of the United States, which would vitiate the so-called Peking-Jakarta division of hegemony in Southeast Asia.

Kuala Lumpur did not find it difficult to see the naivete in Macapagal's confederation. However, the concept of confederation was not at all aversed to some of the Malayan leadership. Razak himself thought that a confederation as an idea was not bad between Malaya and Singapore if the communist elements would not control the island state. The Tunku, however, would agree to consider Macapagal's confederation only after Malaysia was formed.

It was not quite clear to Kuala Lumpur as to what the Indonesian official thought of Macapagal's confederation other than that the proposal would serve Indonesia's objective of frustrating the Malaysia plan. What was circulated among the ECAFE participants that Subandrio was heard to have said was that if the talks were satisfactory along the lines prepared by Macapagal, he would be prepared to persuade his countrymen to accept Malaysia. This could only mean that the outcome of the Macapagal's proposed summit would be an agreement to form a confederation after the Malaysia plan had been actualised if one could accept at face value that Macapagal had no objection to the Malaysian plan. However, Manila during the ECAFE meeting, was so clouded in confusion that my advice to the Malayan Government was to accept the proposal of the Manila three layer conference.

After getting the agreement from the Government, I despatched a signal to Manila through the Malayan Embassy that Malaya would attend the senior officials' meeting and that I would head the Malayan delegation. In the meantime, Kuala Lumpur had received the Indonesian draft agenda which was as follows:

- (a) general exchange of views on the problems of peace, security and stability in the region;
- (b) discussion on responsibilities of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines towards the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia;
- (c) consideration of ways and means of achieving closer cooperation in Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines in carrying out the aforesaid responsibilities.

The Malayan Ambassador in Manila, Zaiton Ibrahim under instructions, had discreetly told the Manila Foreign Office top official that looking at the first point willy-nilly one would have to raise the question of the role and threat posed by PKI and the chronic instability in Indonesia. The Malayan Ambassador also informed Manila that the third agenda was tied to the first

two concentrating only on the aspect of security. Since the three countries had different meanings and concepts to the question of security, the subject would be extremely controversial.

Malaya would wish to see a meeting with constructive agenda with proposals which could bring the three nations together after the formation of Malaysia. That in itself posed some difficulties since Malaya could not commit any proposal on behalf of Malaysia which had not as yet come into being. However, Malaya would very much like to see a proposal which could be given consideration by the new Government of Malaysia after it had been formed. Kuala Lumpur then suggested to Manila to return to the Pelaez instructions of the thirteenth of March and the meeting of officials in order to understand fully what the Malaysia plan was all about. The agenda should include an exposition of the Malaysia plan without discussions and debate on the concept.

Kuala Lumpur had the impression that the Indonesian tactic was that she did not want the Malaysia plan to be the springboard for discussions but Indonesia would want a general discussion on security, peace and stability in Southeast Asia which would be threatened as a result of the Malaysia plan even if nobody else other than the Malaysians understood the plan and concept of Malaysia. Without the knowledge of what Malaysia was all about it was sufficient for Indonesia to prove that the concept of Malaysia whatever it might mean was controversial and therefore posed a threat to peace and security.

Manila lost no time in pursuing the idea of the tripartite meeting of officials which would lead to a summit. During the ECAFE meeting, the momentum had been set as a result of discussions between Macapagal and Razak and Macapagal and Subandrio. The Manila Foreign Office sent through its Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur an official letter inviting me to the tripartite talks at Under-Secretaries level. The Philippine Government disclosed that Manila would be represented by the Under-Secretary Salvador Lopez and Indonesia by Suwito Kusumowigdado.

Since the invitation was conveyed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was also the Prime Minister, the Tunku in his reply said that he was happy to "allow" me as the Permanent Secretary to attend the talk which Manila had proposed to hold on April 5, 1963.

Kuala Lumpur had been making assessments as a result of the ECAFE meeting discussions and the comments made by the Philippines and Indonesia. The Tunku, for some reason, had become utterly unenthusiastic about the proposed summit. He thought that a tripartite ministerial level would suffice to resolve the differences of opinion on the Malaysia plan.

The Malayan Foreign Office had recommended to the Government that the tripartite ministerial meeting should be preceded by a meeting at official level which should determine the agenda and prepare as much ground work as possible with the aim that when the ministers met they could formally endorse

the report of the officials. The Malayan Government therefore would stress on the need for approaching the tripartite talks on a systematic and constructive basis with a view to bringing the three countries closer after the establishment of Malaysia. The Government would be willing through the Permanent Secretary to give a detailed briefing on the Malaysia plan but would never accept any postponement of its implementation. It was obvious to me that the Malayan Government had placed on me the responsibility of getting some sort of consensus to be the basis for a tripartite ministerial approval since I had been the project officer for the Malaysia plan and had been involved from the word go.

The Tunku was leaving for Manila on April 2, 1963 to attend the ASA Foreign Ministerial Conference and I had gone a few days in advance to prepare for the meeting. But it turned out also as an occasion for a tripartite official meeting since Suwito was in Manila. Conscious of the Malayan Government stand on the summit, I entered into a serious discussion with Lopez and Suwito and eventually came out with an agenda for the officials' talk which were as follows:

- (a) general exchange of views on problems of stability, security, economic development and social progress of each country and of the region as a whole;
- (b) exposition of how each country proposed to face these problems consistent with regional and international responsibilities;
- (c) discussion of ways and means by which the three countries could achieve closer cooperation and assist each other in solving these problems.

During the discussions for the agenda I was careful not to go into detail in order that when the agenda came up officially it could be debated to our satisfaction. But it was important to provide an opportunity for the Malaysia plan to be explained without debating on its concept and form. This, I thought, I had succeeded by including para (b). Even if at that stage the form of words might not be acceptable, the principle of the exposition of how each country regarded and proposed to manage the problems of security had already been put in place.

Before the meeting of the tripartite senior officials took place, the Tunku had arrived in Manila on the April 2. He being the Prime Minister was accorded the highest consideration by Macapagal. The Tunku was billeted in Malacanang and had a series of meetings with Macapagal. One of them I thought was rather significant. Together with Macapagal was Pelaez and Lopez, while Minister Khir Johari and I accompanied the Tunku. It was on the morning of the fourth of April.

Macapagal began by stressing the importance of Southeast Asian nations getting together and exchanging views to remove any misunderstanding between them. He reminded the Tunku that the natives of Malaya, the Phillipines and Indonesia belonged to the same racial stock. He stressed on his favourite theme of Malayness as the one powerful reason why the three nations should exist in peace. The Tunku, in his response, concurred with

Macapagal and strongly believed that if Malaya or later Malaysia was in trouble, the Philippines would not abandon the Malayan or Malaysia people. Likewise, the Tunku reaffirmed that there was a permanent bond of friendship between the people of Malaya and that of Indonesia. But this relationship had been deteriorating because leaders like Sukarno and Subandrio had allowed the PKI to exercise a dominant role so much so that Sukarno and Subandrio were now reduced to being only the mouthpieces of PKI. According to the Tunku, the task before the Philippines and Malaya was to deliver the people of Indonesia from the communist clutches. The ordinary Indonesian should be persuaded to impress on Sukarno and the Government that their current policies would serve no useful purpose to the people and that the real enemies of Indonesia were the communists. The Tunku urged Macapagal to continue concentrating his efforts to muster the Malay peoples of Southeast Asia. The Tunku said, in a tone that was intended to drive an important point home that when the chips were down, the US and the UK would not be able to defend the region effectively. Only the Malay peoples should defend themselves.

At that juncture Macapagal said that as far as he knew the Indonesian army was anti-communist and that left a ray of hope. The Tunku turned to me to make my contribution. I said from our assessment since Madiun, the PKI had revised their strategy and had directed their efforts towards subverting the armed forces. The PKI had a great deal of success in subversion and infiltration amongst officers of the air force and some navy and army personnel. Many army officers could be classified as anti-communist but the process of infiltration and subversion had been extremely thorough and methodical. Malayan intelligence had it that the Siliwangi Division and Kostrad were about the only units which were relatively free of communist infiltration.

As a general observation, the cadre of officers in the armed forces other than the army could no longer be relied upon to stop communist expansion. The PKI also had succeeded to persuade Sukarno that there was need for the Fifth Force. I explained to Macapagal what in reality would be the Fifth Force and its intended function. Sadly, my surmise of the Fifth Force became a reality which nearly succeeded to place a PKI Government in Jakarta in 1965.

Macapagal said that the Philippines had no intelligence network operating in Indonesia but had to rely entirely on the US. The Tunku offered that arrangement would be made to supply the Philippines with information on what was going on in Indonesia. Macapagal expressed gratitude to the Tunku.

Then I was requested by the Tunku to brief Macapagal about the latest with regard to Azahari since Manila had supported Azahari's rebellion and now Azahari had moved to Jakarta. I told the meeting that the Unofficial Committee of Coordination against Malaysia which was headed by Subandrio had lost faith in Azahari and was building up Dzulkipli as a field leader. After an extensive briefing, Dzulkipli had been sent back to Putussibau not far from the Sarawak border. Azahari after making some

protests was allowed to go to the area on the borders between Sarawak and North Borneo but the Indonesians did not provide any communication system between them. The Committee of Coordination under Subandrio was planning to make sporadic border incidents during the tripartite ministers meeting in order to make a point. Evidently, Subandrio was going to use the same tactic which Indonesia applied during the negotiations with the Dutch over West New Guinea.

At last, the question of Singapore came up. It was Pelaez who requested the Tunku to inform the meeting about Singapore in the Malaysia plan. The Tunku said that as far as Singapore was concerned, the Referendum had established beyond any doubt that the people were in favour of Malaysia. Pelaez, much to my consternation, said that the Tunku should try for a rapprochement with Sukarno because he would have his hands full in dealing with Indonesia. By that suggestion, Pelaez gave the distinct impression of having pre-supposed the acceptance of the Malaysia plan by Sukarno or its abandonment by the Tunku. I wondered then whether he was aware of the implications of his suggestion.

The Tunku said that it was extremely important for the three countries together to be friendly. Active cooperation was the only safe way. The Tunku said that there was a great deal of talk that the Malaysia plan would bring together from Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak the three million Chinese as forming a threat to Southeast Asia. He pointed out that if the 140 million Malay people were united there was no need to fear the Chinese in Southeast Asia.

At that juncture, I intervened by drawing Macapagal's attention for the fact that the conditions in Indonesia as prevailing had taken a dangerous turn because the communist in Southeast Asia which were the creatures of the CCP were able to create a native based communism. Hitherto CCP inspired and led communist groups in Singapore, Sarawak and Malaya had been constituted and active predominantly among the ethnic Chinese with a smattering of others but with little consequence. It was then possible to defeat them. Should Indonesia become communist, it would be relatively easy for the natives of the Borneo territories and Malaya to be subverted and that would certainly include the Philippines.

Referring to Pelaez's suggestion to the Tunku, I said it would be rather difficult for an anti-communist Malaya to show signs of unreserved friendship towards the Sukarno regime in view of Sukarno's political doctrine of embracing PKI communism as the third element besides nationalism and religion in the national polity (nationalism, religion, communism otherwise known as NASAKOM). I cautioned the meeting that if Malayan and Philippine leaders showed signs of embracing Sukarno, the ordinary Indonesian who could not accept the triangular doctrine of NASAKOM and there were many in that country, would be in utter confusion. It would be read as a sign of approbation.

By all indications, the Tunku-Macapagal meeting had achieved something. Pelaez told me that he was glad that the meeting had cleared the air. He also expressed confidence in the future after hearing the Tunku and me.

Soon after that, the tripartite talks at Under-Secretaries level got under way. I led the Malayan delegation assisted most ably by Ambassador Zaiton Ibrahim and Hamzah Majeed together with a number of young diplomatic officials from Kuala Lumpur. The Indonesian side was led by Suwito assisted by Ambassador Nazir Pamontjak and two others while Under-Secretary Lopez led a delegation of senior Foreign Office officials from Manila including Busuego, an old friend of mine.

The meeting started on the April 8 in the Foreign Ministry of Manila. The whole arrangement was extremely well thought out with good and comfortable areas for important and private discussions which were important in negotiations of this kind. Much of the work would be done in the lounge where the air would be less tense, conducive to frank discussions. The Philippines had made it into a fine art. The people who served us in the lounge were female university under-graduates; two of them were beautiful daughters of Lopez.

The first day was all pleasantries and there was no real or serious business. The second day was different. It might be recalled that I had been involved in preparing the provisional agenda for the official talks which would be the basis of the agenda for the ministerial discussions. When it was being worked out on March 30, 1963 I had agreed tentatively and I was already comfortable with the format in particular agenda (b). The meeting of officials therefore gave me an opportunity to adjust the agenda to suit the latest thinking in Kuala Lumpur especially after ECAFE and ASA when Razak and the Tunku had made their inputs with Macapagal.

Quite early in the day, I asked for clarification on items (a) and (b) of the proposed agenda. I stressed the point that (a) would only be acceptable if a few terms were clarified to avoid unnecessary circular arguments. After a great deal of discussions, it was finally agreed to an annotation defining in more precise terms the areas for discussions under (a) which would be in the form of a confidential annexure to the agenda.

As the meeting dragged on the next day, it was clear that I had hit the nail on the head. Suwito was manoeuvring to use the ministerial tripartite meeting to internationalise the Malaysia plan and I was not going to let him have his way. I found the Manila delegation was not at all aware as to what the Indonesian delegation was trying to achieve. At least that was what it seemed and I was exceedingly pleased that the Manila delegations was supportive of my arguments.

It was on the eleventh of April that an agreement was reached on the two items as forming the main substance of the agenda of the tripartite ministerial meeting. These two items were as follows:

- (a) general exchange of views on current problems concerning the stability, security, economic development and social progress of each country and the region as a whole and exposition of efforts being exerted by these three countries either individually or jointly to solve them;
- (b) discussion of ways and means by which the three countries can achieve closer cooperation and assist one another in solving the problems referred above on the basis of mutual respect and consistent with their national, regional and international responsibilities and obligations.

I was delighted to have achieved the above agreement; responsibilities and obligations had to be specific. The Indonesian aim to internationalise the Malaysia plan had been thwarted. Malaya would, if she wanted, have the opportunity of going on record the story of her success in development and what the Malaysian plan was all about in the context of decolonisation, security and stability of the region.

When I reported to the Tunku that the agenda could be of great use to Malaya, the Tunku was pleased. However, he had his misgivings with regard to Indonesia. It so happened that while the talks were going on in Manila, Sukarno started to implement his policy of confrontation by sending about sixty men in uniform to attack the Tebedu police station on the Sarawak border killing one police corporal and wounding two constables. At the same time, the Vice Chairman of the CCP was visiting Indonesia, Sukarno welcomed him as a friend based on their common struggle which, according to Sukarno, was always stronger than a friendship under a "full moon". All Malaysians recognised that Sukarno was taking a swipe at Malaya. During the inter-war years, a movie was made in Indonesia using the tune of the national anthem of Perak as the background music. A romantic lyric was created for the tune which was called *Terang Bulan* or roughly translated as the "Light of the Full Moon". It was this tune which with some arrangement became the Malayan national anthem.

The Tunku in his message to me in Manila, expressed regret over these developments. He gave his agreement that the two items should form the main substance of the agenda of the tripartite ministerial meeting. The Tunku also requested me to talk to Suwito and to draw his attention to the repeated attempts by Sukarno to escalate the situation which were not conducive to the successful conclusion of the coming talks.

The Tunku in Kuala Lumpur was extremely patient and in deference to Macapagal was constrained not to make any public statement. I knew the Tunku well and he must be agonising over the fact that Sukarno had caused native blood to be spilled in Tebedu even if Sarawak was still British. I really marvelled at his forbearance.

After having succeeded in getting the substance of the agenda for the ministers meeting in the form of the two items, the Manila meeting of Under-Secretaries went on for a further three days. This period was devoted to

finding an agreement for the framework of the ministerial discussions. As the discussions progressed, I began to notice that both the Jakarta and Manila delegations were pursuing the line that the three Foreign Ministers should meet and after exchanging views they should arrive at decisions for cooperation and joint actions. Only then would the officials be brought in to draw up the programme of action to give effect to their decisions. It would appear to me that the two delegations preferred to proceed with the talks with an agreed list forming subjects for discussions within an agreed framework.

I thought it was highly dangerous to come to an agreement about a list of subjects for the ministers to discuss. Such a move, if I gave my agreement, would bind Kuala Lumpur and the Malayan Foreign Minister to discuss subjects which could be twisted to fit into the agreed list. That way the Malayan Foreign Minister could be drawn into discussions on a topic which he did not wish to discuss. Very strenuously, I urged for an agreement that ministers should first be briefed before the start of the meeting and I would certainly refuse to accept a list of subjects at the current level of senior officials without a detailed presentation. As a concession, I said I would be prepared to accept lists of subjects without comments and to offer my own list without comments. However, I would require an agreement to the effect that officials would meet at a later date to discuss the subjects at length and to seek the necessary clarification to brief the ministers. I also added another stipulation that the meeting of officials should terminate at least ten days before the scheduled date of the ministers meeting. This would give sufficient time for ministers to be familiar with the subjects for deliberations.

I had also kept something up my sleeve that I would, if necessary as a final stand, press for the exchange of memorandum on each subject which a delegate wished to discuss outlining the various points. Subjects which did not form part of a memorandum should not enter into discussion at the ministerial meeting. I had privately hinted this to Lopez whom I thought should initiate the idea.

When I put forward the point regarding the necessity of preparing the ministers before they met, the Indonesian delegation strongly opposed it. After some lengthy exchanges, Lopez of Manila, in order to find a compromise formula, offered the idea of the exchange of memorandum prior to the ministerial meeting. Both Suwito and Lopez gave me the impression that they were merely interested in getting the Foreign Ministers to meet. Their line was that if the ministers were to encounter any factual difficulties or if they lacked adequate preparation, they could appoint committees of officials to delve into details.

The Lopez proposal as a compromise was essentially my minimum position. Since it came from Lopez I gave all the credit to him for breaking the impasse. I could see the great pleasure in the faces of the Manila delegation although I could not say the same of Suwito and his officials.

After that, it was a matter of getting a communique out. Eventually the agreed communique of the tripartite Under Secretaries meeting was published on April 17, 1963 which announced that the officials agreed to recommend that the Foreign Ministers meeting be held in Manila some time in the middle of May which the officials agreed in principle might be followed by a tripartite summit meeting.

The communique revealed that the officials agreed to submit the following documents for consideration of their respective governments in connection with the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers:

- (a) the provisional agenda and its annotation;
- (b) the procedures to be followed;
- (c) a Note of Understanding regarding a prior exchange of explanatory memorandum concerning questions to be discussed at the ministerial meeting.

The communique also stated that the substantive items of the provisional agenda would provide for an exchange of views on common problems and explanations on how each country would endeavour to solve them. Under another item of the provisional agenda, the Foreign Ministers would consider a tripartite summit meeting.

The meeting of the officials in Manila had lasted from 9 to 16 April during which time we were overwhelmed by the hospitality of the Manila officials. The amount of mango juice I must have consumed would have come to a few gallons when it was difficult to refuse being served by such charming lady undergraduates who had volunteered to be involved in the exercise in diplomacy. Whether these students had imbibed any knowledge in diplomatic practices, I could not say but for sure they had helped to dampen heated arguments and kept everyone in the true and narrow path of diplomacy. The Philippines had always been famous for their sugary mangoes and beauteous damsels. They had on that occasion played their roles most effectively. When I requested a Malayan foreign service official to escort one of the students back to her home after a Malayan reception, the gallant bachelor promptly responded, "Sir, for King and Country, I'll do anything!"

I rushed back to Kuala Lumpur to report to the Tunku personally although I had been keeping him informed by coded messages. Also, Narasimhan of the UN Secretariat, was coming for a talk with Razak who wanted me to be present. The meeting between Razak and Narasimhan took place on the April 16, 1963. I recalled that Thong Yaw Hong of the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and my deputy Tengku Ngah were also present.

The Tunku was not in town. He had gone to Perak on one of those visits he frequently made to the rural areas. The Tunku had left word that if Narasimhan wanted to meet with him he had asked me to arrange for a light aircraft to fly the UN official to Bidor airstrip where a meeting could be arranged.

When Narasimhan met Razak at the latter's office, Razak told him regarding the Tunku's message. Narasimhan thought that it was not necessary for him at that juncture to trouble the Tunku but later perhaps after he had made his rounds. He was of course delighted to meet with Razak since those two had a mutual liking for each other.

Narasimhan told Razak that before he left New York he had a chat with the Indonesian Ambassador who had indicated to him that good progress had been made at the Under-Secretaries meeting in Manila which I had attended on behalf of Malaya. It would seem to Narasimhan that the officials had prepared well a ministerial level meeting which would lead to a Summit. Narasimhan was gratified as to what he had learnt about the meeting between Razak and Macapagal in Manila on the ninth of March which had paved the way for the latest development.

Razak told Narasimhan that he had received the new Indonesian Ambassador Djatikusumo the previous Saturday and from the conversation he had gathered the impression that what was needed in order to clear any misunderstanding was a meeting of the three leaders. Razak felt that Djatikusumo was frank and sincere in what he said.

Narasimhan said his sole interest as an international civil servant was to work for a removal or reduction of tension in this part of the world as long as his good offices were required. Irrespective of the formation of Malaysia, any international tension would be of no benefit to anyone and that all efforts including independent ones should be devoted towards that purpose.

Narasimhan came out with a proposal, if Razak would agree, that he would broach with Sukarno the idea of a confederation. This, according to Narasimhan, would play up the ego of the Indonesian President who could play a part as a leader in that confederation. Narasimhan was to request Sukarno to refrain from attacking Malaya which would be a member of that confederation. If Sukarno agreed to refrain from attacking Malaya it would enable Narasimhan to develop further the idea of the confederation. Razak was well aware of the policy that any confederation should only take effect after Malaysia had been formed and it would be Malaysia and not Malaya which would be a member. However, he did not reveal that attitude to Narasimhan but rather took the line as he had often told to some Filipino newsmen that it was better to start with ASA with Indonesia also as a member. To start a confederation would be a big project which would entail great risk of failure. However, Razak did not object to what Narasimhan was proposing to do.

The next subject raised by Narasimhan was the question of the Indonesian political refugees in Malaya who should be strictly treated as such. Razak responded that these political refugees would always be treated as political refugees with their rights and duties as determined by international law and Narasimhan could convey his assurance to the Indonesian leaders. On the question of the possibility of joint naval patrol between Indonesia and Malaya

which Narasimhan raised, Razak responded that the Philippines Defence Secretary had mentioned the subject of Malaya-Philippines joint naval patrol. He had told the Defence Secretary that this idea should be a matter for discussion. Razak did not reveal his thought in respect of a joint naval patrol between Malaya and Indonesia.

Narasimhan shared with Razak what he would wish to suggest to the Indonesian leader. He would broach with Sukarno and Subandrio if they would agree, possibly during the ceremony of the handover by the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West Irian to the Indonesians to insert a statement which would be made by Sukarno and Subandrio to the effect that Indonesia had no territorial ambitions over the Borneo territories. Indonesians had made such a statement in private and it would be helpful if they would now make such a public statement.

Narasimhan was in good heart. But he did not come out with any really new ideas. My deputy, Tengku Ngah, who was present at the meeting, shared my view that Narasimhan did not suggest anything practical which would bring about a relaxation of tension.

The UN official was not alone in raising the question of the breach of privileges among Indonesian refugees in Malaya. The British intelligence had noticed that of late there had been some activities of Indonesian businessmen from Sumatra meeting Indonesian dissident groups in Penang. The British Government, through its High Commissioner, had expressed its anxieties that the activities of the former Indonesian rebels in Malaya might prejudice any future opportunity of bringing about a conciliatory attitude of Indonesia. However, the invectives through broadcasts and the press from Indonesia made the people of Malaya angry and some indeed had taken upon themselves to fraternise with the former rebels if only through that way they would express their anger against the government of Sukarno. Furthermore, many of the former rebels were staying with their relatives who were Malaysians and this was particularly true in the west coast of Malaya from Kedah to Johore. It was difficult to prevent the people from expressing their ire.

In the meantime, the propaganda attacks from Indonesian leaders had not abated. Even Nasution had joined the chorus. I invited the Philippines Ambassador, Abu Bakar to lunch. He was a personal friend and we often played golf together. Our wives too were close friends and often they had their own hen parties. I was able to speak very candidly without fear of being misunderstood.

During that lunch, I drew his attention to the various statements which had come out of Jakarta. To say the least, I was bewildered since these actions of the Indonesians were certainly a slap on the face of Macapagal since he had requested Subandrio that there should be a moratorium on attacks. Abu Bakar said he would be seeking a clarification from Manila and no doubt would also be communicating with Jakarta and he would let me know. I expressed surprise that Manila had not done it as yet because I knew if Malaya had made

those attacks, Manila was sure to come out immediately with outbursts. I told Abu Bakar in all candour that Manila should try to clarify the Philippine position vis-à-vis Indonesia.

I told Abu Bakar that the Tunku had promised Macapagal to supply some intelligence to Manila. The various authorities concerned were working on it. It was not the intention of the authorities to convey the intelligence through the Kuala Lumpur Embassy for reasons of security but through the Malayan Embassy in Manila but I did not tell Abu Bakar that.

I spoke at great length regarding communism and the PKI and expressed my misgivings regarding the US attitude towards the so-called "special specie" of the communists in Indonesia as believed by the US and some other Western powers. However, I told Abu Bakar that as far as their intelligence was concerned, the US was quite accurate regarding the communist subversion and infiltration in Indonesia. I then requested Abu Bakar to get his government to be briefed confidentially by the US intelligence community and to let us know if my surmise was correct or otherwise. I warned Abu Bakar that there might be a difference in conclusions between the political side and the intelligence side. The political side believed that the Indonesian communists were a different kettle of fish and even if the PKI took over the government of Indonesia, it would not be a communist government as seen elsewhere. This was the kind of view I told Abu Bakar which I heard from the British or the USA and some other Western powers. I said even Australia politically did not share Malaya's concern regarding the dangers of communism in Indonesia. There seemed to be wishful thinking or a misplaced faith in Sukarno's ability to control the PKI. Everything that was happening in Indonesia was a step by step preparation towards a PKI takeover by which time the Indonesians would be so conditioned or so impoverished that they would willingly accept any kind of government.

I revealed to Abu Bakar that the Tunku was happy with the outcome of the senior officials meeting. In fact, the Tunku would be sending a letter to Macapagal expressing his satisfaction at the outcome of the talks. As for the Foreign Ministers meeting, the Tunku would inform Macapagal that he preferred Razak to represent him at the Foreign Ministerial meeting. As far as I knew, the proposed meeting as prepared by Manila would take place sometime during the middle of May and Razak would be away during that period. The meeting could only take place after his return.

I also told Abu Bakar that the Tunku's letter would express a similar bewilderment and concern over the Indonesian stepping up of their vicious attacks on the Malaysia plan. The Tunku told me that he might tell Macapagal that Sukarno was not sincere in his desire for peace. In fact in a letter he wrote to Macapagal, the Tunku did mention his feeling about Sukarno's insincerity.

The Tunku's desire for Razak to represent him at the Foreign Ministers Conference somehow leaked out. Consequently, the meeting would have to

depend on a date later than stipulated since Razak would still be away by that time. The meeting would have to be held somewhat later than the middle of May.

Subandrio seized the opportunity to lambast at Malaya saying that it was a play at procrastination to secure a *fait accompli*. He, on the other hand, wanted the meeting as a matter of urgency. Subandrio also told the press that Indonesia wanted positive consultations with Malaya on the Malaysia plan. Indonesia was also prepared to enter into a defence understanding with Malaya together with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

Much to our consternation in Kuala Lumpur, Subandrio expressed concern over the influx of Chinese into North Borneo in order to increase her Chinese population before Malaysia came into being. Subandrio, as if to contradict himself, referred to a statement made by Liu Shiao Chi that he was not unduly concerned about the political affiliation of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia since all Chinese were regarded as possessing the same ethnic affinity. Indonesia, according to Subandrio, was most reluctant to continue with its policy of confrontation and it would be withdrawn if the summit meeting materialised. Then he gave a grim warning and some in Kuala Lumpur thought it as a threat while most regarded it as a challenge that Indonesia was in a position to frustrate the Malaysia plan if Malaya did not cooperate.

Subandrio's statement became a topic of conversation in Kuala Lumpur among those in the Government, the press and those concerned with the Malaysia plan. The general public had dismissed it as an idle threat. However, the point was that Subandrio was trying very hard to give the impression that Indonesia was concerned for the well-being of the Malays. He seemed to think that with Malaysia the ethnic Chinese would swallow everything in Malaya and in view of that fear Indonesia and Malaya should get together. The opposition to the Malaysia plan was an Indonesian way to save the Malays. Subandrio had once told the Malayan Ambassador in Jakarta that Indonesia had been aware that the Malays in Malaya had been left far behind by the Chinese.

Soon after that, the Philippines Government officially inquired from the Malayan Government if the seventh of June would be convenient for the ministers' meeting. Manila had taken into account the request by the Tunku to let Razak represent him at a date convenient to Razak. I checked with Razak and informed Manila that the proposed date was suitable. I also learnt that Indonesia had also agreed to the date.

As in accordance with what had been agreed at the three Under-Secretaries meeting in Manila, the three governments would simultaneously exchange memoranda in Manila on the thirtieth of May.

* * *

In the meantime, the Tunku and I had been getting similar signals that Sukarno wanted to meet the Tunku in Tokyo. A Singapore lady of sound credibility was the leading source who acted like a messenger. I was chided by the Tunku when I said Sukarno could not be serious with us since he had other reasons for visiting Tokyo and that the meeting might be an excuse. The Tunku said Sukarno did not require any alibi and that we should listen to what he had to say. I apologised to the Tunku for being presumptuous and I followed it with my view that I had no real objection to the meeting but that we should not be overly sanguine since Sukarno was then known to be interested in a certain Japanese lady!

The Tunku then told the messenger that in view of the attacks made against him and Malaya, Sukarno's real intention had become doubtful. If Sukarno wanted a meeting then he should issue an official invitation. Sukarno should not secretly arrange for a meeting yet attack the other party in public. That would give a wrong signal.

Soon after that, I received a phone call from the Indonesian Ambassador in Singapore, then Sugiharto, telling me that the chance of getting an official invitation was remote. He asked me if it was possible to organise a meeting without the official invitation. I told him that was a matter which had to be discussed with the Tunku but in view of the personal attacks and invectives and the ridiculing of the national anthem, it would seem to me that an invitation would be necessary. I was sure then Sukarno would not find it difficult to issue an invitation since the meeting was at his behest.

Sugiharto expressed surprise that as far as he gathered from a certain Singapore lady who I discovered later the same public spirited person who was concerned over the deterioration of relations and was anxious to contribute by being an honest broker, it was the Tunku who wanted a meeting with Sukarno. I denied any such thing and told Sugiharto that the impression given by the Singapore lady to the Tunku was that Sukarno had wanted it. I also pressed the point that there was no reason for the lady to indulge in any duplicity. Sugiharto admitted that there was a mix-up and I told him that it would be better to drop the idea of the meeting although efforts must be increased to improve relations between the two countries.

A couple of days after my telephone conversation with him, Sugiharto came to Kuala Lumpur this time accompanied by the Singapore lady and called on the Tunku. It was from the viewpoint of strict diplomatic practice a bizarre arrangement since neither the Malayan Ambassador in Jakarta nor the Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur knew of this call. It was all diplomatic hush-hush.

The Tunku was extremely gracious to receive the two at such short notice. He insisted that I should be present and I noted that the Ambassador did not appear comfortable and it was the Singapore lady who started by saying that Sugiharto had an important message for the Tunku. Sugiharto said that the Tunku's wish for an official invitation had been communicated to Jakarta and

he had received a cable from Jakarta that same morning, hence the rush to Kuala Lumpur to call on the Tunku. It was about eight p.m.

I was seated next to the Tunku and he whispered to me that this must be the work of the "broker" throwing his eyes in the direction of the Singapore lady. I understood his signal and I nodded. Sugiharto went on to say that in the message from Jakarta, Sukarno had expressed the wish that the position should remain as before and that there should be no conditions to the meeting. I whispered to the Tunku that the proposal for the meeting was still secret and the Tunku nodded. The purpose of the meeting, according to Sugiharto, was to try to understand each other's viewpoints and to seek clarifications. Sugiharto said that it would be very difficult for his President to issue an invitation lest he would be subject to attacks by certain quarters namely the PKI and their groups who did not wish to see a relaxation of tension between Indonesia and Malaya. Sugiharto also said that Sukarno held the view that if it was not possible to have a meeting in Tokyo between him and the Tunku it would serve no useful purpose to have a tripartite meeting of Foreign Ministers in Manila. The Tunku on hearing this, looked at me with a faint smile.

I had passed to the Tunku that morning certain reports from the Associated Press and Narasimhan's report that Subandrio had told him about the impending Tokyo meeting. London, from our sources, were also abuzz with the news. The Tunku, while showing the Associated Press report to Sugiharto, said he was shocked that the news regarding the meeting had been known to the press. The press report was in great detail including the proposal that the Tunku would lay the foundation stone of the Malayan Embassy in Tokyo during his visit to meet with Sukarno.

The Tunku emphatically said that the position could not, as Sukarno had wished, remain as before since Jakarta had not kept the matter a secret. As for himself, he had kept the whole story from the day when we received the first feelers until then a secret even from among his Cabinet ministers. The only person who knew about it was me and the Tunku had no reason to think that the story was leaked from Kuala Lumpur. Otherwise how did Narasimhan know and the news dateline was Jakarta. He was therefore in an extremely embarrassing position and revealed to Sugiharto that as a result of the AP report he had to call for an emergency Cabinet meeting that morning. The Tunku said that if he proceeded with the meeting as arranged, Macapagal would have a negative impression of Malaya-Indonesia ganging up in view of the arrangement to have a tripartite summit. He also revealed to Sugiharto that his Cabinet colleagues had advised him not to go; however, he was able to convince them to let him go if Sukarno would issue an invitation which might be conveyed through the Malayan Embassy in Tokyo or Manila. All the Tunku needed was five days to prepare for his trip.

It was agreed that an invitation would come from the Indonesian side which would be passed through the Malayan Ambassador in Tokyo since Sukarno was already there.

Sugiharto asked the Tunku as to what Narasimhan thought of the proposed meeting. The Tunku told him that the UN official had expressed to other people that such a meeting would be useful. Sugiharto was thoroughly embarrassed by the disclosure that Jakarta had inspired or leaked the news of the meeting. He revealed that the President was already in Tokyo and he would go there the following day to explain personally. He expressed confidence that he would be able to persuade Sukarno to issue an invitation.

As I walked with Sugiharto to his car, he explained regarding the misunderstanding as to who initiated the idea of the meeting. He said the Singapore lady went to Jakarta and conveyed to the President the *salam* (greetings) of the Tunku and expressed the Tunku's desire for a meeting with Sukarno. The President responded immediately. Hence, everyone in Jakarta and he had the impression that the initiative was the Tunku's. I told him that the Tunku had the impression that it was Sukarno who wanted the meeting. Sugiharto then said that it would be best in future not to include the Singapore lady in this affair.

At that stage, I could not help speculating that the whole initiative came from Sugiharto who wanted very much that Indonesia and Malaya should not be on a confrontation course. Having known that the Singapore lady was known to the Tunku, she was then tasked to go to Jakarta and then to Kuala Lumpur. The two must have been concerned with the relationship of the two countries which many believed could be mended if the two leaders met and then develop a personal relationship. I believed they wanted to be honest brokers hence the amateurish tale she carried to Sukarno and then the Tunku. They were extremely embarrassed when the leaks had pointed to Jakarta. They did not reckon with the wiles of the PKI and Subandrio.

I asked Sugiharto as to why the President feared certain quarters regarding the issuance of the invitation. He said the PKI were extremely hostile to the idea of the Tunku and Sukarno getting together. I said that was strange because Sukarno had often boasted and believed even by the Americans that he could control the PKI and that the PKI could not influence him. By then it was clear that Sugiharto knew that Sukarno's boast was idle. He admitted that Sukarno was only boasting but requested me that I should not allow the matter to be a subject of Malayan propaganda against the President. The bottom line was that he was very much a President's man.

We soon received the invitation for the Tunku to meet with Sukarno in Tokyo. The agreed dates were May 31 and June 1, 1963. The Japanese Government had arranged for the site of the meeting. It was the house of Mr. Ohira who was then the Foreign Minister.

When we arrived in Tokyo, the Malayan Ambassador was at the airport and he told us that he had been talking to the Indonesian Ambassador who said that the President would be bending over backwards to accommodate whatever we wanted. Since Sukarno had issued the invitation, he was going to play host. And that he did.

When the Tunku arrived at Ohira's residence at about 9.30 a.m., Sukarno was already there and the Tunku was received most cordially. The residence was a beautiful Japanese style home with a large lawn and a garden. The setting could not be better to conduce a successful meeting. I was the only one with the Tunku while Sukarno was accompanied by Subandrio. Our respective ambassadors were not required to be present at the discussions. Those others that formed the entourage of each leader were given another room and plenty of coffee after they had been introduced to the respective leaders.

The Tunku and Sukarno with Subandrio and I were in a cosy room with chairs and coffee tables in Western style. Before entering the house I thought to myself that we might have to sit cross-legged on the *tatami*. I would not have enjoyed the prospect of sitting in that way although I was quite accustomed to sitting cross-legged but if the meeting took too long, I would find it somewhat uncomfortable. However, the Japanese host was extremely thoughtful and provided us with all the comforts and amenities including coffee, tea and Japanese cookies.

After the pleasantries for about ten minutes, both parties had become relaxed. In the beginning I thought there was some tension. The Tunku was not very forthcoming but Sukarno exuded such charm that after a while, the Tunku seemed more relaxed. Sukarno was dressed in a kind of uniform that he had invented for himself. He carried a baton with him as if he was a field marshall. The Tunku, Subandrio and myself were in the usual Western attire suitable for the weather in Tokyo.

We began serious business only at about 10.00 a.m. Sukarno began the conversation by saying that because Indonesia and Malaya were neighbours the two should discuss with each other in particular when we had a scheme which would bring the two countries to share a common land border. Sukarno said that Indonesia was not interested in colonising or interfering in the internal affairs of neighbours. He then requested the Tunku to explain to him what the Malaysia Concept was all about.

The Tunku was quite calm and relaxed while listening most intently to Sukarno whom he had not met since becoming the Prime Minister. I could see that the Tunku was well-prepared and in a most convincing way, at least I thought so, gave a full expose' of the aims, plan and reasons for Malaysia fully stressing on the problems of communism in Singapore, Malaya and Sarawak. The Tunku talked of decolonisation of the British Borneo territories and the need for their social and economic upliftment. The Malayan Government was satisfied that adequate consultation on the views of the people had been taken through the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Cobbold Commission, elected council of Sarawak and an elections in North Borneo with Malaysia plan as an issue. Responsible community bodies had all expressed their support for the Malaysia plan. The Tunku also explained that Malaysia would, like Malaya, be a federation with well defined state and federal responsibilities.

Sukarno expressed misgivings regarding the support of people in the Borneo territories since he had received letters to the contrary. He was apprehensive that trouble might break out as the Dutch plan for the Indonesian Federation or the British plan for a Federation of Africa. Since Indonesia was next door, she must take notice.

The Tunku replied most assuredly that the plan was neither British nor based on the Dutch Federation to perpetuate colonialism. It was a plan which had gone through the various processes with the support of the people. The Tunku emphatically said it could not fail.

At that juncture, Subandrio intervened by saying that Indonesia alone knew her own desires and capabilities and she had good reasons to have a defence programme in order to keep the islands together. While there might be cogent arguments for Malaya to have Malaysia, at least Malaya should have consulted Indonesia just as Indonesia had done with Australia over West New Guinea. Subandrio said he and Nasution went to Canberra for that purpose.

With regards to consultations, the Tunku said that Senu Abdul Rahman the Malayan Ambassador had consulted with Jakarta and Razif the Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur had been fully briefed from the beginning and kept up to date as to what was happening officially. To my horror and surprise, both Sukarno and Subandrio denied this. I was about to burst out to remind them regarding Subandrio's statement in *New York Times* and his words in the General Assembly in 1962 when I saw the Tunku was well composed but pensive and I knew he did not want the lies exposed which might end the meeting in disaster. I therefore held my peace.

The Tunku rather softly said that Malaya had always supported Indonesia and with regard to West New Guinea, Malaya had brought the matter in the UN, the Commonwealth Conference and other international platforms including meetings in the United States, Canada and the Dutch Government itself. It was therefore a matter of great disappointment to Malaya that Indonesia had taken an unfriendly attitude towards the Malaysia Concept. The Tunku looking straight at Sukarno said for her survival Malaya considered that Malaysia was the answer. He had suggested Indonesia to join ASA so that ASA could be a commonwealth to help each other. Every year, heads of government could meet and exchange views while each country would remain free and independent.

At that stage, Sukarno said that he would propose to continue discussions the following day at the same time and place. The conversation was about an hour and the language used was Malay/Indonesian since there were few differences in them. The meeting was extremely cordial and the words used were most polite, appropriate, even restrained.

I thought Sukarno emphasised a great deal on the lack of proper consultations of the views of the people of the Borneo territories. It appeared to me that he had regarded the elections there with misgivings since they were held under a colonial rule. I discussed with the Tunku and suggested to him that perhaps when we resumed discussions he could suggest a referendum in

the Borneo territories. Sukarno had been given at that first session in no uncertain manner the indication that the Malaysia plan would inevitably be actualised. It would seem to me he had to find some way out whereby he could not openly oppose the formation of Malaysia. An open confrontation would be counter-productive both domestically and internationally especially investments and foreign loans. Also, I thought he would find it difficult to sever diplomatic relations with Kuala Lumpur.

The Tunku as a response thought that I could be right if Sukarno had been a free agent but the PKI influence had been very strong. The PKI had no compunction about confronting Malaya and Malaysia and Sukarno had to follow. The communists did not want investments and loans since they would contribute towards economic development which would deprive them of the ground for subversion. Anyway we, at that stage, had looked forward to the next day's meeting with the hope that something positive could come out of it.

The second session, as the previous one, was just as cordial. The Tunku was asked on the question of the population in North Borneo and Sarawak to which he replied. The Tunku also said that the Malaysia plan had envisaged an immigration control by the new states. The question of the Malaysian nationality and Malaysian citizenship in respect of Singapore also was patiently explained by the Tunku.

The Tunku sought permission to ask the President a question. Showing a great deal of magnanimity he responded positively. The question which the Tunku wanted clarification and I had known in advance was rather sensitive and I did not expect Sukarno to reply. The Tunku wanted to make a point even if Sukarno did not answer; he was in such a mood that I did not think he cared one way or another.

After seeing Sukarno's demeanour, the Tunku said that if his question was irreverent or irrelevant he would wish to stand corrected. He inquired whether it was true that Indonesia had changed her attitude towards Malaya because of Malaya's attitude towards China when China attacked India. It was Subandrio, not Sukarno, who replied that the Indonesians were a proud people and could not be influenced by anyone.

The Tunku then spoke of China's designs in Southeast Asia. Sukarno told the Tunku that when Liu was in Jakarta he had asked Liu whether China had any designs in Southeast Asia. Liu flatly denied this and Sukarno said if Liu had admitted he would have told Liu in the face that he was an imperialist. To this the Tunku said that surely Liu was not of a feeble mind as to admit that the communist movements in this region were the creatures of the China Communist Party.

Sukarno said the communist problem should be handled very carefully. In Vietnam, President Ngo could not have succeeded by his methods. The Tunku agreed with this and said that Ngo Dinh Diem had always tried to carry everything on his own shoulders. The position in Malaya was that the communists were not native-based or origin and therefore it was certain that

the loyalty of the Communist Party of Malaya was to an alien power. In Indonesia perhaps it might be different because the communists there were native-based. In any case the Malayan Government had succeeded in defeating communism and in the process of fighting them had acquired useful lessons and experiences.

I noticed that Sukarno was attentive and seemed to try to absorb what the Tunku said. Either he was extremely keen to know about what the Tunku said of communism or simply in deference he showed a demeanour different from Subandrio. I thought Subandrio was rather impatient with what the Tunku was saying as if he was disbelieving or even disrespecting. However, there was no interruption from him.

These exchanges were rich in content about communists and communism based on each other's experiences. Sukarno was with the native-based communists who were on the side of the nationalist and the religious groups against Dutch colonialism. The Tunku with the China oriented Communist Party of Malaya and his experience at the Baling Talk after which he often said that communists could not be trusted, and he could not accept that the PKI was any different.

Sukarno returned to the question of the Malaysia plan. While he appreciated the Tunku's exposé he wondered if the implementation of the plan could be postponed. If it could not be postponed then Sukarno said there was no purpose in having the tripartite summit. The Tunku said that the summit could discuss many things including problems which might arise after Malaysia. The Tunku as usual had chosen his words carefully.

Sukarno then sought assurance from the Tunku that the subject of Malaysia would be discussed at the ministerial level including opposition to the formation of Malaysia. The Tunku with a smile said of course Indonesia would be quite free to raise any matter she wished but it would be entirely up to the people of the Borneo territories, Singapore, Britain and Malaya to decide what to do after that. That seemed to close the meeting.

Immediately after the previous days' meeting. I had a thorough review of the conversation with the Tunku at the home of the Malayan Ambassador. I had suggested to the Tunku that it would be best if we drafted the communiqué and put in the ideas that would be agreeable to us. These points included that Indonesia and Malaya should always have the Treaty of Friendship as the basis of cooperation and any differences on matters directly and exclusively affecting the two countries should be settled amicably. The other point was that both sides should refrain from making public insulting remarks. Since Malaya was only reactive it would be best to refer to both sides. And finally Sukarno should not be given an opportunity to abort the proposed tripartite ministers' meeting which might lead to the summit. Macapagal should not have the impression that Malaya was

intransigent which led Sukarno to prevent the tripartite meeting, the brainchild of Macapagal.

It was then agreed that I should draft the communiqué in English but two problems arose. One, the Tunku should succeed in steering the conversation to the desired areas; (b) that Indonesia as hosts would have prepared their own communiqué which we have to defer to. Unless it was so violently outrageous, we could not demand for another draft but only to amend it.

However, the Tunku was a marvellous operator. He got all the points that we needed. And to my great joy the Indonesians on the second day had not prepared any communiqué and Subandrio seemed relieved that I had prepared one.

Both Sukarno and Subandrio went through my draft very thoroughly. Sukarno made one grammatical correction though the draft was in English. Since it was of no consequence I thanked him for correcting the document which was in a language that did not belong to either side. This delighted Sukarno, and Subandrio made slight modifications in two places which also were agreeable. The Tunku feigned a serious study of the draft which he had approved the previous night and made no comments. He stood up and asked to be excused to visit the rest room where he said he could be free from me to hold his own! Subandrio then also left for another room which served as the Indonesian Secretariat to have a communiqué freshly typewritten to be distributed to the press which was outside on the lawn in the hundreds with their pads and cameras.

I was then left alone with Sukarno. Since it was not part of the meeting any longer, I thought I could ask something that had bothered me a long time. I asked for permission to ask him a question. He was most charming and welcomed the idea. I was one of those who had admired all the Indonesian freedom fighters and Sukarno was certainly one of them even though some of my friends among the political refugees had very nasty things to say about the man.

The question I put to him was that I had heard from a very credible source and confirmed by a few equally credible people that soon after the Bandung Conference and after communist China having learnt of the apprehensions of the native Indonesians towards the Chinese Indonesians whose loyalty was suspect, China had struck an understanding with Sukarno that China's sphere of hegemony would include all the mainland of East Asia including Singapore and Malaya but not the islands which meant Indonesia, the British Borneo territories and the Philippines. I had seen a Chinese map which drew the line of China's area cutting some parts of the mountainous region of India, and to include Burma and an area in the China Sea not very far from the coast of Sarawak. This division of East Asia as China's realm of hegemony and influence and the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines as lying outside it had, I was told, given comfort to Sukarno. My question to Sukarno was that why was he so ready to abandon the natives of Malaya, South Thailand and

Singapore many of whom were the kith and kin of the Indonesian people belonging to the same ethnic cluster without finding a solution that would satisfy everyone. Sukarno in attempting to reply, addressed me in an endearing term and said, if I was that frightened of the Chinese why not migrate to Indonesia. I told him I could migrate anywhere to be safe, England, America, India but I was not thinking of myself. Thousands of Malays and other indigenous peoples were going to be overwhelmed and treated as minorities in their own homeland. He cut short the conversation by saying that he and I should discuss the matter further on another occasion.

That shook me and from that day, the esteem I had withered away and even after the end of the confrontation when Razak called on him in Jakarta, I had refused to see the man who had disappointed me so much. I had expected him to address the question but not to avoid it. I then understood the meaning of his meeting with Dr. Burhanuddin Helmy and Ibrahim Yaacob almost at the end of the Pacific War on his way back from Saigon after meeting Terauchi when Sukarno told the Malay nationalist leaders that Malaya was not going to be a part of the Indonesian armed struggle against the Allied Forces. Malaya had to fend for herself to achieve independence.

Just then the Tunku came in and Sukarno was all smiles again. He told the Tunku about his visit to the Indonesian side of the Timor Island. He said he was at a place about ten miles from the border of Portuguese Timor and the people from the Portuguese side came by the thousands to hear him speak. He told the Tunku that the Portuguese colonial government was extremely backward and cruel. They treated ordinary prisoners in Portuguese Timor like slaves. I wondered if the Portuguese Timorese had understood him since they could not have learnt the Indonesian language or Malay.

The Tunku spoke on the subject of golf which was a part of Malaysia Plan diplomacy. After a while he recommended to Sukarno that golf might be good for him as a form of exercise and relaxation. Sukarno said he could never play golf in Indonesia because thousands and thousands of people would throng around the golf course to watch him play!

These bits of conversation gave the insight that Sukarno was obsessed by monumentalism.

Subandrio came in with sheets of the communiqué. I was careful to read it again lest some words or phrases might inadvertently or otherwise be changed. It was as drafted and an Indonesian official distributed the communiqué to the press with the Indonesian Government letterhead. This must be very flattering to the Indonesian side.

The leaders had their photographs taken first in the room then on the lawn. While Sukarno was beaming with smiles and exuding charm to all the press men and women with his marshall's baton under his armpit, the Tunku looked glum and was not at all talkative when asked by the press. There must have been about a hundred press men and women of all nationalities. Prominently seen amongst them were from Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore and

the Philippines. There were a number of Japanese, Americans, Australians, British and some from the wire services.

A young American lady photographer kept asking the Tunku and Sukarno to pose together for a picture in animated discussion. Both leaders bowed to the demands of the press but the Tunku was not smiling. That would not make a good picture after the communiqué had strongly suggested happier tidings. This young lady kept on urging the Tunku to smile while Sukarno was beaming from ear to ear. When the Tunku did not change his expression the young lady egged on the Tunku to say "cheese" but to no avail. A flock of photographers were focusing their lenses on the two leaders and anxiously waiting to snap a happy picture.

This young lady was very persistent and begged the Tunku to say something in Malay or the Indonesian language. The Tunku, I noticed, stared at the young lady then looked at Sukarno and turned to the photographers and said in a clear voice in Malay a four letter word, the nomenclature of the female part of the anatomy which was the same Malay word in Singapore, Indonesia and in Tagalog and some other Philippine dialects. There was a roar of laughter since most of the photographers came from the Malay archipelago and the Tunku joined in the laughter. Click, click, click with flashes and a happy picture was the result much to the satisfaction of the young lady who was so persuasive. I saw the young lady later approached the Tunku and asked him why he had refused to say "cheese" until she had asked him to say something like "cheese" in Malay. She asked him what was the Malay word he used. The Tunku responded in the hearing of many in that Ohira lawn that the word he said was something which sometimes smelt like cheese! There was another roar of laughter.

When I got him alone in the car after leaving the meeting, I asked him what made him say something so outrageous like that when all the wire services would be recording the story. He said when he looked at the young lady and then at Sukarno that word came to his mind. He simply could not resist saying it out aloud. In any case he did not think the wire services would care for such a story. I said God forbid. I was told later the story circulated the globe but never got published, much to my relief. That was the Tunku in his mischievous mood amidst the seriousness of affairs of state.

I had through the Malayan Ambassador kept Razak informed of the progress of the meeting. When I found that Sukarno had agreed with my draft communiqué I thought we had protected our position and therefore in my view we had achieved the minimum. That was at last a limited success. The Tunku had manoeuvred Sukarno to cease the propaganda war, to support the tripartite ministers meeting leading to a summit. With regard to the request of Sukarno to include the discussion on Malaysia at ministerial level, no doubt with a view to abort or postpone the implementation of the plan, the Tunku had agreed and had given notice that it was entirely up to the parties

concerned to decide on their own fate. These agreements through the communiqué had been made public.

Razak and the Malayan Foreign Ministry were jubilant I was told on receiving the news of the ending of the meeting. Only the Tunku was full of foreboding and he did not believe that Sukarno would keep his words after his return to his capital when the PKI would start changing things. I told the Tunku that even if Sukarno could not keep to his side of the bargain in particular the war of words at least now in the eyes of our people and friends, Macapagal and the world, any aberration would have to come from Sukarno. To that extent I thought we had gained something in the international psywar.

Sukarno had been told how determined Malaya was to implement the Malaysia plan if it was accepted by those concerned in the plan notwithstanding any objection from outside quarters. I was not so sanguine as to think that Sukarno had by this meeting withdrawn his objection. On the contrary, Sukarno and Subandrio would have believed that they had achieved victory in getting the Tunku to agree that the tripartite ministers could discuss the Malaysia plan. Surely in their view it was a step towards internationalising the subject particularly if Manila could support Jakarta.

I had already worked it out in my mind that if I was Subandrio this would have been my minimum position. With Manila's support, Subandrio would certainly try to get the United Nations involved. From that moment onwards, the Malaysia plan Task Force was geared towards preparing for the role of the UN which might come from the tripartite ministers' meeting or the summit.

We decided to return to Kuala Lumpur soon after that meeting and took a Japan Airlines flight via Bangkok. I sat in the aisle seat next to the Tunku and the take-off was prompt and smooth. When we reached a certain height we saw Mount Fuji. The PA system crackled and we heard the captain telling us that Mount Fuji was in sight. Legend had it that if a visitor was leaving Japan and saw Mount Fuji, whose crown was often hidden in clouds, the person would return to visit Japan again. That was it. After a few minutes I noticed Mount Fuji again and then disappeared. Again it appeared and disappeared and again and again. I became curious. As a steward passed by I tapped on his shoulder and asked him why I had to see Mount Fuji so many times even if the Japanese Tourist Board had obtained the cooperation of JAL. The man laughed and whispered not to tell the others in the cabin that there was a minor technical problem and the plane had to return to Tokyo for repair. To do that they had to jettison fuel into the bay since they could not land with full load and full tank.

The Tunku kept nudging me as to what I was talking about with the steward since we were in whispers. I had the dilemma of whether I should tell the Tunku or not. I decided to tell him. As soon as I did that, as swift as a lightning, he had taken out from his pocket a miniature Koran and begun to read certain prayers. I had never seen the Tunku in such a situation despite my assurances that the problem was minor. He reminded me only a few days' before that Loke Wan Tho had died in a plane crash in Taiwan. He refused his

drinks which I thought was a strong signal of his anxiety! We landed back in Tokyo and after three hours took off again. This time there was no Mount Fuji since the cloud had enveloped it but we had enough of it that morning to last us a lifetime. Just before landing the normal announcement by the staff came through the PA system ending with the stereotype assurance but rather mispronounced by the Japanese who did not have an "L" in their tongue that JAL hoped we had enjoyed our "fright". The Tunku pinched my shoulder and we both had to control our laughter as I knew how frightened the Tunku was!

On arriving at the Bangkok airport, we were ushered into the salon d'honneur where the Thai premier Thanat Khoman and other Thai dignitaries were waiting for him. To the Thais, the Tunku was their favourite, perhaps because the Tunku's mother was Thai and he had part of his education in Thailand. Amongst them were Ambassadors from the Commonwealth as the Tunku was also a favourite figure in that association. I saw framed on the wall the advertisements of the various airlines. One caught my attention which was rather attractive I thought. It was a man with a turban and a pointed well-greased moustache bending in a traditional salutation with the slogan "Fly Air India, you will be treated like a Maharajah". I could not resist telling the Indian Ambassador whose name I have forgotten that Air India should remove that poster. I said I had lived in India and I knew how they treated their Maharajahs. The Ambassador was a man of good humor and he laughed with me most heartily since that was the first time he said he saw the poster. I was informed later that while the man with the moustache continued with his *namaste* there was no more promise of a treatment like a Maharajah in Air India.

The Tunku, in his minutes of anxiety having to circle the Tokyo Bay even if he was given the opportunity to view Mount Fuji many times alluded to the death of Loke Wan Tho, the Singapore magnate and a leading figure in the film industry. That year the Asian Film Festival was held in Taipei. I was for sometime a member of the panel of jurors and was invited to Taipei to judge the entries at that festival. I had prepared to go and in fact had arranged with Loke Wan Tho to visit the historic and scenic places outside Taipei. I even had my ticket to fly with him when Sukarno extended his invitation to meet with the Tunku in Tokyo.

A member of the jury to adjudge the merits of films had to undertake a very laborious and time-consuming work involving hundreds of hours and thousand and thousand feet of films. But it had its compensations. Therefore it was with some reluctance that I had to change my plan. In Tokyo we were put up at the Palace Hotel. It was late one night when I received a telephone message from an old friend of mine by the name of Jimmy Wei a senior government official of Taiwan that Loke Wan Tho had died in a plane crash. I had been scheduled to have flown with him. I had Sukarno to thank for my life.

The Tokyo communiqué issued by Sukarno and the Tunku by all appearances had their differences resolved at the house of Ohira. Sukarno

appeared to have made a genuine effort to understand the Malaysia plan and to have appreciated the depth of determination of the Malayan Prime Minister. I recalled a moment when I thought that things might go awry during the Tokyo meeting when Sukarno asked, if at the ministerial meeting or the summit, Philippines and Indonesia were to object to the formation of Malaysia, what would the Tunku do. In a very clear voice firmly spoken, he said that he had only one recourse and that was to refer the views of the Philippines and Indonesia to the people of Malaya through their elected representatives in Parliament and he would be guided by their decision. However, the matter rested there since Sukarno and Subandrio made no response.

* * *

That was the backdrop of the tripartite ministerial meeting which began on June 7, 1963. As agreed in the meeting of the three Under-Secretaries, each government had submitted in advance a memorandum stating its viewpoints on matters that it might wish to raise.

The Indonesian memorandum emphasised the struggle for independence of Indonesia and this struggle against colonialism and imperialism continued even after achieving her independence. Colonialism and imperialism manifested themselves in economic, political and military fields. Indonesia, while emphasising her national identity, would reject any ideological intrusion from outside particularly if it contradicted Indonesian culture and ideals. Indonesia was aware that nations might have the same objective, need not necessarily follow the same procedure for achieving it. In international relations, Indonesia sought the friendship of all nations irrespective of its social system so long as that offer of friendship was reciprocated.

The memorandum stressed on the nurturing of the best of relations with immediate neighbours. However, any development which might cause concern to one neighbour deserved to be discussed between them and a conflict should not arise because of misunderstanding, misinformation or misinterpretation.

Indonesia considered the security of Southeast Asia as the responsibility of the countries concerned namely, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia with the eventual addition of Australia and New Zealand. The memorandum called for greater understanding among those countries without interfering into each other's domestic affairs. In this context any change in the status quo from one of dependency to another status should be fully understood not only by the people concerned, but also by all the neighbouring countries. Therefore, there should be discussions and consultations between neighbours and any one member must not ignore the concern expressed by the others.

The Philippines memorandum gave importance to the question of security although it conceded that security would not be achieved without stability. The Philippines realised that a problem in any one of the neighbours would invariably affect her as well. Thus, this required as a

solution a joint effort of the nations concerned free from foreign interferences. The Philippines believed in a more effective arrangement to further economic development and social progress and such an arrangement should ensure security and stability in the area, particularly in respect of dependent peoples whose rights and aspirations should be determined through the United Nations Organisation. The Philippines would be prepared to submit concrete proposals which could assure respect for a freely expressed will of the people concerned and thereby contribute to the development of a new sense of unity in the region.

The Malayan memorandum pointed out that the two main problems germane to the questions of peace, security and stability in Malaya were communism and poverty. It stated that through methods well tested and experiences accumulated over a period of fifteen years the Malayan Government had successfully thwarted the communist designs and their methods in Malaya which included subversion and armed insurgency. Malaya warned that so long as communism was allowed to establish a firm base in any of the territories in Southeast Asia, so long would it pose a serious threat to the security of each individual country in the region and the security of the region as a whole.

Surveying the state of the communist movements in the region, the Malayan memorandum pointed out that communism had firmly taken root among the indigenous people of Indonesia and had been enjoying the prestige of being officially recognised as the integral part of the Indonesian revolution. While it had to be admitted that communist groups had participated in the anti-colonial struggle, they had an agenda of their own and the official recognition, not surprisingly, gave the illusion that a communist movement was a genuine nationalist movement. Such a situation in Indonesia could adversely affect both Indonesia and Malaya.

If the yearning of the people for higher living standards were not met with, it could lead to an erosion of popular will to resist foreign ideologies which meant facilitating the growth of communism. It was the moral responsibility of a government to provide the basic economic and social needs of the people and the fight against poverty was a priority among nations which have just achieved independence.

The Malayan memorandum stressed the awareness of the Malayan Government of the need to create conditions of stability and well-being for peaceful and friendly relations among nations in general and those in Southeast Asia in particular. However, the pre-requisite for increasing tripartite cooperation was the establishment of a climate of confidence among the peoples of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. Thus, the first commandment for the promotion of intra-regional confidence was respect for and recognition of the national sovereignty of the independent countries of the region. The memorandum concluded that there was widespread potential for the three countries to work together for this common benefit and if these

potentials were tapped, the people of the entire Southeast Asian region could look forward to an era of peace and stability.

The Malayan Foreign Office had managed to get in advance the copies of the Manila and Jakarta memoranda. There was therefore an opportunity for the Malaysia Task Force to study them before Razak left for Manila. I would like to place on record the names of those who accompanied Razak as his advisers; I was included, being the Project Officer for the Malaysia plan:

- (i) Zaiton Ibrahim bin Ahmad – Malayan Ambassador in Manila;
- (ii) Raja Mohar Badiozaman – Economic Adviser;
- (iii) Zainal Abidin Sulong – Foreign Ministry, Leader of Malaysia Plan Task Force;
- (iv) Zakaria Mohamed Ali – Foreign Ministry;
- (v) Hashim Sam Abdul Latiff – Treasury;
- (vi) Jack de Silva – Task Force member, Foreign Ministry;
- (vii) Ahmad Nordin – Foreign Ministry, Information Officer;
- (viii) Hamzah Majeed – Foreign Ministry;
- (ix) Abdul Aziz Hussein – Special Assistant to Razak.

The Indonesian side was led by Foreign Minister Subandrio assisted by the Deputy Minister Suwito. The Indonesian delegation included:

- (i) Nazir Pamontjak – Ambassador in Manila;
- (ii) Djatikusumo – Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur;
- (iii) Brig. General Wiluyo Puspojudo – Fourth Deputy Chairman, People's Congress;
- (iv) Imam Sukarto – Foreign Ministry;
- (v) Col. Otto Abdulrachman – Armed Forces;
- (vi) Faris Harsono – Information, Foreign Office;
- (vii) Thaib Napis – Legal Directorate, Foreign Office;
- (viii) Haditirto – Trade Department;
- (ix) Hardojo – Embassy, Manila.

The Philippines team was led by the Vice President who was currently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Emmanuel Pelaez. He was assisted by Salvador P. Lopez the Under-Secretary. Other members were:

- (i) Narciso Reyes – Ambassador in Jakarta;
- (ii) Yusup Abu Bakar – Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur;
- (iii) Librado Cayco – Special Assistant to the President;
- (iv) Juan Dionisio – Consul-General in Singapore;
- (v) Benito Bautista – Foreign Office;
- (vi) Luis Maghanna – Foreign Office;
- (vii) Earnesto Pineda – Foreign Office;

- (viii) Ms. Felicidad Gonzales – Foreign Office;
- (ix) Rolando Garcia – Foreign Office;
- (x) Thomas Padilla – Foreign Office.

In his opening address, Palaez pointed out that the Conference was a significant step towards the greater cooperation of the three participating nations, to foster closer understanding and to cooperate effectively in securing a lasting peace in Southeast Asia. He urged the delegates to face squarely the central problems of the area namely the problems of security. Malaysia had been proposed as a solution to the problem of security of Southeast Asia. While reservations and misgivings expressed by the Philippines had been well-known, Palaez stated that his country was prepared to consider the proposal anew in the light of the recent developments. The Philippines was also prepared to submit to the Conference details of Macapagal's proposal for a Southeast Asia Confederation comprising Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo.

With regard to the Philippines claim to North Borneo, he reiterated that the Philippines had repeatedly declared that the claim would continue to be pursued by every peaceful means. Manila was convinced that the claim could be most justly and expeditiously settled within the framework of a Malay confederation.

Razak in his opening remark said that the Conference was a momentous occasion in the history of Southeast Asia. He was confident that with goodwill, sincerity of purpose and courage the leaders of the three countries echoing the spirit of oneness of the Malay peoples they should be able to overcome all problems and difficulties.

Referring to the Tunku-Sukarno meeting in Tokyo, Razak said the meeting had cleared the way for the realisation of the Foreign Ministers' meeting. It was his belief, said Razak, that the Conference offered an exceptional opportunity to find ways and means of achieving effective cooperation among the three countries. The stakes were high because the leaders of the three countries depended on the security, peace, stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia. Razak pledged that Malaya would render all cooperation necessary to remove any barrier that might have stood in the way of bringing the three countries closer.

Meanwhile, it had come to our knowledge that the Philippines and Indonesian delegations would raise the question of self-determination in the Borneo territories at the Conference. It was also revealed that the two governments would want some kind of plebiscite or referendum to be held in the territories of North Borneo and Sarawak.

At an inhouse meeting, it was decided that Malaya should not initially agree to the idea of referendum or plebiscite. It was also agreed that should the question crop up, Razak was to inform the two ministers that the Malayan Government was fully satisfied that the wishes of the people of the two British

territories had been adequately expressed in favour of Malaysia. If, however, the Philippines or Indonesia were adamant, then Razak was to say that Malaya would be prepared to agree to an independent person, for example, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to ascertain after Malaysia had been established whether what Malaya had believed had been correct or otherwise. And if the independent observers were to find that there was a reasonable doubt as to the popular support for Malaysia and recommended that a referendum or plebiscite should be held, the Malayan Government would bind itself to agree to such a recommendation.

We had shot a telegram off to the Tunku about our line of action and he had promptly responded agreeing to it. We had recommended the bare line because we had also received information that Pelaez had on 25 April met in New York Roger Hailsman, the United States Assistant Secretary of State, who was requested by Pelaez that the US should not make anymore policy statements on Malaysia lest it would cause difficulties at the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting. Pelaez had in mind a plebiscite within five years after Malaysia Day on the West New Guinea formula as a possible means of meeting opposition from Indonesia. The US was requested to keep an open mind in case the question of the plebiscite had to be put.

By the time we reached Manila, the Malayan delegation already knew that the US policy was simply to welcome any decision agreed to by the three ministers. The US was confident that a plebiscite would be in favour of Malaysia but the US Government itself quite correctly would not make that suggestion.

Pelaez was doing his best to make the meeting a success and we surmised that he would have agreed to our bottom line and would persuade the Indonesians to accept it. On our side, we could only agree to bind ourselves to such an exercise as referendum or plebiscite only after Malaysia had been formed and not earlier since the territories were British and the Malayan Government had already been satisfied as to the wishes of the people.

The Tripartite meeting was a journey in self-discovery. The speeches highlighted the historic importance of the event which would forge a common future together. What soon appeared to be different was the emphasis on the problems.

Subandrio's theme was a defence of Jakarta's policies. He stressed that Indonesia's quest had been to rediscover and re-establish her national identity which had been distorted by centuries of colonial rule. While recognising the significance of material development of a country, he laboured with the point that development in the context of Indonesia would take a secondary role to the primary objective of establishing a national identity. He emphasised on the non-conventional methods adopted to achieve that objective and he sought the understanding of the other two ministers and indeed the rest of the world. He admitted that those non-conventional methods had necessarily caused and even provoked concern. Indonesia was in the process of returning to the roots

of her culture. Subandrio pointed out that in order to defend her independence, Indonesia had diverted a great deal of her resources towards defence.

The Malayan delegation could easily discern from Subandrio's statement on the so-called non-conventional methods for re-establishing a national identity without providing for economic welfare of the people was a disguised preparation for the creating of a situation conducive to the growth of communism. If Subandrio was not a party to such a design, he was a brilliant apologist for the dangerous situation which he admitted was causing concern to Indonesia's neighbours. He was pleading for an understanding without a rationalised explanation.

Turning to the question of the Malaysia plan, Subandrio declared that however distasteful the problem was to Indonesia, he agreed that efforts must be made to solve the problem. He offered no solution but would be receptive to the viewpoints of others. At that stage, we noticed the Indonesians had swallowed the Phillipine line, hook and sinker. Both Pelaez and Subandrio made references to the Malaysia issue with the emphasis that it was the most acute problem affecting Southeast Asia. Malaysia plan, as expected, would become the central issue in the negotiations. Other issues such as economic cooperation were a mere hogwash to be relegated to be mere events.

Pelaez wanted more than anything else a face-saving device so that the Philippines could withdraw her opposition to the formation of Malaysia. He thought that could be achieved by a general endorsement of the idea of a Malay Confederation with the hope that the spirit of Malayness would extricate everyone out of the quagmire. Pelaez kept on emphasising the need for a referendum in North Borneo, consistent with the principle of self-determination which he thought if agreed to, would free Manila from the shackle of the claim.

Razak managed to steer the meeting to address itself on the ways and means of achieving closer cooperation among the three countries. To this end, the three ministers agreed to the establishment of a consultative machinery at the level of the Summit, Foreign Ministers and senior officials which would discuss matters of common concern such as security, economic and cultural cooperation.

However, Subandrio would not be detracted from his pet hate – Malaysia plan. He raised the matter with a suggestion that the implementation of the Malaysia plan should be deferred for a period of six months to enable an independent observer – the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative, to ascertain the wishes of the people regarding their support or otherwise for the Malaysia plan. If this was done, Indonesia according to Subandrio, would give full support to Malaysia.

Razak rejected Subandrio's proposal by saying that Malaya was already satisfied regarding the wishes of the people. Subandrio insisted on the independent inquiry be done before Malaysia Day in order to give the

appearance that the people in the Borneo territories accepted Malaysia on their own volition and free will. Subandrio was also willing to leave the choice of an observer to Malaya and he was willing to accept Narasimhan, the UN Chef du Cabinet, as the observer. If this were to be carried out before Malaysia Day, Subandrio said both Indonesia and the Philippines would welcome the Malaysia plan. At that juncture perhaps not wanting to be left out, Pelaez maintained that the Philippines would still want the claim to be considered after Malaysia Day.

The Malayan delegation after the day's session, went into a huddle. It concluded that the idea of the independent observer could be accepted because everyone was certain that he would give the right answers. If we could agree on that we could quickly conclude the meeting with a complete agreement on all matters. The delegation thought that before Malaya presented its stand, a consultation with the Tunku would be helpful. A coded telegram was sent to the Tunku who responded by telephone agreeing to our line of action. He spoke with Razak who was told to agree with the proposal of appointing an independent observer to ascertain the wishes of the people of the Borneo territories before Malaysia Day provided the British Government would agree.

The Tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers was concluded on the eleventh of June after Razak made his presentation and agreement regarding the appointment of an observer provided that the British Government, which was responsible for North Borneo and Sarawak, did not object to such an exercise before the formation of Malaysia. It fell on the Malayan Government to seek the agreement from the British Government with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary steps in order to ascertain the wishes of North Borneo and Sarawak.

I thought Indonesia and the Philippines had appeared genuinely desirous to drop their objections to the formation of Malaysia after Malaya had given the undertaking.

However, after all that, the Philippines wanted more than an assurance that the claim would be raised after Malaysia Day which the Malayan delegation had given its agreement. The Philippines declared her new position that her attitude towards Malaysia which then meant to drop the objection or otherwise would be contingent upon the final outcome of its claim. Razak asked me what I thought. I was quite annoyed with this kind of escalating game that was being played. Unreservedly, I told Razak that the Philippines was being bloody-minded and we should agree to no more than such form of words that the inclusion of North Borneo in Malaysia would not prejudice the claim. In this regard, the Malayan delegation agreed that the three ministers would exert their best endeavours to bring the claim to a just solution by peaceful means in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the Bandung Declaration. After the points had been agreed, I intervened by saying that considering the importance of the issues it was imperative that the Tripartite Summit should be convened as quickly as possible.

The Macapagal plan also became a subject for discussion. The plan envisaged the grouping of the three Malay nations working together in close harmony without surrendering any portion of sovereignty. There would be regular consultations held at the levels of the Summit, ministerial and senior officials to deal with matters of mutual interest and common concern consistent with the national, regional and international responsibilities or obligations of each country without prejudice to its sovereignty. This rather convoluted phrase was to take care of treaty obligations which each country had with others. To give effect to this decision the meeting also agreed that each of the three governments would establish its own secretariat pending the setting up of a central secretariat which would coordinate and cooperate with each other in the fulfilment of their agreed tasks. Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers should meet once a year.

I had my reservation regarding this idea since it smelt too much of a racial or ethnic conglomerate which would go against the concept of a true regional cooperation. I expressed my candid views to Razak and reported to the Tunku that the Malayan Government had its own communal problems and therefore the matter should be treated with caution without giving such an impression to the Philippines or Indonesia. I did not think that it would be desirable for Malaya to be entangled with such an arrangement without adequate preparation domestically.

* * *

It would be pertinent to put the exact words of the Ministers' agreement on the most important subject of Malaysia. It was referred to in two important paragraphs:

Paragraph Ten: The Ministers reaffirmed their countries adherence to the principle of self-determination for the peoples of non-selfgoverning territories. In this context Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative.

Paragraph Eleven: The Federation of Malaya expressed appreciation for this attitude of Indonesia and the Philippines and undertook to consult the British Government and the governments of the Borneo territories with the view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary steps in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of those countries.

Immediately, the Malayan Permanent Representative at the United Nations in New York was alerted regarding paragraphs ten and eleven. Narasimhan was contacted by Ramani, the Deputy Head of the Permanent Representative. Narasimhan, in response, said he had first to contact London, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and Manila to determine if it was the wish of the governments concerned that he should undertake this independent assessment

of the wishes of the people. Narasimhan would not go to the governments of the Borneo territories. Only after contacting those governments concerned would he report to the Secretary-General. Once this process had been completed, the Secretary-General would despatch his representative to ascertain the wishes of the Borneo people.

U Thant then met all the three Permanent Representatives in New York informing them that Narasimhan would be in Manila when the Heads of Governments meeting convened although it was made clear that Narasimhan would not participate in the meeting, neither would he be an observer. U Thant would ascertain what precisely was expected of the United Nations' representative and he would also advise the Heads of Government on what the representative could achieve.

According to U Thant after the Summit, Narasimhan would go to the Borneo territories and then would report back to him. The three governments agreed to the proposed procedures.

The Tunku decided to brief U Thant in a telegram on the latest development following the Tripartite Ministers' Meeting. He also requested the Secretary-General to appoint Narasimhan as his representative to ascertain the wishes of the Borneo peoples since Narasimhan was no stranger to the Borneo territories. The Tunku said that according to his information both Jakarta and Manila would not object to Narasimhan.

In the meantime, I had instructed the Malayan High Commissioner in London to convey to the British Government paragraphs ten and eleven of the Manila ministerial communiqué and at the same time to discreetly seek the view of the British Government and the governments of both the Borneo territories regarding the role of the Secretary-General or his representative. If the British Government agreed to the proposals, it would be formally approached by the Malayan Government requesting the British Government to invite U Thant to implement the agreement.

I had pointed out to the Tunku, Razak and Malayan representatives in London and New York that the United Nations was not in any way involved in the arrangements for finding out the will of the Borneo peoples. The request to involve the Secretary-General U Thant or his representative was a device so that the Philippines and Indonesia would no longer oppose the Malaysia plan.

However, some unseen hands were working at another level to frustrate the Malaysia plan. The Committee of Twenty-Four, the Decolonisation Committee of UN had other ideas. The Committee felt that it had been bypassed and the Manila decision had incurred its displeasure. Pressure was mounting on the Committee to place a Borneo territories hearing on the agenda which would entitle the Committee to invite petitioners. In that case the British and may be our representative as well in the UN would be lined up against the petitioners and that would not only be an unnecessary procedure for us but would truly internationalise the Malaysia plan. With the help of friendly powers in the UN in particular Australia, the subject of the Borneo

territories was not placed on the agenda of the Committee of Twenty-Four. The news from New York was received in Kuala Lumpur with relief.

The Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, Djatikusumo had called on the Tunku informing the Prime Minister that Indonesia would welcome and support Malaysia if the promise as agreed to by the Foreign Ministers in Manila was fulfilled. He had been instructed by Sukarno himself that his main task in Kuala Lumpur was to support the Tunku. Djatikusumo was not only a general in the Army; he had been a minister in Sukarno's cabinet – a trusted President's man. The Tunku thanked him, Sukarno and the concern of the Indonesian Government. The cooperation with Indonesia had always been regarded as a matter of paramount importance.

I was present at that meeting and the Tunku was oozing with charm and soon Djatikusumo was at ease and spoke a great deal. The meeting was at the Residency with tea, cookies and sandwiches amply served. For some reason the Ambassador said that in Europe they were working towards a Common Market and there was no reason why with the "potentialities" (his word) in this region, similar arrangements should not be made. The Tunku seized the opportunity to press his point on a subject which was close to his heart then. It was precisely for that reason, the Tunku said in a tone full of enthusiasm, that he had proposed ASA which had come into being with only three members. His disappointment was that Indonesia had found it unable to join even though the idea was first mooted to him by the Indonesian Charge d'affairs in Manila. Djatikusumo with an embarrassed smile said that after the problems of West New Guinea and Malaysia plan had been resolved, it would be possible for Indonesia to reconsider the question of ASA.

Something inside me believed that not only Djatikusumo but all Indonesian, except the PKI, would share the Ambassador's view. (This stuck in my mind and during the painful period of confrontation I continued to toy with the idea that with its end and the demise of PKI it would be possible to revive the question of regional cooperation with Indonesia. That was the seed which germinated and blossomed into ASEAN.)

The Tunku then was in good heart and a happy state of mind. U Thant had, in reply to his message, written that Narasimhan would be nominated as his representative provided there was no objection from any quarter. The Committee of Twenty-Four had been won over and Djatikusumo had brought Sukarno's tidings. The whole thing now hinged on Narasimhan who knew Malaya and the Borneo territories well. He had been heard to say that if an election was held and conducted fairly, the results would indicate an overwhelming support for the Malaysia plan.

The elections in Sarawak held in June 1963 had shown beyond any doubt that the people had supported the Malaysia plan. Four major groups had contested the elections, namely the Alliance, the pro-Malaysia PANAS, the anti-Malaysia plan SUPP and a group of independents who were pro-Malaysia but

did not wish to be identified with any political parties. The SUPP victories were in the urban districts where the voters were mostly of Chinese origin.

It was Narasimhan who broke the shattering news to Malaya, through Ramani (our UN representative), that Jakarta appeared to have second thoughts regarding U Thant's role. This was perhaps Jakarta had become unhappy with U Thant's choice of Narasimhan as his representative but they were reluctant to say so openly. Jakarta suspected that Narasimhan would not be impartial.

However, Jakarta were eventually persuaded to accept the fact that Narasimhan's presence in Manila at the proposed Tripartite Summit was merely to ensure that the Heads of Governments would not decide on a task for U Thant which the Secretary-General could not properly undertake. The choice for U Thant was rather limited since Narasimhan alone could claim to know and understand the mind of the Secretary-General. Jakarta also had been told that it did not necessarily follow that after Narasimhan had reported on the Summit, U Thant should choose Narasimhan to represent the Secretary-General in determining the wishes of the people in North Borneo and Sarawak.

Having heard this latest setback from Jakarta, the Tunku told me he had expected something like that to happen despite the Tokyo communiqué. There would be more conditionalities and impediments until Malaysia plan had been frustrated. He then asked me to send a message in his name to U Thant, through Ramani, expressing his apprehension about Sukarno's attitude; Narasimhan's presence in Manila during the Summit might be distorted as an attempt to impose the services of Narasimhan on Indonesia and the Philippines. It was a big hint that it was better if Narasimhan did not go to Manila during the Tripartite Summit.

On receiving the message, Narasimhan told Ramani that he concurred with the Tunku and had advised U Thant accordingly. However, the proposal that Narasimhan be present at the Summit had been sent to Manila and Jakarta and should they agree officially, then Narasimhan would have to go to Manila.

With regard to the proposed fact finding mission to North Borneo and Sarawak, Narasimhan thought that the Secretary-General could nominate anyone and his task would be comparatively simple because what was needed were meetings with political and community leaders and to ascertain whether the elections held were properly and lawfully conducted without force or coercion.

Narasimhan volunteered a message to the Tunku through Ramani regarding Brunei. He thought under the circumstances it would be impossible for anyone to assert that the people of Brunei were in favour of the Malaysia plan. Anyone who claimed that the people supported the Malaysia plan would be stretching his neck a bit too far and this should be borne in mind at the proposed Summit in Manila.

U Thant, having agreed with the Tunku not to send Narasimhan to Manila, proposed that the Technical Assistance Board resident representative in Manila, MacKenzie, a Canadian national, should be available if necessary for consultation and for transmitting messages to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General requested that MacKenzie should be accorded the rank equal to Lopez, Suwito and I so that for specific functions MacKenzie would be able to obtain easy access to the meeting for purposes of consultations. The Tunku promptly replied, agreeing to the proposals made by U Thant.

It may be recalled that in so far as the people of Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak were concerned, the successful Lansdowne negotiations and the Singapore Referendum were all that mattered and there was concern in those territories regarding the Malaysia plan that its implementation would be delayed by outside interferences. Both the British and the Malayan Governments too were equally anxious that Singapore should be quickly merged in Malaysia to obviate any possibility that the communists and their cohorts would be taking power after the Singapore Constitution had been revised. That revision would be taking place quite soon. The British Government and the Malayan Government were satisfied that the people of North Borneo and Sarawak had made their wishes clearly known as well as the people of Singapore regarding the Malaysia plan.

On July 8, 1963, the Malaysia Agreement was signed in London which would bring Malaysia into existence by August 31, 1963 on the basis of what had been agreed between Malaya and Singapore and Malaya and the Borneo territories.

This event detonated the fury of Sukarno and the mass media of Jakarta. Offence was taken to the fact that Malaya and Britain had agreed that Malaysia would come into existence even before U Thant had carried out his task of ascertaining the views of the Borneo people.

The Tunku was accused by the Jakarta mass media as having unscrupulously brushed aside the ministerial agreement reached in Manila even before the ink on which it was written had dried. What guarantee was there that the Tunku would honour any agreement that might be achieved at the coming Summit. They also objected to the point in the Malaysia Agreement which referred to Malaysia affording to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia. This was interpreted as harbouring ulterior motives towards Indonesia. Since this was regarded as a threat to the security of Indonesia, there was no choice but that Malaysia had to be opposed. The Anglo-Malaya defence arrangement was also regarded by Jakarta as contravening the Ministerial agreement in Manila.

While still in London after signing the Malaysia agreement, the Tunku was asked to comment on the strong Indonesian reaction to the Agreement. His reply was that the President would not reject the Malaysian plan because this would be a great disadvantage to Indonesia's economy because of her

large trade dealings with Singapore, Malaya and the Borneo territories. The Tunku also stated that the agreement reached in Manila by the Tripartite Foreign Ministers did not imply a United Nations plebiscite but rather an individual assessment by a United Nations official.

Subandrio called the Malayan and the Philippines Ambassadors in Jakarta and informed them that the atmosphere should not be polluted by statements on issues which should be thrashed out at the Summit itself. However, within a few hours, Sukarno fired his salvo against the Tunku when the President was addressing a meeting of the Indonesian Catholic Party. He accused the Tunku of breaking his promise supposedly made at the Tokyo Summit by signing the Agreement establishing Malaysia. Sukarno declared to the world that the Tunku was a man who did not keep his word. Indonesia not only did not agree with Malaysia but would oppose it at all cost.

Within hours, another Sukarno outburst was heard in a speech to graduate officers of the East Java War College when he announced the renewal of Indonesia's confrontation policy since Malaysia was against the Indonesian ideals, the revolution and the state.

The Tunku retorted in London that at the Tokyo Summit he had made it clear that Malaysia would be established as scheduled though Malaya would not object to Malaysia being discussed at the Tripartite Summit.

The Indonesian Ambassador in London, an old friend of mine by the name of Diah, was summoned by the Tunku to his suite at the Ritz. He wanted to clear the air after Sukarno's latest outbursts. I sat together with the Tunku. Also present was the Deputy High Commissioner, Tunku Jaafar.

The Tunku expressed regret and surprise that Sukarno had made a public outburst to the effect that he had broken his promise to the President. The Tunku had believed that after Tokyo they had parted on the best of terms and that Sukarno had fully understood the points discussed. On paragraphs ten and eleven of the Manila Ministerial recommendations, the Tunku informed Diah that U Thant had been briefed on the latest developments. The Tunku envisaged that U Thant would have completed his work before August 31, in order to provide the opportunity for Indonesia and the Philippines to welcome and recognise Malaysia.

Diah made the point that there was every reason for Indonesia to interpret the signing of the Malaysia Agreement with the date for Malaysia to come into being on August 31, as providing for a *fait accompli* before U Thant had completed his work.

I chipped in the conversation and told Diah that the mere signing of the Agreement with the target date could never be understood that Malaysia had already come into being. The matter had to be placed before the legislators of the United Kingdom, Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak for their approval. There was, therefore, adequate time between the Summit in Manila and August 31, for U Thant to ascertain the views are required.

The Tunku referred to his statement regarding Indonesian recognition of Malaysia. He said there was no intention of slighting or denigrating Indonesia but he was just stating what he thought was factual that it would not have been in the economic interest of Indonesia not to recognise Malaysia in view of the volume of trade between Malaysia and Indonesia through Singapore and other Malaysia centres. Of course the question of navigation was entirely up to Indonesia. Diah accepted the Tunku's explanation and would convey it to Jakarta.

On the way out as I walked with him, Diah remarked that he was highly impressed by the Tunku's sincerity and cordial feelings towards Indonesia.

However, the situation did not improve. Macapagal was in a flap and had written to both Sukarno and the Tunku imploring them that nothing should be done which would likely disturb the fraternal relations and that all differences and issues could be discussed at the Summit.

Subandrio soon came out with a demand that a referendum or plebiscite should be held in North Borneo and Sarawak before August 31, 1963. To the Malayan Government, U Thant was then the key figure. The Malayan Government was working on an idea to obtain from U Thant that after due inquiry he was satisfied that the people of the two territories supported Malaysia. That would have complied with the understanding reached at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Manila.

Ong Yoke Lin, who was Malayan Ambassador in Washington, concurrently head of the Permanent Delegation in the United Nations, was tasked to discuss with U Thant. After some detailed conversations including the elections in North Borneo and Sarawak, U Thant wanted the Tunku to know that as far as he was concerned, it would be sufficient for him or his representative merely to ascertain the views of the elected members of the legislatures in North Borneo and Sarawak whether they were in favour of Malaysia or otherwise. According to U Thant, this method of ascertainment could take about two weeks and therefore could be completed well before the thirty-first of August. A referendum or plebiscite would take at least four months to complete. U Thant proposed that the Tunku should give his assurance to his colleagues at the Tripartite Summit that Malaya would adhere to the findings of the Secretary-General.

In the meantime, Sukarno had sent a message to the Secretary-General, through the Indonesian Ambassador, to say he was undecided about the Summit. The reason offered by the President was the public opinion in Indonesia had mounted against the Malaysia plan which he could no longer disregard.

The Ambassador apparently had told U Thant that the Indonesian public opinion had swung far to the extreme because the Tunku had humiliated Sukarno by signing the London Agreement allegedly after having promised that until the Manila Summit, nothing would be decided. It would be an insult to the Indonesian people if Sukarno attended the Summit.

U Thant in his sincere effort to save the situation suggested through our delegation in New York that the Tunku should make some conciliatory gesture. U Thant was also anxious that the Summit should be held so that he would have the mandate to get on with what he was supposed to do as his contribution towards a settlement of the issue. He thought no harm could be done if the Tunku made a further gesture to ease the tension.

The Tunku back in Kuala Lumpur having heard the views of U Thant and in deference to him, had instructed me to prepare a clarification which could be given to all Malayan missions with instructions to make known as widely as possible what the London Agreement was all about.

The Tunku approved a statement which I drafted. It said that apparently there had been some misunderstanding over the Malaysia Agreement signed in London on the eighth of July with Britain before the Summit meeting as a result of which it had been regarded by certain quarters in Indonesia as an insult to the Republic. At the Tokyo meeting, the Prime Minister had informed President Sukarno that he would be going to England on June 27 to meet the British in order to sign the Agreement for the formation of Malaysia. At that stage the President did not raise any objection nor at any stage during the negotiations in London.

North Borneo and Sarawak were British territories and it had been necessary for the Malayan Government to obtain the agreement of the British Government in order to satisfy the terms of the agreed recommendations at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Manila. The relevant decisions of the Foreign Ministers were in paragraphs ten and eleven which were fully quoted in the statement.

The statement further said that the British Government had been informed of the decision in paragraph eleven and it would be consulted as soon as the Heads of Government endorsed the course of action as had been recommended by the Foreign Ministers. The Malayan Government had already informed U Thant of the outcome of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Manila and had indicated the likelihood of his services being sought. His reply had been most prompt and accordingly Mr. MacKenzie, UN Representative in Manila was appointed to serve as liaison for the Secretary-General for this purpose.

If any further clarification was required before the Summit, the Malayan Prime Minister was prepared to meet with President Sukarno himself or his representative in Bangkok.

The Tunku further added his own which said that it should be appreciated that he could not enter into any commitment regarding North Borneo and Sarawak until the London Agreement had been signed. Not until the British indicated their readiness to convey judicial sovereignty over those territories and had attached their signatures to a document transferring these territories could he have any semblance of authority over the issue. After he had their promise for the formation of Malaysia he was then in a position to meet with the President and discuss with him more fully the subject of Malaysia.

The statement further said that the Tunku had publicly and privately met Indonesian Ambassadors in London, Denmark, United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia and had explained to them his position in no uncertain manner and he had agreed to carry out to the best of his ability the terms of understanding reached in Manila and Tokyo.

Before the statement was issued, I thought it polite and politic that I gave it first to the Indonesian Government through the Indonesian Embassy. In the absence of the Ambassador, I called the Charge' d'affairs to the Ministry.

I explained to the Charge' d'affairs that at no stage did the Prime Minister go back on his words and recounted what had happened in Tokyo where the President did not appear to object to the Tunku going to London to sign the Agreement.

The Charge' d'affairs took the same line as Diah in London to say that the signing of the Agreement created a *fait accompli*. I then patiently explained to him the implications of paragraphs ten and eleven of the Manila recommendations. It confirmed my suspicion all along that the Indonesians had never fully understood the purpose of those paragraphs. The Charge' d'affairs was surprised and I was certain he did not feign so, when I told him that these paragraphs were conditions for Indonesia and the Philippines to welcome Malaysia and not for its formation. The Charge' d'affairs, in all earnestness asked me what would happen if the ascertainment of the views by the Secretary-General could not be completed before the thirty-first of August. I replied that if an easy procedure was taken, the ascertainment could be completed before thirty-first of August. However, if a more complicated process was adopted for the ascertainment of views, then the Secretary-General could continue even after Malaysia Day. In the circumstances, Indonesia and the Philippines would have to withhold their welcome and recognition until this exercise had been completed. He then asked what would happen if the views of the people were found by the Secretary-General to be opposed to Malaysia. In giving my answer I said that would be purely "iffy". He agreed that from all indications and his observation people of the territories concerned favoured Malaysia.

When I handed him a copy of the statement I stressed the point made by the Tunku that he was prepared to meet with Sukarno or his representative in Bangkok before the Summit to clear any misunderstanding. I requested the Charge' d'affairs to use all his best endeavours to lessen the tension and improve the atmosphere which would conduce Sukarno to attend the Summit. He promised to do so.

Whether it was the result of my conversation with the Charge' d'affairs who received a copy of the statement or some other reasons I could not be certain but Sukarno did eventually agree to go to Manila for the Tripartite Summit much to the pleasure of Macapagal. Sukarno, before leaving Indonesian at a "Ganjang Malaysia" mammoth rally at Gelora Sports Palace, continued with his high degree vilification of Malaysia and a promise

that Indonesia not being a nation prone to niggling would carry on the struggle of confrontation until the neocolonist Malaysia had been frustrated. Sukarno, claiming to be one among the Indonesian braves was ready to fight for Indonesia anywhere as he would go to Manila to fight for the cause.

The Tunku and the Malayan Government had ignored the outbursts in order that his trip to Manila would produce something positive. A strong delegation accompanied the Tunku with Minister Khaw Kai Boh since Razak had to stay behind to hold the fort.

Even on the first day of our arrival in Manila, I had to resolve a tricky problem. A member of our delegation was a reporter for Radio Malaya, an extremely attractive young lady with vivacious ways. She had interviewed Sukarno in the afternoon. Her room was a few doors away from my suite in the Manila Hotel. At about six p.m. there was a knock on my door. There was this young lady looking very distraught asking for advice as to what she ought to do. It seemed a few minutes before she came to me, an Indonesian military officer with a big bouquet of red roses came to her room to say that it was from his President who requested the pleasure of her company for dinner in his suite. She did not know how to handle the situation and asked for help. She was in tears and I did not have the heart to tease her that she could do much for King and Country. Immediately, I arranged for her to leave Manila that same evening and the young reporter cum announcer for Radio Malaya became unavailable for dinner. Later, I told the Tunku of the incident and warned him that he should be prepared to be accused of being selfish and unwilling to share alike the beauteous bounty of Nusantara. The Tunku looked pensive and all he said was that we should be prepared for a hard time.

Inaugurating the Summit Conference, Macapagal stressed that it was the first time the leaders of the three nations of Malay origin in Southeast Asia had come together to consider their common problems. With regard to his proposal for a close association between Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia which he referred to as Maphilindo, he said these represented respectively the short term and the long term implications of the problems which had confronted them. Macapagal said that they would discuss these matters freely, fully and frankly in the manner of brothers and neighbours.

Neither the Tunku nor Sukarno made any speech. Before the meeting started, it was agreed that Macapagal the host would make a welcoming address. This was to avoid the possibility of the Summit being prejudiced by anything said by either of the two. Manila was on tenterhooks since everyone in the capital wanted the Summit to succeed.

At a closed door meeting between the three leaders, the Tunku was eventually persuaded to postpone Malaysia Day in order to enable U Thant to complete his work in ascertaining the views of the people in the two British Borneo territories. It was not easy for the Tunku to agree but his high sense of responsibility dictated that it would be in the best interest of all concerned that he should relent to the request of the other two. However, he said he had

to consult with his colleagues in Kuala Lumpur since the matter was of paramount importance and that it had some legal implications if the date was to be changed.

The Tunku had a telephone conversation with Razak who had already been briefed by me earlier when I offered the advice that such a postponement should be at the behest of U Thant. It appeared, before the Tunku spoke, Razak had already called for a special Cabinet meeting. He told the Tunku that Cabinet was most unhappy at the suggestion that the postponement was the result of a pressure from the Philippines and Indonesia. According to Razak, the way of presenting the matter had become very important. If it had been presented that the postponement was agreed to at the request of the Summit, the Malayan Cabinet chaired by Razak had expressed the opinion that it would be most difficult to defend the Malayan position externally particularly in the Borneo territories. Razak emphatically conveyed to the Tunku the opinion of the Cabinet that it would be possible to consider postponement if it was at the specific and personal request of U Thant to the Summit.

The Summit instructed the Foreign Ministers to immediately meet in order to prepare for the Summit the subjects which they would come to agree. The Tunku tasked me to assist Khaw Kai Boh who would represent Malaya.

* * *

The Ministers met on the thirty-first of July and concentrated on the question of the Summit adopting the decisions reached at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting in June in Manila. Naturally, the discussions centered on paragraphs ten and eleven which related to the Malaysia proposal and the role of the Secretary-General or his representative to ascertain the views of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak so that Indonesia and the Philippines could welcome the formation of Malaysia if there was a popular support for it.

Lopez who had become the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines informed the meeting that he had received a communication from the UN Secretary-General to the effect that the ascertainment exercise would take one of the following forms:

- (a) if the procedure referred to by the Report and recommendations of the Foreign Ministers meant its implementation only through constituted authorities, the exercise could be completed in a few weeks;
- (b) if a direct approach to the people was required, a specific mandate from the General Assembly was necessary. This procedure would take four months.

Lopez also said that the Secretary-General had pointed out that a plebiscite after Malaysia had been formed would be impracticable.

Subandrio made a lengthy speech mostly pulling a yarn about Indonesia being in difficulty since she had been anxious to see Malaysia succeed yet the suspicious circumstances surrounding the process of the formation of Malaysia had forced the hands of the Indonesian Government. Thus Indonesia had no choice but to seek the following:

- (a) that the principle of self-determination should be implemented in toto;
- (b) that such an implementation should not be only in the form of a rehearsal of what had already been done by the British; and
- (c) that such an implementation should be made to appear as a decolonisation process and the people of the Borneo territories should on their own accord, come out in full support of Malaysia.

Subandrio stressed almost an ultimatum in his presentation.

Khaw Kai Boh was our minister. I had no *locus standi* other than being a member of the delegation. However, our team was small and compact enough and every member knew his particular role. So before Kai Boh said anything, the subject would have been thoroughly thrashed out.

Kai Boh was rather polite and conciliatory, taking the line that Malaya had been fully satisfied with the results of the general elections in the Borneo territories. Therefore, a referendum or plebiscite would cast a negative reflection on the results of the elections which had Malaysia as its central issue and also would cast doubt on the validity of the mandate of the existing governments in North Borneo and Sarawak. Kai Boh, following an agreed line, proposed that the question of defining the method for determining the wishes of the people should be left entirely to the Secretary-General of UN.

Lopez, objecting to Kai Boh's line, pointed out that U Thant should be given specific guidelines so as to help him arrive at a decision acceptable to all concerned. Lopez also claimed that U Thant was not absolutely free to decide in any way he liked because he was governed by certain principles and practices of the United Nations.

The intervention by Lopez began to turn the discussion into an argumentative wrangle. Kai Boh obtained permission for me to speak and I did so by pointing out that U Thant should not be bound by the principles of the United Nations only since his role was personal at the request of the three governments. As far as the Malayan Government was concerned, U Thant or his representative was requested to give the necessary assistance and he should be free to be guided by the UN principles and other circumstances as well. On the specific subject of the procedure to be followed, I reminded the meeting that the Malayan Government was not absolutely free to commit itself on any step to be taken because North Borneo and Sarawak still belonged to the British. Therefore, the proper step would be for U Thant to have the concurrence of the British Government and the governments of the two territories to be consulted in whatever steps he intended to take.

Lopez interrupted to say that he had no doubt about the integrity of U

Thant. Bearing in mind the time factor, it was important to ensure that the Secretary-General would not decide to adopt a procedure which would just be a mechanical exercise to confirm a result which was already known. To that, I strenuously said that U Thant's hands should not be tied to any specific course of action.

Subandrio then made an appeal for an appreciation of his difficulty of having to justify to the Indonesian people that the decolonisation process had been adhered to in the Borneo territories. U Thant, according to Subandrio, should implement a fresh democratic process and not a mere recognition of a process already carried out "by the British". In so far as Indonesia was concerned the timing factor of August 31, was of little importance.

I then asked that the meeting should resolve two important points:

- (a) was the meeting agreeable to leave the matter entirely to the Secretary-General;
- (b) was the meeting in favour that Malaysia Day be postponed if the process was not completed.

Subandrio replied that U Thant should be asked to state the period necessary to carry out the task in accordance with the principles as enunciated by the General Assembly as Resolution 154(xv). In essence, the Resolution referred to the question of integration which should have come about when the integrating territory should have already attained an advanced stage of self-government so its people would have had the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic process. The integration also should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the people of the territory acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deemed necessary, supervise the process.

Kai Boh in whispers asked me and the rest of the Malayan delegation what it was all about. We went into a huddle and I explained to Kai Boh and the others that the Malayan Government could live with it since it was not the Resolution but the principles of it which U Thant would be required to observe. We then told the meeting that the Malayan delegation could accept Subandrio's suggestion and the Philippines delegation followed suit. It was then agreed that what was decided be transmitted to U Thant through MacKenzie.

While awaiting for reply from U Thant, the Tunku having heard what had happened at the Ministers' meeting of July 31, decided most graciously that in the circumstances it was necessary to give U Thant adequate time to complete his work. He told me that he had discussed with Razak by telephone that if U Thant could not complete his work before August 31, then Malaya would have to accept any advice of the Secretary-General with regard to the need to postpone Malaysia Day.

Sukarno, unlike the Tunku, was huffing and puffing in his suite, refusing to accept the results of the elections in North Borneo and Sarawak being held "by the British" as valid. He still wanted a plebiscite.

Macapagal wanted to know as to the time that would be necessary for a plebiscite to be held with UN observers.

U Thant's reply was crystal clear. He would require specific authority from Britain for him to hold a plebiscite. Without such an authority the Secretary-General would have no right to organise the plebiscite which if the existing electorates could be used would take two months. The role of Britain in this regard had become extremely important.

U Thant also asked the Summit if they could agree on paragraphs ten and eleven which were recommended by the Tripartite Foreign Ministers' meeting in Manila in June. I had occasion to discuss this point with the Tunku and the rest of the Malayan delegation with the view that the Summit should endorse paragraphs ten and eleven. The Tunku suggested that U Thant should be informed that the date August 31 was not unalterable. With regard to the Secretary-General's task of finding out the views of the British territories and Malaya's responsibility to consult the British Government and that of North Borneo and Sarawak, I suggested that we should also try to persuade Britain not to be too wedded to the date of August 31. I was quite nervous at that stage to suggest a time frame for the Secretary-General but I knew that if the exercise would be based on the results of the recent elections it would not take too long. We let MacKenzie know of our thinking and he had passed the "scoop" to U Thant. Ramani was also in constant contact with Narasimhan.

U Thant in reply to the message sent by the ministers stated that in view of the time factor he expressed difficulty in implementing his task if it could not be based on actions already taken under the colonial Government. The Secretary-General also stated that it appeared that the elected representatives of the people were so elected through informed and democratic processes and that subject to residence qualifications, the electoral roll was based on universal suffrage and included all qualified voters over the age of 21. As I had anticipated, U Thant would confirm that the criteria laid down in UN Resolution 1541(xv) would appear to have been met. U Thant proposed to ascertain the views of the elected representatives of Sarawak and North Borneo if the governments concerned agreed.

On receiving U Thant's message, the Ministerial meeting was hurriedly convened. Subandrio was livid. He angrily commented that the time factor was of no concern to U Thant. It was a matter for the Summit to decide. Subandrio stressed that he had to justify his decision to the Indonesian people in such a manner that it would not appear as if he had surrendered to the British. He gave his interpretation of UN Resolution 1541(xv) to the effect that U Thant should go to the Borneo territories and prepare the electoral roll and Indonesia would be prepared to accept the finding so long as it was made in the Borneo territories. The electoral roll should include those detained by the

British. There should be voting. Indonesia hoped that U Thant would complete the exercise not later than September 30, 1963. Even if there was no mandate by the General Assembly for U Thant to carry out the plebiscite, Indonesia was prepared to accept the role of U Thant.

There was a great deal of discussion following U Thant's message in which I was given permission to freely participate. The Malayan delegation held fast to its views that U Thant should feel free to decide on the method of finding out the views of the people of the British North Borneo and Sarawak regarding Malaysia. He would be doing that without a General Assembly Resolution but at the behest of the Tripartite Summit in the particular circumstances to break an impasse. I reminded the meeting that the formula in paragraphs ten and eleven, as decided in Manila in July at the Foreign Ministers' meeting, was adequate as a general guideline for the Secretary-General to perform his task. In any case, Malaya could not see how the Secretary-General could hold a plebiscite or referendum without the authority of the General Assembly which had certain procedural rules and the concurrence of the British Government having to reckon with the pro-Malaysia views of the elected governments of North Borneo and Sarawak.

Finally, the delegations from Jakarta and Manila relented and agreed that plebiscite or referendum would not be required. However, the two delegations insisted that the three countries should be represented in the working teams on the ground that the whole exercise must satisfy all factions in Indonesia and the Philippines. It was Subandrio who was most vocal on this issue. He repeated his earlier point that he had to produce a convincing evidence to his people. Finally, he came out with something I had suspected all along that the question of Malaysia was not the important issue since differences could occur between Malaya and Indonesia without the issue of the formation of Malaysia. He said he had often asked himself regarding the question of relationship between Indonesia and Malaya whether Malaya was a friend or a foe!

The matter of recognition of Malaysia arose and I asked Subandrio a direct question regarding Indonesia's attitude on the matter. Subandrio had by that time composed himself and in a calm and rather calculated way replied that non-recognition, as far as Indonesia was concerned, could not be peaceful; rather it had to be hostile. Coolly he said in response to my question, non-recognition for Indonesia would mean hostility, driving a chilling sensation down my spine.

I was told later by members of the Malaysia Task Force that they too had read the signal that turbulence was ahead. However, they were grateful to Subandrio for sending the signal of things to come which would give them a head start in the preparation to meet any eventuality.

The Malayan delegation strongly opposed the proposal that the three countries should be represented in U Thant's working team. Such a proposal would imply distrust of the representatives, chosen by U Thant and that the British Government and the Governments of the two territories would regard

the exercise as an unacceptable intrusion. On the other hand, the Malayan delegation would have no objection if the Secretary-General himself would want to include the representatives of the three countries in his fact finding team. Under the circumstances, I ventured to guess that the Borneo governments and the British governments would not object.

Finally, the Indonesian and the Philippines delegations conceded on the question of a plebiscite and referendum and settled for the agreed paragraphs ten and eleven of the Tripartite Ministerial Report and Recommendations at Manila in June. However, pursuant to these paragraphs, U Thant should ascertain the views of the Borneo peoples in the context of Resolution 1541 of the General Assembly prior to the establishment of Malaysia.

The Malayan delegation was elated with the agreement expressed by the two delegations and without ado, conceded to a further request that the Secretary-General should examine, verify and satisfy himself whether in the recent elections in Sarawak and North Borneo that:

- (i) Malaysia was the major issue;
- (ii) Electoral Registers were properly compiled;
- (iii) Elections were free and there was no coercion;
- (iv) Votes were properly polled and counted.

The wishes of those who were qualified to vote and could have exercised their right had they not been detained for subversive activities, imprisoned for political offences and those absent from Sarawak and North Borneo at the time of elections should also be considered.

There was jubilation in the Malayan camp and after the Tunku had been briefed, members went to town on a celebration. They had every reason to rejoice since every aspect of the problem had been taken care of. Now it was left to the Summit to endorse the agreement and U Thant could then proceed with what he had to do as he thought fit since the agreement reached had given him a free hand. As far as Malaya was concerned the only concession was an agreement that Malaysia Day would take place after U Thant had made known his finding. Even if it was in the negative which was not at all likely, the only effect was the question of recognition by Jakarta or Manila. The main shadow of concern was the likelihood that whatever U Thant did, Jakarta would not accept the verdict unless it was in the negative. All sorts of excuses would emerge and there would be a delaying tactic. The Malayan delegation also suspected that Manila would follow Jakarta since it had been obvious at the various levels of discussion, Manila echoed Jakarta. And Malaya had to be prepared for such an eventuality. Therefore, amidst the merriment, there were discussions in whispers as to the next steps to be taken to ensure that Malaysia plan would not be frustrated.

The Summit met on August 5, 1963 and formally endorsed the Report and Recommendations of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers. The Manila Accord was born and so was the Manila Declaration.

The Declaration was concerned with Macapagal's idea of a united Malay world comprising Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, known as Maphilindo. The Declaration reaffirmed the adherence of the three to the principle of self-determination at the same time together to maintain fraternal relations and the strengthening of relations in economic, social and cultural fields. The three committed themselves to a common struggle against colonialism and imperialism and to regard themselves as a new emerging force – a concept which came from Sukarno. It was in this Manila Declaration that the three leaders agreed to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by having frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo. In the accompanying Joint Statement it was agreed that each country should establish a national secretariat which would consult together with a view to coordinate and cooperate with each other in setting up the necessary machinery for Maphilindo.

During the discussion on Maphilindo, the Malayan delegation contributed little to the idea. There were reasons to be concerned regarding the Malaysia plan since Maphilindo could be an obstacle to the Malaysia Plan. The question of British colonial territories in the region and that of Portugal would come within the purview of Maphilindo. Malaya's concern for the future of Singapore would be brushed aside to the advantage of the communist elements in that island and their ilks in Sarawak and collaborators in Brunei. The PKI and the CPM with their mentors, the Communist Party of China, would be tickled pink.

Our delegation was also wondering if such a move would create apprehensions in Malaya among the non-Malays particularly those of Chinese origin after having witnessed how Indonesia had treated the ethnic Chinese in rural areas and in some of the lesser towns. Maphilindo smelt a bit too racial for the liking of Malayan Ministers like Khaw Kai Boh who had to listen to the discussions. Nevertheless, for the sake of solidarity, we agreed to go along with the idea but the Tunku advised caution.

With reference to defence, the statement emphasised that the responsibility for the preservation of national independence, peace and security in the regions rested with the governments and the peoples of the countries concerned and the three governments undertook to have close consultations among themselves in these matters. It was also agreed that foreign bases should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert national independence of any of the three countries. Neither would arrangements for collective defence be utilised to serve the particular interest of any big power.

* * *

The Malayan Government had as early as the 3 August received from its mission in the UN that U Thant had been thinking of sending Mr. Janecek of Czechoslovakia with another person as his representative in the view-finding exercise. Some Malayan officials were hoping to get Narasimhan as the other

person but U Thant had been warned not to appoint Narasimhan because Subandrio, while in Manila, was reported to have said that Narasimhan was biased towards Malaya. It was learnt that Janecek was acceptable to Indonesia because he had been involved in the Irian Barat exercise.

The names of members of the UN Malaysia Mission comprised entirely international civil servants of the UN Secretariat under the leadership of Mr. Michelmore who was a national of the United States. The team composed of eight members were divided into two, one to deal with Sarawak, the other with North Borneo. Mr. Michelmore, the leader, was tasked to deal with Sarawak, assisted by three members (Kanakratna a Ceylonese, Dadzir a Ghanian and Abdul S. Djani an Egyptian). Mr. Janecek was the deputy leader of the team and his work was to be in North Borneo. He also had three members to assist him (Howard an Argentinean, Baqai a Pakistani and Akashi a Japanese). The Malayan Government received the names of the members of the UN Malaysia Mission without reservation and indeed with a great deal of pleasure and satisfaction since they were men highly regarded by the Malayan Permanent mission at the UN for their integrity and sense of impartiality.

The governments of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya by then had decided to request U Thant for his agreement that each of the three governments would send observers to witness the implementation of the task undertaken by the Mission. However, there was considerable disagreement on the question of the numbers each country should send for the purpose. This necessitated the UN Malaysia Mission to postpone the start of its work from August 22 to 26.

It was also necessary to obtain the agreement of the British Government with the concurrence of the Government of North Borneo and that of Sarawak. In giving its agreement to the visit of the observers, the British Government with the concurrence of the two colonial governments laid out certain stipulations which included an advice to the Governments of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya that no observer should be a *persona non grata* which meant that a person who had been expelled from any of the Borneo territories for any reason or had been declared as unwelcomed.

The Government of Sarawak and the Government of North Borneo required that each observer group should be accompanied by an official of the territory concerned. There were other requirements: these included that the observers' function should be restricted to that of observing the work of the Mission and should not carry out any parallel or independent inquiry. The observers also should not be participating in the questioning of persons interviewed or in the drafting of the reports of the Mission neither should the observers give advice or directives to the Representatives of the Secretary-General. It was also required of the observers that they should remain together throughout their stay in the Borneo territories and that they should travel and function as a group so as to enable each of them to simultaneously observe the same events.

The three governments were locked in a discussion as to the number of observers that each could send. It was finally agreed that each government should send four observers and four clerical assistants. However, the Jakarta and Manila observers did not turn up in Kuching until the September 1. Their excuse was that they had faced difficulties over appointments of clerical assistants. It was obvious to everyone else including the UN Malaysia Team that there was a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the two governments and easily surmised by the Malaysians that it was a calculated joint effort on their part to procrastinate and thereby have the Malaysia Day postponed *sine die*.

The UN Malaysia Mission had lost its patience with the delay. It had planned to start work on August 22 and the Malayan Government had, as agreed, appointed four observers, two for Sarawak namely, Senator Zahir and Ambassador Yaacob Latiff and two for North Borneo namely, Senator Athi Nahappan and Ambassador Zaiton Ibrahim. Because of the lame excuses for the delay of sending observers on the part of Jakarta and Manila, Michelmore announced that the work of the Mission would start on August 26 irrespective whether the observers from the two capitals were present or not.

The Mission started its work on the date as announced by Michelmore. Only the British and Malayan observers were present. The Mission had decided to meet and hear views and opinions of elected representatives and individual leaders and members of political and other societies and anyone else who would wish to express their views. The people of the two territories were annoyed with the new date since they had been looking forward to meeting the Mission on the twenty-second which caused a momentary confusion. But it made them more determined to prove to the world that Jakarta and Manila were just being bloody-minded, and there was wide dissatisfaction with the way their fate and future were being trifled with. The Malayan observers who went with the team of the Mission to Simanggang in Sarawak on the twenty-sixth reported the people there expressed to the UN team in no uncertain manner that they were not in a mood to entertain the idea of postponing the formation of Malaysia. They demanded the establishment of Malaysia as originally scheduled, August 31.

As observed by the Cobbold Commission, the Malayan observers also reported that in Sarawak the Michelmore teams also found a number of Chinese, particularly those who belonged to the left wing of SUPP which had been largely dominated by the CCO, were opposed to the Malaysia plan. Using the well-known tactics of the communists which respected no laws and order other than their own, they had resorted to organising demonstrations, some ending in violence. These occurred in Sibu, Miri, Marudi and Bau where the CCO had succeeded to overwhelm the people, the majority of whom were Chinese who had been subjected to coercion and intimidation.

The Malayan observers who had been following closely the work of the UN team in Sarawak reported that the Mission was not in the least impressed by the demonstrations and riots which were participated by young people. These

occurred only in towns dominated by the community of Chinese ethnic origin. The pro-Malaysia elements had exercised self-restraint and could have organised bigger demonstrations if they had wanted to, but in their wisdom and sense of responsibility, had avoided doing so. The UN Mission who had wide international experiences were quick to recognise that the riots and demonstrations were typical communist ploys giving a disproportionate anti-Malaysia sentiment. The communist elements in the SUPP were extremely naive when they freely used communist jargons and hostile attitude when giving evidences before the Mission without realising that the members of the Mission could easily discern the hollowness of their opposition. After all, how could the UN Mission be impressed by anti-Malaysia riots and hostile demonstrations when the UN had been committed to peace and self-determination which could be obtained from assessing the number of votes cast in a fair and well conducted election.

The SUPP anti-Malaysia elements demanded that the UN Mission should also consider the circumstances in which the elections were held. While admitting that in the recent elections, Malaysia was a major issue, the elections were carried out in a manner that was fair. However, it was pointed out to the Mission that the anti-Malaysia stance of SUPP had not met with any success because of the Azahari rebellion in Brunei, the police action against the Party including the search of party premises and arrest of party members on the ground of communist clandestine activities. All these put their party machinery out of gear to successfully win the elections. It would seem to the Malayan observers that the anti-Malaysia case of SUPP depended largely on this issue. The Malayan observers thought that the SUPP presentation had not impressed the UN Mission. There was, all in all, an overwhelming support for the Malaysia plan.

In North Borneo, the Mission started work on the same day as in Sarawak. The team led by Janecek right from the start endeavoured to find out whether the elections were fairly and properly conducted. Unlike Sarawak where the CCO was present, if there had been any coercion or intimidation it would have to come from elements in the colonial government which would have wanted to retain colonialism. Foremost in the mind of the Mission was whether the elections were fair and the polling and counting of votes were properly carried out and whether in the elections Malaysia was a major issue. The Mission made as targets of the inquiry categories of people who would include elected or otherwise members of the various councils and representatives of political societies at national and local levels. Others from whom views had been sought were representatives of chambers of commerce, clubs and various friendly societies, native chiefs and village headmen and private individuals including defeated candidates at all levels of elections. The Mission included in their enquiry members and former members of the defunct Liberal Party some of whom were ex-detainees because of their association with the Azahari rebellion in Brunei.

The Malayan observers following the UN Mission in North Borneo reported that an overwhelming majority of those who appeared before the Mission supported Malaysia and definitely agreed that the elections were conducted fairly and without coercion. There was no evidence to show that a qualified person was barred from registering or voting and that "Malaysia" was a major issue. The people interviewed said that if elections were held again the support for "Malaysia" would even be greater than shown at the last elections because the people had realised that "Malaysia" would bring for them independence, unity, peace, development, prosperity and security. Jakarta and Manila had since become ogres.

There were some discordant and divergent views expressed by a handful. The native party called *Pasok Momogun* was in a state of confusion. At the national level, it supported the Malaysia plan but at the local level, in particular in Keningau and Papar, the branches of *Pasok Momogun* wanted independence prior to joining Malaysia. But from the Party as a whole, there was no opposition to North Borneo being in Malaysia. In Sipitang, six ex-detainees who were involved in the Azahari rebellion naturally mouthed what Azahari had always wanted that there should be a union of North Borneo with Brunei and Sarawak under a constitutional ruler, Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin of Brunei, before joining Malaysia. This would have been at variance with Malaysia plan and would not at all be favoured by the Sultan of Brunei and other pro-Malaysia elements in the Borneo territories.

The Malayan observers were of the view that the UN Mission had conducted their enquires in an impartial and objective manner.

The United Nations Malaysia Mission had to face one irritant. It may be recalled that Jakarta and Manila were procrastinating about sending their observers on some lame excuses. Seeing that Michaelmore was not going to delay further his work and I had tried to convince Subandrio that he should send them the observers from the two capitals, turned up on the first of September although no effort was made to persuade Manila to do so. The hearing by the UN Mission had been going on for seven days. They had almost completed their work except for two more days.

* * *

At the time when the Indonesian observers arrived in Kuching on September 1, in essence, Indonesia had succeeded in frustrating the plan for August 31 as Malaysia Day. On the August 30, I had visited Jakarta where I met Subandrio at his residence. I was accompanied by the Malayan Ambassador in Jakarta, Kamaruddin Haji Idris and a member of his staff, Abdullah Ali. I had brought my special assistant Jack de Silva of the Foreign Ministry while Subandrio was assisted by his Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito. Subandrio was recovering from an attack of flu but he received me. After the usual pleasantries, I began the serious part by saying that I had come in the spirit of Tokyo (Sukarno-Tunku Joint Statement) on the agreed understanding that

there should be a discussion and consultation whenever a common problem should arise affecting the relationship between the two countries. I had therefore come to Jakarta to convey the feelings of the Malayan Government and to ascertain the views of Jakarta regarding the question of observers for the UN Malaysia Mission in North Borneo and Sarawak and other related matters.

As mentioned earlier, Indonesia had delayed sending observers because of difficulties over the appointment of clerical assistants. U Thant had agreed that each of the countries could send four observers and four clerical assistants. Indonesia had submitted names of senior diplomatic officers as clerical assistants and that became a problem and then consequently a delay in the work of Michaelmore.

Subandrio, in his explanation, said that he had regarded those clerical assistants as reserves who would replace any of the senior observers who might fall ill during the ascertainment exercise. Subandrio conceded that those officers nominated as clerical assistants were not of clerical grades but stressed they were not senior officers either. Almost angrily he said he was not that stupid as to appoint stupid people as observers hence he had chosen bright officers. Since Indonesia should share the responsibility of the task of observing the work of the UN teams, he asked how else could Indonesia be able to obtain a correct appraisal from the observers if he did not send intelligent people.

The British had objected to the appointment of the officers as clerical assistants. It was within their right to do so although it might seem a quibble. But the British had knowledge that these so-called officers, to be cloaked as clerical assistants, were in fact intelligence operators and I told Subandrio so. He burst out laughing and said that the British had overreacted and had made a wrong calculation regarding those men. If Indonesia had been really serious about subverting Kalimantan Utara, which the Indonesians called the British Borneo territories, she could have commenced such subversion on a large scale from 1945. As regards the credentials of Col. Otto Abburachman who was the head of the Indonesian observer team, Subandrio said he had appointed the Colonel simply to get the armed forces to be committed. Col. Otto Abdurachman was also soon to be appointed as Ambassador.

As proof of his good intentions, Subandrio referred to instructions he had already given to his observer team, instructions not to talk to the people of the Borneo territories but only to the UN Mission and to the other observers from Malaya and the Philippines.

It would appear that the British Government and the Indonesian Government had been in communication over the issue of the observers. The British, it appeared, had insisted on the observer team being split in advance which Subandrio thought that the British was deliberately being difficult. Indonesia could only agree to the split after having met with Michaelmore.

Subandrio said that the British had accused Indonesia for expansionism and had alleged Indonesia for organising border raids. By being obdurate on the question of observers, Subandrio said the British had lost an opportunity of presenting to foreign observers evidences of the alleged raids. Indonesia had no expansionist ambition since Indonesia had too much territory already and had so many problems in dealing with it. Even if the British Borneo territories had expressed a wish to join Indonesia, they would be rejected by Indonesia.

He stressed that the only reason behind Indonesia's attitude regarding the observer issue was because Indonesia wanted to be fully identified with the findings of the Secretary-General. But he revealed that U Thant had only on August 29 informed Jakarta that four UN working teams would be operating in the Borneo territories. Referring to subversive activities, he denied any Indonesian involvement but on the other hand it was the British who had been guilty of the practice and Indonesia was about to declare three attachés at the British Embassy as *persona non grata*.

Subandrio began to look even more agitated than ever and directed his attention more to what he called as the intransigencies of the British Ambassador who was rude enough as to write to him that in view of the shortage of accommodation, the Indonesian observers might have to sleep in tents. Subandrio said the British lacked international courtesy. It was highly undignified and exclaimed emotionally that Indonesians were not beggars.

Then Subandrio said, when the heat of his temper was still on that issue, the British had been quibbling over the questions of military aircraft transporting the Indonesian observers from Jakarta to Kuching. He wondered as to why the British appeared to be so worried when the plane in question was only a Dakota. The Indonesian Government had not hitherto objected to the British flying their military attaché over Indonesian territory. The Indonesian Government as a reprisal would henceforth not permit any British military aircraft to use the Indonesian airspace.

I suggested to Subandrio that the British probably feared the resentment which would arise in the Borneo territories if an Indonesian military aircraft had been permitted to overfly and land in Sarawak while raids across the border were taking place. The Indonesian reprisal would not be based on a very firm ground if the British were to offer alternative arrangements to transport the observers from Singapore. Subandrio appeared pensive but made no comment.

When he lifted his head again, Subandrio said that he was grateful to the Tunku for his independent thinking and the Tunku was aware of the British colonial policy. In Southeast Asia the British policy was in line with the traditional policy prior to her withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent and Burma. Subandrio added that the British wanted to leave a time bomb in this region. I could not contain my disgust at the sort of worn out lecture on Western colonialism and the patronising attitude towards the Tunku who he

had been vilifying as a neocolonialist stooge. I said in a somewhat jocular manner that if that was true then together the bomb had to be found and defused.

Subandrio then appealed to me that I should appreciate the prime effort on the part of Indonesia not to let Malaya get hurt since she had been unfortunately caught in the middle of a strictly Indonesian problem with Britain. The current impasse had to be understood as an Indonesian-British affair. He wondered as to what the British really wanted in respect of this observer issue. In a voice that was clearly to be understood as extremely serious, Subandrio said that if the British persisted in adopting a tough stand against Indonesia, Indonesia too could be tough. If Britain wanted war, Indonesia would lose in a conventional war; however Indonesians could show the British what they could do in a guerilla war. Subandrio drew my attention to the 60-40 arrangement with regard to the partial nationalisation of US oil interests in Indonesia. Britain had huge assets in Indonesia in the form of oil installations as well as more than 200 estates. Indonesia was creating a precedent in dealing with Western economic interest and Malaya could follow this method and benefit without having to struggle but simply to follow the precedents set by Indonesia.

Returning to the question of observers, Subandrio thought there was no further point in sending those observers since there were only a couple of days left, unless the UN Mission ceased operations for one or two more days. Such a delay on the instruction of the UN Secretary-General would enable pressure to be mounted against the British for the purpose of enabling the Indonesian observer team to proceed to Kuching.

At this point, Subandrio reiterated Indonesia's policy of supporting the Tunku. He tried to substantiate it by stating that he had himself suggested that part of Sukarno's speech delivered on August 28, in which Sukarno gave a public commitment to abide by the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak. Subandrio also referred to a letter which Sukarno had written in the same spirit to Macapagal. In that letter Sukarno had urged Macapagal to support the Tunku and in order to strengthen the Tunku's position, Sukarno had suggested that the first Maphilindo Mushawarah should be held in Kuala Lumpur sometime in October or November. I already had some idea of the letter and in my discussion with the Tunku about it, he dreaded the day when he would be asked to host a Maphilindo Mushawarah. We both had concluded that the event would never take place because Malaysia was inevitable and Sukarno could never accept it. Maphilindo was meant for Malaya, not Malaysia.

As my mind was wandering and wondering about all that had been said by Subandrio perhaps intentionally to be provocative, Subandrio in a tone that was soft and conciliatory said that he would wish to admit that Indonesia was very much a prisoner of her own stupidity which was result of her historical

experiences. While staring at nothing he said Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy was a manifestation of that stupidity.

I could see Jack de Silva almost falling from his chair and the Malayan Ambassador looked in my direction questioningly. I simply shook my head slowly because the statement was also a puzzlement for me. He could not be serious, I thought, though silently I would agree with him.

And then as if he had heard the reveille, he spoke in a firm voice that Indonesia should now live with the future and not with the past. Therefore, Indonesia's main preoccupation would be to find ways and means of living with the aftermath of Malaysia. However, he expressed the hope that Malaya would understand that it was most difficult for Indonesia to suddenly accept Malaysia from a completely anti-Malaysia policy. Despite the difficulty experienced by Indonesia in effecting a radical departure from her previous policy, Subandrio gave his solemn assurance to do everything in his power to bring about Indonesian official acceptance of Malaysia. In this connection, according to Subandrio, his determination to succeed was reinforced by his realisation that Malaya was under strong pressure from the Borneo territories, Singapore and Britain.

The last few minutes were a drama and I could not decide whether to take what had been said seriously or otherwise. I told my side later that we should accept it at its face value and to let the future resolve the doubt.

Then suddenly Subandrio brought us back to the question of the British objection to the Indonesian military aircraft to fly into Sarawak bringing Indonesian observers. It looked as if he had been thinking of what I had commented regarding his reprisal plan and the possible British alternative arrangements. Subandrio told me that to indicate Indonesia's goodwill and willingness to cooperate, he was prepared to send the Indonesian observers by an Indonesian military aircraft to Singapore and to have them transported from Singapore to Kuching in a British aircraft. In reply I said that I was happy with this change of attitude on the question of the transportation of the Indonesian observers. I also expressed my appreciation of his sentiments and of Indonesia's support for the Tunku.

Having now had the opportunity to say my piece, I confirmed about the difficulty confronting the Tunku who was under considerable pressure both from the Borneo territories and from Singapore. The Tunku had been accused of cowardice when in fact he was exercising patience in the face of personal attacks and abuses particularly from the Indonesian Government-controlled mass media. I assured Subandrio that the Tunku and the Malayan Government had refused to deviate from the path of peace and brotherly relations with Indonesia.

Yet, the Tunku, inspite of his unflinching determination to stand firm against these pressures, I told Subandrio that the Tunku had been obliged to recognise and to act upon the strong national sentiment concerning Malaysia Day. The people in the territories of the Malaysia plan had become aware that

it was the Tunku who had decided not to proceed with the establishment of Malaysia on August 31. And since then, he had to face a growing demand for a firm alternative date. There had also been demands for the separate independence of North Borneo and Singapore. The politicians in these territories were becoming increasingly agitated, impatient and worked up.

At this juncture, Subandrio intervened by requesting me to get Donald Stephens to refrain from making anti-Indonesia statements because if he continued to do so Indonesia might be forced to retaliate. Then, Subandrio, as if not wanting others but myself to hear him, said in a low voice audible enough for me and some others to hear that Indonesia had three battalions ready for the Borneo operations. He, however, hastened to add that the personnel concerned were not Indonesians. Subandrio said these people were in a habit of crossing the Kalimantan border since the inhabitants on one side of the border had relatives on the other. It would have been difficult to instruct them to cease the border crossing with immediate effect. However, Subandrio assured me that he had already spoken to Nasution, the Minister of Defence, to stop the border operations. Subandrio then appealed to me to assist him in every way possible to make his work less difficult in getting the guerillas to pull back as soon as possible.

I was at a loss when Subandrio dropped a name like that of Nasution. I wondered if he was bluffing but that was not important. The important thing was that he confirmed what we had known for sometime. I had become convinced more than ever that the declaration of Malaysia Day without the approbation of Indonesia was certain to witness the deployment of those hostile armed men.

I had accomplished my first task of visiting Jakarta. Every assistance should be given to the Indonesian observers although I could not see any possibility of Michelmores recommending a delay in his work. However, whatever few days left they should be utilised to give the late comers a picture of what had so far taken place. We all had become convinced that Manila as a sidekick would follow the Indonesians in words and deeds.

Another task which I had to perform was to inform Subandrio of the change of Malaysia Day. It was the decision of the Cabinet following the Tunku's recommendation that the date of Malaysia should be postponed to accommodate Jakarta and Manila which had to await the announcement of the result of the UN Malaysia Mission to enable them or otherwise to welcome Malaysia. August 31 had been inserted in the Malaysia Agreement and any variation of that date should be announced before the target date. It was on August 26 that Cabinet made the decision that Malaysia Day would be on September 16. This was the result of my private inquiry from U Thant as to the expected date when the work would be completed. I had been advised that U Thant could announce the result one way or another on the fourteenth.

It must be remembered that the exercise was to enable Jakarta and Manila to welcome Malaysia and not for the purpose of the establishment of Malaysia.

It was in deference to Indonesia and the Philippines that the Tunku had persuaded the Cabinet to agree to the postponement because he very much wanted the two countries to welcome Malaysia. I recalled the harsh words which some members of the Cabinet used against Indonesia and the Philippines but the Tunku was magnificent. He was being unjustly accused even by some of his Cabinet colleagues of cowardice and there were demands for separate independence from some people in Singapore and North Borneo.

I had drafted the statement accompanying the Proclamation of Malaysia Day by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong which His Majesty would have to make on the August 29. I had been in communication with U Thant through our Permanent Mission which was treated with the strictest confidentiality. The draft statement had met with the concurrence of the Secretary-General. Cabinet had instructed that Subandrio should be invited to Singapore to meet with Razak who would explain the circumstances as to the reasons for the announcement. However, Subandrio had an attack of flu and so it fell on me to see him in Jakarta to clarify the position of the Malayan Government which I had done.

After the question of the observers had been resolved with Subandrio I then continued the conversation recalling the Manila Accord which decided to have the ascertainment exercise by the Secretary-General of UN in order to enable Indonesia and the Philippines to welcome the new nation and that Malaya very much wanted Indonesia to welcome Malaysia. For that reason the Secretary-General had been requested to complete his work before Malaysia was formed. I reiterated the point so that there would be no misunderstanding that the purpose behind the Manila Agreement was to enable Indonesia and the Philippines to welcome Malaysia.

I had I thought adequately explained to Subandrio that in view of the constitutional and legal requirement that the date August 31 as in the Malaysia Agreement could not be changed after that date, the Malayan Government at its Cabinet meeting had no alternative but to take a firm decision on a new date before August 31 and the agreement of the British Government had to be sought. I informed Subandrio that U Thant had indicated that the task would be completed and the result announced by the September 14. It was unfortunate that Razak could not meet with Subandrio in Singapore due to the latter's illness. It was the Malayan Government's wish through the Deputy Prime Minister to convey to the Indonesian Government that Cabinet decision. When the Tunku realised that the meeting in Singapore could not take place, he had despatched me to Jakarta to clarify the Malayan Government's position in the spirit of Tokyo.

Subandrio with a resigned expression assured me that Indonesia had fully realised that Malaysia was a foregone conclusion. Regarding the new date for Malaysia, Subandrio said he was appreciative of the reasons for such a decision although he stressed that Indonesia must reserve her position in view of the absence of the observers. However, he said I could rest assured that he

would do his best to look towards the future rather than the past so that there would be peace. He added that he was grateful to the Malayan Government for letting Indonesia know the background for the new date for Malaysia.

Subandrio went back to the subject of the observers. He expressed the view that a postponement of the ascertainment exercise for two or three days would enable Indonesia to give him active cooperation so that the problem could be settled once and for all. Touching on the Secretary-General's role he felt the Eastern Bloc would raise a query on the UN on the ground that the Secretary-General had not obtained a directive from the General Assembly before undertaking the ascertainment exercise. I had a ready answer for this but decided to keep my own counsel.

Instead, I changed the subject somewhat by drawing Subandrio's attention to a piece of information which I had obtained before meeting with him. I told him that the British Ambassador in Jakarta was extremely upset when he discovered that senior Foreign Service officers had been requesting the US and Australian Ambassadors to apply pressure on the British Ambassador in respect of the observer issue. The Ambassador had expected the Indonesian officials to consult with him directly instead of using the US and Australian Ambassadors as conduits. I told Subandrio that I had expressed the view to the British side that the Indonesians were probably correct in not consulting the British directly because in accordance with the Manila Accord, it had been agreed that Malaya should be the channel of communication. Subandrio said he noted the unhappiness of the British but admitted that it was he who had talked to the Australian and the US Ambassadors. Subandrio said these two Ambassadors who came to him appeared to have been very keen to be of assistance and he told them what he felt.

Subandrio was oozing with kindness. He made all of us stay for lunch during which he referred to the subject of the new date for Malaysia Day and asked whether the Malayan Government could make its announcement regarding the new date in such a way as not to prejudge the Secretary-General's finding. I went over the same ground as I had done before lunch and since the government statement had the agreement of U Thant, I assured Subandrio that in that regard Malaya had been and would continue to be careful.

After lunch we asked permission to leave and Subandrio and Suwito walked us to the gate where our cars were waiting. While walking I requested Subandrio once again to find ways and means to make it possible for Indonesia to send the observers even at this late stage. After all, I said, the observers were intended for presentment in Indonesia and if we could not resolve the question of observers, all the good work in Tokyo and Manila would come to nought. I expressed the hope that Indonesia would welcome Malaysia. Subandrio responded that he would do his best and held my hand in an extremely warm handshake. As I shook hands with Suwito he whispered to me that it would be extremely helpful if some ways could be found to suspend the operation of the Secretary-General's teams for a couple of days without

upsetting the programme that the announcement by the Secretary-General could still take place on September 14. All I could assure him was that I would earnestly try to find some way to convey the point although I know that it would fall on deaf ears.

I must admit that I was very impressed with the way Subandrio engaged us in the conversation even if it was spiked with cynicisms and sarcasms which were directed towards the British and for Donald Stephens. He was more cordial towards the Tunku and Malaya. Even as I spoke about the new date, my statement was received with restraint and with apparent understanding of the reasons for the Malayan Government decision in the matter.

As I expected, Indonesia and the Philippines sent their observers to the UN Malaysia Mission on the first of September. I had passed to the Secretary-General the request for delaying the work of the UN mission but there was no further postponement of the exercise. The two observer delegations were able to witness the last two days of the nine-day scheduled itinerary.

The Indonesian observers at the end of the exercise remarked echoing what Subandrio had said in Jakarta that the Indonesian observers would reserve the right not to associate themselves in whatever manner with the findings on the hearings in Sarawak before the afternoon of the first of September and in North Borneo before the morning of the second of September. They further alleged that the element of a fresh approach was not apparent in the whole operation. In other words, the Indonesian observers were of the opinion that UN Resolution 1541 was not complied with and the hearings conducted by UN teams merely took the form of samplings.

The Philippine observers conceded that the hearings were conducted fairly and impartially. However, they felt that the time allocated for the enquiry was much too short. They alleged that the Mission sought to test public opinion regarding Malaysia almost entirely by means of scheduled hearing. They were in chorus with the Indonesian observers to point out that the enquiry was not a fresh approach. They further alleged that the local colonial government had maximised their rapport with the UN Mission.

* * *

The Yang di-Pertuan Agong had announced on August 29, that the new date for Malaysia was September 16. On the fourth of September, Djatikusumo handed to me a Note in which the Indonesian Government made a strong *démarche* against the Malayan Government for having fixed September 16 as Malaysia Day. The Indonesian Government alleged that the action of the Malayan Government in fixing the date while the UN Malaysia Mission was still in the process of carrying out its task as contradicting the Manila Agreements. The Note further alleged that by its action the Malayan Government had presented U Thant with a *fait accompli*.

In its reply to the Note the Malayan Government explained that the ascertainment by U Thant as agreed in Manila was to enable Indonesia and

the Philippines to welcome the establishment of Malaysia. In so far as Malaya was concerned, she had no doubts and was already satisfied that the wishes of the people of Sarawak and North Borneo regarding Malaysia had been freely and fully expressed through various processes. Further and more important, it was only after U Thant had intimated that he could complete his task and make his conclusion known by September 14 that the Malayan Government decided on September 16 as Malaysia Day.

My Jakarta meeting with Subandrio on the morning of August 30 had become a non-event.

U Thant's conclusions were announced on September 14 and were overwhelmingly favourable to the Malaysia plan. The Michelmores Mission stated that Malaysia had been the issue in the elections in North Borneo and Sarawak and the elections were freely and impartially held.

On receiving the Report from the UN Malaysia Mission on September 14, I prepared a Note and invited the Indonesian Ambassador Djatikusumo to call at my office to receive it. It was a very short meeting which lasted about ten minutes. While handing the Note I informed the Ambassador that in compliance with the Manila Accord, the Malayan Government would then expect the Indonesian Government to welcome Malaysia now that the ascertainment exercise by the Secretary-General had been completed before the formation of Malaysia. Malaya had complied very strictly to the letter and spirit of the Manila Accord and Malaya expected Indonesia to do the same.

There was another matter on which I addressed with the Ambassador; it was not part of the Note. I informed the Ambassador that the Malayan Government was very apprehensive of the tense situation in Jakarta which might cause injury to life and property of the Malayan Embassy staff and other Malayan nationals. I requested the Indonesian Government that it should take adequate measures to ensure the safety of the Embassy and its staff. Indonesia would be held responsible for any untoward incident against Malayan citizens. Should such an occasion arise, it would be extremely difficult for the Malayan Government to control the temper of the Malayan people should they decide to take retaliatory measures against the Indonesian Embassy. I therefore expressed a very strong concern over this matter and requested the Ambassador to convey it to his Government. Djatikusumo replied that he would do his best to bring about a solution to these problems and he would convey to Jakarta the feelings of the Malayan Government on these matters. He was flying back to Jakarta the next day.

The next day was September 15 and Malaysia was to be proclaimed on September 16, 1963. Somehow I felt uncomfortable when he said he was returning to Jakarta in a way as if he was going for good. Indeed it was and that was the last time I talked with Lt. General Djatikusumo.

Subandrio on September 16 summoned the Malayan Ambassador and informed him that as from the date, he had no status in Indonesia. Likewise,

Manila informed the Malayan Ambassador that the Philippine Government had decided to defer action on the question of recognition of Malaysia. The Malayan Ambassador was further informed that meant Manila would have no diplomatic relations with Malaysia and that Abu Bakar, the Philippine Ambassador was being recalled. While claiming no relations with Malaysia, the Philippines Government decided only to reduce the Embassy to the level of a Consulate.

Clearly, both Indonesia and following closer to her heels, the Philippines were not serious about the role of the Secretary-General. They wanted the exercise so that it could be turned into a controversy with the United Nations taking cognizance of the matter. Little did they appreciate that the Secretary-General with his chief aide, Narasimhan, was trying to find a way out for them so that they could gracefully recognise the inevitable formation that was Malaysia.

PART FIVE

Finale



Indonesia and the Philippines were raising all sorts of issue regarding the observers, but regardless of the quibbles, the Michelmores teams steadfastly stuck to their tasks and carried out their work. The talk of the delay in the formation of Malaysia in deference to Jakarta and Manila was leaving a disquieting effect on the people of Malaya, Singapore and the two British Borneo territories. North Borneo declared its adherence to Malaysia on August 31, upsetting the Tunku for ignoring his plea. Datu Mustapha and Donald Stephens declared August 31, as Sabah Independence Day. Razak had to go to Jesselton to represent the Malayan Government. Datu Mustapha became the Head of State and Donald Stephens his Chief Minister. Singapore also showed her impatience that as of August 31, Lee Kuan Yew declared that External Affairs and Defence should be in the hands of Singapore. The Tunku was equally unhappy with Singapore's attitude although in both cases it was understandable.

When I met Lee Kuan Yew on the September 6 at Sri Temasik, he said it was extremely unfortunate that the Tunku had completely misunderstood the motives of his declaration that External Affairs and Defence were to be transferred by the British to Singapore. He said it was intended to strengthen the hands of the Tunku and his bargaining powers and also to satisfy those who felt disappointed that Malaysia could not come by the thirty-first of August. I said that the whole affair should have been thoroughly discussed with the people in Kuala Lumpur before any action was contemplated to avoid misunderstanding. I then asked him as to what his plans were on the twelfth of September since it had been reported that he would do something startling if Britain would not comply to his demands. He replied that Singapore would unilaterally declare her independence and Lee Kuan Yew's government would bring Singapore into Malaysia. On hearing his plan, I warned him against doing something which might again bring misunderstanding. Lee Kuan Yew said he would send Goh Keng Swee to Kuala Lumpur to explain matters.

Such were the difficulties which the Tunku and the Malayan Government had to face for the cooperation rendered to enable Indonesia and the Philippines to welcome Malaysia. However, all these were not appreciated by the two Governments that on the day that Malaysia was formed, they chose not to recognise her let alone welcome her. For the Malaysia Task Force, it was a matter of grave concern because it had not forgotten what Subandrio said in Manila at the Foreign Ministerial Meeting in answer to my question as

to the implication of non-recognition that non-recognition could not be peaceful. Non-recognition to Indonesia meant hostility. All the Malaysia Task Force could do was to warn all security agencies and allies of the possibility of physical action and not mere verbal confrontation.

Another serious consequence of the Malayan Government's decision to have the Malaysia Day postponed to September 16, 1963 was the steps taken by the Sarawak colonial government in August 1963. The elections for the State Legislative Assembly had been duly held and the results clearly indicated that the pro-Malaysia elements had carried the day.

Distribution of seats at all district levels except for SUPP were pro-Malaysia.

Alliance	138
SUPP	116
PANAS	59
Independents	429

It was unclear at that time as to the originator of the move but without the connivance of the colonial administration, it could not have taken place. I refer to the political development in Kuching when Stephen Kalong Ningkan was made the "Chief Minister" of Sarawak before Malaysia Day although until that time, there had been no provision for such an appointment. It would appear that the "Chief Minister" would be an understudy in the role of a colonial Chief Secretary and during the colonial period, the Governor held the ultimate executive powers. This was obviously an anomaly in the context of Malaysia and the idea had been resisted in the Cobbold Commission Report as Wong Pow Nee and I had submitted against the recommendations of the two British members. At the London conference on Malaysia, both the Tunku and MacMillan had rejected the British members' view. Instead, the Lansdowne Committee had recommended that the first Governor should be jointly nominated by Britain and Malaya and appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for a period of two years. From day one in Malaysia, the Governor would be the constitutional head while executive powers would be exercised by the Chief Minister. Thereafter the appointment of the Governor would follow the provision in the Constitution.

I reckoned the appointment of Stephen Kalong Ningkan as an understudy while the colonial Governor was still in office would have been an acceptable arrangement. However, the problem arose when Ningkan's government which would inherit the colonial government had made known its desire to recommend to the British government the appointment of Temenggong Jugah as the Governor on Malaysia Day. The British Government therefore had to seek the concurrence of the Malayan Government.

Sensing that there was going to be a problem with regard to the nomination of Jugah, the British Government sent Duncan Sandys to speak

to the Tunku. Sandys arrived in Kuala Lumpur on August 24, and soon met the Tunku. Following that, Jugah was to be nominated by the British Government as the Governor of Sarawak in Malaysia.

The Tunku after hearing the British proposal was livid with anger and immediately called an emergency Cabinet meeting. I was asked to be present. It was held at the dining hall of the Residency.

The Tunku explained to the Cabinet that the British had proposed the name of Jugah as the first Governor of Sarawak. This was done on the insistence of the so called "Ningkan Government". The Tunku said that Malaya could not recognise the "Ningkan Government" and if it had come from the British Government it must have been at the insistence of the colonial administration. Anyway the issue at hand was that there had been an understanding with Kalong Ningkan that if the first Chief Minister was an Iban, the Governor would be a Malay and vice versa. The first appointment was only for two years. The Tunku, apparently very angry, said that an interference by the colonial administration appointing Ningkan as "Chief Minister" at this stage when the Lansdowne committee made no such provision was anomalous. He concluded that Malaysia should be formed as scheduled on September 16, with Singapore and North Borneo. It would be difficult for Malaysia to survive when there was so much interference and breach of understanding. He would rather not have Sarawak in Malaysia. Then he went to town regarding Jugah whom he was very fond of but he said could not qualify to be a Governor. He would find it impossible to recommend the name of a person who could not read or write other than his own name. How would the governor read his annual address at the State Legislative Council? The situation would be ridiculous. One after the other ministers spoke and supported the Tunku on his decision of Sarawak to be left out of Malaysia.

However, Razak made a firm stand. He said he could not imagine a situation without Sarawak in Malaysia. He had Malaysia in his mind all the time with the problem of the nomination of Jugah and Ningkan easily resolved.

It was at that stage that I intervened, with the Tunku's permission. I requested the Tunku to give me a few hours – say three – to work out a solution. Sardon Zubir, a senior Cabinet member said that I had spent almost three years to get the Malaysia Concept accepted, how could I resolve a problem of such magnitude in two or three hours? Other ministers spoke against my offer to save Sarawak from being left out of Malaysia which must have been seen as efforts that could only end in futility. Razak looked glum and stared in my direction. I did not know whether he was looking at me or blankly staring in my direction. However, on seeing him and having heard what he said, I could not help thinking that here was a man who was truly committed to Malaysia and I could see that he would have walked out of the meeting if there was pressure on him. That emboldened me and made me more

determined to do something contrary to what the Tunku's flatterers and hangers-on were talking. Somehow I sensed that when the Tunku said that there would be no Sarawak in Malaysia it was not that final. He could not give up something that he had so much cherished but he was playing for effect. He wanted to be able to tell the British that there had to be another candidate who should be a Malay since he would have no objection to Kalong Ningkan being the Chief Minister. However, his Cabinet colleagues did not understand him and egged on with the idea of no Sarawak in Malaysia.

I was exasperated and so, it seemed, was Razak.

At last, the Tunku spoke. This time his anger had subsided. He was all sweetness again and said that "Grizzly", as he fondly called me, had offered to resolve the problem. Why not try him and he might succeed and we would have Sarawak in Malaysia. He asked Khaw Kai Boh to assist me. I was appalled because a third party particularly a minister who was a non-indigenous person would cramp my style. I could not comprehend a situation where a minister was tasked to assist a diplomatic officer. What if, in the course of the conversation, he objected to my line of thinking? What if he produced another agenda to solve the problem which would not coincide with mine? Many more questions crossed my mind but Malaysia was bigger than all these and I agreed to Khaw Kai Boh accompanying me. However, I asked the Tunku that the decision of the emergency Cabinet meeting should be treated as a non-event if I succeeded and there should be no record of any decision. The Tunku and the Cabinet agreed and the meeting was adjourned.

I rushed to the office of the Tunku and asked his personal secretary, Nik Hassan, to lend me his phone. I rang up the residence of the British High Commissioner where Duncan Sandys was. I managed to get Duncan Sandys easily and since I had known him for some time, we were on first name basis.

On the phone, I told Duncan Sandys that Malaysia was off. He barked back almost tearing my ear drums saying that I could not do that to him. I told him that I could since his side reneged on a major issue. Then he seemed to cool down and asked me if something could be done. I told him, if he would help, perhaps something could be done.

On that day the whole of the Sarawak Legislative Assembly members who were supportive of Malaysia were in Kuala Lumpur accompanied by some of the British colonial officials. They were all encamped in Merlin Hotel which was then one of the leading hotels in town. Colonial officials had requested that these assemblymen be in Kuala Lumpur to give support to Sandys, if necessary, regarding the Governor's nomination. It was to me too much of a colonial last stand in keeping with the Brooke slogan, enshrined at the gate of the Astana – Have Hope While There is Still Breath (*Berharap Selagi Bernafas*). The Iban community was being used. The only way to resolve the problem was to separate the expatriate colonial officials from the Iban members of the Assembly and to reason with them.

With that in mind, I told Sandys that if he was serious in seeking a solution he should call immediately all the expatriate colonial officials in Hotel Merlin to assemble at Carcosa and have morning coffee with him while I talk to the Ibans in the hotel. He readily agreed.

I noticed Datu Bandar Mustapha and Rahman Yaacob were standing outside the Tunku's office. They, on their own volition, had come to the Residency, perhaps sensing something serious was happening, to offer their assistance if required. I asked them if an alternative government could be formed. They were confident it could be done. I was not so sanguine. I looked at the list of pro-Malaysia members of the Assembly. There was no way a government could be formed without the support of Kalong Ningkan and SNAP. I had no occasion to speak to SNAP leaders who might be offered to fill the appointment of the Chief Minister instead of Kalong Ningkan and form a government on Malaysia Day. I kept on permutating the number of members on a piece of paper but it would not produce a government without SNAP. And if Ningkan was adamant, then the colonial expatriates would win the day with Sarawak outside Malaysia.

However, I kept the piece of paper in my pocket which contained the names of all Assemblymen but without any alternatives to Ningkan. Khaw Kai Boh, as instructed by the Tunku, was waiting for me and I requested him to ride with me and Rahman Yaacob to Merlin Hotel. As for Datu Bandar Mustapha, I requested him to stay away from the Merlin Hotel since he would have been a red rag to the pro-Brooke Malays and Ibans.

When we arrived at the Merlin, I asked Rahman Yaacob to take Kai Boh to lunch and I asked for the key of his room in case I needed to use it for a private meeting with someone. Before I left the Residency, I had informed Sandys that I would need to talk to the Iban Assemblymen in the Hotel and they were to congregate on one of the floors which had a large lounge facing the elevators. I cannot now recall which floor it was exactly.

As soon as I got there, I saw Ningkan, Jugah, all Iban Assemblymen including some Pengarah and Penghulu. They sat silently waiting for me. As I stepped out of the elevator, I was invited by Jugah to sit on one of the chairs apparently reserved for me. There was not a single expatriate colonial official; they all had left for Carcosa to meet with Duncan Sandys. I said I did not want to sit down since what I had to say would be very brief and the time for decision was short. We had done all our *runding* (discussions) since 1961 and all I wanted to know if Ningkan and my Iban brothers would reconsider the nomination of Apai Jugah as Governor of Sarawak.

I gave a short explanation of the role of a Constitutional Governor and that the power would really be in the hands of the Chief Minister. I reminded Kalong Ningkan of the first conversation I had with him in Kuching after which he decided to support the Malaysia plan. I told him that I would keep my side of the bargain by making sure that he would be made a Chief Minister

but he must keep his side by accepting a Malay for the first Governor whose term would be no more than two years.

Then I started my bluff. I produced the piece of paper from my pocket which contained names I had written as the alternative government which I could not be sure if it would gain the support of the Assembly. I said to them, addressing more to Ningkan, that I had the names of the people who would form the government of Sarawak on Malaysia Day but it was not Ningkan who would be the Chief Minister since he had reneged on his words to me and to the Tunku. However, his name could be reinstated if he would agree not to recommend Apai Jugah as Governor. For Jugah, there would be something for him but not the appointment as the first Governor. This was a statement I made at great risk even if I had known that the Tunku would not accept Jugah as Governor but I did not have the slightest clue as to the reward or alternative appointment for Jugah.

No one spoke. They looked at one another. I knew I was winning and the bluff was working. They did not know amongst them as to who was completely loyal to Ningkan. I then wanted them to speak to each other without interference. I told them that I would be going to Rahman Yaacob's room for fifteen minutes and then I would come out and return to the Residency to report to the Tunku. If they agreed to change their mind about the appointment of the first Governor then they should all come with me to the Residency to meet with the Tunku. I then went to Rahman's room on the same floor and sat down at the edge of the bed wondering if I had succeeded in what could be regarded as the most Machivellian ploy in the whole Malaysia exercise. I had been careful not to tell them that the Tunku did not want Sarawak in that mood or that the majority of Cabinet members did not want Sarawak in Malaysia in those circumstances. That would not be effective since I had realised that the Ibans wanted Malaysia. The only problem was one of the expatriate colonial officials who had exploited the Iban pride and nationalism by using Ningkan and Jugah.

When fifteen minutes time was up, I walked out of Abdul Rahman's room, full of anxiety and trepidation, but I was not about to reveal my demeanour other than self-confidence and courage, qualities which I knew the Iban highly respected.

When I reached the lounge they were all up, standing in silence looking sombre as if they were attending a funeral. I smiled nodding my head to Apai Jugah in respect and pressed for the elevator. As the elevator car arrived and the door opened I entered it and Apai Jugah and Kalong Ningkan stepped in followed by some others. A second car arrived and the rest filled that up and we went down. The delegation cars were there and we all drove up to the Residency.

I arrived first and rushed upstairs where the Tunku was to tell him of the good news. But I needed him to back up my words about Jugah. He said that would be taken care of but what about the Malay Governor. I said it would be

either Datu Bandar Mustapha or Abang Openg. The Tunku said Datu Bandar would be an excellent Governor. I said I agreed but the Ibans and many Malays would be unhappy and perhaps would put up a vigorous opposition, I would fall for Openg I said. The Tunku was silent and I left him to make up his mind.

Ningkan, Jugah and the rest of the Ibans had arrived and Nik Hassan had them seated. The Tunku came down. Apai Jugah came forward and shook the Tunku's hands; then he began to weep apologising for the trouble he and Kalong Ningkan had caused. He said he did not want the position of the Governor as he knew his own limitation but had been egged on by a very senior British official and Kalong Ningkan. He wanted peace for Sarawak and agreed that the first Governor should be a Malay if Ningkan was acceptable as the Chief Minister. Jugah was full of tears and seemed extremely remorseful. So were the others, including Ningkan and the senior Iban leaders.

I saw the Tunku also was in an emotional mood. His eyes were glassy and there was no smile on his face. Obviously, he was very touched. He thanked Apai Jugah and Ningkan and all the Iban leaders and appreciated their goodwill and wisdom. He would inform the British and would ask them for another nomination. As for Apai Jugah, the Tunku said that he as Prime Minister would want a lot of help; he could think of no better person than Jugah on whom he could depend. He said he would invite Jugah to serve in his Cabinet to be his advisor on Sarawak affairs. That would make Jugah a full minister who would be given political and parliamentary assistants.

There was a bursting of smiles all round and soon coffee and cakes were served. I left the room to ring up the Cabinet Secretary to consider the Cabinet meeting as a non-event so that the sad episode would not be recorded since so much ugly words were spoken. After that, I rang up Duncan Sandys and told him the good news. Once again almost bursting my ear drums, he shouted this time in joy with thanks to me whom he called a "bloody king-maker". I too was overwhelmed with emotion and forgot to tell him that the British still had to produce a name for the Governor and who Kuala Lumpur would favour. I reflected on that point later; I decided not to follow it up but hoped the Sarawakians themselves would come up with the right name, which they did.

What a near miss. Razak was elated and profusedly thanked me for the last effort. He confessed that at the Cabinet meeting that was not, he was at a loss and thought that Malaysia was not going to include Sarawak and perhaps Malaysia itself might not come into being. He could see Donald Stephens and Datu Mustapha taking their own course which would irritate the Tunku who would chuck everything up. Without North Borneo and Sarawak, a Singapore merger would not be on the card. With that prospect, Razak had thought of the future as gloomy.

As for me, anytime I thought of Jugah or Ningkan, flashes of the drama would come back to my memory and the kind of ghastly game I had to play. I must admit I was not in the least proud of my role but in the bigger interest of

the people of Malaysia and the security of Southeast Asia, I had learnt in time to live without shame, having adopted a way of solving a problem of life and face.

This as I recall is the story of the formation of Malaysia in matters I had personally been concerned with.

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